




The Africana World

From Fragmentation to Unity
and Renaissance

Edited by Mammo Muchie, Sanya Osha
and Matlotleng P Matlou

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The Africana World: From Fragmentation to Unity and Renaissance

**The Africana World:
From Fragmentation to Unity and Renaissance**

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The Africana World: From Fragmentation to Unity and Renaissance

Edited by Mammo Muchie, Sanya Osha and Matlotleng P Matlou

This book, dealing with important issues such as Africa's struggle for self-determination, freedom and liberation, and moving towards unity and renaissance, comes at a strategic time in the continent's development. It raises fundamental issues about African condition and ordeals. It links the struggle for independence through the experiences of, and challenges faced by, Africa's oldest liberation movement – the ANC. It should be interrogated and studied by all concerned about the future of Africa.

– Dr Essop Pahad, Founder and Editor, *The Thinker*

This book poses crucial questions and proposes fresh approaches to deal with the legacy of disunity in Africa. It is especially useful for African scholars, public intellectuals, activists and policy analysts who are still committed to and working towards the realisation of the 'vision of African unity'.

– Prof. Kwandi Kondlo, University of the Free State

From an academic point of view, African studies have two main problems: first, the prejudices of ethnocentric perceptions and, second, the fast changes of the continent on political, socio-economic and international dimensions. Even for the most skilled specialists it is difficult to understand the processes going on. Because of this, this book represents a very important tool for those concerned with African studies, inside and outside the continent. These authors identify different levels and tendencies, keeping an objective perspective about African developments towards integration.

– Prof. Paulo Visentini, Head of the Brazilian Centre for African Studies
(CEBRAFRICA)

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Preface

We are pleased to share the intellectual output from the first Scramble for Africa conference that was held from 25 to 27 May 2011. The conference theme was ‘Putting African Unity First to Overcome the Scramble for Africa: Africa in the Twenty-first Century after the Quasiquicentennial of the Scramble for Africa’. The papers selected after a peer review process have been grouped under the following themes:

- Postcolonial Nation Building Processes
- Governance, Democracy and Development
- The New Scramble for Africa: Brazil, Russia, India and China
- Indigenous Knowledge Systems
- Twenty-first Century pan-Africanism

The work has been edited by the organisers of the conference. The programme was initiated by the South African Research Chair Initiative (SARChI) at the Institute of Economic Research on Innovation (IERI) and the Tshwane University of Technology (TUT), together with the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA). These partners then mobilised support locally from the National Research Foundation (NRF), the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI), the Department of Science and Technology (DST), Ditsong Museums and the Centre for Black Arts and African Civilizations (CBAAC) of Nigeria to implement the project. This networking approach to the production of knowledge must form part of the culture to create dynamic processes of interactive learning and to diffuse knowledge as widely as possible in order to sustain, inspire and retain, alive and uninterrupted, the African liberation imagination.

It is with both pride and humility that we launch the book, *Africana World: From Fragmentation to Unity and Renaissance*, during the second Scramble for Africa conference and whilst the African Diaspora Summit is being hosted by South Africa from 23 to 25 May 2012. Each of our conferences will culminate in the production of a peer-reviewed publication to be launched in the next year. We intend to use the conferences and book series as foundations to commemorate an African education and liberation month every May, just as February and October are Black History Months across the diaspora.

One of the central outcomes of the first Scramble for Africa conference was the Tshwane Declaration. It is strongly recommended that Africa Liberation Day should continue to be celebrated with both intellectual and popular education

and other exhibitions in order to concentrate resources, energy and spirit to make Africans learn to engage with one another, network and build trust and spread African unity for full liberation.¹

We demand that all of us unite behind the cause. Just as May 25 every year has been recognised as Africa Liberation Day, the whole month of May should be dedicated by all the African states as Africa Unity for a full Liberation Month in order to spread pan-African education.²

For all of us, the cause is to demand that, ten years after the establishment of the African Union, and over 50 years since the independence of many African states, governments and the African Union (AU) dedicate, declare and enforce the whole of May across the African world as a month for the education of African unity for liberation and comprehensive and deep integration.³

Finally, Africans are varied, but they are not that diverse. They should celebrate their similarities whilst finding unity in their diversity and differences.

We trust that the books that appear in these series of annual African liberation month events will be used for education that brings Africans together and will reveal a shared unity and renaissance project to make sure that Africa's voice is heard with full recognition and no doubts.

Mammo Muchie

Sanya Osha

Matlotleng P Matlou

Notes and References

- 1 See the *Tshwane Declaration on African Liberation Day and the Africa in the 21st Century* and the *Quasquicentennial of the Scramble of Africa Conference*, 25–27 May 2011. Available at: <http://www.nesglobal.org/symp125/node/5> (accessed 7 May 2012).
- 2 See the *African Unity can make Africa's Free and Bright Future* cause led by Muchie, M. and Abayneh, B. Available at: <http://www.causes.com/causes/646713-african-unity-can-make-africas-free-and-bright-future> (accessed 7 May 2012).
- 3 See the *Yekatit for Unity Education Month: For the Adwa Victory of Yekatit 23, 1888* cause as led by Abayneh, B. Available at: <http://www.causes.com/causes/652641-yekatit-for-unity-education-month/about> (accessed 7 May 2012).

Acronyms

AACC	All African Conference of Churches
ABC	All Basotho Convention Party
ACJ	African Court of Justice
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
AEA	Association of Evangelicals of Africa
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AME	African Methodist Episcopal Church
AMEZ	African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church
AML	anti-monopoly law
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
BCP	Basutoland Congress Party
BNP	Basotho National Party
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CACF	China–Africa Cooperation Forum
CAEMC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CDS	Centre for Democratic Studies
CNIS	China National Innovation System
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CRDPA	Centre for Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo

DTA	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
EAC	East African Community
EBA	Everything but Arms
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ERD	European Report on Development
EU	European Union
FDI	foreign direct investment
FET	Further Education and Training
GCIS	Government Communication Information System
GDP	gross domestic product
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV/AIDS	human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome
HPI	Human Poverty Index
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICT	information and communications technology
IDP	integrated development plan
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LCD	Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LED	local economic development
LNDC	Lesotho National Development Corporation
LWP	Lesotho Workers Party
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MFA	Managed Funds Association

MFP	Marematlou Freedom Party
MGI	McKinsey Global Institute
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
NADECO	National Democratic Coalition
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCIR	National Council for Inter-governmental Relations
NDDB	Niger Delta Development Board
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NECON	National Electoral Commission of Nigeria
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	non-government organisation
NIE	newly industrialised economy
NRC	National Republican Convention
NUL	National University of Lesotho
NUDO	National Unity Democratic Organisation
OAIC	Organization of African Instituted Churches
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMPADEC	Oil-Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PPP	public-private partnership
PRC	People's Republic of China
PTA	preferential trade arrangement
PRI	public research institutes
R & D	research and development

REC	regional economic community
RSIS	Rivers State Internal Security Task Force
RoO	Rule of Origin
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	structural adjustment programme
SARPN	Southern African Regional Poverty Network
SASSA	South African Social Security Agency
SDP	Social Democratic Party
STI	science, technology and innovation
SWANU	South West Africa National Union
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
TIC	Transition Implementation Committee
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNIA	Universal Negro Improvement Association
UNICEF	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIVEN	University of Venda
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction: **African Unity: If Not Now, When?**

Mammo Muchie, Sanya Osha and Matlotleng P Matlou

Inspiration

‘Now is the accepted time, not tomorrow, not some more convenient season. It is today that our best work can be done and not some future day or future year. It is today that we fit ourselves for the greater usefulness of tomorrow. Today is the seed time, now is the hours of work, and tomorrow comes the harvest and the playtime.’

–W.E.B. du Bois

Introduction

The European scramble for Africa that originated from the 1884 Berlin Conference had a double consequence for Africa. The first is that Africans were divided by pulling those that should be together apart, and blending those that had distinct variations within one territorial enclosure. This very cynical action paradoxically ensured that the only way Africans could heal this divisive scheme was by rejecting it and asserting the primacy of their African identity over all other identities such as language, ethnic affiliation, colour, race and state boundary. As Davidson Nicol perceptively recognised, Africa is not a country, but a concept:

You are not a country, Africa;
You are a concept,
Fashioned in our minds, each to each,
To hide our separate fears,
To dream our separate dreams.¹

We, as Africans, can and should share a unity and renaissance project identity more than any other identity in the twenty-first century. The reason for this is that as Africans we have shared a common predicament that establishes our similarity above our differences. We have been enslaved, or were forced into it, by being divided to fall into this indignity. This came to all of us as Africans without any distinction. We have fallen into colonialism. We still suffer neocolonialism. In recent times we are threatened with possible re-colonisation, driven mainly by those powers who were involved in tearing Africa apart in the first place and for which they still show neither contrition nor apology. What we need is the collective capacity to turn this negative into a positive by coming together and manifesting

a unity and renaissance agency over the current division. For Africa, it is a necessity that we learn to unite and deal with the challenges that come to unsettle our collective spirit and imagination by treating with contempt the assumption that it is easy to divide Africans, if such things as preferential and discriminatory aid is given to them, while at the same time imposing sanctions against others that do not toe the donors' desired line. If the donors give, the prisoner dilemma in Africa increases; if the donors do not give, still Africa appears to be a loser. Whether donors give or not, Africa seems to be losing as a recipient. Increasing competition that deepens fragmentation and discourages collaborative integration, unity, liberation and renaissance is no option. This challenge of remaining in a fragmented state has to be confronted systematically and thoughtfully. The fact that Africa lacks a shared and robust unity and renaissance project identity has been its undoing to date. This has to change by reversing the disunity road into a unity direction that has not yet been traversed.

Constructing Unity with a Shared, African-anchored Project Identity

The works we have put together here for the start of a new approach to the awareness of why Africans must learn to act with shared values in responding to challenges that affect all Africans, regardless of who may be the specific target at any particular time. The lack of a unity project identity was manifestly exposed when the former colonial powers, such as France and Britain, with the backing of the United States of America (US), used the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to invade Libya on the pretext of preventing Libya from becoming yet another 'failed state', and therefore undertaking the 'right to protect through humanitarian intervention'. The fact that the African Union (AU) was ignored is partly evidence of the combination of arrogance and benevolence it receives from outsiders and partly due to the division inside the AU, with member states that behave more like member states of the United Nations (UN) than the federated states of the US, or even the non-federated form prevalent in the construction of the European Union (EU). Other voices, from powers far away from Africa, were heard. The world hardly heard or cared to hear what the African voices had to say on the still unfolding Libyan saga. African statesmen who consistently spoke in opposition to the NATO invasion were leaders who espouse pan-African ideals, such as former SWAPO leader, Sam Nujoma, and the leading proponent of the African renaissance, former president Thabo Mbeki. Only a few who are still in power stood against the principle that former colonial powers can return and deal with conflicts that Africans themselves should have addressed.

The fact that the AU and the African voice can be ignored continues the humiliation that Africa has suffered in history. That this humiliation continues is a

stark reminder that Africans cannot go on happily in their separate ways. They must travel together on the freedom highway or they will continue to be ignored or even go unnoticed, no matter what each on its own is able to do, or is allowed to do.

In the Libyan episode, the voice of the AU was nowhere to be heard. We were treated to the media spectacle which showed to the world the brutal and shameful disposal of the slashed and burned body of the then Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi, while the US foreign minister triumphantly and gleefully saluted this sordid episode. There was no voice to be heard from Africa regarding this episode, which contravened Section IX of the Lieber code prohibiting the assassination of war prisoners, which Gaddafi turned out to be, when he flew the white flag of surrender:

The law of war does not allow proclaiming an individual belonging to the hostile army an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any captor, any more than the modern law of peace, allows such international outlawry, on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. The sternest retaliation should follow the murder committed in consequence of such proclamation, made by whatever authority.²

African states had different policies on the Libya situation, from the start of the conflict to the demise of the Gaddafi regime. They were disunited when the episode in Benghazi exploded. They were disunited when NATO intervened. They remained disunited when the Gaddafi regime was overthrown and Gaddafi was brutally murdered. Some voted for the UN Security Resolution authorising a ‘no fly zone’ over Libya. It is still not clear what lessons African states have drawn from this episode and whether being totally ignored and marginalised worries them or whether they do not care at all whatever happens to any one of them. There is no united African voice demanding that justice is done. The problem of the Libya crisis is that it does not stop in Libya. It has the potential to go beyond to wider Africa. We see now that the situation in Libya is not only chaotic, but that, at present, potentially dangerous spillover effects to North Africa are also taking place. Currently, Mali is in crisis, suffering both a coup and armed insurrection. This danger may expand to other regions in North Africa, creating reasons for deeper intervention by external actors and complicating the challenges on the road for Africa to become finally free, united and strong.

The fact the AU did not have a clear and united policy in Libya has a lot to do with the current danger that the region is facing. To begin with, some members of the AU advocated regime change in Libya. However, a number, however small that number may have been, of the African states rejected regime change and opposed the NATO invasion of Libya. When member states have these differing positions, what emerges clearly is that there is no African unity to speak of. There is none of

the power that comes from the AU having shared values, a shared vision, a shared purpose to deal with and respond to challenges that confront one of the member states and that, in fact, can affect all others in the AU. What it means is that because African states were disunited on the Libya issue, none of them were taken seriously and Africa's collective voice was ignored. Whether the member states had decided on regime change, no regime change or dialogue regarding Libya, the fact that they remained divided meant that they disregarded the real priority issue: the capability to develop, maintain and sustain inter-African strategic alliance in order to manifest a robust and united African agency, the expression of united African power that others can only ignore at their own peril. So the key was the expression of the much-needed African political capacity to counter any other projection of power that affects the destiny of Africa from those outside Africa. It is others, in this particular instance the invading NATO powers, that used African states to both undertake the invasion and demonstrate that Africans' collective voice is too fragile and weak to make any difference. What clearly came out and what Africans must pay close attention to is this: Why did Africans fail to act together? What came through forcefully is African division, echoing very much a repetition of the historic dilemma Africa finds itself in. Africa continues to be marginalised in international affairs instead of commanding a position that others will recognise for fear of dire consequences should they ignore or sidestep Africa's voice and common position. For as long as African states remain disunited, others will continue to penetrate Africa and ignore Africa's voice in international relations.

Oddly enough, one of the main reasons why Africa's dignity, since the fifteenth century, continues to be violated and abused is that the penetration of Africa is not challenged by the unified presence of an African-determined strategic response. If any foreign intrusion is unchallenged by a unified African approach, those that mean ill to Africa can succeed in imposing solutions to her problems that may or may not work. Far from this phenomenon disappearing, the disunity seems to continue despite the recognition by all that unity is important and that disunity brings unexpected hazards and further problems. The disunity of Africans has contributed to Africans falling victim to slavery, to being stolen from Africa and taken to the Americas. This division continued throughout the scramble for Africa. It continued under colonialism. It still continues under neocolonialism. Now there is the real threat of being re-colonised, with the danger that states may be left severely divided, as in the current tragedies of Somalia and Libya. The question is which state will be the next target? Will African states again be divided in the face of another unwelcome incident? Continued failure to manifest a united response to things that happen in Africa will cost Africa dearly. There is thus a compelling reason to hasten the sustainable building of the African robust unity and renaissance

project identity in order for Africa to emerge with pride and dignity to deal with problems that matter most to Africans before and above anyone else.

Ending over 500 Years of Humiliation

In 2013 it will be 50 years since the OAU, now the AU, was formed.³ The challenge is how to build an Africa that will be free from abuse by achieving the goal of uniting Africa for the promotion of the welfare of the people of Africa as a whole, not in part as a class or ethnic group. To prevent more resources from flowing out rather than coming in, unity is essential. The acute governance crisis and leadership deficit must be resolved and fully corrected. Africa cannot afford to continue to remain divided in dealing with and responding to challenges from outside. There is no alternative but to unite when issues that come to one African state also end up affecting the whole of Africa, such as in the Libyan case. The lack of a united response leads to negative re-penetration. Thus, building a shared understanding, values, purpose, policy and strategy with a decolonised imagination, knowledge, intelligence, innovation, competence, learning and identity is critical to creating a free and a non-humiliating African future.

The first African unity for liberation international symposium focused on a critical review of the scramble for Africa that took place 127 years ago. The reason for looking back on history is not to re-narrate it for its own sake, but rather to find lessons so that the consequences of that old scramble for Africa do not continue through the re-launching of a re-colonisation project by the old colonial powers and/or a new competition between new rising powers that may be focused on an Africa that is still vulnerable, being populated currently largely by weak and fragmented soft or failed states.

Today, a multiplicity of ethnicities and communities of varying degrees of diversity, differences in size, language, identity and culture exists, having all shared a history that humiliated them all irrespective of their specific identities. In 1884, a number of European powers met in Berlin. By its adoption, the General Act of the Berlin Conference of 1884 segregated all the peoples of Africa (except Ethiopia and Liberia to a large extent), divided them and established the various mechanisms for their subjugation and exploitation. The scramble of Africa that this act unleashed resulted in the colonisation of Africa and would later see 54 postcolonial states emerge from the mid-twentieth century until very recent times. In 2010, more than one-third of the existing states celebrated their golden jubilee anniversaries.

Arguably, the legacies from the Berlin Conference are still evident. The post-colonial states inherited the colonial strategy of divide and rule. Currently, Africa continues to endure the divisiveness of arbitrary territoriality and ill-matched ethnic groups as a result of the violent colonial polices and interventions. The

states that emerged did not transcend this dilemma. In 2010, Cameroon, Togo, Madagascar, DR Congo, Somalia, Benin, Niger, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Senegal, Mali, Nigeria and Mauritania celebrated their golden jubilee anniversaries. For example, in 1884, Cameroon was colonised by Germany. After the Second World War, 80 per cent of Cameroon fell under France and 20 per cent under the British. The French part became independent in 1960; and the British part in 1961. Cameroon became a United Republic in 1972 and one republic in 1984. Neither Cameroon and nor all the others are yet free of the burden inherited from the initial European scramble for Africa. Fifty years after they formally became politically independent, virtually none of these countries has overcome the colonial albatross.

As a consequence of the divide-and-rule formula stemming from the scramble for Africa, many states have suffered civil wars, conflicts, military rule and limited economic development. In addition, Africa is still constantly vulnerable to the machinations of external forces. However, there have been some commendable performers, thriving democracies, good governments and impressive economic developers. Until the global recession starting in 2008, most of the continent grew at about six per cent annually, many were on track to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), most countries were democracies and a growing number subscribed to the African Peer Review Mechanism. We have now eight states classified as roaring lions. Those that condemned Africa as hopeless are eating back their words. Hope and possibility are becoming defining attributes in Africa.

The Scramble for Africa, Berlin 1885

The borders drawn by the European powers almost 120 years ago remain artificial and many states have not transformed into nations, hanging together precariously as they are persistently threatened by internecine conflict and full-scale wars. The key prize for the European scramble for Africa was the Congo Basin. The tussle amongst the Portuguese, the French and King Leopold of Belgium was based on who took control of the Congo River, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Congo-Brazzaville. Not unexpectedly, at the time, the Germans used the title, 'Kongo Conference' instead of what is popularly known today as the Berlin Conference. Frantz Fanon points out that 'Africa is like a revolver, the Congo Basin is the trigger. Whoever controls the Congo controls Africa'. Unfortunately, the scramble for the control of the Congo continues unabated. From the outset, Congo's independence was problematic. The first leader, Patrice Lumumba, was murdered by imperial powers solely interested in the enormous wealth of the country. While foreign forces and actors plunder the resources of the DRC, its

natural inhabitants are left to suffer the deprivations of war. The rich minerals and resources of the Congo are a curse on the people, but a blessing to those who exploit the resources and are involved in the endless conflict.

Perhaps no other event exemplifies the playing out of the tragic drama of the scramble for Africa than Sudan's independence in 1956. The moment of celebration was also the commencement of the rebellion against the geographical reality named Sudan, which was created by the British. While the Arabised North Sudan was celebrating freedom from Anglo-Egyptian control, the wishes of the people in South Sudan for a federation went unanswered. Consequently, an armed struggle started shortly after independence which went on for more than three decades, until somewhat resolved by a referendum in 2011 that allowed South Sudan to become a separate state. The conflict in Sudan has not yet fully ended.

Although Sudan became independent before Ghana, African decolonisation has been recognised to have begun with Ghana's hoisting of its national flag and the lowering of the Union Jack on 6 March 1957. Kwame Nkrumah, the Ghanaian leader, understood that the more important challenge – apart from Ghana's independence – was to overcome the legacy of the scramble for Africa by uniting all of Africa. The end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 heralded the end of the independence struggles (apart from the Spanish Sahara), but the desire for a united Africa still remains a dream.

Africa is not without historical achievements in resisting the continuation of the scramble for Africa today. Two distinct successful examples of resistance have been achieved: by Haiti, from the African world outside the continent, and by Ethiopia, within Africa. In different ways, both held the African resistance and liberation imagination for a long time. Interestingly, Haiti became the first black independent republic in 1791. Napoleon's 60 000 armed forces could not stand up to the power of Toussaint L'Ouverture and his gallant comrades. Unfortunately, Haiti's independence took the form of a neocolonial settlement, where France demanded indemnity to the tune of 22 billion dollars, a debt that Haiti kept paying until recently, thereby making it the most impoverished state in the African diaspora. It has taken nearly 109 years to pay off this indemnity, turning Haiti from a rich sugar cane producer into an impoverished and vulnerable state.

Ethiopia is the other inspiring country that held the independence imagination for over 500 years. Ethiopia was a kingdom, not a republic like Haiti, but it remained un-enslaved, un-degraded and un-colonised, fighting the powers that sought to subvert its independence. In recognition of the country's resolve and determination, the Ethiopian flag has served as the flag of independence for 15 African states and the OAU, and now the AU. Echoing Nkrumah, in 1963 Emperor Haile Selassie said, 'Our liberty is meaningless unless all Africans are

free'. Nevertheless, like Haiti, Ethiopia remains an exhausted African nation and has had to pay the price for its resistance to imperialism and colonialism. In 1991, Ethiopia became split into vernacular and ethnic enclaves and Eritrea also split from Ethiopia. Africa can draw positive lessons from Ethiopia's history of independence. It can also draw lessons from what has happened to Ethiopia since 1991.

Failure to defend Ethiopia's resistance history is also a failure to live up to the worthy expectations of all those who derive so much spiritual energy from the idea of Ethiopia as a free provider to the African world of the 'resistance-liberation logocentric imagination' that is still much needed as a tangible resource in vulnerable and penetrable Africa. Ethiopia is synonymous with the very idea of a de-colonising imagination. Its history of successful resistance is the timeless bearer of this alternative de-colonising logo for the spread of the African world's liberation imagination. Ethiopia – as an anti-colonial symbol – is very relevant today, as it was in the past and will be too in the future. The significance of Ethiopia's history now, at a time when Africa is being re-threatened with war and re-colonialism, needs to be appreciated. Its importance during this time when the former colonial powers are returning to Africa with military aggression cannot be lost to both those willing to resist the new aggression and those who commit this latest aggression. At the core of pan-Africanism (Africawinet) is this resistance that Ethiopians continued to manifest through history, regardless of how mighty the imperial aggressor or the colonialist happened to be. A distinguished Harvard professor, Raymond Jonas, has written about the Adwa Victory of 1896 as a definitive African victory that inspired resistance from South Africa to the new world by Ethiopia by symbolising a successful stand against the World Empire.⁴ To remember that history is to give agency to Africa by recognising what a part of it did in leaving a historical legacy of dignity in the resistance against repeated humiliation, which Africa remains confronted with, and which seems to see no end, to this day.

It is 100 years since the African National Congress (ANC) was established as the first liberation movement in Africa. The founding president of the ANC, John Langalibalele Dube, was also a pastor of the Ethiopian Church of South Africa. He established Ohlange Institute in Natal, which has Ethiopianism as pan-Africanism as its principles for building a New Africa that is humane, spiritual and prosperous.⁵ The ANC has both spiritual and pan-African roots linked to the anti-colonial and patriotic liberation imagination achieved by the long resistance in Ethiopia. There is, thus, a South Africa in Ethiopia, and an Ethiopia in South Africa. Similarly, there is a Nigeria in South Africa and a South Africa in Nigeria and this principle can be all inclusive and include Africa as a whole and the Africana world. The principle of ubuntu exists in all of Africa; what remains is the practice, translation or doing it.

This positive learning from each other that took place between Ethiopia and South Africa, for example, has been shared by the entire African world from the continent to the Americas. This positive history is founded on successful resistance which can reinforce the pre-slavery contribution to African civilisation, religion, language, science, engineering and architecture. The positive data from pre-slavery and post-slavery resistance along with the negative data of enslavement can serve positively to propel the African unity and renaissance today. The positive data constituting this history can serve also as a core driver for ending Africa's repeated humiliation. This is because African unity can be anchored with a value and dignity that the pre-slavery and post-slavery resistance achievement, the anti-slavery, anti-colonial struggles – pan-African struggles – mounted in the continent and the wider African world. The Haitian and Ethiopian resistances together registered to end all forms of humiliation confronting Africa over 500 years. All the resistances and the recorded achievements, for example by the Ethiopian-Africans that resisted all forms of humiliation, provide positive data for building Africa's united future and for bringing the African unity agenda to the forefront in today's world. It is for these reasons that we respect our African ancestors, whatever their shortcomings, and whatever problems they were unable to solve in their lifetimes and left behind for future generations to settle. They left timeless, inspiring resources to build Africa's united future. This inheritance remains to this day a relevant asset for building the much-needed decolonising imagination, to remove what Bob Marley characterised as 'mental slavery', which remained to confuse Africans after economic and political slavery had been abolished.

It appears that other Africans, both in the continent and outside, appreciate the value of the resistance history from the Ethiopian part of Africa, that current Ethiopian-African citizens now and in the future must always value and treasure, as well as the great historical achievement of their ancestors. Ethiopians, as Africans and not as degraded *ethnie*, must unite and strive to make ethnicism something of the past, by coming together with foresight and a sense of history. They should do it to restore the historical imagination that will make a difference to the African world as a whole, by forging the African unity and renaissance project identity now and not in the future.

On 1 October 2010, the most populous state in Africa, Nigeria, celebrated its golden jubilee anniversary. Approximately one in five Africans is a Nigerian, so Nigeria can be used as a template to judge the performance, capabilities and potentials of the entire continent. Nigeria is also important not only because it has one of the most powerful economies in the continent, but also because it has the largest market. Is Nigeria out of the woods, or is there a scenario of chaos within that will affect the entire continent if the country is unable to overcome

the legacy inherited 125 years ago? Unfortunately, Nigeria has not been able to achieve a significant proportion of its vast potential. It has had an unfortunate history of military dictatorships and serious civil unrests (including a civil war), as have many other African countries. The benefits of its enormous natural resources – particularly petroleum and gas – have often not been employed for the development of the country, but have instead been siphoned off into foreign bank accounts by unscrupulous politicians and public servants. There has been a depletion of its public services in areas such as health, power generation, education and social welfare and development. All these drawbacks have combined to make Nigeria the so-called ‘sleeping giant’ of the continent.

The most powerful achievement of the end of the twentieth century for Africa was the welcoming of South Africa into the common African home.⁶ In 1994, South Africa became free from racial domination. Its rebirth combined its liberation with the lofty ambition for an African renaissance and an African century. South Africa is a potential leader in Africa, given the size of its economy relative to other African states, and the access it has to many international policy forums, which other African states lack. It is not clear how other African states see South Africa, as it is still not clear to what extent Africa is a priority in South Africa’s foreign policy. Some countries see South Africa as a source of foreign investment and development strategies and as a fighter for African causes, whilst others resent the glory this so-called latecomer is enjoying, and see the country as a potential neocoloniser, questioning its commitment to Africanness. The expression of commitment to the African renaissance ‘by Thabo Mbeki, has revealed a broad intention and willingness to create public awareness in South Africa to shoulder a wider African role’.⁷

The issue of whether South Africa can give Africa leadership by prioritising Africa over states like Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICS) and other states outside Africa, remains an open question. As South Africa tries to go along with BRICS, paradoxically it may have lost ground to China, India, Brazil and others in parts of Africa where it (South Africa) is yet to make enduring collaborations.

In Search of a United African Voice

As the various regions of the world – Europe, Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe – line up behind major powers on global issues, it is also necessary to reflect upon which voice or regional leader should speak for Africa. The theory of hegemonic stability suggests that there are powerful countries that assume leadership by providing public goods such as security. Africa has a number of pivotal states that can work together to facilitate unity amongst the African governments by providing some resources to undertake this task systematically. South Africa

helping with the African Parliament and Libya helping with the transition from OAU to AU are a couple of examples. But these could be systematised and from each region there could be a few states that could be selected to provide leadership in building African unity systematically, provided they are prepared to work together and pool their resources and their strength to give much needed leadership in presenting a united position within the AU, and encouraging each member to align its position with the AU's position.

It is clear that the US leads the rest of the West and acts as its leading voice. Britain has always accepted US leadership as a matter of national policy. They call it a special relationship. In Latin America, Brazil and Argentina are jockeying to be the leading voices of the region but, increasingly, Brazil is establishing itself as the leading voice. China is contending with Japan for leadership in Asia. But can the same trend be said to be taking place in Africa? The picture is far from clear. The major states of Africa – South Africa, Egypt, Ghana, Ethiopia, Libya, Senegal, Kenya and Nigeria – do need to be clear about their roles in order to articulate a unifying vision that speaks for the entire continent, so that when Africans participate in global forums there is unity of voice and action.

In this first Africa Liberation Day international symposium, participants have provided engaging analyses of the question of African leadership in Africa. They have addressed, in various ways, how Africans might deal with the world with united action and with one voice, thus responding to the world in a way that forestalls any potential for the division, manipulation and seduction by external aid that undermines Africa's overall interests in today's international affairs, which are characterised by organised hypocrisy. They have raised the huge cost Africans will continue to incur if they fail to create within the AU, shared values and a system to generate a united policy, strategy, voice and action. The cost will become increasingly unbearable if Africans are not willing, or ready, to be led by other Africans and instead succumb once again to the manipulation of the former colonial powers or the new emerging powers. This is an important matter, related to whether Africa lives under the shadow of the old and new scrambles for Africa, by being prepared and ready to close this ugly chapter of its history. Who in Africa would speak for Africa remains an open question. Can the AU be reorganised to provide the voice to lead Africa, or can the pivotal states be organised to provide stability and security as Africa's much needed public good?

The Double Moment and its Impact on Africa's Future

So more than 125 years after the Berlin Conference, and 50 years after more than a third of Africa attained independence, the past lives on in the present, threatening Africa's future. We believe it is important to take this double moment of an

infamous European Scramble for Africa and the jubilee celebrations of more than a third of Africa to pause and reflect on these questions: Which way is Africa going? Is there a link between the 125 years that have passed since the Berlin Conference ‘moment’ of 1884–1885 and the 50 years that have passed since the 1960 ‘moment’ of freedom from colonial rule? If so, what is this link? Is it positive or negative? If negative, how shall Africa overcome this?

How does Africa’s past speak to its present? How does the interaction of the past with the present shape and frame the future? There is a need to look back in order to understand today and what one wants to see in the future.

The overriding concern is that, although there is a recognition that some African economies are growing and although the *Economist*, which described Africa as hopeless seven years ago has now decided to stress in an editorial that Africa has become a hopeful continent (*Economist*, 3 December 2011), the African economy is still largely agrarian and rural, and growth is not linked primarily to the transformation dynamics of the rural economy. Much of Africa’s exports remain mineral and agricultural primary commodities. What this means is that within the international division of labour, where Africa is today has not enabled the African economy to emerge as a manufacturing and industrial economy.

The Key Questions in Africa

The following questions together bring out the stark fact that Africa has not completely removed the threats to its independence and wellbeing from various external and internal forces, both new and inherited from history. Africa needs to address these challenges systematically, in the only way they can be dealt with, that is, by pulling together an African unity agenda for total liberation.

- The old scramble for Africa: is it over or does it still continue in different guises with different actors and players?
- The postcolonial states: are they robust or fragile? How can they overcome the arbitrary carving up and splitting of ethnicities and vernacular communities? Is it by disintegrating into vernacular and ethnic states or by integrating in a united resistance, independence and liberation imagination as Africans? Which identity should take priority – the African, the sub-ethnic or the vernacular?
- There is talk of the new scramble for Africa and in fact research is being undertaken on how and why rising powers such as China and India are re-carving up Africa, at least by searching to exploit Africa’s rich resources. How credible is this assertion?
- Are the old European powers and the US continuing in concerted efforts to control Africa’s natural resources?

- How will Africans navigate from a past that lives on in the present, threatening Africa's future to forge a twenty-first African Century? Can Africa claim the twenty-first century? Are Africans ready to be led by fellow Africans to construct Africa's capacity to deal with a world eyeing its resources, and respond without sacrificing Africa's values and interests? Who in Africa should lead Africa by displaying the ability to command legitimacy from all?
- There are a number of processes for integration – the AU, the Regional Economic Communities, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and the pan-African Congresses – in different ways they all keep alive the pan-African imagination. Do they all share an African unity project identity rather than going along paths that mutually deflect one another from pursuing goals that will make Africa fully free and independent?

What makes the threats of re-scrambling for Africa real is that the unity of Africans remains at a very low level. That is to say, whether the scramble for Africa lives on or not, to this day, in substantive terms, African engagement with other Africans is mostly secondary to their respective engagement with others outside Africa. There is more disengagement with one another than the much needed engagement that should be driving African unity history for total liberation forward.

There is a need to acknowledge all the positive data to counter, effectively, either the continuation of the old or the new scramble for Africa. Africa must claim the twenty-first century as the African century. The lessons of the past, the challenges of the present, and the opportunities and possibilities of the future must be combined to achieve African unity now. This is the real challenge confronting Africa today: it is still 'unite or perish' time, very much as Kwame Nkrumah diagnosed the challenge starkly and simply in 1963.

All the positive energies from within Africa must be integrated to make Africa achieve agency for navigating the contours of a difficult world. As Africa has had the rawest deal in human history, all efforts must be made to make sure all of Africa, a united Africa, gets a fair, just and new deal.

The opportunities to expand the widest possible education for unity must be made. Understanding how the old scramble for Africa was consummated can be useful for drawing lessons in preventing the coming of any new scramble for Africa. A pan-African education curriculum is waiting to be designed; a curriculum that can serve all, from primary to tertiary education, by including programmes for learning about the scramble for Africa, the threat of the new scramble for the resources and peoples of the continent, the opportunities for making Africa's time this twenty-first century; a curriculum based in the value of all the positive data that can be gleaned from the histories in the African world (we must not ignore the negative episodes, but learn from them). Such concerted actions and

education using technologies and various teaching methods must be spread across the African world to reach the African street. The point of this education is to empower all Africans to own their power to make the elite, who have not pushed unity at a faster rate, listen to them. The top-down process of unity has been too slow. The bottom-up pressure has to be added. With both active and in constant communication, progress for African unity will no doubt accelerate.

There are three major outcomes of the first Africa Liberation Day international symposium held from 25 to 27 May 2011. The first is the Tshwane Declaration for African Liberation and Unity that was unanimously endorsed by the participants.⁸ The second is the decision to continue this education for African unity by organising the African Liberation and Unity International Symposium every May.⁹ The third is that a large number of scientific chapters were presented, out of which we selected the 16 chapters for this edited book. The chapters have been selected after going through a review process and they vary in the issues they address separately. What is common is that they address the problems in the context of the challenges Africa is going through in the contemporary world. We shall now introduce a brief summary of each chapter.

Brief Summary of the Contributions

The chapter by John M. Mudau and Joseph Francis is about the protocols adhered to during a community engagement that took place in Vhembe district of Limpopo province in South Africa, and reflects on what was learnt from it. The engagement sought to strengthen the implementation of the nine pillars of the South African antipoverty strategy through public participation in defining poverty and vulnerability. The pillars of the strategy are the creation of economic opportunities; investment in human capital; income security (through the provision of social grants, basic services and other non-financial transfers such as a social wage); improving healthcare; improving access to assets, in particular housing, land and capital; social inclusion and social capital initiatives; environmental sustainability; and good governance.

The study clearly reveals that the marginalised understand best how they can be assisted, what roles they must play, and the nature of systems to introduce in order for sustainable development to be achieved. The conclusion from the authors is that for Africa to develop independently, grassroots communities must take ownership in self-emancipation and in defining poverty and wellbeing.

Tapera O. Chirawu addresses the problems of corruption in chapter 2. He starts by quoting Parenti's statement that in a world where 'power is derived from the loyalty of others and wealth from the labour of others; where many citizens' failure is other people's success; and where noble intentions and ignoble effects

exist in equal abundance, the power of a man is his present means to obtain some future good'.¹⁰ The author argues that corruption is morally offensive, but that those who dabble in rent-seeking behaviour nonetheless see this immoral process as a means to ensure direct and indirect benefits. The author argues that both politically and economically, corruption undermines national development, particularly in Africa. He claims that outsiders such as Europeans, Americans, Chinese and many other nationalities may directly or indirectly fuel it and considers that Africa has become the main arena or theatre for corruption to play out. The author maintains that stopping this in Africa presents a real challenge.

In the following chapter, Sanya Osha discusses the issue of Nigerian militarism and its effect on various facets of Nigerian socio-political life. He argues that militarism is a processual mode of governance that extends well after the end of military rule. In other words, democratic dispensations that emerge in the wake of military rule also contain seeds of militarism. The author explores the implications of this view by tracing the constitutional status of the Nigerian military and the mode of politics. In doing so, he examines the question of militarism and pro-democracy struggles, the militarisation of Ogoniland during the height of the social struggle and, finally, the connections between the post-military dispensation and actual militarism. This examination yields rich insights into the effects of militarism on broad aspects of Nigerian political culture.

Maurice O. Dassah discusses the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 that initiated the scramble for Africa and imposed colonialism on Africa. The problem in Africa is that the colonial legacy lives on. The author claims that although African leaders cannot be absolved from blame in the fragility crisis, the footprint of colonialism is unmistakable, but is seldom accorded unequivocal primacy. The author draws four insights: first, institutions are the key determinants of fragility. Most post-colonial sub-Saharan African states experienced extractive colonialism with indirect rule, which did not favour the development of strong institutional structures and property rights, because the environment was not favourable for colonisers to establish permanent settlements. Second, four key characteristics of the formation of colonial state institutions, namely, artificiality, exploitation, extraversion and weak governance, are related to features of state fragility. Third, colonially imposed institutional features did not change following decolonisation. Finally, the persistence of weak institutions in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa is aided by a number of factors. The author concludes that current dysfunctional institutions suggest that African states were thus stillborn at independence and that the path-dependence of institutions explains current institutional quality, thereby establishing the colonialism–fragility nexus. The author suggests measures to re-establish resilience: to include 'responsive'

state-building, approaching development by relying more on Africa's centuries-old political, economic and cultural resources; paying attention to promoting socially cohesive national and local societies and institutions; building legitimacy alongside state capacity; and reforming, rather than re-building, dysfunctional colonially inherited institutions.

Samuel A. Nyanchoga looks at the driving force behind China's new links with Africa. He argues that ideological concern may not necessarily be the motivation for its keen interest in Africa. China's growing population and the demand for raw materials to feed her domestic industries may provide a more logical explanation. While this may be true, Africa is entangled in a new web of colonialism in which her lucrative resource base is extracted to satisfy external economic interests. External financial assistance given by China may not spur qualitative economic growth and development in the continent. China seems to target resource-rich countries that are politically unstable or whose governance track record has been the subject of concern in the West. The increasing presence of China in Africa is viewed by many as a self-interested, mercantilist mission that threatens a new sort of colonialism with China indirectly in control, in league with African autocrats. This has generated debate between the West and China as to whether China in Africa is bad for development and democracy. The West, particularly the US, is accusatory about China's activities in Africa, while China takes a defensive position, accusing the West of consigning African countries to perpetual poverty and underdevelopment, an undemocratic economic order, bio-piracy and scientific imperialism, among other evils. The debate between China and Western capitalist countries reveals interesting scenarios of political and ideological divides in the struggles between neo-liberal approaches to development and the socially orientated approaches promoted by China. It also reveals a new phase in the European and Asian scramble for Africa's strategic resources. This chapter demonstrates some of the implications of China's links with selected African countries by providing a sectoral analysis of Chinese investment activities. The chapter also highlights the level of democratisation in those countries where China has massive investment, and debates whether there is colouration between Chinese investment and low levels of democratisation and development in some of the selected African countries. The chapter finally gives some recommendations for the way forward, noting that for Africa to develop it is necessary to synergise local and external factors.

Ebrahim Fakir and Chris Landsberg acknowledge the brutal consequences of the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference and seek to contribute answers to the vexing question of what arrangements are necessary to put in place an appropriate socio-economic and development architecture that will help Africa overcome a

century of colonial domination, settler colonialism and white minority domination. The authors trace the history of the development of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and its role in attempting answers to this question. Specifically, the chapter interrogates the legacy of NEPAD as a socio-economic development, and neo-pan-Africanist, plan of renewal and renaissance for the continent, and discusses what its future role might entail, given the lack of any alternative models.

Vusi Mashinini discusses the tensions, controversies and periodic bloody conflicts that cloud the Kingdom of Lesotho regarding the role of Chinese-led development interventions. Lesotho has had relations with China since colonial times. Depending on the ideology and foreign policy of the ruling party, these Lesotho–China relations have been either covert and secret as was the case during the rule of the Basotho National Party of Leabua Jonathan, which was pro-capitalist and Anglo-American propped; or open and overt, as relations have been since 1994 when the pro social democracy Basutoland Congress Party under Ntsu Mokhehle took government. Since the latter phase, the Lesotho development landscape has been characterised by an unprecedented escalation of development support from the Far East, especially from China, India and Malaysia. Simultaneously, there has been an increase in the inflow of nationals from these countries, to invest and/or work legally or illegally, especially in the commercial and industrial sectors.

Martin Kaggwa discusses the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) in chapter 8. The European Union (EU) is in the process of finalising EPAs with individual countries and regional groupings in Africa that include the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Interim Economic Partnership Agreements (IEPAs) have been initiated by the EAC region, Botswana and Swaziland in the SADC, and Ghana and Ivory Coast in the ECOWAS region. EPAs introduce reciprocal trade arrangement between the EU and African countries. Kaggwa examines the extent to which the EPAs can be developmental tools for African countries against the background of the continent's failure to take advantage of preferential trade treatment by the EU since 1975. It is argued that EPAs, in their current form, can only serve as subtle tools to capture and control the African market. It is proposed that for the EPAs to benefit African countries, provisions on support for the attainment of global competitiveness, rules of origin restrictions, and funding of related adjustment costs should be significantly changed. Regional groupings in Africa need to co-ordinate negotiations pertaining to these issues, using access to the continent's market, investment opportunities, and resources as leverage and strategic instruments to ask for better terms.

Sushmita Rajwar discusses the growing interest of China and India in Africa. In the last two decades there has been keen interest in African investments from India and China, both major Asian players. China's increasing presence over the entire African continent is an area of concern not only for the West, but especially also for India, who is not a new player in the continent. India has been strengthening its relationship with African countries since the time of its independence. Thus India has always been uncomfortable about drawing comparisons between its activities and those of China in the African continent. However, the series of changes in its policy towards Africa over the last few years shows that the presence of China has become an issue of concern for India, particularly since China has been in tough competition with India in many of the African countries where India has always boasted of its time-tested, historical ties. Keeping this in mind, the author analyses the various competing interests of China and India in Africa and the rather different approaches of each in exploring those interests.

Mario Scerri applies the innovation systems approach to his analysis of the prospects for economic integration in Africa. The theoretical basis of this approach and its variations are explored, as well as its foundation in the political economy. The broad version of this approach is adopted to classify specific groups of national systems of innovation in Africa and assess their viability potential. Various measures of the viability of innovation systems, in terms of their reproduction, growth and evolution, are developed and applied to draw out the possibilities for the emergence of regional economic integration in Africa. The author concludes with a discussion of policy implications for the successful emergence of regional systems of innovation in the continent.

Reinhart Kössler writes that one of the most difficult heritages bequeathed to Africa by colonialism and apartheid is a specific form of institutional and legal pluralism. This applies in particular to the level of local practices, administration and politics. While in actual practice and by statutory provisions, traditional authorities are local extensions of the state, at the same time they claim legitimacy from different sources, such as genealogy and popular consent. There are obvious links that connect these institutions to colonial and apartheid dispensations, and an important issue for analysis is their resilience in recent times, in particular after the eventual demise of colonialism and apartheid in southern Africa. The author sets out some of the legitimacy issues that such resilience raises. Using southern Namibia as the regional focus for his discussion, he addresses the role some traditional leaders played in anti-colonial resistance, the struggle against apartheid and the liberation struggle, while many others clearly collaborated with the powers of the time. The new role of traditional leaders and their relationship to formal

politics after independence and majority rule had been achieved are then briefly discussed, revealing the ambivalences that prevail.

Pharoah J. Mavhunga and Misozi Chiweshe argue that the colonisation of Africa led to the downgrading of indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) that Africans had developed over time, knowledge systems that were suited and relevant to African situations. African IKS were systematically replaced by Western colonisers' own knowledge systems that they projected as modern, superior and progressive. A multitude of problems afflict the African continent today, and indeed, the rest of the world as a result of some of the Western knowledge systems and technologies ensuing from them. The chapter argues that Africans, rather than perceiving their own IKS as backward, inferior and retrogressive, should instead reinvent, repackage and promote them for use in addressing modern-day challenges, most of which have been created by the so-called Western science and technology.

Ronald A. Nathan writes that the AU can be seen as both a fulfilment of a pan-African vision and as an agency for the completion of the said vision. This desire for closer ties foresees the inclusion of the sixth region of the AU, comprising its disparate diaspora, primarily in the Americas, Europe and Asia.

The author looks at the role of the black African church in the Americas in the development of pan-Africanism in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries and sees the possibilities that exist for future partnership, collaboration and cooperation in the pursuit of a developed Africa. The early black church was prominent in the exercise of relief, recovery and redemption of Africa. Its religious myths 'Ethiopianism' and 'black millennialism' unleashed a vision of pan-Africanism that inspired the peoples of Africa at home and abroad. Its missions provided development programmes, educational opportunities and models of leadership that would loosen the stranglehold of colonialism on the minds and bodies of Africans.

Baba A. Buntu acknowledges the races for the political, economic and resource-based appropriation of Africa that were catapulted by the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference, but claims that these scrambles started far earlier, continued longer and carried with them multilayered effects that help to explain the intricacy of African powerlessness. In search of practical, contemporary solutions, Buntu posits that young Africans constitute an immense power that can create a transitional foundation for sustainable development. The author motivates for the positioning of youth in self-empowerment strategies, with the objective of unscrambling Africa. Arenas for this unscrambling process include education, entrepreneurship, environment, media, law and culture.

David L. Horne argues that pan-Africanism is not static. It has evolved over the last generation as a paradigm very much akin to ubuntu, the African humanist

philosophy which sees the world as a humane place where African traditional methods of consensus building, rehabilitative rather than punitive justice, making agreements and mutual and reciprocal respect provide the norm, value and network building to sustain human relations and nature protection and preservation. The author then explores how pan-Africanism has manifested at various levels. He discusses pan-Africanism at the governmental level, the regional economic level and the diaporic levels such as the Pan-African Organisation Committee (PAOC) in Barbados, NGOs such as Africare, and a number of other regional and sub-regional initiatives. The author makes the observation that, based on the reviews of these various cases and examples of pan-Africanism, as in the nineteenth and twentieth century, twenty-first century pan-Africanism is alive and growing in the African community and in the world at large. He concludes with optimistic visioning by declaring that although there are still epidemics passed on from the old European scramble for Africa, pan-Africanism has been anchored and is inspiring the African future by making and building it.

Kimani S. Nehusi writes that the Mdw NTr (*Medew Netjer*) or hieroglyphs, an African script that was the first in the world to be invented, was deployed as an instrument of vastly improved communication and a significant aid to the creation of national unity in the state of Kemet. Today it invites consideration as a primary occasion for doing pan-Africanism. Language is not merely linguistic phenomena divorced from the processes unfolding in society. It is a record of and a witness to a people's experiences and perceptions. The author shows how analysis of the *Medew Netjer* reveals many of the values, attitudes and behaviours held in common by African people: this language carries the first available, coherent and detailed statement of African identity. Clearly, the author argues, its incorporation into the research agenda of African scholarship and the human sciences in Africa could become a major step forward to a deeper understanding of ourselves and the promotion of pan-Africanism.

Concluding Remarks

Together, the chapters in this volume demonstrate how important it is for Africans to work together, to continue, and to institutionalise a systematically generated pan-African education which will put Africa first and not, as it is now, last. Global exploitation must be fully challenged so that Africans are never let down again. New initiatives are needed to expand the educational opportunities.¹¹ From the top down, there is a need to add bottom-up learning and education. The best way to predict Africa's free and united future is by creating it. The African renaissance was launched at the end of the apartheid era in South Africa like the wind of change in the 1960s of independence. The full realisation of the African

renaissance rests upon Africans. Let Africans do it by making all Africans both united and renascent at the same time!

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- 9 See the *African Union After a Decade: Putting African Unity First Means Putting Humanity First*. Available at: <http://www.nesglobal.org/au10/node/6> (accessed 28 March 2012).
- 10 Parenti, M., 1978. *Power and the powerless*. New York: St Martin's Press, pp. 4–5, 111.
- 11 See, for example, the cause to demand dedicating the whole month of May as the African liberation and unity month. Available at: <http://www.nesglobal.org/symp125/node/5> (accessed 30 March).

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Chapter

Strengthening the Implementation of Antipoverty Strategies and the Active Role of Stakeholders: A Case Study of Mutale Municipality Community Engagement

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Poverty is becoming increasingly entrenched in Africa and continues to defy efforts to eradicate it. Various authors¹ have noted that more than 75 per cent of the poorest countries are in Africa and the situation is worsening. In South Africa, the fight against poverty started in earnest only after 1994 as a product of the dawn of an inclusive government. However, the shedding of jobs from the formal economy, together with the fact that successful poverty eradication measures are mainly dependent upon government have frustrated efforts designed to combat poverty.²

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that efforts towards poverty eradication can no longer be limited to a narrow understanding of poverty, which either focuses on income or access to basic services, but rather to an individual's ability to meaningfully participate in efforts aimed at improving their livelihood. It remains difficult to articulate what poverty really is and when one is really 'poor'. This challenge demands the development and adoption of national poverty lines. Although this is the case, Arimah³ argues that national poverty lines are country-specific and are inherently arbitrary. For this reason, a consensual definition of poverty based on a communal understanding of what poverty is, becomes critical.⁴ Aliber⁵ argues that one of the constraints in addressing poverty is the policy makers' understanding of the nature and form of the poverty they want to address.

In this paper, empirical evidence indicating that the involvement of interest groups at grassroots community level in the defining of poverty and specific steps needed to deal with such challenges is presented. It is demonstrated that participation in a social programme is critical and provides a sense of belonging and worth.

1.1 The Need for Developing an Antipoverty Strategy in a Country

Seipel⁶ is of the opinion that for poverty reduction strategies to work, several factors must be considered. This is so because there is no single factor that could resolve the problem. Anti-poverty strategies that rely only on the allocation of resources, economic growth or any other single approach have not always been effective. A potentially effective anti-poverty approach must be based on multiple foundations and must be sustainable. According to the Southern African Regional Poverty Network

(SARPN),⁷ any intervention measures designed to respond to the challenges of poverty should be judged on their ability to make a significant dent at a microlevel. In order to achieve sustainable development with poverty alleviation as its main focus, some of the following strategies must be included through conscious governmental efforts: economic growth, international cooperation and social investment.⁸

1.2 Economic Growth

Economic growth is essential in poverty alleviation. Well-managed growth and equitable distribution of wealth could double income within one generation, and under the right circumstances, it could cut poverty in half. Seipel⁹ indicates that economic growth was effectively used to reduce poverty rates in some Asian countries, viz. China, South Korea and Malaysia. Tropinska¹⁰ argues that for developing countries that are also in economic transformation there is a need for economic growth based on price and trade liberalisation with regards to domestic as well as foreign trade and the stabilisation of the economy aimed at reducing inflation and creating financial and fiscal stability and privatisation of assets, often regarded as the most important component of institutional change. Proper policies that aim to develop the country and alleviate poverty must accompany these interventions. Some of the economic issues to be taken into consideration are growth with equity, effective micro-enterprise and job creation.¹¹

1.2.1 Growth with equity

Any economic growth must lead to expanding opportunities for the poor in order for them to climb out of the poverty net. This suggests that poverty alleviation must be made central to economic growth policy. In this respect, economic growth must benefit both the rich and poor in an equitable manner.¹²

1.2.2 Effective micro-enterprise

The development of labour-intensive micro-enterprises should be supported. Small- and medium-scale businesses and agricultural activities are essential to the financial wellbeing of poor people because substantial income and staple foods are typically generated from these informal economic sectors in developing countries. This reinforces the notion of saving among poor people.

1.2.3 Job creation

Economic growth alone will not reduce poverty unless it is supported by an effective and coherent job creation policy. If it is not well monitored, economic growth

alone can precipitate job losses. In order to avoid this situation, an equitable social policy that is well supported must be put in place. Thus, a desirable job creation approach is one anchored on policy that can help the poor. Job creation must be targeted within both the private and the public sectors through tax policies and relevant legislation.

1.2.4 International cooperation

Seipel¹³ suggests that although the primary responsibility for fighting poverty rests with the national effort, international involvement is critical for a successful outcome. Poverty, like the economy, is no longer a mere national concern. It is a global challenge. The rapid globalisation that has occurred in the twentieth century has brought both opportunities and challenges to developed and developing countries alike. In order to reduce global poverty and strengthen global relationships, communities must rectify the growing problems of trade, debt relief and foreign aid.

1.2.5 Trade

Fair trade is essential for promoting regional and international cooperation.¹⁴ The balance between rich and poor countries must be minimised. According to the UNDP,¹⁵ the open market and free flow of technology and information have created considerable global wealth for some, while others have benefited little or not at all. Both rich and poor countries must embrace the principle of an open market. International fair trade must allow all countries to be charged the same lending interests for example. This will help developing countries to manage their debts without having to dig deep into their already exhausted budgets.

1.2.6 Debt relief

The crushing burden of foreign debt must be relieved from poor countries. Many poor countries are so deep in debt that it is very difficult or almost impossible to make a sound economic policy. There are several ways of relieving the debts. For example, the principal debt could be cut, the length of the loan could be extended, interest rates could be reduced, and ultimately, the entire debt could be erased. With the money saved, poor countries could invest in education, health and other development projects.

Laopodis¹⁶ argues that a country's ability to service its foreign debt could be discussed in terms of its domestic economy, foreign operations and social environment. Within this setting, certain variables may be identified that typify a particular country's condition when in economic distress. The economic health and

social (and political) stability of a given country would then determine whether it is able to service its debts. Social tensions can severely disrupt the process of development and the uninterrupted servicing of foreign obligations. In order to determine whether a country is able to service its debt, the following factors should also be considered: the country's macroeconomic indicators (gross domestic product [GDP]), growth, investment to GDP, savings rate, government deficit to GDP, and inflation rate, balance of payments indicators (export growth, imports to GDP and imports to reserves), debt indicators (debt service ratio and debt to reserves), and social indicators (contribution of agriculture and education to development).

1.2.7 Foreign aid

Poverty alleviation efforts may be facilitated through more and better directed international aid from more affluent countries. Beinart¹⁷ and Weaver¹⁸ are of the opinion that even though foreign aid has often been grossly mismanaged and thus become an instrument of imperialism, it has also brought stability and growth to many poor countries. An example is what happened after the Second World War under the Marshall Plan. Grants, low interest loans and technical assistance were given to the allies and enemies alike, which rebuilt Europe and lifted millions out of poverty. A similar approach is needed to save indebted and faltering countries from falling into economic and social disaster.

1.2.8 Social investment

Both Meth¹⁹ and Seipel²⁰ suggest that a successful anti-poverty approach integrates economic growth with social investment. A successful partnership between economic growth and social development enables people to deal more effectively with changing economic environments and political priorities. International organisations such as United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) support strengthening the poor through the delivery of basic social services. All social service spending that provides opportunities for self-reliance contributes to long-term benefits for the people concerned and society. Social investment in poverty alleviation encompasses education, health and human capital development. These are critical ingredients of sustainability.

1.2.9 Education

Educating the poor is one of the most important ways of fighting poverty. Education opens up a wide range of economic opportunities for people. Without an educated labour force, neither individuals nor countries can compete

effectively in the global labour market and cope with ever-changing economic environments. This is especially true of the present information- and technology-oriented economies.

1.2.10 Health

Investing in healthcare is another important strategy that can be used to resist poverty. There is a strong association between good health and investing in education. While this does not suggest that poor health causes poverty, there is, however, a strong relationship between poverty and poor health. A population with prolonged poor health will eventually affect the economy of that particular country. Gaiha²¹ is of the opinion that the health of the public must be protected to ensure that its productive capacity is not undermined. When people die prematurely or experience serious health complications from preventable diseases, potential economic growth and development may be severely compromised.

1.2.11 Human capital

Human capital stock is one of the major determinants of workers' success in the labour market. A high level of human capital stock enhances workers' ability to obtain a wide range of employment and increase their income. In order to remain productive and enjoy mobility in the labour market, the human capital stock of workers must be strengthened continuously. The White Paper for Social Welfare²² points out that individuals, families and communities need to be reinforced through programmes that contribute to optimal social development. Since basic education is not always readily available for everyone, Seipel²³ suggests that strategies such as investment in on-the-job training programmes, apprenticeships, vocational education and rehabilitation play a most useful role.

In South Africa, many strategies and programmes that aim to meet the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty by 2015 have been developed and implemented. To date the country has had mixed results and continues to face serious poverty-related challenges.²⁴ In response to this seemingly perpetual challenge, in 2008 the South African government developed a draft document entitled, *Towards an Antipoverty Strategy*, which rests on nine fundamental pillars. These key pillars are presented in Table 1.1.

Our study was based on these pillars. It sought to determine and understand poverty and vulnerability from the point of view of the citizens at grassroots community level in the Vhembe District of Limpopo Province.

Table 1.1 The nine pillars of the South African antipoverty strategy

Pillar	Description
Creation of economic opportunities	Ensure that the economy generates opportunities for poor households to earn improved incomes through jobs or self-employment
Investment in human capital	Provide the health care, education and training needed to engage with the economy and in political processes
Income security	Provide safety nets for the most vulnerable, primarily through social grants. This is to ensure that vulnerability associated with disability, age and illness does not plunge poor households into destitution
Basic services and other non-financial transfers	Encompasses what has been termed a social wage, consisting of services such as subsidised housing, and expanded access to water, electricity, refuse removal and sanitation; as well as a raft of minimum free basic services for vulnerable sectors of the population. Inability to pay for basic services should not prevent the poor from accessing these services altogether
Improving healthcare	Ensuring that poor children grow up healthy, providing quality and efficient preventative and curative care, and ensuring that illness or disability do not plunge poor households into destitution
Access to assets	Particularly focuses on housing, land and capital, including public infrastructure, both to improve economic and social security and to provide the basis for economic engagement in the longer run
Social inclusion and social capital initiatives	Combining programmes to ensure a more inclusive and integrated society, based on the development of more integrated structures and engagements across class and race, as well as solidarity in communities and society as a whole. The focus is also on strengthening social capital, especially for the poor to expand their networks and ensure they have access to information
Environmental sustainability	Strategies and programmes that help link increasing economic opportunities for the poor to the protection and rehabilitation of ecosystems, reversing environmental degradation and promoting ecotourism
Good governance	Accountability to citizens, direct intervention in the provision of information, facilitating participatory, pro-poor policies and sound macroeconomic management. This is to ensure proper use of public funds, encouraging shared economic growth, promoting effective and efficient delivery of public services and consolidating the rule of law

Source Towards an antipoverty strategy for South Africa, 2008

1.3 Definition of Poverty and Vulnerability

Mudau²⁵ concedes that it is always more difficult to define a concept than to talk about it. However, Seipel²⁶ regards poverty as a difficult concept to define. Although there is general agreement that poverty is a condition of deprivation, the conceptualisation of deprivation remains contentious. Consequently, different countries have developed a wide range of indicators to measure poverty. It is worth noting that the following two concepts are used the most in defining poverty in the world:²⁷

- Income poverty – this refers to both absolute poverty and relative poverty, which is discussed below.

- Human Poverty Index (HPI) – this is based on the theory that poverty involves more than the lack of income. It means the denial of choices and opportunities for a tolerable life. The Human Poverty Index examines the most basic dimensions of deprivation such as early death, malnutrition, illiteracy, access to healthcare and safe water.

According to Barker,²⁸ poverty can be defined as a state of being poor or deficient in money or means of subsistence. Poverty can be classified as absolute, which refers to being below a subsistence level of income. Also, poverty can be relative, meaning being below the living standard of a person's mainstream community. People who are impoverished may also be considered transitionally poor, which is a brief, temporary poverty related to specific events in their lives or environments, such as during a state of war or when a disaster strikes. The marginally poor are those people who move in and out of poverty because of job insecurity, inadequate skills or limited education. There are also the residual poor, who experience long-term and inter-generational poverty which, Aliber²⁹ indicates, is also referred to as chronic poverty.

Wilson and Ramphel posit that there is a need to examine poverty in a more realistic way, implying one that addresses the real everyday issues. For them, poverty is 'not knowing where your next meal is going to come from, and always wondering when the council is going to put your furniture out and always praying that your husband must not lose his job'.³⁰

Broadly speaking, the World Bank considers poverty as:

Hunger; poverty as lack of shelter; poverty as being sick and not being able to see a doctor; poverty as not being able to go to school and not knowing how to read; poverty as not having a job, as a fear for the future, living one day at a time; poverty as losing a child to illness brought about by unclean water; poverty as powerlessness; lack of representation and freedom; poverty has many faces, changing from place to place and across time, and has been described in many ways. Most often poverty is the situation people want to escape.³¹

According to Noble et al.³² the concept of poverty in industrialised nations has developed over the years from 'absolute' concepts that are frequently defined in terms of minimum subsistence levels to 'relative' concepts that relate poverty to notions of exclusion from participation in mainstream society.

Noble et al.³³ note that the main criticism against this definition of relative poverty is that in any given country there will always be poor people since there is no equality. For this reason, it is important to adopt the argument for absolute 'core' poverty.³⁴ Sen³⁵ argues that there is an absolutist core in the idea of poverty. One element of the absolutist core is obvious enough in that if there is 'starvation'

Figure 1.1 Absolute poverty and relative poverty (Adopted from Noble, et al.)³⁶



and ‘hunger’, then no matter what the relative picture looks like, clearly there is poverty. Distinguishing between the poor and the non-poor is inevitably more complex for a relative conceptualisation of poverty. Usually, definitions fall into two main groups, namely, one based on resources (income or expenditure) and one based on social indicators of full participation in society (Figure 1.1).

This understanding of poverty³⁷ fits the African context in its ability to arrive at the meaning of poverty in one of two ways. The first definition, based on resources, focuses on what poverty means to those who study it (as an absolute dimension). According to Saunders,³⁸ the second definition is considered from a more outcome-oriented perspective, which explores what poverty means to those who experience it (i.e. poverty is a relative dimension). A combination of these two dimensions allows policy makers to consider the notion of a consensual definition of poverty.³⁹ Noble et al.⁴⁰ further argue that any poverty alleviation strategy which does not consider the causes of poverty as seen by those working with it and those living in poverty will have difficulty in really alleviating poverty. Saunders⁴¹ stresses that if, for example, poverty is seen as a result of structural inequality within society, any serious attempt to eliminate poverty must first seek to change those conditions that produce it. Individual members of society

are reluctant to accept responsibility for the existence of poverty. However, its persistence is a judgement on the society that condones the conditions that give rise to the poverty. As such, it is important for communities to define poverty and be ready to alleviate it.

The argument that this paper advances is based on the Alcock stance:

If we recognize that poverty is essentially a contested concept, then why is it that academics and politicians continue to seek an acceptable definition or argue that their approach is the correct one? Why can we not simply agree to differ, or suggest perhaps that poverty, like beauty, is contained only in the eye of the beholder?⁴²

It is for this reason that this paper presents the views and understanding of poverty and vulnerability as viewed by those (beholder) living in the circumstances. It is important to ask, whenever an effort is to be made to alleviate poverty, whose poverty does one want to alleviate? Failure to do this is likely to result in policy-makers missing the poverty mark.

1.4 Methodology Adopted in this Study and Roles of Stakeholders

In October 2008, the Government of South Africa launched its draft Antipoverty Strategy and opened it up for public comment and inputs. While seeking inputs from all stakeholders, institutions of higher learning were also considered as strategic partners. The University of Venda's (UNIVEN) Vice Chancellor's Office entrusted the Centre for Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation (CRDPA) with the responsibility of spearheading the processes leading to submission of inputs into the strategy on behalf of the entire campus. A team comprising the CRDPA and other UNIVEN staff, government departments (Government Communication Information System: GCIS, Transport, Labour, the Vhembe House of Traditional Leaders and Office of the Premier, Limpopo), the Makhado, Musina, Mutale and Thulamela municipalities in the Vhembe District was established. This team's role was to coordinate stakeholder engagements, starting with a seminar which was held at UNIVEN on 12 March 2009.

More than 220 people representing a wide range of stakeholders participated in the seminar. These included UNIVEN schools, NGOs operating in the Vhembe District, government departments (Social Development, Transport, the South African Social Security Agency: SASSA, Public Works, the Office of the Premier, Labour and Provincial Treasury), the Vhembe District Municipality, the Vhembe House of Traditional Leaders, all local municipalities in the Vhembe District, faith-based organisations, parastatals and representatives of grassroots communities. After presentation of the antipoverty strategy by a Senior Officer from

the Presidency, participants proceeded to engage each other in three breakaway groups. The themes that the commissions deliberated on were:

- Appropriate approaches to rural development that support poor families
- Human resource development to improve the fight against poverty
- Social cohesion or partnerships

The seminar participants resolved that the CRDPA should continue providing leadership in future engagements that would clarify what poverty and vulnerability were within the context of the Vhembe District. It was agreed that the engagements would strive to further deepen public participation by facilitating grassroots community reflections that build an understanding of the poverty situation in their respective areas of residence. In this regard, the engagements would be decentralised to villages or townships, wards and municipal levels. A Vhembe District-wide antipoverty social dialogue would then be organised as a platform for sharing the products of the engagements.

The information presented below is a product of all the engagements that took place in the Mutale Municipality. It represents the voices of the people at grassroots community level regarding what they experienced and understood to be poverty and vulnerability in their areas. Also, the people made suggestions on what they believed were solutions to their poverty. Similar engagements are planned for the Makhado, Musina and Thulamela municipalities, which form the other parts of the Vhembe District Municipality.

1.5 Preparing for Successful Grassroots Community Engagements

A district-wide coordinating team was established. The team developed a roadmap that defined the crucial activities that would lead to community-level engagements. The roadmap reflected the time frames and the institutions or organisations responsible for implementing the activities. After the development of the action plan, a series of preparatory activities were carried out. These included the orientation of all members of the District and local Municipality coordinating teams. A workshop was then held to orientate the teams to the antipoverty strategy as well as the participatory philosophy of community engagement that the study espoused. In addition, all these members were trained in how to facilitate community-based research that applied reflection circles as an approach to multi-stakeholder engagement and collective decision-making.

After the orientation workshop, a district-wide workshop was held where all stakeholders from each municipality were oriented to the study and where they were accorded an opportunity to enrich it. The Executive Mayor of the Vhembe District was the guest of honour in this workshop and extended his support

and commitment to see the study being completed. A member of the District Municipality's Executive Mayoral Committee facilitated the workshop programme.

In the all-stakeholder workshop, critical players from each municipality deliberated on how the study would be conducted in their local areas. More than 250 people representing national and provincial government, community-based organisations, non-governmental organisations, traditional leaders, organised business and others participated. Through municipality-specific reflection circles, rollout plans for the study were developed. Ward councilors and community development workers were tasked with working closely with the municipal coordinating teams and ensuring that village-level work proceeded smoothly. It was emphasised that they would bring on board all stakeholders within each ward. This was done to ensure that the process was as inclusive as possible. After this workshop, each municipality implemented activities contained in the plan developed during the district-wide all-stakeholder workshop. Although the study focused on the entire Vhembe District, this paper is confined to the experiences gained in Mutale Municipality.

1.6 Antipoverty Community Engagement Activities in Mutale Municipality

The antipoverty coordinating sub-team assigned to facilitate engagements in Mutale Municipality held a series of meetings with political leaders within this Municipality. This aimed to create awareness and secure support for planned grassroots community engagements.

All-ward stakeholder workshops were held in each of the eleven wards of Mutale Municipality. Members of the Municipality Coordinating Team presided over the workshops. The workshops were designed to make leaders from the villages/localities that constituted the ward aware of the study and solicit ideas that would strengthen implementation. In addition, the engagements sought to secure support and commitment to the successful completion of the study. At the end of each consultative workshop, participants elected a ward engagement team. In each ward, the respective councilors, ward committees and community development workers worked closely with traditional leaders in identifying and mobilizing stakeholders who participated in the ward-level workshops.

All ward-level engagement teams were intensively trained in facilitation, application of participatory rural appraisal techniques and building an understanding and appreciation of ethical practice in social research. More than 120 village-based volunteers were trained. After training, each ward engagement team was assisted to develop its grassroots community-level research plan. Ten of the eleven wards successfully completed the study.

1.7 Who did the Ward Research Teams Engage with in Each Village?

Village assemblies were organised. Community members who participated in the village assemblies or reflection circles were grouped on the basis of the following categories:

- Children: boys and girls separately
- Youth: male and female separately
- Women: adults (36–50) and 51 and above separately
- Men: adults (36–50) and 51 and above separately
- Leaders: Group A (traditional leaders, ward committees, civic associations, etc.) and Group B (welfare organisations, i.e. NGOs, faith groups and any other) separately

In each reflection circle, the participants were asked to deliberate on the following issues:

- What challenges make it difficult to achieve what each pillar of antipoverty strategy aims to realise?
- What causes the identified challenges?
- What might help solve each identified challenge?

1.8 Findings from the Community Engagement in Mutale Municipality

Tables 1.2 to 1.10 present the consolidated results of the engagement of more than 500 localities (villages or townships) within Mutale Municipality. Although the grassroots communities identified many issues, the most common ones are listed below with their root causes included in brackets:

- Lack of employable skills (no computer education in schools, lack of FET colleges, high dropout rates, inadequate scholarships or bursaries for the many deserving candidates, lack of learnership or internship opportunities, alcohol and drug abuse, only residential 2-day courses normally delivered, lack of training institutions, poor skills)
- Lack of birth and identification documents (traditional leaders charge prohibitive fees for letters, Home Affairs Department does not go to people, ignorance, lack of knowledge, no birth certificates, lack of birth registrations)
- Inadequate funding for basic services (municipality has a poor revenue base, municipality overlies on service fees only, long processes from national to local government are prone to leakages through corruption along the way, poverty in rural communities)
- Difficulties accessing grants (social workers take too long to process applications, orphans face more serious problems, lack of knowledge of procedures, general grant processing systems are too slow, misuse of social grants)

- Corruption (misuse of project monies, self-interest, self-interest and poverty connectedness – those with connections access benefits, no monitoring of use of public funds, mismanagement of funds, dishonest leaders, lack of financial advice)
- Delays in settling land claims (municipality does not own any land, changes in personnel in Land Claims Commission, release of government funding for purchase of land is too slow, corrupt practices)
- Conflicts/disharmony among the municipality, traditional leaders and community members (lack of knowledge of roles and responsibilities)
- Lack of resources such as ambulances, medication and health personnel, in particular doctors, paramedics (illiteracy, inadequate medicines, too few people training as doctors, lack of learnerships or internships, government not procuring enough medicines, government not employing enough nurses)
- No easy access to healthcare (clinics are too far away, too many villages, no access road to Vhufuli, no organised structure to advocate for hospital to be built, shortage of funds, lack of commitment from Department of Health and Social Development, poor consideration by healthcare service providers, clinic fees are too high)
- Grants not provided to deserving people (teenage pregnancies, people do not attend meetings and thus do not get support)
- High crime rates (substance abuse, mushrooming taverns, unemployment)
- Illiteracy: lack of education (high dropout rates, teenage pregnancies, poverty, alcohol abuse, expensive education, too few good schools)
- Lack of relevant knowledge and information (illiteracy, no reliable cellphone network)
- Shortage of water (inadequate resources such as funding, no infrastructure installed, poor response from those in power – they only come to us when they want our votes, community too rural and difficult to provide services)
- Government does not properly consult people when implementing projects (corruption and nepotism)
- Illegal cutting of trees (people want space to farm, lack of job opportunities)
- Indiscriminate digging of deep holes seeking building sand (people want to acquire building sand, lack of environmental education, selfishness, poverty)
- Lack of coordination or consultation (every department wants to do things on its own, no understanding between traditional leaders and other structures)
- Substandard shelter or housing (poverty, poor monitoring when houses are built, contractors are unprofessional, nepotism)

Table 1.2 shows that in order to ensure that there is vibrant local economic growth certain fundamental things need to be put in place. These include education, as in all the wards illiteracy is very high, and reducing crime levels. This is in line with

Table 1.2 Ensuring that the local economy generates opportunities for poor households through jobs or self-employment

Challenges (and causes)	Ward										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9	10	11	
High crime rates (<i>substance abuse, mushrooming taverns, unemployment</i>)	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
Illiteracy: lack of education (<i>high dropout rates, teenage pregnancies, poverty, alcohol abuse, expensive education, too few good schools</i>)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Unemployment (<i>lack of training institutions, poor skills</i>)				✓		✓	✓			✓	
Persistent land disputes involving traditional leaders and the municipality (<i>conflict of interest, power hunger, corrupt leaders motivated by selfish interests</i>)				✓						✓	
Lack of relevant knowledge and information (<i>illiteracy, no reliable cellphone network</i>)		✓	✓					✓	✓		
Lack of funding to start own businesses (<i>lack of knowledge on how to access available funds, illiteracy, corrupt practices, lack of knowledge on how to develop business plans</i>)	✓				✓						
Most community projects are dysfunctional (<i>lack of financial management skills, poor project management, tensions among project members, greed</i>)						✓		✓			
Municipality is too rural (<i>thin revenue base for the municipality, accessibility is poor</i>)				✓			✓				
Key: ✓ = The ward identified this as a major issue needing attention. There are no results for Ward 7.											

Table 1.3 Provision of relevant skills and training needed for human development

Challenges (and causes)	Ward										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9	10	11	
Lack of employable skills (no computer education in schools, lack of FET Colleges, high dropout rates, inadequate scholarships or bursaries for the many deserving candidates, lack of learnership or internship opportunities, alcohol and drug abuse, only residential 2-day courses normally delivered)	✓		✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	
Lack of tertiary institutions (inadequate visionary local leaders, predominantly rural nature of municipality)	✓			✓			✓				
Lack of information (no access to internet, information centres in urban and surrounding areas, self-interest, nepotism)		✓		✓	✓	✓					
Lack of trainers (trainers simply not there, lack of knowledge and role models)	✓						✓		✓		
Inadequate infrastructure and equipment (lack of funding, limited support from government departments)			✓								
Illiteracy and high dropout rates (shortage of resources especially funds, unemployment, poverty, lack of motivation to perform well)		✓	✓			✓					
Key: ✓ = The ward identified this as a major issue needing attention. There are no results for Ward 7.											

the views of Meth⁴³ and Seipel⁴⁴ who also argue that education is vital in order to make sure that antipoverty strategies are effective.

From Table 1.3 it is evident that few community members had skills. However, such skills were not relevant and as such there was a need to re-skill the community towards a particular vocation and also to understand the manner in which community members had survived the harshness of life in the past. Investing in social capital was essential if poverty was to be eradicated. This means that communities must be allowed to determine the kind of skills they need for their survival. It is important to make sure that those who are at school are encouraged to continue with schooling.

Table 1.4 indicates that, despite the serious efforts and resources put into social security by the South African government, several people in most villages still lacked basic information on how to access grants. In some cases, some people did not even have an identity documents, a critical requirement for applying for social grants. In almost every village there were children and some older people who did not have identity document, implying that they were excluded from benefiting from social security. It is crucial for stakeholders such as the Departments of Home Affairs as well as Health and Social Development to resolve this problem through collective effort. Institutions such as the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) need to be located in the villages so that access to them is improved.

Table 1.4 Provision of social grants to the poorest of the poor and the vulnerable groups

Challenges (and causes)	Ward										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9	10	11	
Difficulties accessing grant (<i>social workers take too long to process applications, orphans face more serious problems, lack of knowledge on procedures, general grant processing systems are too slow, misuse of social grants</i>)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓		
Grants not provided to relevant people (<i>teenage pregnancies, people do not attend meetings and thus do not get support</i>)	✓			✓			✓		✓		
Lack of birth and identification documents (<i>traditional leaders charge prohibitive fees for letters, Home Affairs Department does not go to people, ignorance, lack of knowledge, no birth certificates, lack of birth registrations</i>)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Many under-age girls becoming mothers in order to access the Child Support Grant (<i>peer pressure, lack of parental and community guidance, inadequate sex education, breakdown in family values</i>)								✓	✓		
Critical players such as SASSA are too centralised and not easily accessible to people (<i>long distances travelled to reach service centres</i>)		✓				✓				✓	
Key: ✓ = The ward identified this as a major issue needing attention. There are no results for Ward 7.											

Table 1.5 Improving access to basic services

Challenges (and causes)	Ward										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9	10	11	
Shortage of water (<i>inadequate resources such as funding, no infrastructure installed, poor response from those in power – they only come to us when they want our votes, community too rural and difficult to provide services</i>)	✓	✓	✓				✓		✓		
Too many households do not have access to electricity (<i>lack of information, municipality cannot meet the backlog, shortage of funds, overreliance on ESKOM for electricity yet there might be alternative sources of energy</i>)	✓	✓				✓			✓		
Conflicts/disharmony among the municipality, traditional leaders and community members (<i>lack of knowledge of roles and responsibilities</i>)			✓	✓			✓	✓			
No monitoring of service provision, including appointed service providers (<i>contractors, government departments and some community leaders are corrupt</i>)			✓	✓	✓						
Predominantly poorly maintained gravel roads always in poor state (poor maintenance, lazy contracted workers, lack of adequate funds, unnecessary bureaucracy in government departments which delay implementation processes)			✓						✓		
Inadequate funding for basic services (<i>municipality has a poor revenue base, municipality overlies on service fees only, long processes from national to local government are prone to leakages through corruption along the way, poverty in rural communities</i>)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓		
Key: ✓ = The ward identified this as a major issue needing attention. There are no results for Ward 7.											

Table 1.6 Improving healthcare in Mutale Municipality

Challenges (and causes)	Ward										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9	10	11	
No easy access to healthcare (<i>clinics are too far away, too many villages, no access road to Vhufuli, no organised structure to advocate for hospital to be built, shortage of funds, lack of commitment from Department of Health and Social Development, poor consideration by healthcare service providers, clinic fees are too high</i>)	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓		✓	✓	
Lack of resources such as ambulances, medication and health personnel, in particular doctors, paramedics (<i>illiteracy, inadequate medicines, too few people training as doctors, lack of learnerships or internships, government not procuring enough medicines, government not employing enough nurses</i>)	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓			✓	✓	
Shortage of equipment (<i>service providers not delivering on time, corrupt practices, no funds</i>)					✓				✓	✓	
Lack of health-related information (<i>ignorance, no reliable information centres, distance from sources of information is too long</i>)			✓	✓			✓				
Key: ✓ = The ward identified this as a major issue needing attention. There are no results for Ward 7.											

More than 15 years after the democratic dispensation in South Africa, most people in the Mutale Municipality (Table 1.5) still had limited access to basic services such as water and electricity. Apparently, the municipality did not have sufficient mechanisms to monitor service provision.

Table 1.6 highlights the fact that healthcare was a major problem, especially with respect to the availability of clinics for primary healthcare or even ambulances to attend to emergency situations within the communities. Almost all the wards within this municipality reported that there was a serious lack of resources. Communities did not have information on health and did not know where such was provided. Introduction of information centres could be critical in these villages. Through these kinds of initiatives government would succeed in social investment.⁴⁵

In Table 1.7, the challenges faced in promoting development in rural areas are articulated. It was pointed out that the bulk of the land still belonged to traditional leaders and the municipality had no control over it. Other major challenges that were cited related to the utilisation of land and resources in an optimal manner: corruption; lack of adequate funding for small farmers; land belonging to the traditional leaders and provision of sub-standard houses by the municipality.

Table 1.7 Improving assets such as land, funding and other resources

Challenges (and causes)	Ward										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9	10	11	
Substandard shelter or housing (<i>poverty, poor monitoring when houses are built, contractors are unprofessional, nepotism</i>)	✓		✓			✓			✓		
Lack of agricultural support systems	✓										
Traditional own/control most of the land and not easy to access it (<i>selfishness, poor relations with municipality which does not have land of its own, small business people offer bribes</i>)	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓		
Too much focus on use of land for human settlement at the expense of development (<i>ignorance, preoccupation with maintaining growing own villages, lack of entrepreneurial skills, illiteracy and ignorance</i>)			✓	✓			✓	✓			
Corruption (<i>poor leadership, unfaithfulness, breakdown in African values</i>)		✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	
Delays in settling land claims (<i>municipality does not own any land, changes in personnel in Land Claims Commission, release of government funding for purchase of land is too slow, corrupt practices</i>)			✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	
Lack of adequate funding (<i>poor planning by municipality, lack of information, instability, corruption</i>)			✓	✓		✓			✓	✓	
Key: ✓ = The ward identified this as a major issue needing attention. There are no results for Ward 7.											

Table 1.8 Promoting social cohesion by strengthening interpersonal relationships, expanded networks and access to information

Challenges (and causes)	Ward										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9	10	11	
Lack of information (<i>internet access and TV & radio reception is poor, lack of resources, no relevant information centres, tendency to hide information, no post office, because people want to hide information</i>)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		
Lack of coordination or consultation (<i>every department wants to do things on its own, no understanding between traditional leaders and other structures</i>)	✓		✓	✓	✓				✓	✓	
Educated people are selfish (<i>stereotyping</i>)		✓				✓					
Lack of values of humanity (<i>placing own family above everything else</i>)		✓									
Jealousies amongst local residents (<i>people are power hungry and thus do not want to leave positions of power</i>)					✓		✓				
Selfishness (<i>people think about themselves and own families</i>)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	
Municipality and the general public not on good terms (<i>no reliable communication between municipality and the people</i>)		✓		✓				✓	✓		
Key: ✓ = The ward identified this as a major issue needing attention. There are no results for Ward 7.											

Table 1.9 Providing environmental sustainability

Challenges (and causes)	Ward										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9	10	11	
Illegal cutting of trees (<i>people want space to farm, lack of job opportunities</i>)	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓			✓		
Lack of electricity (<i>extreme cutting down of trees, seeking fire wood</i>)											
No nature conservation (<i>no structure advocates for such skills to be shared, ignorance, illiteracy</i>)		✓	✓								
Veld fires (<i>no electricity</i>)		✓							✓		
Indiscriminate digging of deep holes seeking building sand (<i>people want to acquire building sand, lack of environmental education, selfishness, poverty</i>)			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Environmental pollution (<i>people do not have information about environmental issues</i>)					✓	✓		✓			
Littering (<i>too few dust bins, lack of dumping sites</i>)	✓								✓		
Soil erosion (<i>too many dongas</i>)	✓			✓		✓		✓	✓		
Burning of bushes (<i>people want land for crop farming</i>)				✓			✓	✓	✓		
Key: ✓ = The ward identified this as a major issue needing attention. There are no results for Ward 7.											

In order for sustainable development to be realised there have to be strong bonds amongst community members. Table 1.8 reveals the many factors that hindered social cohesion in the Mutale Municipality. People were described as selfish. A lack of internet to link people and a lack of humanity and poor coordination of services by government departments were cited as some of the major factors. It is vital for the government to continue playing a key role in promoting social cohesion. However, in doing so, there is a need for services offered by different government departments to be properly aligned and coordinated. Each department should be aware of the services offered by others, which would help avoid duplication.

It is not possible to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development without proper management of the environment. Table 1.9 reveals the following as evidence of communities not looking after the environment properly: illegal cutting down of trees, indiscriminate digging of deep holes seeking building sand and soil erosion. Community members agreed that it was and should be within their power to look after the environment so that development could take place.

1.9 Policy Imperatives

This article argues that for Africa to develop and eradicate poverty it needs to seriously re-examine the definition of poverty. For a long time Africa has defined poverty through the lenses of the colonial masters. This is evident in the reliance on the definition in the works of authors such as World Bank,⁴⁶ Barker⁴⁷ and Seipel,⁴⁸ among others. All of them are informed by Western and Eurocentric understandings of poverty, which use income as the base.

Africa needs to define poverty from the eyes of those living in it. As argued in this paper, poverty should be left in the eyes of the beholder. People from Mutale Municipality demonstrated that they understood and knew what poverty was and could use these parameters to identify a poor person. The results presented here constitute the ‘voices’ of the grassroots communities in the entire Mutale Municipality. They give pointers as to what integrated development planning in the municipality should focus on. The experiences gained from this study provide ample evidence of the role that a rural-based university can play in transforming grassroots communities in a rural location. In this case, the CRDPA served as the vehicle that carried the people’s voices to those who can help address local challenges. Also, the comprehensive and multidimensional nature of the study results make it an integrative platform for all stakeholders in the entire municipality, be they government, NGOs, educational institutions or the municipality, among other players. The fact that some issues were ward-specific suggested that targeted interventions should be designed deliberately zeroing in on them. The study can best be regarded as a situational analysis of the Mutale Municipality which the

Table 1.10 Ensuring proper use of public funds, encouraging shared economic growth, promoting and official delivery of public services and consolidating the rule of law

Challenges (and causes)	Ward										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	8	9	10	11	
Corruption (<i>Misuse of project monies, self-interest, self-interest and poverty, connectedness- those with connections get to benefit, no monitoring of use of public funds, mismanagement of funds, dishonest leaders, lack of financial advice</i>)	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓				✓	
Phenomenon of tenderpreneurship is widespread (<i>government officials and politicians are greedy, lack of monitoring systems, ignorance of community members, Process of tendering not clear</i>)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓				
Lack of financial management skills (<i>no skills</i>)		✓	✓			✓					
Nepotism (<i>self-interest and poverty, poor human resource capacity</i>)			✓			✓					
Government does not properly consult people when implementing projects (<i>corruption and nepotism</i>)			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	
Poor utilization of resources (<i>no information about importance of quality service, lack of personnel to monitor projects, no community policing forum</i>)	✓			✓				✓			
Key: ✓ = The ward identified this as a major issue needing attention. There are no results for Ward 7.											

Municipal Council, coming in after the 18 May 2011 local government elections, can use as a basis for constructing its core business, namely the integrated development plan.

The more than 120 volunteer development agents who engaged village-level communities constitute a critical mass of researchers who can be developed further to play even more significant roles in municipal planning, implementation of development initiatives and also monitoring progress. The results are a product of a unique engagement process which included children, youth, women, men and community leaders who participated in collective ventilation platforms. This approach must be sustained as it deepens democracy and hands over the baton used in the community and municipal development race to those affected by the challenge.

The model used by the participating stakeholders to galvanise a wide range of players to participate in processes leading to this report might be the solution to inter-governmental relations problems bedevilling most local municipalities. The Mutale Municipality should try to build on the momentum gathered to date and not treat this as a once-off event. It is fundamental to use the consolidated results presented here to give feedback to all villages, including what the inputs could

be used for. Once village-level communities endorse the results, it is vital for all stakeholders to organize a workshop under the auspices of Mutale Municipality to develop an integrated action plan and appoint a team that would monitor its implementation. In addition to this, the results of this work should be used to identify and adopt ‘poverty pockets’ where the multiple stakeholders can come together and demonstrate how to fight poverty and underdevelopment collectively. Lastly, there are a number of ‘low hanging fruits’ that this study made available. These can be implemented right away, which, if done, would significantly build the confidence of the communities in their leaders and the importance of participating in research on issues that affect their livelihoods.

1.10 Conclusion

This study demonstrated that the people of the Mutale Municipality both young and old were ready to participate in any meaningful community engagement. It is up to the municipality to harness and promote this community readiness. Taking it from the point that development is about people, there is no reason why sustainable development cannot be attained in this municipality. A significant product of this study was the revelation that there were some areas where the relationships between community structures, in particular traditional leaders and ward councilors/ward committees needed to be improved. The fact that the study failed to take off in one ward owing to irreconcilable differences among local leadership structures within the time scheduled for this study suggested that research of this nature must always plan for such eventuality. Also, the municipality needs to find a way of dealing with the challenges in the ward in question. Lastly, given the richness of the findings of this study, there is no reason going forward why the municipality cannot produce relevant IDP or local economic development (LED) policies and implementation strategies. The results highlight a poverty map for the municipality, which if properly used would help improve the targeting of development interventions and reduce the chances of promoting irrelevant development. Lastly, the paper concludes that people in rural areas who should inform policy-makers on the definition and extent of poverty and vulnerability in their areas. A consensual definition of poverty is appropriate if Africa is to be saved from extreme poverty.

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2

Chapter

The Flip Sides of Corruption: A Challenge to Developing Countries

Tapera O Chirawu

Life is anchored in human consciousness of the self and of the environmental factors pivotal to the provision and receipt of the goods and services necessary for livelihood. However, that experience comes with various challenges. The first is how to sustain a livelihood given the presence of inflated personal desires, the propensity for competition and the paucity of resources worldwide. Our environment exposes us to natural and manufactured deprivations of life-supporting elements, namely food, shelter, clothing and political freedom. The second challenge is how to ensure an equitable supply of life's needs and maintain a balanced satisfaction among the beneficiaries of an environment characterised by inflated egos and where there is competition to have more than one needs. At the same time, the provision of goods and services requires the skills to manage diversity and ensure transparency, efficiency, fairness, and effective delivery systems. These are important elements that generally guarantee satisfaction. Ideally, these elements should be supported by social and economic control systems designed to ensure the attainment of both individual and collective objectives in ways that ensure peaceful coexistence attained through good governance. The administration and management of societal affairs need to be performed with the consent and direct participation of the electorate or representatives thereof. Therefore, society needs elected or appointed leaders vested with the power and authority to drive the processes designed to provide goods and services to society. That leadership responsibility recalls Parenti's well-known statement:

Where power is derived from the loyalty of others and wealth from the labour of others; where many citizens' failure is other people's success; and where noble intentions and ignoble effects exist in equal abundance, the power of a man is his present means to obtain some future good.¹

To that end, experience has proven that there is great temptation for public servants to bend official rules and regulations (where they exist) for friends and other benefactors, thereby making most bureaucracies worldwide either slightly or egregiously corrupt.² They use the power that they have, the power invested in the positions that they hold, as means to bend the rules for personal benefit. Hence, personal gain, allegiance to community norms and practices, organisational

compulsions, political trappings, demands for national security, national development through international collaboration and economic pressure could be said to be the factors that promote corruption.

2.1 Defining Corruption

There are several ways of defining corruption. Some social-science authorities say that corruption is the use of public office for private/personal gain; government systems without competition; the privatisation of politics so that it concerns the distribution of benefits from economic transactions; and demanding additional payment for services that one is already officially paid for.³ The *Business Dictionary* defines it as an act of ‘giving or obtaining advantage through means which are illegitimate, immoral, and/or inconsistent with one’s duty or the rights of others, [and] often results from patronage’.⁴ Generally, corruption can be loosely defined as *initiation of transaction of goods and/or services to benefit the initiator, persons, or organisations of her/his choice. That includes one’s government*. Goldstein refers to it as ‘a kind of politics in that it concerns the distribution of benefits from economic transactions (exchange and capital acculation)’.⁵

Corruption, it is known, permeates all levels of society, affects many organisations and influences foreign policy. One of its key characteristics is that it is immoral and unethical because it denies citizens important social and economic opportunities, and results in short- and long-term physical and psychological damage to those deprived of their rights, thereby causing destitution for many, and material gains for a few. This creates a situation where many citizens fail and a few succeed.⁶ That means corruption exists within a structured environment where social, political and economic power relations instrumentally determine who gets what, when, how much and for how long. Corruption is, therefore, inseparable from society’s requirements for daily existence – professional opportunities, land ownership and delivery and receipt of a wide range of goods and services. The other characteristic of corruption is its victims’ explicit willingness to pay in order to get something so that they can survive. Corruption occurs in an environment where there are either no measures to prevent the practice, or where anti-corruption laws exist but are reluctantly enforced, if at all. In addition, civil servants and senior politicians involved in the practice become oblivious to the phenomenon.

Although no country is exempt from corruption, those involved differ in terms of their level of capacity and institutional support for being corrupt. Table 2.1 demonstrates that, in the author’s view, Western nations occupy the leading position in influencing and perpetuating corruption in large parts of the world given the amounts of money they spend on bribing individuals and government officials in the less developed parts of the world, particularly Africa. Table 2.1 provides a

Table 2.1 Examples of corruption instigated by Western organisations and/or governments in Africa, 1980–2010⁷ (USD and GBP)

Person	Organisation	Amount	Recipient	Objective
US				
W.J. 'Dollar Bill' Jefferson	iGate & Mody	Unspecified	Nigeria's vice president	Win tenders
Dick Cheney and Jim Bob Brown	Willbross Group	\$180 million	Nigerian government officials	To win a \$6 billion tender
Albert Jack Stanley	KBR	Unspecified	Government officials	Tenders
William Utt	Halliburton	\$579 million	US authorities	Bribery fine
UK				
Tiny Roland	London Rhodesia Company	Unspecified	Government officials; freedom fighters	Economic favours
Michael Foster	Carbon Harvesting Corporation	Unspecified	Government officials	Tenders
Officials of	BAE Systems	£500 million for South Africa; £1 billion for Eastern Europe	Government officials in South Africa, Saudi Arabia; Tanzania; Czech Republic	Business concessions
Officials of	Kier International	unspecified	Officials of Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP)	Tender worth \$8 billion
Officials of	Sterling International	unspecified	African leaders	To win tenders
Officials of	Sir Alexander Gibbs	unspecified	African leaders	To win tenders
France				
Prosecutors	Judiciary		The public, in particular corrupt African presidents	Economic benefits; block anti-corruption legislation
Officials of	Spie Battignolles	Unspecified	Masupha Sole, CEO LHWP	Construction tender
Officials of	Schneider Electric	\$6 million	Masupha Sole	Tender
Officials of	Technip SA	Unspecified	Nigerian government officials	Tenders
Canada/Germany				
Officials of	Lehmeyer International	Unspecified	LHWP officials	Tenders
Officials of	LHWP	Unspecified	LHDA CEO, Ephrame Sole	Tenders
Italy				
Officials of	Saipen Construction	Unspecified	Nigerian government officials	Tenders
Japan				
Officials of	JGC and KBR Corporations	Unspecified	Nigerian government officials	Tenders

selection of major cases of corrupt activities planned and implemented by Western organisations and/or governments in Africa between 1980 and 2010.

2.2 Causes of Corruption

Human experience points to a wide range of causes of corruption. These include the propensity of personal desire to succeed in every endeavour at whatever cost; personal wish to socially, politically and economically move ahead of others in spite of personal handicaps; a competitive urge; desire for social, political and economic trappings; leadership pressure to ensure organisational and/or national economic security as opposed to personal gain (e.g. developed nations or transnational companies bribing small countries in order to gain business concessions); and the desire to maintain personal status created by delusions of grandeur. During his days as president of Zaire, Sese Seko Mobutu made it a law that the national television broadcaster showed him descending from heaven and ascending to heaven before and after every news bulletin respectively.⁸ There could not be better encouragement by a corrupt, greedy head of state to fellow citizens in leadership or administrative positions to employ their ingenuity in the effort to illegally benefit materially or otherwise than when Mobutu told them: 'If you want to steal, steal a little, cleverly, in a nice way.'⁹ It takes two to tango, as the cliché goes, and the same applies to corruption, particularly if it is of an international nature, as witnessed by the legacy of colonialism and the compulsions of the superpowers' politics of proxy and self-enrichment.

Greed as a cause of corruption can be illustrated by several examples, such as former Egyptian President Mubarak's billionaire cabinet ministers, not to mention his own personal wealth, said to be worth between US\$30 and \$70 billion.¹⁰ Others are the jailing of former Japanese president, Fujimori, in 1997 on corruption charges; oil companies' bribes to host governments in the oil-rich so-called Third World countries; the Halliburton corruption case involving US Vice President Dick Cheney in Nigeria; the US government's awareness of corrupt practices by American companies in several countries; France's special relations with the presidents of its former African colonies; and the Seychelles government's 'promise to give immunity from extradition or prosecution for corruption-related crimes committed elsewhere' (dubbed the 'Welcome, Criminals Act' by US officials).¹¹

These serve as some of the many examples of official corruption or tacit sanctioning of corruption by the governments of those involved – individuals and/or companies. Each of these examples of corruption manifests at different levels, and sets in motion situational spin-offs that entrench the interests of the socially, politically and economically powerful, while exacerbating the destitution of the deprived.

Once one realises that bribery is necessary to achieve what one wants, in both parties – those who ask for bribes and those who offer them – the expectation evolves from being a norm to a culture, particularly in Africa. The practice consolidates itself at all levels of society as institutional bribery – what is known as *kitu kidoko* in Tanzania and *maslaha* in Gambia – and drives all transactions, commercial and non-commercial, as long as someone gives a service that is needed by another party.

2.3 Levels of Corruption

At the personal level, it is instinctive to strive for a better life in ways that are sometimes contrary to fair competition. When success is difficult to achieve, other means are sought to make it happen, particularly when many members of the society realise the benefits. Hence the Cameroonian proverb ‘you eat, I eat’, meaning if you want to succeed, you should help me succeed as well. This ethos translates, for example, into bribing a government official or civil servant for their service. It is a dangerous practice that frequently becomes endemic in the community. Once corruption extends to the community level, it becomes difficult to eradicate because it entrenches itself as an expected and acceptable way of life.

At the organisational level, with particular reference to government, bureaucracy and corruption become so intertwined that bureaucrats become used to a routine of corruption and find it difficult to change the way of doing things.¹² A bribe may make them work faster on a particular case/issue for which they have been paid.

At the political level the lure of power inevitably persuades leaders to cushion their positions as much as possible, and sometimes they resort to the Machiavellian way: being rational and tough in exercising politics.¹³ The world has witnessed such overindulgence, often proving that political processes are self-centred, and that they constitute the driving force or the engine of government.¹⁴

National security constitutes another level where corruption has become endemic. Most importantly, it presents a mixed bag of corruption because comprehensive security has several elements and each needs particular attention and administrative skills in order to collaboratively achieve national security anchored in good governance characterised by natural and constitutional freedoms. At the basis of national security is the need to fulfil the requirements of life. People must have food, shelter, clothing and other basic necessities of a social, political and economic nature. The provision of these services necessitates a complex network involving individual citizens, civil society organisations, political parties, national government and other countries that are members of the political and/or economic groupings to which a country may belong. The provision of these

services also requires a legally recognised leadership accepted by the country's citizens, prompting the view that 'society is a form of order imposed by some men on others, and maintained [if necessary] by force'.¹⁵ It is at all times characterised by individual and collective interests that form the basis of individual and collective livelihoods, obtained either through fair play or corruption. Therefore, it is arguably compatible with Hobbes's theory that 'society is based on rational self-interest'.¹⁶ The invasion of Iraq by the US-led nations is an attestation of such self-interest at an international level – the security of one is the security of all. Hence, hypothetically all individual (national) and collective (international) security matters generally translate into economic security issues – freedom for every nation to make economic decisions by networking with other countries. However, the endeavour to achieve such national/economic security is, more often than not, sullied by developed countries' overt corrupt practices in the form of bribery, etc., particularly with partners in less developed countries in order to get favours from poorly paid government officials who participate in corrupt schemes in exchange for much-needed cash.

2.4 Categories of Corruption

Broadly-speaking, there are two categories of corruption. The first category is prompted by personal desire. This is embedded in the competition that underpins social networking – one's imagination of how members of the community perceive an individual's place and role in society's strata. This form of corruption is characterised by seven elements:

- Knowledge that others have benefited and continue to benefit from corruption
- Desire to compete with socially and economically successful individuals
- Absence of legal instruments to prevent/curb corruption
- Compulsion to ensure one's success
- Instinctive desire to move ahead economically in one's peer group
- Government's failure to create jobs
- Outright greed

The second category is the corrupt acquisition of political trappings. This can be found in

- the desire to fulfil political campaign promises, particularly when the overall prevailing conditions are not enabling
- countering pressure to give in to national demand for a change of government
- fear for one's life after years of trampling on impoverished masses, which gives credence to the West African saying: 'greet all the people that you meet when going up, because you will meet the same people when coming down'

- governments' deliberate reluctance to enforce anti-corruption measures because enforcing them would wipe out the support the leader has among the current and prospective beneficiaries of corruption and
- the necessity to secure one's future should political fortunes change (evident in the way Mubarak was deposed from power in 2011, for example).

Although 'a perfect order in a social system would signify the arrival of utopia',¹⁷ corruption by design undermines the concept of 'moral community', or 'a collectivity of people who share certain "definitions of the situation" (called values), which legitimise the inequalities of social organisation and cause people to accept them as morally justified'.¹⁸ Yet individuals, communities, organisations, political parties, national governments and cross-national organisations plan and carry out corrupt activities that create destitution in the midst of wealth. Behind these activities is the quest for power, prompting Nietzsche to observe: 'Where I found the living, there I found the will to power'.¹⁹ Citing Lyndon B. Johnson as an example, Korda further noted that 'to confess that one has power is to make oneself responsible for using it, and safety lies in an artfully contrived pose of impotence, behind which one can do exactly as one pleases'.²⁰ Behind such pretence lie ominous designs to achieve whatever power at whatever level, a phenomenon that confirms many psychoanalysts' contention that 'the will to power is an essential expression of our humanity, though [psychoanalysts] seem unable to recommend just how this instinct should best be used'.²¹ Many people, communities, organisations, politicians, governments and international governmental groupings express this instinct through corruption, which manifests itself in personal desires and political trappings.

2.5 Instruments for Corruption

Social, political and economic elites initiate corruption in most countries. More often than not, they are powerful government officials or they have very strong ties with government because they either have material wealth or power. Hence, as Parenti argues, their 'interests never stand naked. They are enshrouded in the flag, fortified by the law, protected by the police, nurtured by the media, taught by the schools, and blessed by the church'.²² The national flag, the law, the police, the government-manipulated media, the schools (most of which are government-controlled) and even the church are subtly used by government as instruments to enforce the state's control over its people. And the state does so fully aware of this prevailing corruption. At the same time, government's action underlines the fact that power determines who gets what, when and how.²³ The less powerful also benefit from corruption in ways that, in turn, deprive those below them, as

corruption filters down to the lowest levels of the entire fabric of society. The prevalence of the phenomenon is readily observable in countries where public institutions are largely politicised.

2.5.1 Politicisation of public institutions

Politicisation of public institutions is carried out by the party in power to ensure it remains at the helm. Hence, the public-service human resources machinery is designed to hire, promote and train mostly loyal party members and exclude those who are not. This is tantamount to the party owning the public institutions. Consequently, every party member in each institution knows who put her/him there and why: to serve the interests of the party. In turn, the institution's hierarchy replicates the process that led to its establishment, namely to select those to join the ranks strictly as prescribed by the party. This usually results in a civil service blighted by untrained or semi-trained non-performers who qualify for the position purely by dint of being party members.

The politicised institution's provision of services to the public follows the same dictum: it prioritises party supporters and disfavours non-party members. An example is a police force hired as party members who arrest known non-party members for petty crimes, but turn a blind eye when party officials commit serious crimes. The treatment of opposition party members can become inhuman in many cases. It was not surprising that Mubarak's state police employed 1.4 million personnel who became infamous for their brutality against protestors and the voice of dissent.²⁴ In the process, skilled citizens affected by unemployment, underdevelopment, marginalisation, mistreatment (e.g. unprocedural suspensions and/or dismissal), poverty and destitution are forced to migrate to countries where they can find employment and are able to feed their families.²⁵ Upon realising there is a skills shortage, the governments that politicise public institutions usually hire foreign labour who do not threaten the country's political status quo.

2.5.2 Persuasion

Persuasion is usually used in conjunction with pay-offs, kickbacks, gifts and other methods to win the support and approval of government officials for favourable policies.²⁶ To quote some examples:

In the 1970s US-based Lockheed bribed top government officials in Japan to buy Lockheed jets for the Japanese military, [and] in the early 1990s, the Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCCI) was found to have operated a vast illegal worldwide network of money laundering, fraud, and corruption.²⁷

Therefore, corruption may be either initiated by foreign interests or may be of endogenous origin. Nonetheless, the objective is the same: ‘Get what you want even if it means succeeding through the use of illegal or immoral methods. It could be argued that many Africans are sucked into corruption by the benefits they see accruing to fellow corrupt citizens, usually because of the absence of preventive measures – laws and policies.’²⁸

2.5.3 Force

The use of force as an instrument of corruption can only be explained within the social, political and economic matrix on which the realities and values of society rest. Political leaders are effectively an inseparable part of this matrix. Every society is expected to have unrestricted human networking that brings about self-actualisation in the environmental milieu (social element). It experiences deliberate and mutually beneficial exchanges of goods that confer material pleasure (economic element). And it practises a structured government system established through the consensual participation of the citizenry (political element). Benefits accruing from the interaction and cross-fertilisation of the three elements forming the matrix may precede acquisition of power (individuals arising to powerful political positions through elections or coups), which is the fountain of force. Once there, they feel free to use force under whatever pretext they see fit in order to achieve their objectives. Such force could be used in the name of the state as a representative of a human community that has the ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’.²⁹ This scenario leaves the powerless citizen vulnerable not only to corruption (deprivation of rights), but also to many other inhuman treatments by government agents who either do not agree with what they are asked to do against fellow citizens, or do not understand the role that they should play in society. However, they do it only in order to earn a living. This is largely the case in Africa.

2.5.4 Economic deprivation

Many political parties in power, particularly in the so-called Third World, withhold development from regions and/or constituencies dominated by opposition parties. It is a form of ‘punishment’ meted out to convince the electorate in such regions to switch their allegiance to the ruling party. In the process, the agents of the parties responsible may infiltrate the target recalcitrant communities in an effort to capture favourable media publicity from political converts, who are usually presented at hyped news conferences projecting the governing party’s inroads into the opposition community. In line with the politicisation of public institutions,

denying skilled and well-trained citizens employment because they do not support the governing party is an attestation of economic deprivation. Consequently, not only do those directly victimised suffer, but so do their dependants. Another direct effect of such economic disenfranchisement is the denial of a better future for school-going children, who end up deprived of a decent education because their skilled parents fail to find work and cannot pay their children's school fees. Also important to note is that the country will suffer from both the economic brain drain and a financial drain as a result of the high salaries paid to so-called experts, some of whom may have dubious qualifications and cannot be employed in their own countries.

2.5.5 Unfulfilled promises

Although the government may have the capacity to hire personnel (albeit underpaid), the state's capacity to handle the challenges of industrialisation – endogenous commercial/economic development that boosts economic output and creates jobs – is constrained by the lack of local skills in the workforce. Additionally, economic promises are hardly fulfilled, particularly in terms of improving the social welfare of workers. Sometimes this has resulted in 'ghost' public-service personnel being created by well-placed, but underpaid, workers who corruptly establish non-existent employees, whose 'salaries' are paid into someone else's account. This form of corruption occurred in Malawi, where the government was forced to establish 'pay parade' after 68 000 out of a workforce of 169 000 failed to provide information to facilitate electronic pay cheque deposits.³⁰

2.5.6 Seeds and instruments of corruption

Whereas in the West corruption could be said to be propelled by the capitalist ethos at all levels, in Africa the principal causes are greed and poverty, which make the continent vulnerable to various forms of financial bribery. Financial fraud is accepted and practised as a means to survive in an environment full of inequality and vicious competition, prompting cunning strategies that disregard and/or absorb blame regardless of the inhuman consequences at different levels of governance. These serve as attestations of the common and multifaceted nature of Africa's overwhelming corruption.

2.6 Does Corruption Have a Positive Side?

Research has shown that corruption is practised for personal gain. The benefits are not meant to be shared with other members of society, at least not directly. To that end, it is a manifestation of the notion of 'each man for himself and God for us all'.

Hence, one must either join the practice and survive, or reject it and perish. What is also true is that Africa would be better off in terms of development if the large sums of money transferred out of the continent and banked or invested overseas were used to create jobs and build economic infrastructure in the countries the money was stolen from. That is only one of the flip sides of corruption.

On the other hand, corruption is practised for the greater good it brings to the country. The US, UK, France, Germany and other developed countries practise corruption directly or indirectly on a large scale outside their borders with the knowledge of the good it brings to their nations. There is no question that corruption creates jobs, reduces unemployment and boosts economic output, leading to higher levels of gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national product (GNP). It also raises citizens' economic capacity to meet social and other challenges. Therefore, it is not surprising that these countries are prepared to directly or indirectly pay large sums of bribery money. Non-implementation of anti-corruption measures and the effort to separate local from external corruption drives home how low such governments are prepared to stoop. However, that does not take away the benefits that their countries gain from the practice. Hence, Africa, arguably the richest continent in the world, continues to suffer from the weight of economic servitude largely as a result of corruption embedded in oblivious political dictatorship disguised as democracy because the African countries organise regular elections. Yet intimidation, stuffing of ballot boxes, and in many cases actual murder of opposition party supporters characterise the electoral processes.

2.7 The Way Forward

To deny that African scholars persistently call on the continent's political leadership to recognise and implement developmental recommendations emanating from scientific research perpetuates the myth that African citizens are unpatriotic and do not participate in the governance of their countries, particularly in policy formulation. The problem is no one listens seriously to them. They are often just viewed as political opponents. At the same time, to link Africa's underdevelopment to its colonial legacy is to accept failure to fulfil Kwame Nkrumah's prophecy that everything will follow once political freedom has been won. His vision was that attaining independence would mean acquisition of power – the power to make laws that would effectively change how government affairs are managed. He hoped for the empowerment of citizens in ways that would give them the ownership of the means and control of production. Instead, the dawn of political freedom in most African countries ushered in an era of self-righteousness based on ever-increasing political weakness manifesting through social and economic trappings for the leadership – always asking the question 'what is in it for me?'. This situation continues to make

those who have easy access to resources ‘best able to parlay [their] advantages into greater advantages, using resources they already possess to accumulate still more’.³¹ In other words, corruption disadvantages society’s poor. In the process, a public sentiment antagonistic to the elite political leadership has been fostered. Yet, as many optimists would argue, ‘the tragedy is not in the falling, in the failure to rise’. In spite of Africa’s governments’ seemingly successful suppression of academics’ efforts to shape political and economic thinking and vision through literature and research; regardless of the growing levels of urban garbage – even though municipal rates which should be used for collecting trash, are levied every month – and despite the untenable, deep-rooted, divisive political intolerance that drives skilled citizens out of their countries daily, there is a solution to every political challenge.

The way forward is to create a respected and sustainable forum composed of carefully *selected representatives of the continent’s intellectual* collectivity and the leadership of the African Union for the purposes of exchanging views on good governance as a prerequisite for development. The latter should be the objective of every nation. The failure of the past should not be allowed to stand in the way of new efforts and strategies to move Africa forward.

2.8 Conclusion

Corruption is a tool for all – individuals, communities and organisations wishing to gain materially, or to improve their social or political standing in society where under normal legal and procedural circumstances they would otherwise not be able to. Politicians use corruption not only to get votes, but to elevate their social status and accumulate wealth. This was revealed during the Arab North African revolutions of 2011. Entrepreneurs who would otherwise fail under conditions of transparency and fairness resort to corruption to sustain their businesses. The ordinary person gets involved in corruption purely to survive. The poor who have been condemned to struggle turn to corruption in order to survive. They are forced to part with the meagre resources that they have in order to get the little they can get in order to survive, thereby prompting the West African saying ‘you eat, I eat’, referred to earlier. In essence, corruption creates a dog-eat-dog environment that makes people prioritise survival at all costs. Some governments, in particular those that are economically well developed, use corruption to further accumulate wealth at the expense of weak and poor nations, mostly by providing tacit support to national companies that have proven their worth in ensuring national economic growth even if doing so means they have to be corrupt wherever they do business, especially in Africa.

The above observation confirms that Africans are no more corrupt than their European, American or Chinese counterparts. The wealthiest nations spend

millions of dollars in corruption money, and in return reap billions. The challenge is how to stop corruption – if it can be stopped – particularly in Africa, where the business of some governments is to gain international acceptance through trade regardless of the conditions; where majority party representatives do not tolerate opposition members' contributions to formulating policy; where anti-corruption units are packed with ruling party sympathisers who refuse to incriminate corrupt political allies; where reports on corruption are released only if they do not incriminate the ruling party or government; where appointment to government positions is based on party membership rather than suitability for the position; where tenders are awarded mostly to unqualified party supporters or their relatives, resulting in failure to deliver services; where awarding scholarships depends on which political party the applicant's parents support; and where access to public facilities (e.g. media, transport, property) is largely reserved for the ruling party.

In the absence of a continental consensus involving all stakeholders, namely politicians, academics, non-governmental organisations, the public and private sectors, and student bodies, in crafting a pragmatic road map to reduce corrupt practices in Africa, there will be little hope for future generations to experience meaningful political freedom and economic independence.

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3

Chapter

Transitions of a Political Culture

Sanya Osha

3.1 The Military Imperative in Postcoloniality

Several myths regarding the Nigerian military establishment have been created and perpetuated by Nigerian intellectuals. More than the myths by the military itself, the myths created by the opinion moulders of civil society have an added veneer of legitimacy, accuracy and, perhaps also, respectability. True, the Nigerian military establishment is not entirely innocent of civil society's perception of it. Indeed, it played an ingenious role in the general construction, popularisation and, ultimately, entrenchment of its own image.

Before we attempt an understanding of this widely accepted image, it is necessary to revisit the constitutional status of the Nigerian military establishment, in the course of which we shall discern how its traditional functions have been usurped by non-constitutional motivations and interests.

The Nigerian Armed Forces were established by the Army Act of 1960, which was also the year in which the Royal Navy Act was promulgated.¹ The Air Force Act came into effect in 1964. The Nigerian constitutions of 1960, 1963, 1979 and 1999 all contain legal provisions regarding the Nigerian military. These provisions include the following:

The Federation shall: establish, equip and maintain an Army, a Navy, an Air Force and such other branches of the Armed Forces of the Federation as may be considered adequate and effective; for the purpose of:

- a. Defending Nigeria from external aggression.
- b. Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea and air.
- c. Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so.
- d. Performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

We must, however note, at this juncture that the Nigerian constitution does not provide for the Nigerian military to participate in the political field. Of course this has not prevented it from assigning to itself purely political functions. What is even more interesting are the various instruments, procedures and interests that

it has been able to amass and employ in legitimising its functional and ideological interests (no matter how inchoate). Obviously, there are theoretical explanations for this which I shall attempt to furnish later.

O.B.C. Nwolise, a notable scholar of Nigerian militarism, identifies several extra-constitutional functions which the Nigerian military has assigned to itself. Some of these functions include what he terms security and defence inputs, political inputs, alternative political leadership, socio-economic inputs (settlement of soldier–civilian disputes), social service, economic opportunities, project construction, image-making (psychological) inputs, sports and games and finally international peacekeeping.²

These are the major functions he ascribes to the Nigerian military, several of which lack constitutional backing. Nwolise's classifications also reveal a distinct ideological bias. He argues, for instance, that 'the military is equipped to do things the civilian politicians have most assuredly failed to do because of the military's training, skill, hierarchical structure, dedication to national integration and service'.³ This kind of intellectualisation of the military myth has helped to perpetuate the military's arrogance and excesses.⁴ Its so-called hierarchical structure has produced paradoxical effects. While it is supposed to be an institution structured by rigid discipline, the realities, compromises and flexibility inherent in the political terrain have evidently had a corrupting influence that the military institution has not been able to adequately address. Military dictators such as General Ibrahim Babangida exploited the contradictory and paradoxical strains in Nigeria's military–civil relations to the detriment of both the Nigerian military and civil society.

Perhaps one of the greatest challenges for the development of a democratic ethos in Nigeria is a critical analysis of the contradictory strains in military–civil relations, and how they affect the national consciousness and political behaviour. Indeed a framework for such an analysis needs to be constructed because militarism is a historico-political process that extends beyond itself; it is in fact akin to a dialectical mode of sociopolitical dynamics that coerces, persuades and conquers until even civil society begins to employ its dictates, procedures, features and arguments in legitimising itself. Thus the commencement of a democratic dispensation after the end of prolonged militarism does not necessarily imply a definite conceptual and epistemological fissure. This is a fact of which the Nigerian civil populace must constantly remind itself.

To begin with, military culture in Nigeria has had several years to develop. As it developed and refined the instruments for its perpetuation, civil society was also co-opted in the effort until the language of non-militaristic discourse not only became abbreviated and corrupted by the discourse of militarism but also became indistinguishable from it. There is a need to rebuild and strengthen the language of

non-militaristic discourse. In other words, there is a need to rebuild the discourse of the civil ethos. Of course this is a task easier said than done.

One of the ways in which we can understand how militarism structures the political discourse of civil society in Nigeria is to determine how its ideological and intellectual proponents operate. We have noted how Nwolise provides conceptual justification for the military ethos. Jibril Ibrahim, another respected Nigerian scholar, identifies other Nigerian academics that were co-opted by the military establishment for elaborate ideological purposes.

But just as militarism had its fervent ideological proponents, it also had its avid detractors within the wide spectrum of the Nigerian civil populace and also within the military itself. Until very recently, in the major debate regarding the incursion of the military into the field of politics, some scholars have argued that the military institution cannot carry out any meaningful or fundamental change in society. This school holds that the only avenue for sociopolitical change is through revolutions and that the military as a conservative force often allies itself with the ruling class to abort revolutionary initiatives. Opposing scholars in this debate believe that the military can stimulate real development, given the special qualities of military organisations.⁵

Sadly, this debate, instead of developing the language of non-militaristic discourse for the purpose of developing an alternative and viable mode of governance and social relations, went on to impoverish the very language of civil rights. It has been noted that 'militarism is antithetical to democracy'. Also, that 'the contradiction between military rule and democracy is not only ideological but also philosophical'.⁶

What does this demonstrate about the actual continuities and transformations between the two separate discourses? What approaches have the Nigerian civil community evolved to critique its own militaristic influence?

Earlier on, I mentioned the fact that democracy within the Nigerian sociopolitical context is often contiguous with militarism. There are several theoretical explanations for this argument. J.B. Thompson, writing in the introduction to Pierre Bourdieu's *Language and Symbolic Power*, demonstrates the nature of the social character of language and the 'complicated ways in which linguistic practices and products are caught up in, and moulded by, the forms of power and inequality which are pervasive features of societies as they actually exist'.⁷ Thompson stresses the aspect of Bourdieu's work that elaborates on more productive methods of viewing the operations and the social and political conditions of language. He observes that:

The recognition of the right to speak, and the associated forms of power and authority which are implicit in all communicative situations, are generally

ignored by the linguist, who treats the linguistic exchange as an intellectual operation consisting of the encoding and decoding of grammatically well-formed messages.⁸

What concerns us at this juncture is Bourdieu's preoccupation with the social and political operations of language. Perhaps this insight is not wholly original since it bears a close resemblance to Foucault's discourse of power. These discursive insights can also be profitably applied to the Nigerian sociopolitical context. What are the operations of power in relation to reason and the production of social discourse? How do we discern its precise origins and its effects and what methodologies have we evolved in critiquing them? How do we ascertain the precise force of the discourse of power in a supposedly liberal democratic context? Indeed these are important questions.

As mentioned earlier, General Ibrahim Babangida, the former Nigerian dictator, devised a wide array of political stratagems to camouflage his genuine political intentions. His professed intentions turned out to be insincere and self-serving (in relation to the numerous promises he made to the Nigerian populace), but elaborate discourses were constructed to conceal them. In order to grant force and credibility to these strategies, Babangida employed the services of several skilful political scientists who were quite adept in the art of prevarication. Instead of admitting the failure of Babangida's transition-to-civil-rule programme, Olagunju (1993), one of his advisers, prevaricates:

... if mistakes were made – and indeed there were some – such mistakes were not about intention and values; rather they were outcomes of social procedures, personal judgement and institutional capabilities.⁹

Oyovbaire, another political adviser, is even more elaborate in his justifications of the Babangida regime and its numerous deceptions. Babangida's 'programme and courses of actions were woven around the liberalisation of the economy'.¹⁰ Oyovbaire proceeds to describe Babangida's general programme of action thus:

Having laid the major policies and programmes of his administration by 1988/89, the regime proceeded on a massive investment to provide the institutional and normative support for the realization of the objectives of the programmes. Quite a huge amount of resources in funds, materials and human commitment were heavily invested in the programmes of democratisation and liberalisation. These included such areas as grassroots development; the restructuring of market forces and the privatisation and commercialisation of appropriate government parastatals; the basic institutions of the political process for transforming the human behaviour; organization of political groupings into political parties;

conducting elections; the knowledge and management of human statistics which included the population census; other basic social infrastructure in health, education, sports, the media and culture. There was also investment for the rapid development of the Federal Capital Territory and the expanded federalization of the political system by way of creating more states and local governments. There were many more other areas of resource investments undertaken by the regime for democratization of the political system and liberalization of the economy.¹¹

This lengthy excerpt displays the discursive intent of the official version of the Babangida myth by a skilful political scientist. Babangida was concerned with history and assigned his political advisers the task of constructing the official version of the discourse pertaining to his regime.

However, equally astute political scientists have contested the carefully constructed discourse regarding Babangida's regime. The Babangida regime sought not to historicise truth, instead it sought to dress it in a prettified garb and hide it behind a mask of benevolence. And as we have noted, it enlisted the skills of its own carefully selected scholars to legitimise its own version of truth and discourse.

Academics such as Oyovbaire maintain that the military has contributed immensely to the democratisation process. But it has also been argued that 'there are in-built mechanisms in military culture that makes its democratization processes truncated, less enduring and prone to failure'.¹²

Furthermore, in relation to the Babangida regime's self-created discourse, there is also a specific and direct counter-discourse. Jibril Ibrahim, for instance, argues:

Under the Babangida and Abacha administrations, what used to be known as corruption has become the art of government itself. There is a complete prebendalization of state power and virtually all acts by public expenditure or public goods of any kind leads to the appropriation of state finances or property by officials. The routine operations of government are being subjected to prebendal rules. It is widely known, for example, that officials of state governments and parastatals have to pay, as they put it, 'up front' a percentage of their statutory allocations to the Presidency, Ministry of Finance and Central Bank officials before their allocations are released. They, in turn, simply take their own personal shares 'up front' from so-called government coffers. Contractors who used to bribe officials for government contracts have been completely sidelined. The President, military governors, ministers etc. simply allocate contracts to their own front companies, and they don't even have to pretend they are doing the job because nobody can dare pose questions.¹³

Matters deteriorated even further during the Abacha regime. The discourse of deception which the Babangida regime painstakingly administered to the bewildered

Nigerian nation was deemed unnecessary by the succeeding administration. Discourse and strategies of prevarication were not construed as a mark of civility but as a sign of governmental weakness. The language of force gained momentum under the Abacha regime and its effects are still evident today, even within the context of a democratic dispensation. Abacha did not make elaborate plans to construct and propagate an elaborate official history around himself and his regime in the way Babangida attempted. Babangida's official history of his regime, even though very problematic, carries a certain appeal in some Nigerian political circles. His support for Obasanjo's candidacy for president in 1999 makes common perceptions of his democratic credentials even more problematic. He had annulled the 1993 June 12 presidential elections but had partially redeemed his image by his subsequent actions, which led to the beginning of the fourth democratic dispensation. In this way, a clearly reactionary profile is counterposed with a revolutionary one, thereby contesting the popular versions of recent Nigerian history that show Babangida in a bad light. In addition, the institutional legacies left by Babangida and Abacha contain a self-perpetuating logic, that is, a rhetoric of performativity that is not easily disavowed by the rhetoric of liberal democracy.

The point at which the rhetoric of militarism, in other words, the totalitarian ethos, meets the rhetoric of democracy creates a mild form of institutional neurosis. Institutional neuroses of this kind are even more glaring in political contexts such as South Africa which has to battle with the daunting institutional legacies of apartheid.¹⁴ The aftermath of apartheid as a constitutional and political reality requires dismantling many of its institutional legacies that were inherited by the post-apartheid dispensation, and is a task that in some ways remains to be completed. In essence, the implicit rhetoric of institutions, whether totalitarian or benevolent in nature, pervades the entire social structure and in turn shapes the infrastructure of consciousness of society at large. Militarism and apartheid as political totalitarianisms are not just ideological realities; they constitute a way of thinking and a mode of existence that are supported by a multiplicity of political, cultural, social and economic forms of capital that are quite capable of mutating according to different political circumstances. In other words, these totalitarianisms are capable of considerable resilience, even under adverse conditions.

The language of the present Nigerian constitution did not really evolve out of the furnace of real democratic political contestation but under the weight of prolonged militarism. Thus the language of militarism, which is also the language of force, in very significant ways, enjoys a privileged status over the language of civil rights and the civilian ethos. The discourse of force in the Foucauldian sense continues to assume an epistemic dominance over the democratic temper – be it in its neo-liberal or leftist pretexts.

There is a poverty of analytical methodologies by which the relationships between the history of militarism and democratic practice within the Nigerian context are investigated. The apparent end of militarism or the beginning of a democratisation process does not necessarily signify a discontinuous epistemological rupture. The seeds of militarism are contained in, dispersed and maintained by the democratisation process despite all appearances to the contrary. The question at this juncture is this: is civil society ready, and what are its capabilities to create its own autonomous discourse for the survival of the emergent dispensation of Nigerian democracy? As repeatedly stressed, militarism extends into the current democratic structure. What are the objectives of the surviving strains of this militarism within the democratic dispensation? Addressing these questions will provide the conceptual tools with which we can begin to understand and strengthen the ongoing political culture. In other words, the discourse of the civil ethos must begin with an independent critique of its own status, and then focus on the numerous strains of residual militarism within the Nigerian polity.

Perhaps another productive approach for addressing the problem is the possibility of viewing militarism as contiguous with democratic culture in states that are undergoing political transformation. This would enable us to move beyond a familiar discursive binarism that poses the not altogether helpful military/civilian dichotomy. It would also enable us to overcome the complacency such binarism enforces. We simply have to continue to remind ourselves that there is no mode of speech (within the Nigerian political context), no language, that is not already tainted by the advent of militarism. The lessons to be drawn from the challenges of coping with the strains of residual militarism extend beyond the Nigerian nation. Similarly, the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa cannot be construed as a clean political and epistemological fissure. Apartheid, apart from being an elaborate system of sociopolitical organisation that legitimated racial segregation, also thoroughly pervaded every South African social structure and institution. Moreover, it is embedded in the general infrastructure of South African consciousness. As such, it has elaborate mechanisms of concealment and dispersal by which it can reconfigure its logic and violence even long after its ostensible demise. The Nigerian experience is certainly a worthy invitation for a more stringent critique of the aftermath of apartheid and other, similar forms of discredited political arrangements.

3.2 On the Importance of Dissent

Wole Soyinka made a serious and disconcerting allegation about General Sani Abacha, possibly Nigeria's worst ever dictator, on Radio Kudirat, a pirate radio station operating at the height of his dictatorship. General Sani Abacha was called

a 'clone' of Ibrahim Babangida, the former dictator from whose heinous misrule the beleaguered Nigerian nation is, arguably, yet to recover. Soyinka's claim at the time was taken seriously because of some compelling historical antecedents and a number of what appeared to be carefully orchestrated coincidences that the Abacha regime had engineered. Abacha's elaborate stratagems did not seem entirely new to the Nigerian populace, who were sceptical when not apathetic. The magic-realist grotesqueness that had once characterised the political landscapes of the banana republics of Latin America some time previously was now being replicated in the nation-states of Africa, with what appeared to be a brutally exact historical determinism. As a result, different conflicts of attrition began to permanently disfigure the political history of the entire continent as the tortured landscapes of Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Rwanda attested.

It is important to evoke the figure of General Sani Abacha to remind ourselves of just how close Nigeria was to disintegration and also just how persistent this threat is as the present democratic culture continues to evolve. Abacha reminds us of the flexibilities of the banality of evil as a political concept, of the terror ordinary mortals can create, encourage and condone. It is also important to note that his spirit reigns more powerfully in those that were most directly affected by his terror as well as in the very institutions that were employed in the project of democratic consolidation. Abacha died mysteriously in 1998 by a stroke of luck and not through the thrust and surge of civil society.

Nigeria did not quite reach that violent point of no return but the state of affairs within the nation evinced spiralling hopelessness, chronic insecurity and different layers of division within the polity. Since the annulment of the June 12 presidential elections of 1993, there has been a widespread feeling that just about anything can be 'annulled' including the country itself. Various separatist agendas continue to emerge within the current political dispensation. At this point, the question is, who is prepared to do the annulling? Who would promulgate the ever-threatening decree that looms in the hidden and obviously disturbed recesses of the national psyche?

Once the step is taken to actualise this persistent fear, an interrupted, but steady, cycle of violence will have been completed in all its ramifications: political, psychological and even, possibly, genocidal. It is this incomplete cycle of violence that produces what is surely a false sense of nationhood. The crises in the Niger Delta, the vehement debates over resource control are, in part, manifestations of an aborted collective violence and the crippling thirst to consummate it. What is clear is that the despair and sense of terror that Sani Abacha left in his wake cannot be dispelled by the ephemerality of a democratic culture that is still in its infancy.

If Sani Abacha was indeed a more tyrannical clone of Ibrahim Babangida as history has proved, a few factors may be singled out in support of this view. For one,

he was the de facto number two in Babangida's hierarchy and played a prominent role in entrenching and prolonging the regime. Second, in his heyday, he was the longest serving officer in the Nigerian army, so he had been party to many coups which ensured his hold on power. With virtually no officer courageous enough to challenge him, he held the Nigerian nation in thrall for the period he remained in power.

At this juncture, it is necessary to affirm that Abacha was no mere replica of Babangida, as Soyinka claimed. He was clearly a more inhumane and a more brutal dictator. During the confusing era of the transition to democracy, Nigerian officialdom weaved a great deal of elaborate and digressive rhetoric around the more gullible strata of the Nigerian populace and also the international community. In many instances, this corrupting verbiage deluded many Nigerians and derailed quite a number of genuine initiatives on the part of civil society geared towards the consolidation of the processes of democratisation.¹⁵ It was sometimes difficult to perceive the Abacha regime for precisely what it was: an inhuman authoritarian junta that was bent on the discredited and anachronistic quest of hanging on to power for its own sake.

Ibrahim Babangida, Abacha's erstwhile master, had a better understanding of international opinion concerning issues such as democracy, human rights and freedom of the press, so he attempted to play a double game. He had to maintain power through typical dictatorial means – repression and patronage – but he also tried to present a front of benevolence and sincerity to the international community. No other Nigerian leader has displayed such a disconcerting Janus-like personality (especially at the beginning of his reign). Through Babangida, many alien and corrupt political practices have gained widespread currency. This is not to claim that Nigeria lost its political innocence with the emergence of Babangida. Indeed, it is doubtful if it had any political innocence in the first instance. Nonetheless, Babangida destroyed the legitimacy of the military, and so it could no longer claim to be committed to correcting the ills of society. Militarism itself became, after him, a Janus-like entity; a cancerous evil with capabilities for brutal social (dis) order. Nonetheless, it was also a political evil that the Nigerian populace seemed to tolerate and even accept.

Babangida initially achieved a seductive blend of brute power and a latent democratic ethos which held compelling appeal for many Nigerians. His nemesis, which is something of a paradox, was the annulment of the June 12 presidential elections which proved too costly for him and, more importantly, the nation. June 12 remains a problematic watershed for the sociopolitical evolution of the nation. Short-sighted political opportunists have sought to reduce the significance of this landmark event. However, it is such a morally loaded event that even the

strategy of ignoring it does not diminish it. Any Nigerian politician at some point needs to confront the intractable moral impasse created by June 12 1993. Chris Ngige's ordeal in Anambra state – holding on to his political mandate as the governor – which began in 2003, bears some correlation with June 12. Ignoring its magnitude is akin to removing the ground beneath one's own feet. The simple reason is this: until the issue of June 12 is addressed, every aspirant for political office is necessarily a potential victim of that double-edged militaristic weapon, political annulment. All efforts of political activity face the possibility of annulment until the initial catastrophe is revisited and the annulling agency put permanently in check. This, unfortunately, is a challenge the Nigerian political class has not convincingly overcome. Chris Ngige's political fortunes – which have mafia-like dimensions of political corruption – are inextricably linked to the events of June 12.

Undoubtedly, the origins of ridiculing the political class began with the wily Ibrahim Babangida. In a bid to prolong his reign, he created an unnecessarily bloated bureaucracy, an incompetent class of political opportunists and hangers-on, and an astonishing variety of ill-intentioned government agencies to oil his machinery of dictatorship. The Babangida regime established the Political Bureau in January 1986, which was given the mandate of collating the opinions of Nigerians on the political future of the country and which made appropriate recommendations against the background of the 1979 experience of democratic transition. The consensus of those within the Political Bureau was that the military should disengage from governance in Nigeria by 1990. However, the Babangida administration adopted the choice of 1992 which was unpopular and which betrayed its true political intentions. Even the choice of 1992 was eventually changed to August 1993 after a protracted and monumental struggle in which both the military and the political class were affected and which ended in the June 12 crisis. The truth is that Babangida had no intention of relinquishing power. No cost was spared to realise his ambitions for a continuous hold on power. Apart from employing a daunting array of political analysts and scholars of public policy, such as Ojetunji Aboyade (once chair of the Presidential Advisory Committee) and Adele Jinadu (former director-general of the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria), General Babangida also established the Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) and the National Council for Inter-governmental Relations (NCIR). The CDS, once helmed by Omo Omoruyi, a professor of political science, was entrusted inter alia with 'conducting research into anti-democratic behaviours and proffering solutions to them'. The NCIR, which had another professor of political science, Isawa Elaigwu, as its director-general, was responsible for conducting studies on federalism in a multi-ethnic state like Nigeria.

In one fell swoop, during the first quarter of 1996, the Abacha administration abolished both research bodies, thereby creating a bureaucratic vacuum. Analysts are of the view that these dissolutions were not motivated by any well-advised attempt at restructuring the nation's sagging bureaucracy but by a bid to flush out perceived political opponents, and also to abolish the structures established by General Babangida whether they were effective or not. To support this allegation, Maryam Babangida's Better Life for Rural Women Programme (another exercise in profligate public spending) was dissolved to make way for the Abacha regime-supported Family Support Programme through which millions of naira from the national coffers were spent. The lack of consistency of Nigerian governments is well known.

Under these circumstances, wanton travesties of governance were committed. For example, when politicians were granted permission to form political parties, all of them were in the end found unsuitable after much time, energy and, of course, money had been spent. Politicians were later forced to join two government-established parties – the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC) – which ultimately did not lead to democratic rule. This particular fiasco of the Transition to Civil Rule Programme is estimated to have cost the nation about 50 billion naira.

We have noted the well-known Nigerian penchant for enormous bureaucracies. Accordingly, the Abacha regime established the Transition Implementation Committee (TIC), the State Creation, Local Government and Boundary Adjustment Panel, the National Reconciliation Committee, the Federal Character Commission and the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON). During their existence, these various agencies mainly engaged in petty squabbling among themselves. In a way, they appear to have been established to keep ambitious political cronies in check.

Another disconcerting feature of the Nigerian political scene is the inability to evolve concrete ideological alternatives and to promote new and credible political figures. From the First Republic to the emergent Fourth Republic, Nigerian politics has been characterised by the same jaded ideological tropes and dominated by the same political actors who seem to hold the destiny of the nation in a vice-like grip. When Babangida claimed that he was going to create 'a new breed' of politicians one ought to have known better. For his own part, Abacha did not set himself this futile objective. His strategy at the moment of his emergence was to win over a restless and volatile political class that was still reeling from the seismic dissensions created by the June 12 crisis. Many of the main political figures of the Third Republic (although not necessarily created during this period), such as Lateef Jakande, Adamu Ciroma and Umaru Dikko, gained renewed visibility on

the self-defeating platform of military rule. Some of them became ministers while others were active in the Constitutional Conference of 1995. Once Abacha had successfully concluded his strategy of winning over major political figures, they were at his mercy and lost the moral basis to challenge his authority.

As such, virtually no politician of commendable calibre emerged from the failed June 12 presidential elections (except perhaps Bola Ige who was assassinated in mysterious circumstances in 2001). All that the politicians and the Nigerian populace could do was to plead with the military authorities to relinquish power peacefully. Through its hold on power and through innuendoes of terror, the military had become the moral barometer of the nation. This point becomes more relevant when we notice the number of hitherto powerful political figures that were ruthlessly silenced. Olusegun Obasanjo, the first president of the Fourth Republic, was put in jail and might have died there. Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, his erstwhile deputy, was also put in jail where he died under mysterious circumstances. Both Obasanjo and Yar'Adua had been convicted for the alleged Colonel Lawan Gwadabe-led coup plot. M.K.O. Abiola, the presumed winner of the June 12 presidential elections, was also thrown in jail where he eventually died without having realised his mandate. Kudirat Abiola, his wife, was assassinated on 4 June 1996 by Abacha's henchmen. Before her murder, Alfred Rewane, a 79-year-old frontline nationalist and pro-democracy activist, was also assassinated by a detachment of Abacha's henchmen in October 1995. The allegation at the time was that Rewane provided financial support for the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), the pro-democracy organisation. These ghastly assassinations followed a pattern similar to the killing of Dele Giwa in October 1986, when Babangida was in power.

During the reign of Abacha, Gani Fawehinmi, a prominent civil rights activist, was also jailed and so were his equally dynamic compatriots, Femi Falana and Beko Ransome-Kuti. Journalists were habitually arrested for holding anti-government views and were often tortured. Media houses were closed down and the residences of pro-democracy activists became targets of arson by secret service operatives. In 1994, the home of Air Commodore Dan Suleiman, a pro-democracy activist, was bombed under suspicious circumstances. After the incident, Suleiman went into exile. Several other pro-democracy stalwarts fled the country after persistent harassment from the security services. Prominent among them were Wole Soyinka, Bolaji Akinyemi, Bola Tinubu and, most surprisingly, Anthony Enahoro who moved the motion for national independence in 1953. Lieutenant General Alani Akinrinade's palatial house in Lagos was bombed. Akinrinade, who had once been Chief of Defence Staff under the Shagari regime, also had to go into exile. It was strongly speculated that his association with the broad-based political alliance, NADECO, was responsible for the unprovoked attack on his home. Soyinka's

home in Abeokuta, Ogun state, was also raided. His travails did not begin or end there: he narrowly escaped being murdered in his hotel room in the United States of America at the tail end of 1995. In addition, during the first quarter of 1996, the staging of his play, *The Trials of Brother Jero*, by a Lagos-based theatre group, was stopped by security service agents. Israel Eboh, the director of the play, asked for justification and the answer he received was ‘for security reasons ... the national interest’. This preoccupation with intellectual matters on the part of the security forces was to a large extent created by totalitarian paranoia. For instance, in April 1996, the late Bola Ige, the former civilian governor of Oyo state, was to launch what was an innocuous book at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs in Lagos, but the occasion was disrupted by security agents.

In other words, Abacha’s reign was filled with terror. When Kudirat Abiola was murdered in a street in Lagos, it was yet another opportunity to crack down on pro-democracy forces. M.K.O. Abiola’s first son, Kola, was thrown into a police cell and members of the pro-democracy organisation, NADECO – Solanke Onasanya, an 80-year-old man, Abraham Adesanya, a senator in the Second Republic, and Ganiyu Dawodu – were all detained. Many other pro-democracy activists were also forced into exile.

When Saro-Wiwa was hanged, Tom Ikimi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, went on overseas trips claiming that the Nigerian judiciary was a model of excellence and that the Nigerian press enjoyed considerable freedom. Yet Nosa Igiebor, the editor-in-chief of *Tell* news magazine, was placed in detention in 1995 and only released seven months later without charge. In addition, over 300 000 copies of the magazine were seized by state security operatives within eight months. As a result, 24,5 million naira was lost by the company during the regimes of Babangida and Abacha. The editors of the magazine also received constant death threats stating that the ‘Rewane treatment’ would be visited upon them.

However, Nigeria was able to emerge from the height of Abacha’s terror to launch a noteworthy campaign for democracy. Abacha signified terror and it cannot be said that the nation has thoroughly purged itself of his ghost. Olusegun Obasanjo rose out of the belly of that terror. The seeds of Abacha’s fascism are evident everywhere and they can re-germinate with stealth or brazen terrorisation. In other words, only a complete purge of the terror that Abacha left in his wake will be the beginning of a new democratic cycle.

3.3 Military Boots in Ogoniland

One of the measures taken by the Babangida administration to pacify the agitations of oil-bearing states was the establishment of the Oil-Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) through Decree 23 of 1992. This

was meant to serve eight states and fifty local governments within the federation. Albert Horsfall, a retired civil servant and lawyer, was made the commission's first chairman. The chairman and the members of the commission, by the decree, were to serve for a period of four years and their tenure was renewable only once.

The primary task of OMPADEC was the reconstruction and development of the oil-bearing communities that fell under its jurisdiction. In attempting to rehabilitate decaying infrastructure where it existed and providing essential social amenities where none were present, OMPADEC was also mandated to initiate elaborate programmes of research. Long before its establishment, in 1960, the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) had been entrusted with more or less the same functions as OMPADEC. The NDDB did very little to improve the lot of the oil-producing communities.

In carrying out its objectives, OMPADEC was allocated three per cent of the Federation Account (a slight increase on the two per cent favoured by the civilian administration of Shehu Shagari in relation to the oil-bearing communities). The federal government also gave it considerable autonomy in the disbursement of funds for development projects. However, after a year of operations, there were mixed feelings about the success or otherwise of OMPADEC. The commission published a report entitled *OMPADEC: A year after* which highlighted the fact that it had been able to provide several communities with roads, school buildings, electricity and science laboratories. Chairman Albert Horsfall was at the forefront of championing the achievements of the commission.

However, as was mentioned earlier, there were widespread misgivings about the happenings in OMPADEC. In fact, a group called the Urhobo Study Group publicly disowned OMPADEC, accusing it of ethnic injustices and of failure. Saro-Wiwa had no faith in the commission either and it will be recalled that he called it 'a body meant to disburse the peanuts set aside by those who had seized the oil reserves of the delta to the unfortunate inhabitants'.¹⁶

At the same time, the issue of the chairmanship of the commission became a highly volatile political matter. The following passage stating the position of the Ijaws of Delta state should corroborate this view:

We want it noted now that when the executive chairmanship eventually moves to Delta state in accordance with the accepted reasoning of all concerned, that position has to be reserved for the Ijaws who are the No. 1 producers in Delta state.¹⁷

With this kind of determined stance, other ethnic groups also strengthened their views as to how OMPADEC was to be constituted. The politicisation of the commission became the basis of ethnic chauvinism and distrust. Hence, the

ethno-nationalist chancre that had always impeded the cohesion and realisation of the political aspirations of the federation in turn degenerated into what may be regarded as a minor point of difference. Apart from the majority of the Ogonis who were unimpressed by the records of the commission, the Urhobos and Itsekiris of Delta state also felt excluded from its centre of activity. These feelings of marginalisation, and competing expectations of performance, clearly eroded whatever credibility the commission might have had:

In the eyes of the people, OMPADEC was a national cake that must have everyone on board, every clan must have a staff in its offices, and contracts should be awarded to just about anyone. With that kind of misperception, OMPADEC was bound to have a credibility crisis.¹⁸

In view of this kind of understanding, the commission was unable to accomplish its initial objectives. Oil-producing communities still suffer from abysmal neglect and pauperisation coupled with the now firmly entrenched processes of environmental degradation. The Ogoniland scenario only serves to buttress this argument.

On 22 February 1996, the Horsfall-led board of OMPADEC was dissolved and a sole administrator in the person of Professor Eric Opia was appointed. Typical of the Nigerian political landscape, his community, the Ndokwa people of Delta state, took up a full-page advert in a newspaper extolling General Sani Abacha who had appointed their 'son'. The ethnic implication of such an elaborate public gesture ought to be clear enough. OMPADEC had become in several ways an instrument designed for the purposes of granting favours to political cronies. Opia was no stranger to the Nigerian political scene. During the Babangida era, he had contested for the governorship of Delta state under the banner of the NRC and lost to Felix Ibru. However, he managed to get himself elected as a representative to the 1995 Constitutional Conference. His political fortunes blossomed from that moment and so his appointment as sole administrator of OMPADEC did not altogether come as a surprise. The snag, though, was that given his strong partisan background, how would he have been able to depoliticise the operations of the commission and also dispel the ever-present spectre of ethnicity? As we shall see, Opia did not plan to succeed. The inadequacies of OMPADEC were numerous and hydra-headed, requiring fundamental and far-reaching solutions which neither the federal military government nor the functionaries of the commission were willing and/or able to apply.

Now that we recognise that ethnicity is one of the problems affecting the evolution of appropriate measures to address the grievances of oil-bearing communities, it is also necessary to know what the federal authorities have done in this regard.

As the Ogoni agitations for economic and political empowerment increased, the federal government became quite apprehensive. Consequently, in 1993, the Babangida regime promulgated the Treason and Treasonable Felony Decree. The aim of the decree, essentially, was to ‘dissolve and proscribe any association of individuals of three or more persons ... which ... is formed for purposes of furthering the political, religious, ethnic, tribal, cultural or social interest of a group of persons or individuals contrary to the peace, order and good governance of the Federation’.¹⁹ This brings us back to the point discussed much earlier about the issue of the indivisibility of the nation which was broached in the first chapter of this study. The stance by Nigerian governments generally on the indivisibility of the Nigerian nation evinces an almost embarrassing inability to confront the problems of cohabiting with minorities in the federation.

To demonstrate that it meant business in relation to the decree, the Babangida regime went ahead to proscribe bodies such as the Association of Minority Oil Producing States (AMOS), CARIA (Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Imo and Anambra), the Committee of Northern Elders, the Committee of Peace and Unity, the Committee of Unity and Understanding, Egbe Ilosiwaju Yoruba, the Middle Belt Forum and other associations of similar interests. It was a miracle that the Ethnic Minority Rights Organization of Nigeria (EMIRON), which later metamorphosed into the Ethnic Minority Rights Organization of Africa (EMIROAF) under the leadership of Ken Saro-Wiwa, escaped proscription. R.T. Suberu suggests that this may have been due to the haste in preparing the decree.²⁰ The response of these associations to the government’s proscriptions was by and large lukewarm; none of them was evidently as mobilised and organised as the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), and none of them, consequently, was able to give the government the required amount of resistance and trouble. MOSOP, in view of this assessment, was unique in being able to raise the level of ethnic minority activism to an extent hitherto unknown.

As the activities of MOSOP gained wider prominence after the Andoni-Ogoni disturbances of 1993, the government found an apt excuse to institute overtly repressive methods for the containment of the crisis. Put differently, the way was paved for elaborate militarisation. To this effect, the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force (RSIS) was set up with Major Paul Okuntimo as its chairman. Okuntimo, in true military or rather fascist fashion, thought the crisis could only be quelled through brute force. A memo sent to the military administrator of Rivers state captured, in no small measure, his frame of mind:

To: His Excellency the Military Administrator of Rivers State

From: The Chairman Rivers State Internal Security (RSIS)

Subjects: RSIS Operations: Law and Order in Ogoni etc.

Observations:

- Police in Ogoni remain ineffective since 1993.
- Shell operations still impossible unless ruthless military operations are undertaken for smooth economic activities to commence.
- Akwa Ibom and Opobo borders inadvisable because of inaccessibility. Added to disagreement between Opobo/Andoni making cooperation by the former unrealizable.
- Division between the elitist Ogoni leadership exists.
- Either bloc leadership lacks adequate influence to defy National Youth Council of the Ogoni People (NYCOP) decisive resistance to oil production unless reparation of 400 million dollars paid with arrears of interest to MOSOP and Ken Saro-Wiwa.

Recommendation/Strategies:

- Intra-communal/kingdom formulae alternative discussed to apply.
- Wasting operations during MOSOP and other gathering making constant military presence justifiable.
- Deployment of 400 military personnel (officers and men).
- New checkpoints slightly different from operation Order No. 4/94 dated 21/4/94 by Commissioner of Police Rivers State command.
- Direct daily report to military administrator MILAD.
- Wasting operations coupled with psychological tactics of displacement/wasting as noted above.
- Press monitor and lobby.
- Restriction of unauthorized visitors especially those from Europe to the Ogoni.
- Monthly press briefing by the Chairman of Rivers State Internal Security (RSIS).

Financial Implications (Estimates/Funding):

- Initial disbursement of 50 million naira as advanced allowances to officers and men and for logistics to commence operations with immediate effect as agreed.
- ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group] allowance rates applicable as earlier discussed.
- Pressure on oil companies for the prompt regular inputs as discussed.
- OMPADEC stands as arranged.

Remarks:

- The Ikwere-Ijaw-Ahoada (Obagi) agenda for skeletal operations until full economic activities commence in Ogoni.

- Surveillance on Ogoni leaders considered as security risks/MOSOP propellers.
- Present Secretary to the State Government obviously sensitive (Ogbakor/Ikwere connection).
- Modifications of the programme continuously.
- Ruthless operations and high level authority for the task force's effectiveness.
- Direct supervision by MILAD to avoid unruly interference by other superior officers.
- RSIS independence necessary despite some Mobile Police Units of the Nigeria Police Force (MOPOL) inputs.²¹

This incendiary memo was obviously a highly 'restricted document'. The Okuntimo-led military operation promptly set to work instilling fear, sowing discord and causing mayhem. Indiscriminate burning of private buildings, rape, looting and extortion became commonplace in Ogoniland. It was this kind of repression that created an almost unbearable feeling of siege within the region. The victims of this reign of terror were not only Ogoni indigenes. Geraldine Brooks, a journalist reporting for the *Wall Street Journal* of New York, was manhandled and unceremoniously deported. Similarly, the Civil Liberties Organisation's Nantei Oronto-Douglas and Uche Onyeagocha, who were connected with its Environment Rights Action (ERA) project, were also apprehended by Okuntimo's henchmen and subsequently detained and tortured. Fortunately, they were released afterwards and warned never to return. The two environmentalists were able to offer a graphic account of the military operations in Ogoniland:

The pattern of invasion is the same from one village to another. The soldiers drive into town at top gear, shooting into the air at first, cackling in war-like voices to jump-start the villages into panic. Then they go in for the kill, chasing, arresting, beating and shooting at the fear-stricken folks, extorting money, food items, livestock including live goats, chicken, garri, rice, eggs, and valuables like jewellery, radio, television and video sets are very welcome. But money is a major target since there are no banks in the villages and inhabitants keep much of their cash at home.²²

Added to the brutality was the military braggadocio that had become the histrionic fanfare of authoritarian African political regimes. Major Okuntimo boasted in a press conference that he was versed in 221 ways to terminate human life. He said:

I just take a detachment of soldiers and stay at the four corners of the town. They will (word not clear) the town, but they have automatic rifles that sound dead. If you hear the sound, you will freeze! And then I equally now choose about 20 and give them grenades, explosives and very hard ones. The machine gun with 500

rounds will open up. When 4 or 5 like that open up, and we are throwing grenades into the bush and it goes BOOM! then they know that I am around. And what do you think the people are going to do? And then, we have already put road-blocks on the main road. We don't want anybody to start running, so that the option we made was that we should get all these people into the bush, with nothing except the pants and wrapper they are using for the night; we should get everybody into the bush.²³

In its first year of operations, the RSIS combed out virtually all the villages of Ogoniland using the same pattern of psychological intimidation and military terrorism. By Okuntimo's estimation, in this period of siege Gokan was hardest hit by his activities. Explaining his terrorist methods to *The News* magazine, he revealed:

I sent them into the bush to put them in a defensive position whereby they will ask for the favour of airing their views. After days and nights of sleeping in the bush, they started making representation ... the solution to the Ogoni crisis requires more of psychological approach since the people are pursuing a goal that they will get 400 million dollars from the federal government as royalty. You require a psychological approach to rewind them out of the mobilization.²⁴

Indeed, Major Okuntimo's brutality knew no bounds. Esther Kiobel, the widow of Dr Barinen Kiobel, one time Commissioner for Commerce, Industry and Tourism in Rivers state under the administration of Lieutenant Colonel Komo (whose government had provided the organisational support for the clampdown on the Ogonis), had a sorry tale to narrate. Dr Kiobel had been based in Britain until 1992 when he returned to Nigeria to take up a lecturing appointment with the University of Science and Technology, Port Harcourt. Esther Kiobel's major grievance was that her husband's death had been premeditated and unlawful. She complained, 'I believe that before the trial started, Komo had declared my husband guilty. He used Alhaji Kobani to declare my husband guilty [of murder]'.²⁵

She visited Major Okuntimo who she claimed was 'the brain behind her husband's hanging'²⁶ and received a very rude shock: he did not allow her to see her husband because she refused to 'do what other women did'.²⁷ Her pleading and weeping did nothing to secure her request. Instead, Okuntimo struck her across the face, leaving his fingerprints on it. It was yet another instance for him to boast about his famous 221 ways to kill a human being. The following week, Kiobel returned with a tray of food meant for her husband and this time Okuntimo had a few soldiers beat her up and then she was stripped naked. Her hands and legs were tied, after which she was hurled into an open van heading for Kpor where she was detained for one week.

The hanging of the Ogoni Nine, no doubt, did considerable damage to the tremendous gains of the protest movement. Even Ledum Mitee's confidence was profoundly shaken. For many, he simply became a sell-out. Speaking in a fashion that would have been inconceivable for Saro-Wiwa, Mitee had pleaded on behalf of other Ogoni indigenes who were in detention:

All doors are not closed yet. My appeal is that lives should be saved. Shedding more blood cannot help Ogoni. General Abacha still exercises his prerogative of mercy in the circumstances.²⁸

After the executions of the Ogoni Nine, the Rivers state government established the Ogoni Reconciliation Committee on Peace. Apart from the restoration of law and order, the committee was also charged with developing the local government areas situated in Ogoniland. The committee included first and second class traditional rulers from Ogoniland, prominent indigenes of the area and young people in addition to Major Obi Umahi, who had replaced Okuntimo as the commander of the RSIS, and who was to coordinate the affairs of the committee on behalf of the government. But the seriousness or otherwise with which the government viewed the question of reconciliation became clear, in due course.

Mitee spoke of the need to 'forgive and forget' but the spirit of the symbol of the Ogoni struggle, Ken Saro-Wiwa, was not allowed final and complete repose. His businesses were run down through government-engineered persecution and the workers of his companies were driven underground. The government's approach to the crisis did not change for a long time after Saro-Wiwa's death and most of the recommendations of Okuntimo were followed to the letter. Propaganda was deployed to camouflage the real situation in Ogoniland. The repression of pro-MOSOP figures continued unabated and there were incessant arrests and forced evacuations of people in an attempt to extinguish the merest insinuations of dissent. The only factor that kept the embers of the struggle alive at this point seemed to be the political support of the international community for the Ogoni cause. Nigeria's human rights record during the Abacha era became appalling and this reputation was largely due to the disconcerting manner in which the Ogoni crisis was handled.

Rather than peace returning to Ogoniland as the reconciliation committee might have wished, disunity and discontent within the territory increased. For instance, 15 March 1996 was a particularly tragic day for Nsaa Korsi of Giokoo. This woman, who was in her early forties at the time, was viciously attacked by the agents of the RSIS in the presence of her 18-year-old daughter. As a result of the attack, she was rendered partially paralysed and also mentally affected. In line with government policy, the operatives of the RSIS were not only entrusted

with ‘sanitising’ Ogoniland but also had to present a wholesome picture for foreign journalists and fact-finding missions from overseas. Arguably, therefore, these missions in fact heightened the tensions in the territory since the government was frenetically trying to impress the visitors. Pleasing the visitors in this regard meant nothing other than the distortion of truth together with a crackdown on voices of opposition. Korsi was seen as a dissenter by government-sponsored local collaborators and was consequently singled out for punitive treatment. Her daughter had much to say about her ordeal:

After the foreign visitors had gone, they took my mother to the camp from Giokoo palace, made her to lie face down on the ground, beat her with whips, crushed her with their boots and smashed her all over with the butts of their rifles. The soldiers said she always hid in our house people who wanted to tell the foreigners the true situation of things in Ogoniland.²⁹

As hinted earlier, these fact-finding visits by foreign observers became a source of considerable discomfort for MOSOP sympathisers and activists. Once they became aware of the imminence of such visits, they had to abandon their homes and head for the bushes until the missions had departed; otherwise the kind of fate that had befallen Korsi might repeat itself. Innocent Ogoni indigenes had to confine themselves to usually unmotorable bypaths and mosquito-infested bushes to avoid the armed convoys that paraded the length and breadth of the land. Nnaa Bariko described the modus operandi of the security operatives to *The Guardian on Sunday*:

Evacuation usually takes place two hours before foreign journalists or observers arrive. Usually, we don’t know these foreigners because nobody dares to go close. But the security agents know in advance since the foreigners always inform the government of their coming. From Kpor, word will be sent to the paid agents to appear as real inhabitants of the community. And, at times the soldiers would turn out in mufti.³⁰

Barikor went on to explain the extent to which this art of deception was perfected:

With these agents there, any strange person is promptly arrested. The agents will be engaged in such relaxed pastimes as playing ludo and draughts. Immediately the agents see the foreigners coming, they signal their people at Giokoo junction who, in turn, signal the soldiers and fake inhabitants in Giokoo itself. The soldiers then go into hiding, leaving the agents to talk to the foreigners. Some of these agents pose as paramount rulers of the communities.³¹

When the United Nations (UN) team led by Atsu-Kofi Amega visited Ogoniland in late March 1996, it provoked ‘another season of crackdown’.³² A.D. Deekor,

the paramount ruler of Bera, was arrested for the fifth time on that occasion. His 24-year-old son was severely beaten and 1 000 naira was stolen from his wife. His ordeal did not end there as he was taken to Kpor where he was detained for a week and made to lie on the bare floor of a cell, with eight other detainees. Five days before the arrival of the UN team, the security operatives were already hard at work. The Ogoni villages of Nweol, Birara, Lewe, Giokoo, Mogho and Barako were raided. Members of MOSOP and the Federation of Ogoni Women's Associations (FOWA) were singled out for victimisation. In early April, some Ogoni activists were said to have been detained in various centres around the Tai-Eleme axis. However, this elaborate and brutal crackdown did nothing to discourage those willing to express their grievances to the UN team. They came out waving leaves freshly plucked from trees and placards in full view of the team after, which they were driven off the streets. A fresh series of crackdowns followed to punish the intransigent activists.

The repression did a lot to alter the vibrancy of the resistance movement in Ogoniland. For a long time, fear stalked every nook and cranny. Strangers were avoided and very few were willing to express their true feelings about the Ogoni situation. The 'psychological approach' that the Okuntimo-led RSIS initiated appeared to have had a significant impact. Also, much capital was made of the schisms within the Ogoni leadership structure which were in turn vigorously amplified by the activities of the government. Dr Kudo Eresia-Eke, who was the Commissioner for Information and Culture in Rivers state at the time, strongly supported the government's crackdown on MOSOP activists and the deeds of the RSIS. Eresia-Eke, who held a doctoral degree in political theory and who was a former lecturer at the University of Port Harcourt, did not mince words in exonerating the activities of the military in Ogoniland:

We don't take that mess here. We do not. Because it does not give a good image of the Federal Government [...] And I must say that, over time, the discipline has been very good. I can tell you. And they (the soldiers) do the right thing.³³

Anti-Ogoni attitudes such as those expressed above provoked equally passionate responses from Ogoni indigenes such as Johnson Nna, an insightful political commentator who constantly condemned the political structure and leadership in Rivers state. The ruling elite, in his view, was largely responsible for numerous woes of the state. Ethnic confrontations could have been aggravated when Eresia-Eke observed that 'the Ogonis have provided four out of the total of 17 Information and Culture Commissioners for Rivers State'.³⁴ With almost every indigene of the state sharing Nna's frame of mind, a general feeling of alienation and distrust was bound to prevail. Indeed alienation became an entrenched problem in Rivers state.

Nothing encapsulated the feeling of despondency and of the impending dismemberment of the resistance better than a remark by Ledum Mitee:

If you talk of reconciliation, it has to be total because we are talking about over 2 000 people dead already. To resolve the conflict, you need to look at the root causes of it and try to eliminate them. There is suffering because soldiers have been introduced to 'decree peace' in Ogoniland. Then again, the issues that led to this situation still exist. The things we said in the Ogoni Bill of Rights, no one has bothered to say anything about them. These are issues that have to be put on the table.³⁵

There were serious issues that truly needed to be addressed and these went beyond the responsibilities of Rivers state alone. In fact, they bore directly upon the entire federal arrangement of the polity. Attempts were made to confront these problems but there was also another, equally demanding problem: the honesty and seriousness of those attempts.

For instance, the federal government inaugurated the National Reconciliation Committee (NARECOM) on 26 December 1995, and made Alex Akinyele, a former Minister for Information, its chair. In addition to devising a means through which the June 12 presidential crisis might be resolved, the committee was also charged with looking into the Ogoni crisis and its multiple fall-outs. More precisely, its terms of reference were to

- ensure ways and means to secure the cooperation and participation of various interest groups in the transition programme with a need to strengthen unity, and stability,
- examine and establish dialogue with Nigerians at home and abroad with a view to participating fully in democratisation within the context of the transition programme, and
- make recommendations on any issues that would help promote peace and unity, and the smooth implementation of the transition programme.

Alex Akinyele was just getting a feel for the job when a well-publicised spat with the fire-spitting Minister of Special Duties, Wada Nas, occurred. Such inter-governmental squabbles served to undermine public confidence. There was also the larger question of the health and stability of the Nigerian political arena which did nothing to dispel the generalised scepticism.

If we view this chain of events against the backdrop of the Ogoni crisis, a certain consistency reveals itself. Militarism had radically transformed the Nigerian public imagination. To all intents and purposes, a martial mentality had become the bedrock of virtually every sociopolitical process that had occurred in the country for several years. There were the Murtala-Obasanjo task force on port

decongestion, the Buhari-Idiagbon task force on the recovery of public property and the notorious Lagos state task force on environmental sanitation. Even the brief Second Republic was not spared this apparently endemic mentality. The Shagari-led administration created a task force for the importation and distribution of rice. This trend reflected the continuous militarisation of the Nigerian polity.

Indeed, task forces became quite infamous. An example was the Lagos state task force on environmental sanitation mentioned above. This task force created havoc and misery for the people of Lagos, without securing any lasting goals. Markets were arbitrarily closed down and street hawkers were viciously manhandled. The incessant closures of Lagos markets in turn led to sharp increases in the cost of food commodities and other consumables. In effect, rather than the numerous problems in the city being alleviated, another kind of siege was laid. Indeed, the ad hoc basis on which most of the task forces were established precluded any actual transformative impact on society. In Nigeria, it had always been in the military mindset to galvanise civil society in a purely martial fashion. This affected the ways in which humane and credible institutions of civil society could be developed. After prolonged military rule, this problem persisted and subsequent civilian administrations were likely to find it difficult to completely demilitarise the polity. Military solutions were *ab initio* the preferred approach of Nigerian governments, and nothing reflected this fact more than the handling of the Ogoni crisis.

3.4 Fundamentals of Despair

During the height of military dictatorship in Nigeria, Wole Soyinka faced a dilemma he undoubtedly faces all the time, given his numerous transnational engagements as a creative artist of global fame. He often has to talk about his country, Nigeria – perhaps often in unflattering terms – and this must indeed be a very difficult task. Thus, as a model of artistic excellence, he often has to speak about a highly embarrassing political context. During the regime of the late Sani Abacha's dictatorship, he was invited to a conference in Ethiopia on the theme, 'From Concord to Discord: The Horn of Africa', around the period when the June 12 presidential elections were to be annulled by the military. Naturally the expectations of the participants at the conference had been high. Nigeria, it was widely perceived, was finally on the way to moral sociopolitical leadership and the ideal of democracy. But before the commencement of the conference, the military struck once again and Soyinka was saddled with the distasteful task of explaining the failure. In that instance, he personified both the setbacks and the potential of the Nigerian nation. More importantly, Soyinka posed very tough questions to the Nigerian nation.

When one thinks of Nigeria, one usually remembers the accomplishments of its numerous creative heroes – Chinua Achebe, Ken-Saro Wiwa, Fela Anikulapo-Kuti

and so many other accomplished individuals – but it is hard to locate parallel successes in the political field and figures such as Soyinka are often called upon to explain this ironic lapse.³⁶

Delegates and participants at the conference had come up to him to make various inquiries. ‘Why have you people done this to us?’; ‘Do you know what you’ve done, what example you’ve set?’; ‘Do you know how much we had looked forward to citing you as an example?’; ‘We were holding you up as a model to instruct our people on how it should be done.’ Undoubtedly, Soyinka in those circumstances would have devised and executed a scheme of evasion. Years of trying to keep ahead of the different goons of Nigerian military and civilian dictatorships had made him exceptionally nimble and alert. However, once back in Nigeria, he was to offload his vitriol regarding the national reality on an equally brutalised audience. Casting his gaze on the Nigerian nation, Soyinka informed his Nigerian audience that he wished he was not a Nigerian. He also mentioned that the natural resources with which the country was endowed had become a serious impediment to growth (what within the mineral sector is known as the Dutch disease) and so he would be better off as a citizen in a resource-starved country. Finally, he said that given Nigeria’s natural endowments, much more in terms of development should be expected of her.

When Soyinka says he wishes he came from a resource-starved nation, one knows precisely what he means. For decades, petroleum has been a curse rather than a blessing to the majority of Nigerians. Before then, palm oil had served as the mainstay of the colonial economy and so the history of oil in its various forms has been a catalogue of woes. Oil has been a resource that has always enriched a few and immiserated the majority. In the ravaged and ecologically damaged Niger Delta region, oil has blighted the lives of many people. One could ignore the fact that many watercourses have been polluted. One could also forget about the numerous farmsteads that have shrivelled due to the combined logic of unfavourable global and local processes. We should think instead about the hundreds of people who have had their lives cut short by government troops; we should also ponder the thousands of people whose livelihoods have been destroyed by all sorts of environmental mishaps. Furthermore, we may think about not only families but also entire communities that have been disfigured by the anti-human politics of petroleum exploitation. The point is, since the beginning of oil exploitation activities in the Niger Delta, the entire fabric of everyday life has changed. Livelihoods have been destroyed and young people see no reason to take up farming or fishing. They would rather work for the oil companies which contribute to the misery of their lives, or become extortionists and claim levies from non-indigenes who come to conduct business on their lands.

Ordinarily, when one thinks of oil, one also thinks of wealth. However, in general terms, Nigeria is one of the poorest countries in the world. Bill Clinton said that Nigeria is too rich to be poor and he is right: Nigeria's story has been an interminable story of national wealth being plundered by a self-serving compradorial elite drawn from the military establishment, and an equally morally bankrupt political class. Again, one would expect that a country blessed with so many petroleum resources would have the resource in abundance in its numerous petrol stations. However, the contrary is the case. We often hear about reality outstripping fiction. In Nigeria, social reality clearly has outdone the grimly grotesque in a very peculiar way. In an oil-rich country, long and immobile queues for petrol are common. Before the era of deregulation, shortages were caused by the inefficiencies of the sole government oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), or by the government itself in order to increase prices. Here, in times of scarcity, the rush and scramble for the increasingly elusive black gold sometimes seems more intense than the late capitalist rush to the bottom. Prominent newspaper columnists have written manuals about how to survive the chaos and the violence of the oil rush at filling stations in times of need.

Let us dwell on the consequences of oil scarcity more concretely. Without petrol, the activities of the average nation are stalled. Nigeria presently has no exportable agricultural produce. Consequently, petroleum scarcity and increases in prices have far-reaching reverberations with the cost of public transportation rising by as much as 500 per cent in difficult times. Large-scale transporters in turn charge far more for all manner of business transactions, from the transfer of imported manufactured products to that of locally produced items of food. Given this scenario, instant and galloping inflation is the result.

Currently, the level of poverty in Nigeria is better seen than imagined. Similarly, the sociology of beggary has assumed newer characteristics. Apart from the usual destitutes who have been an integral part of the rural areas and cityscapes, there are new categories of economically dispossessed people wrenched from the country's historically feeble middle class. Those who feel buoyed by the numerous multimillion dollar poverty alleviation schemes need not be, since it is the same government that desperately seeks the favours of the Bretton Woods institutional order and transnational capital that promote those 'programmes of alleviation'. Economic globalisation, as we know, entails drastic cuts in public expenditure and a denigration of welfarist sentiments and leanings. It is now clear that the structural adjustment programmes carried out by the Ibrahim Babangida regime from the mid-1980s onwards, according to the principles of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), failed woefully as they failed in most parts of Africa. Nigerian specialists

on IMF monetary policies in sub-Saharan Africa, such as Adebayo Olukoshi, have devoted several volumes to this widespread failure.

The same levelling politics of gas consumption is at work here. Being wealthy entails having not only a fleet of cars but also one or more electricity generating sets. That means fuel consumption taken together would be quite high. The problem is, how is the level of consumption of petroleum products – petrol, diesel, gas – maintained in times of scarcity? In most cases, even the exorbitant black markets are unreliable, so it means they are not the best source for fuel products.

One might want to know why an electricity generating set is required in the first place. The simple answer is that the electricity supply in Nigeria is as erratic as ever. Many individuals have slid irretrievably into an abyss of deprivation and poverty through the destruction of various electronic gadgets by this on–off type of electricity supply. A parastatal agency monopolises electricity generation nationwide – the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA). Of course, the corporation cannot be sued if one's refrigerator, TV or computer happens to have been ruined by the fluctuations caused by its ineptitude. Entire neighbourhoods go without electricity for many months.

Without these two vital sources of energy – petroleum and electricity – how global can one get in present day Nigeria? How easy is it to domesticate events such as the cybernation of the self and reality that have become a central feature of the developed world and most developing regions? One cannot be appreciably global or virtual given the multiple configurations and compressions of time and space in the context of late capitalism. A wide variety of social, cultural and political forms and infrastructure are required to become sufficiently global. Most of these infrastructural forms are lacking in Nigeria. By this, one means most basically, affordable computing systems and, of course, constant electricity supply. The government is clearly unable to provide these facilities under the present local and global conditions and private enterprise is much too motivated by profit to create far-reaching social change. Mafias control the petroleum and electricity sectors and the government lacks the will to sanitise them. This is because these mafias work for the electricity generating corporation that is meant to supply electricity for all and sundry. Instead of curbing the activities of these mafias, the government is usually too preoccupied with holding on to power.

Yet, with all its capacity to cause social disarticulation and disaffection, petroleum is a kind of glue for the polity, at least from the point of view of the political class. However, petroleum has also bred arrogance and complacency within the privileged classes (high-level government technocrats and powerful business people), and the young people of the Niger Delta (where the bulk of the resource is to be found) are becoming increasingly ungovernable. They are angry that the

oil companies derive so much wealth from their lands and give so little in return. Perhaps they might decide the future of the nation if conditions permit.

Even in the face of a supposedly democratic and secular dispensation, the question of religious fundamentalism remains crucial. Out of the 36 states of the Nigerian federation, over 9 have adopted the sharia legal code. The federal government was clearly confounded by this development. Only when we read about ‘guilty’ people losing limbs in accordance with the code, and the public whippings of those found wanting by advocates of the code, do we know that something is amiss. The president during the period when the code was first introduced, Olusegun Obasanjo, could tell the world that the introduction of the sharia code would not affect the volume of foreign business investments. One wished this had been true. The introduction of the code in the northern parts of Nigeria led to religious conflict in the area, particularly in Kano and Plateau states. Undoubtedly, the religious tensions between Muslims and Christians have become more palpable since the code was made a reality. For business, insecurity of life and property is usually a deterrent.

Millions of Nigerians huddle together on most nights in darkness and mosquito-infested tropical heat contemplating perhaps the meaninglessness and violence that is Nigeria. Most telephone lines are dead and those that are not are beyond the reach of most. Internet connections are also scarce and uncertain in most parts of the country.

Militarism, just as colonialism, is not episodic; rather, it is processual and epochal. The uniform and the gun are two of its most prominent symbols. These national totems of fear have done a great deal to brutalise the Nigerian collective psyche. Poorly educated folk ascribe more powers than they should to the gun and military uniform. Obviously, the deconstruction of their inadequately interrogated primacy has to be systematic, rigorous as well as broad-based. This task has not been initiated in a systematic manner. Of course, the current democratic structure was planned and instrumentalised and is being maintained by powerful military interests. This alone poses a great difficulty.

Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, the Congolese philosopher of history who under unacceptable postcolonial conditions – in which war, genocide and different kinds of authoritarianisms have featured prominently – abandoned the more sedate precincts of the academy in order to become a guerrilla fighter, repeatedly stresses one crucial point in his articles.³⁷ He argues that Mobutism as a historic form of politics extends beyond Mobutu himself and those within his clique. Mobutism has, in other words, become an entrenched mode of misgovernment and sociopolitical interaction.

This argument was found to be true after the downfall and death of Mobutu and when Laurent Kabila assumed power. Kabila’s reign turned out to be a continuation

of Mobutism. Nepotism was rife, governmental accountability and transparency non-existent, and Kabila spent his days scheming transnational mineral prospecting interests.³⁸ Thus political developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo bear some resemblance to those in Nigeria. Paraphrasing Wamba dia Wamba, who has a number of critics, for example, Nabudere,³⁹ it can be said that militarism as a form of politics extends beyond itself. Every time the Nigerian populace assumes that the end of military rule and the beginning of democratic governance spells the end of militarism and indicates a paradigm shift.

Chinua Achebe, in his slim monograph, *The Trouble with Nigeria*,⁴⁰ states that the question of leadership has been the bane of Nigerian political troubles. But the issues of citizenship are equally important.⁴¹ How alert have Nigerians been as citizens or subjects? Who do they expect to perform the task of nation-building for them? Are these questions fully articulated in the public sphere? The opposition parties are both too disorganised and too feeble to present worthwhile alternatives, and there is an evident post-democratic crisis in the movement for sociopolitical reform and the consolidation of civil society that grew out of the mass struggles against military dictatorship. All of a sudden these movements seem irrelevant, under a democratic dispensation as opposed to a military one.⁴² Each night Nigerians lie down in the malarial heat, thinking: Will there be a shortage of fuel tomorrow? Will there be electricity for five minutes so that I can perhaps iron a shirt? More than ever before, the question of national cohesion poses a grave dilemma.

However, there were expectations that the numerous non-governmental organisations that came into existence during military rule would seize the chance provided by the democratic opening and indicate avenues for the collective empowerment of the citizenry.

There is a need to rearticulate the internal arrangements and relationships within the nation. There is also a need to cause the political awakening and empowerment of the citizenry. The opposition parties need to be strengthened, just as the civil rights movement must find new ways of being relevant. Finally, the critique and deconstruction of militarism have to be carried to their logical conclusions. To achieve this, it is necessary to continue the critique and dismantling of the residue of militarism that taints the democratic dispensations that emerge afterwards.

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4

Chapter

Locating the Image of Postcolonial sub-Saharan African State Fragility in the Mirror of Colonialism

Maurice O Dassah

Historically, sub-Saharan Africa has suffered two major forms of extractive events.¹ Firstly, there was the devastating triangular transatlantic slave trade in which Africans were traded as commodities for centuries, robbing the continent of its productive workforce. Secondly, the 1884–85 Berlin Conference-inspired illogical and exploitative balkanisation of the continent and imposition of colonialism saw the establishment of mostly dysfunctional state institutions in colonies, with enduring detrimental effects. Decolonisation saw the lumping together of diverse groups in a motley collection of states, some so small they are politically and economically unviable.

Through analysis of theoretical literature and empirical evidence, this chapter pinpoints the root cause of postcolonial sub-Saharan state fragility in weak institutional development engendered by extractive colonialism. Fragile states differ in a number of respects, including economic growth rates, real per capita incomes, life expectancy at birth, and foreign reserves and external debt. However, according to the European Report on Development,² they share common characteristics: inability to mobilise domestic resources and consequent dependence on external resources; reliance on primary products, particularly agricultural; export concentration or low export diversification; low public investment in human development; underdeveloped soft and hard infrastructure; unstable governance; loss of state legitimacy or capacity; conflict/post-conflict situations and high vulnerability to conflicts or civil war.

The postcolonial sub-Saharan African state has been derogatively described as ‘weak’, ‘fragile’, ‘failing’, ‘failed’ and ‘collapsed’,³ ‘in crisis’, ‘neo-patrimonial’ and ‘predatory’. Harttgen and Klasen add other labels, such as ‘poor performers’, ‘low-income countries under stress’ and ‘countries at risk of instability’.⁴ Past and present African leaders are complicit in the persistence of fragility in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa. However, the seeds of poor state formation and consolidation – lack of social cohesion, underdevelopment, despotic governance, poor economic performance and weak state institutions, which are the unmitigated plight of many postcolonial sub-Saharan states – were sown during extractive colonialism, and their cumulative and enduring effects are still reverberating across Africa.

4.1 The Fragile State: Emergence and Implications

The fragile state phenomenon has emerged as a security-development problem for the international community and is common in sub-Saharan Africa. It emerged from the national-security domain and entered the development discourse in the 1990s, when the central government in Somalia disintegrated with the ousting of Siad Barre in January 1991.⁵ The phenomenon gained international attention when it was put on the development agenda following the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 (popularly dubbed 9/11). Mata and Ziaja indicate that this event put failed states at the forefront of world politics.⁶ According to the European Report on Development (ERD), state fragility is a multifaceted concept associated with ‘poor or unstable governance, loss of state legitimacy or effectiveness, persistent extreme poverty, conflict or post-conflict situations, high vulnerability to conflicts or civil war’.⁷

State fragility occupies a central place in the security-development discourse. Anten provides three reasons for interest in the fragile state phenomenon.⁸ Firstly, it is recognised that conflict, political instability and underdevelopment have global security implications, irrespective of where they occur. Secondly, achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 is high on the development agenda and there is concern many developing countries are not making sufficient progress. Thirdly, policy-makers are concerned about weak, fragile or failing states from three perspectives, namely: recognition that the state is an important player in development; new attention to human security and concern for states’ duty to protect their citizens; and post-9/11 realisation that weak states can be conduits for terrorism and organised crime.

4.2 Defining Fragility

The plethora of definitions in the literature indicates a lack of consensus on what constitutes state fragility. According to Carment, Samy and Prest, despite its importance as part of the international policy discourse, the idea of state fragility remains an elusive concept.⁹ Engberg-Pedersen et al. also indicate the lack of an authoritative definition of state fragility and the absence of an agreed list of fragile states.¹⁰ The OECD Trade/Development Action Group, according to Stewart and Brown, defines a fragile state as ‘... when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations’.¹¹ Engberg-Pedersen et al. criticise this definition on three grounds. First, it is said to focus exclusively on the state and fails to consider the possibility of fragility occurring beyond the state. It also fails to consider the inability of the state to act even

when it is willing and capable. The second criticism relates to strained diplomatic relations and cooperation arising from describing states as lacking political will and difficulty in using the definition for analysis. Thirdly, seeing fragility in the national context, it is argued, precludes the possibility that international events could affect fragile situations.¹² Engberg-Pedersen et al. themselves define fragility as ‘institutional instability undermining the predictability, transparency and accountability of public decision-making processes and the provision of security and social services to the population’.¹³

According to Harttgen and Klasen, the United Kingdom Department for International Development states that ‘fragile states are countries for which the government cannot or will not deliver its basic functions to the majority of its people, including the poor’.¹⁴ This definition includes countries affected by or emerging from conflict, as well as those with strong governments that fail to reduce poverty and abuse human rights. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy has extended the definition of fragility to include political legitimacy – fragile states ‘lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their populations, and/or the political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens at home or abroad’.¹⁵ For Harttgen and Klasen, fragile states refer to a group of countries in which progress in development has been much poorer than the norm, and/or has sometimes been hardly visible at all.¹⁶ This group includes countries in which the state has ceased to function or where state authority does not extend much beyond the capital, as well as a larger group of countries identified and labelled by the World Bank as ‘low-income countries under stress’.

The common thread running through these definitions is that state fragility is closely associated with institutional incapacities, such as authority, the capacity to deliver service entitlements and legitimacy, which are prerequisites for states to function properly. The Country Indicators for Foreign Policy definition is important because it adds legitimacy to authority and capacity (or effectiveness) as the third dimension of state incapacities. Fragile states tend to be weak on two of these dimensions. The OECD acknowledges ‘lack of legitimacy is a major contributor to state fragility, because it undermines the processes of state-society bargaining that are central to building state capacity’.¹⁷

The term ‘fragile state’ is politically stigmatising, distasteful and contentious, and has been criticised from political and analytical perspectives. Politically, it is said that the term ‘reflects unrealistic and largely northern expectations that young and mostly southern states can avoid the violence and repression that characterised state formation over the centuries in the European and American contexts’.¹⁸ Analytically, Stewart and Brown (2010) criticise the term, indicating that it is used

for too wide a set of countries and thereby tends to overlook important variations in state and regime type. Engberg-Pedersen et al. draw attention to two criticisms of ‘fragile states’. First, they argue that although states may be weak in some respects and strong in others and considering that only some of their parts may be fragile, an impression is given that some states are in a fragile condition. This opens the possibility of failure to differentiate between different states experiencing institutional instability. Moreover, the ‘fragile state’ label questions the independence and sovereignty of a state and induces resentment.¹⁹ Given the political sensitivity associated with ‘fragile state’, ‘situation of fragility’ is a preferable description.

Secondly, according to Engberg-Pedersen et al., it is erroneous to think that any country’s situation is fragile, volatile, unstable, relatively stable or secure because unexpected events may occur, creating a fragile situation where none had existed.²⁰ Also, there is no absolute fragility: it is a question of degrees of fragility, since processes and relationships can improve or deteriorate, making a situation less or more fragile. Finally, fragility may exist in higher or lower forms in the same country. This implies that fragile states as a set are not identifiable from non-fragile countries because signs of institutional instability are always present in low-income countries, but are not necessarily indicative of fragility.

Faria and Magalhães-Ferreira indicate that the negative connotation associated with ‘fragile state’ concerns three issues: fear that the term may discourage private and other foreign investment, making countries thus labelled chronically unstable and vulnerable; failure of the term to consider different causes and countries’ particular circumstances because it is too broad and unspecific; and the assumed right of the US to take pre-emptive measures, which are of no interest to most developing countries.²¹

Observatoire de l’Afrique indicates that the African Union rejected the fragile-state concept on three grounds, preferring ‘situation of fragility’.²² First, by associating ‘fragile state’ with 9/11, the terminology implicitly criminalises African states and judges them by Western benchmarks. Secondly, the concept is seen as a shield for rationalising or justifying the actions and policies of Western nations. Thirdly, the label ‘fragile’ makes it difficult for African states to attract and secure investments. However, whether a country is labelled as ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’, or described with the politically correct phrase as being in a ‘situation of fragility’, makes little difference because the groups of countries thus described are so dissimilar²³ in degrees of vulnerability and instability risks as to be hardly comparable.²⁴

4.3 Theories on State Fragility

According to Vallings and Moreno-Torres, the central driver of state fragility is weak state institutions.²⁵ Three theories offer alternative explanations for fragility.

The cost-benefit analysis of insurgence, the first theory, holds that a political system will remain stable as long as no group is better off by inciting a rebellion. Holding conflict as the cause of fragility fails to explain why peaceful means cannot be used to resolve tensions. The second theory, the role of economic performance, attributes fragility to a sudden fall in economic growth or political discontent associated with failed wealth-creation expectations. Empirical evidence, however, indicates a lack of correlation between growth and economic performance and a risk of severe fragility, which weakens the economic performance theory. Thirdly, the modernisation theory explains fragility in terms of increased demands on political leaders by middle classes for greater participation in the economy as a country develops and wealth increases. Specific factors put forward by the three theories as drivers of fragility apply to all states and include economic development; natural resources; history of violent conflict; transitions; external shocks; geography, climate and disease; and the international system. Some factors embodied in these theories drive fragility directly; others do so indirectly. Combined with weak state institutions, however, all these factors can induce fragility.

Faria and Magalhães-Ferreira indicate that there is no simple causal process behind state fragility because complex events and interactions are involved in each case.²⁶ Fragility is neither homogeneous nor determined by borders, and often results from incremental processes over time. The heterogeneity of sub-Saharan states found in a 'situation of fragility' points to the salience of country-specific, rather than regional, factors. Nevertheless, the preponderance of fragile states in the region indicates that regional factors interact with country-specific factors to determine fragility in state institutions.²⁷

4.4 Fragility as a Major African Concern

State fragility is a global problem and not unique to Africa. However, whichever definition of fragility is employed, sub-Saharan Africa is highly represented. To put the scale of state fragility into perspective and highlight the need to promote resilience-enhancing measures, it must be stressed that 'fragile states are the toughest development challenge of our era'.²⁸ Zoellick indicates that globally an estimated 1 billion people, of whom 340 million are among the world's extreme poor, live in fragile states where prospects of achieving the MDGs are bleak.²⁹ The author also states that a third of HIV/AIDS-related deaths in poor countries occur in fragile states, and that a third of people without access to clean water and a third of children who do not complete primary school live in fragile states. In addition, half of the world's children who die before reaching five are born in fragile states. Furthermore, at 54 per cent, the poverty rate in fragile states is more than double the rate in other low-income states, at 22 per cent.

State fragility is rampant in Africa. Statistics based on the World Bank's Low Income Countries Under Stress initiative, which defines fragile states as characterised by very weak policies, institutions and governance, show why the fragile state phenomenon is a subject of serious concern for donors and development analysts. According to Harttgen and Klasen, 21 countries on the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 2007 list are African.³⁰ Countries most affected by state fragility either consistently performed poorly between 2003 and 2007 or had a CPIA score of below 3,2 in each of the four sub-dimensions of the CPIA in 2007, namely, economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public-sector management and institutions. Most countries in these categories are in sub-Saharan Africa and all fragile states scoring less than 3,2 on all CPIA categories, or classified as 'core' fragile states, are sub-Saharan countries. According to the ERD, in West Africa 'several countries have never come close to state consolidation, and the region is one of the poorest and least stable in the world', 10 countries having been home to the activities of at least 35 armed groups between 1998 and 2005.³¹

More disturbing than the CPIA 2007 list is the dynamic list of fragile sub-Saharan African states put forward, but not officially endorsed, by the OECD. This list is a combination of the bottom two quintiles of the World Bank's CPIA for 2007, the Brookings Index of State Weakness in the Developing World and the Carleton University Country Indicators of Foreign Policy for 2007. The list features 29 African countries, more than half the number in Africa, as being in a 'situation of fragility'.

4.5 State Fragility in Postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa

To explain the high incidence of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa, it is essential to look beyond general factors to the colonial experiences states in this region underwent, which radically and irreversibly changed their politico-historical and socio-economic developmental trajectories. Extractive colonialism, with its severe, long-lasting, negative repercussions, explains the existence of weak postcolonial state institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. There is consensus in the literature that weak state capacity, which means '... the capacity to design and implement policies, make credible commitments, run an efficient bureaucracy and provide constraints to opportunistic behavior', and poor institutional quality account for economic stagnation in Africa.³² However, there is no agreement on the determinants of weak state capacity. Institutional quality is explained by three theories, namely differences in social capital, ethnic diversity and the adoption of neo-patrimonial strategies by African leaders not only to preserve their power, but also to maintain their peasant societies. However, none of these theories satisfactorily explains

the diversity of economic performance and state capacity one sees across Africa, where some states are consistently good performers, while others are habitually poor performers.

4.5.1 Colonialism–fragility nexus

Scholars differ on whether colonialism had an overall positive or negative impact on the economic development of postcolonial sub-Saharan African states. Two schools of thought exist. The modernisation theory, according to Bertocchi and Canova (2002), credits colonialism with having promoted the integration of colonies into the world economic system, provided foreign capital and initiated a modernisation process for the colonies.³³ On these grounds, colonialism is said to be beneficial for Africa's growth.³⁴ The weakness of modernisation theory is underlined by evidence that pre-colonial African societies had high levels of economic and social development comparable to societies elsewhere³⁵ and were abreast of the times. As such, the motivation for colonisation could only have been exploitation, and not civilisation or modernisation. Scholars such as Amin,³⁶ Bohannan and Curtin,³⁷ and Adejumobi³⁸ emphasise the existence of complex social formations; developed customs, laws, conventions and ethics to resolve conflicts and maintain order; developed formal political systems; and advanced legal institutions equivalent to modern-day courts in pre-colonial Africa. Ibn Battúta highlights the prevalence of law, order and justice, safety and security.³⁹

That colonialism has been detrimental to the development of postcolonial sub-Saharan African states is argued by the 'drain wealth thesis', which, according to Bertocchi and Canova, acknowledges its deleterious effects.⁴⁰ This school of thought highlights the extractive nature of colonialism, which reduced capital accumulation and impaired the prospects for growth. Colonies were directly exploited through taxation, imposition of tariffs, trade and foreign-investment restrictions, forced labour and enslavement of local people. They were also indirectly exploited through distorted educational policies, which, together with forced labour and enslavement, are thought to have affected growth by creating disincentives to human capital accumulation.

4.5.2 Colonisation strategies

Two main colonisation strategies were pursued by colonisers in sub-Saharan Africa: direct and indirect rule. Settlement colonies were ruled directly and extractive colonies indirectly. According to Lange, the colonisation strategy or form of colonialism adopted by colonisers was deliberate, carefully chosen and predetermined by five factors:

- Presence or absence in the colony of large numbers of European settlers (direct rule obtained in settlement colonies and indirect in non-settlement colonies).
- Strategic geopolitical importance of the colony (direct rule was imposed if the colony was strategically important).
- Economic potential of the colony (extensiveness of administration depended on ability of local resources to maintain it).
- Disease environment of the colony (indirect rule was used where diseases prevented settlement of large numbers of white people, as in most of sub-Saharan Africa).
- Presence of local population (indirect rule was favoured where a large local population was present because of increased costs associated with direct rule and risk to white settlers, since land was not freely available; it also raised the possibility of local people revolting against invasive colonialism).⁴¹

Generally, then, irrespective of the colonisers' identity, colonialism was of two broad categories,⁴² shaped by the disease environment and the relative size of the pre-colonial indigenous population. Settlement colonies were created in environments relatively free of deadly diseases, such as malaria and yellow fever, and with small indigenous populations. For their own welfare, settlers established institutions protecting their property rights and curbing arbitrary rule. Consequently, settlement colonies had effective and lasting legal systems, which proved useful for postcolonial development. Extractive, or wealth-expropriating, colonies were established where settlers were fewer and colonial officials simply focused on wealth expropriation. In such colonies, no legal property protection measures existed. Acemoglu et al. state that 'the main purpose of the extractive state was to transfer as much of the resources of the colony to the colonizer'.⁴³

4.5.3 Characteristics and effects of extractive colonialism

Institutions are the key determinants of fragility.⁴⁴ Some aspects of the formation of state institutions in sub-Saharan Africa can be related to state fragility.⁴⁵ First, the African colonial state was artificially created either through diplomacy or conquest, unlike its Western counterpart, which had been formed organically. As such, replicated European institutional structures did not reflect local social, institutional and cultural environments. Boege et al. indicate that 'whereas the processes of state-formation in Europe and the Western world took centuries, Western state forms were "delivered" like products to many parts of the global south in a relatively short time span during the era of decolonisation'.⁴⁶ According to Boege et al., granting of independence was 'driven to a significant extent by the exhaustion of the colonial powers ...'.⁴⁷ Further, Africa's new political leaders

and the international community often confused the formal declaration of independence with state formation, oblivious of the many obstacles to be overcome in actual state formation. In addition, most of the newly independent states had never experienced unitary pre-colonial rule, did not have a sense of national identity and 'lacked roots in the recipient societies'.⁴⁸ To compound the situation, people often had little or no idea what to expect from the state and what the state expected of them. Consequently, they were relatively disconnected from the state and unwilling to fulfil any obligations.

Kaplan underlines the fact that colonial states and their institutions did not arise from a 'time-consuming process consolidating informal institutions and mediating conflicting interests within society'.⁴⁹ Instead, foreign institutional structures were transplanted into local contexts and forced on a continent that had its own social, institutional and cultural features. Western colonisers, according to Kaplan, 'drew the borders of most African states almost arbitrarily, ignoring local sociopolitical, geographical, and economic conditions, discarding hundreds of years of institutional memory, and creating populations made up of disparate – and often incompatible – identity groups'.⁵⁰ Arguing along similar lines, Myrdal attributes the weakness of postcolonial African states to having had foreign institutions foisted on them, people's resentment and opposition to these institutions, and their unwillingness to abide by rules.⁵¹

Given the absence of formal state institutions in many colonies under colonialism, no concerted effort was made to develop strong institutions because of the high administrative costs weighed against expected gains. In many cases, colonisers detached themselves from colonists by building their administrative control points on hills, a practice invariably inherited by the leaders of the new independent states. Luling captures this state of affairs thus: 'The state ... [is] in most of Africa an essentially artificial one, "suspended above" a society, which would never have produced it and did not demand it. This "mismatch" between the state and society is the essence of the problem.'⁵² The symbolism of political disconnection worsened after independence when economic disconnection was added by the new political elites who, with external sources of funding, exercised hegemony by exploiting natural resources and using the proceeds to entrench themselves.

Secondly, extractive colonialism was specifically calibrated to economically exploit African colonies of wealth to develop the metropolitan powers, much to the neglect of fostering local development. Different types of heavy taxes were collected to support colonial administration, rather than developing local infrastructure. In most parts of Africa, extractive states with institutions to transfer resources rapidly to the metropolis were set up, which were detrimental to investment and economic progress.⁵³ The essentially extractive nature of colonial institutions deprived

African colonies of local development by means of their own resources. Bertocchi and Canova agree that there are significant ‘differences between the colonization experience of Africa and of other continents’.⁵⁴ However, in concluding that ‘the peculiarities of Africa’s colonization experience may be an important cause of its underdevelopment’, they are not forthright in acknowledging the negative impact of extractive colonialism on Africa’s development.⁵⁵ Rodney notes that ‘colonialism was not merely a system of exploitation, but one whose essential purpose was to repatriate the profits to the so-called mother country’.⁵⁶ For this reason, the most crucial objective of the equivalent of the colonial office in each colonising country, which worked hand in hand with their governors in Africa, was ‘to guarantee optimum conditions under which private companies could exploit Africans’.⁵⁷

Thirdly, Clapham points out the extraversion of colonial states.⁵⁸ They were tightly connected to their home governments because colonial administrators were supplied by the metropolis, and colonies’ key administrative policy decisions were made there. Orientation to the metropolis meant there was no focus on providing developmental infrastructure in the colony, except that which facilitated the extraction and export of materials. Extraversion meant only infrastructure that would yield economic returns was constructed, such as railways to transport products from the interior to the coast for shipping. Colonial capitals were strategically located at the coast. It is no coincidence that the current capital cities of many postcolonial African states around the entire continent are on the coast.

Finally, to varying degrees, Britain, France and Belgium administered their colonies remotely, which promoted what Lange calls ‘decentralized despotism’.⁵⁹ Direct or centralised rule, also called ‘integrated domination’⁶⁰ involved a legal-administrative structure with a formal chain of command throughout the colony to the central administration and back to the metropolitan centre.⁶¹ This system involved colonial officials at all levels of administration except at the lowest, where local people were involved. Indirect, decentralised, fragmented state rule or ‘dispersed domination’⁶² involved using chiefs and indigenous institutions in colonial administrations. This was based on a tripartite chain of patron-client relations via chiefs, and led to ineffective central administrations, gave chiefs power that they misused, and left the state ineffective and in a state of collapse.⁶³

According to Lange, local despotism and patrimonialism were promoted at the expense of centralised control by three factors.⁶⁴ First, the central legal-administrative network operated mainly in the colonial capital. This meant capacity to implement policy beyond the capital was severely constrained, leading to constant resort to force. Secondly, customary law allowed chiefs to control communal lands and local police, which they used to dominate their subjects. Further, chiefs had judicial, legislative and executive powers. With excessive concentration of power

in their hands, chiefs became virtual deities. Their role as agents of the colonial administration and misuse of power caused resentment among the subjects, which served to alienate them. Thirdly, as intermediaries between the colonial administration and the indigenous people, chiefs controlled sources of information and resources. As a result, they could play colonial administrators and the people against each other. Worse still, chiefs became rent-seekers in transactions between administrators and their subjects, laying the foundation for modern-day corruption. Although the institution of chieftaincy is important, its role in colonial administration poses an impediment to governance and broad-based development in postcolonial Africa.⁶⁵

To sum up, colonisers created artificial colonial states by diplomatic agreements or coercion; imposed colonial administrative structures foreign to the character of pre-existing African social, institutional and cultural systems; and operated extractive colonialism to exploit African colonies' wealth to develop the metropolitan powers, neglecting local development. The system of indirect rule practised by Britain, in particular, endowed chiefs with extraordinary powers, which led to despotism and laid the foundation for postcolonial elites to privatise state resources through corrupt practices. By relying mainly on chiefs instead of extending the legal-administrative framework to all parts of the colonies, indirect rule weakened central government control and bequeathed few credible institutions to postcolonial ruling elites.

The characteristics of extractive colonialism and indirect rule, which were dominant in sub-Saharan Africa, have had detrimental transformative effects on the politico-historical and socio-economic developmental trajectories of postcolonial African states. Settlement colonialism was widely practised outside Africa in the 'Neo-Europes'⁶⁶ of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the US, where European institutions of property ownership, investment and checks against abuse of power were replicated. In Africa, a few countries, including South Africa, Kenya, Namibia and Zimbabwe, experienced settlement colonialism. Close examination of extractive colonialism is essential to an understanding of state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa because the form of colonialism, rather than colonial rule per se, largely accounts for weak state capacity and institutional quality, hence fragility. Such an examination makes it possible to locate postcolonial sub-Saharan African states' fragility within the detrimental legacy of extractive colonialism. It also helps explain the rampant fragility found in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa relative to other regions that also experienced colonialism.

To recapture the modernisation theory and 'drain wealth thesis', the literature is replete with studies highlighting the positive and negative legacies of colonialism on development. Scholars such as Amsdem, Huff, Kohli, Lange and Wade believe

direct and bureaucratic colonial rule bequeathed positive legacies that made post-colonial states effective in providing public goods.⁶⁷ However, scholars such as Boone, Mamdani, Migdal and Reno attribute Africa's impeded political development to indirect rule,⁶⁸ which left 'ineffective central administrations, empowered local chiefs, and thereby created a system of decentralized despotism that has left the state both ineffective and near collapse'.⁶⁹ In fact, Lange finds that among former British colonies, those that were governed by indirect rule are now less politically stable and have a worse rule of law.⁷⁰ Acemoglu et al. have established that where colonisers' main interest was extraction, weak institutions of private property were established that still persist today.⁷¹ Further, Acemoglu et al. argue that 'Africa is poorer than the rest of the world not because of pure geographic or cultural factors, but because of worse institutions'.⁷² Emphasising the role of extractive colonialism in postcolonial sub-Saharan African states' weak institutions of governance, neo-patrimonialism, underdevelopment, fossilisation of ethnic and tribal tendencies and other predicaments, hence fragility, this article echoes other well-established scholarly viewpoints.

4.5.4 Failure of Africa's new political elites to dismantle colonial institutions

State fragility in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa originated from weak institutions established under colonialism. However, Africa's new political elites have played an inglorious role in the state fragility crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, providing a crucial link in the colonialism–fragility nexus. Decolonisation offered a good opportunity for the detrimental vestiges of colonial institutional forms and practices to be expunged. Instead, however, Africa's postcolonial ruling elites were content with stepping into the comfortable environment established by their predecessors, perpetuating the system and merely 'africanising' the bureaucracy.⁷³

The ERD provides several reasons why independence did not bring an end to the weak colonial institutional structures.⁷⁴ Among the first of these were the weakness of the administrative structures, poor power outreach of some colonial states and new leaders' reluctance to tamper with the institutions they had inherited. Secondly, local people could not take ownership of their own resources, capacities and social networks because Western legal, governance and education systems posed barriers, resulting in tension between formal and informal institutions. Thirdly, leaders of many newly independent African states were either Western-educated or educated in African institutions oriented to Western political values and institutions. For the new leaders, indigenising state institutions amounted to retrogressing, since pre-colonial institutions were deemed unsuitable for development. Chieftaincy, for example, had played an active role in indirect rule under colonialism and was hardly an option to bridging the gap between formal state and

informal local institutions. Fourthly, although colonial extractive institutions did not serve the developmental imperatives of independent sub-Saharan states, they were well suited to advancing the parochial interests of the new political elites. This was because, as Acemoglu et al. and Mamdani argue, colonial authorities often left the running of authoritarian state institutions to a band of local elites, who eventually became leaders of independent states and favoured continuation of the same institutions.⁷⁵ Finally, following decolonisation extraversion could not be instantly terminated, as mobilising domestic revenue, particularly through taxation, was difficult on account of state structures being mostly limited to the colonial capitals, with limited communications with dispersed populations.

The dysfunctional state institutions bequeathed to Africa's new political elites in extractive states at the time of decolonisation were maintained because they served the narrow interests of the elites. Acemoglu et al. provide three economic possibilities as explanations for the persistence of colonial institutions. First, costs involved in establishing institutions restricting government power and enforcing property rights were high. It is argued that if better institutions had existed, it is highly unlikely that Africa's new leaders would have switched to extractive institutions. Secondly, in many cases, colonial authoritarian institutions were run by a narrow band of African elites who gained state control after independence and had good reason to maintain the status quo. Finally, it is likely that colonial agents who became the new rulers had made irreversible investments in institutions supportive of extractive institutions and were keen to maintain them.⁷⁶

4.5.5 Persistence of weak state institutions

Given that colonialism was exploitative and stifled local development, and Africa's new leaders failed to initiate any radical changes to existing institutional structures following decolonisation, what explains the persistence of dysfunctional state institutions more than 50 years after most sub-Saharan African states attained independence?

To borrow from Anderson, most sub-Saharan African states were antiquated before they could ossify and had failed before they were created by being signed into existence when colonisers were forced to relinquish political control, rather than formed on the basis of political or economic viability and social cohesion.⁷⁷ Using India and Pakistan as examples, Collier⁷⁸ argues that many French-speaking West African states should not have been separate independent states because they are small and unable to provide security and accountability.⁷⁹ Exacerbating the size factor and compromising the political viability of these states was the reinforcement of tribal identities through arbitrarily drawn borders, mixing of different groups, confining their movements to territorial boundaries and fixing their social

definition with single tribal identities. In pre-colonial times, free movement had enabled people to assume multiple identities. Ranger attributes the social reinforcement of ethnic identity and polarisation between Rwandan Hutus and Tutsis to the decision of Belgium to issue identity cards in the 1930s, which created the perception that Hutus were second-class citizens.⁸⁰ Newbury indicates that the ethnic-based allocation of social and economic resources between Hutus and Tutsis laid the foundation for the genocide decades afterwards.⁸¹

A key success factor for a state is an enduring national governance system with apolitical bureaucratic structures, such as the civil service, police and army.⁸² For postcolonial sub-Saharan African states, an enduring national governance system has been severely constrained by geographical and socio-economic forms of political fragmentation and weak national institutions. Weak state institutions inherited by Africa's new leaders were not reformed after independence and persist today because they served the interests of local political elites.⁸³

Neocolonialism perpetuates postcolonial extraction. Current events indicate that former colonial powers merely relinquished political power, but still pull levers to retain economic control. By consolidating extraversion, the burgeoning phenomenon of aid and humanitarian assistance is a major disincentive to effective mobilisation of domestic resources.

Path dependence and persistence of weak institutional development in sub-Saharan Africa is supported by theoretical literature and empirical evidence, specifically in terms of the instrumental role played by extractive colonialism in laying the ground for fragile state institutions and the failure of most states in the region before they were formed.⁸⁴ Engelbert and Tull assert that 'the evidence is overwhelming that most of Africa's collapsed states at no point in the postcolonial era remotely resembled the ideal type of the modern Western polity',⁸⁵ and Herbst argues that European powers took possession of Africa, but did little to control it.⁸⁶

Consolidation of colonial power was a difficult task. The limited ability of British and French rulers to 'broadcast their administrative authority over the vast territories they were supposed to control'⁸⁷ lay not only in inadequate capacity and the small staff component, but also in poor development of roads. In the latter respect, colonial authorities faced the same problem pre-colonial rulers encountered. Herbst states the problem Africa's rulers have had to face across time as follows: 'The fundamental problem facing state-builders in Africa – be they pre-colonial kings, colonial governors or presidents in the independent era – has been to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people.'⁸⁸ In both pre-colonial and colonial times, the relationship between rulers and ruled was characterised by detachment. In pre-colonial times, people migrated when irreconcilable differences arose between them and rulers, weakening the

latter by reducing chances of collecting resources. Similarly, colonial rulers had less chance of raising revenue from scattered and mobile people to support permanent government institutions.⁸⁹

4.6 Overcoming State Fragility

State fragility in sub-Saharan Africa is mainly a product of weak state institutions established under extractive colonialism. Many sub-Saharan African states, including Nigeria and Ivory Coast, previously thought to be strong, have fallen into ‘situations of fragility’. African leaders need to make concerted efforts and adopt effective measures to build state resilience. Although Africans themselves should bear this responsibility, there is no denying the complementary role of the international community and any assistance it may offer to overcome the combination of political fragmentation and weak state institutions in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa.

4.6.1 Responsive state-building

State resilience, the opposite of state fragility, implies the ability of states to cope with change while maintaining the bargain of the social contract.⁹⁰ Resilience is the ability of a system to adjust to a perpetuation and maintain its core functions unaltered.⁹¹ Efforts at building resilience tend to focus on the endogenous process of state-building.⁹² Citing Caplan, the ERD describes state-building as ‘efforts by national actors ... to establish, reform and strengthen state institutions, where these have been eroded or are missing’.⁹³ State-building has often been a top-down approach focusing on state actors and national elites, and neglecting local concerns. Emphasis has often been on the legitimacy and capacity aspects of state institutions in delivering basic services in line with citizens’ expectations. However, an exclusive focus on the state overlooks important actors who do not operate within state institutions.⁹⁴ ‘Responsive’ state-building is a new focus on state–society relations offering more enduring benefits than those that are restricted to the state alone; it involves a negotiation of mutual demands, obligations and expectations between states and citizens.⁹⁵ It is a bottom-up approach, focusing on legitimacy and is important because state-building efforts will fail if confined to strengthening institutional capacities only. Consequently, while institution-building is important, sidelining social expectations will not address fragility. Support for civil society is essential in providing checks and balances on the state and making it accountable.

4.6.2 Recognition of historical, political, economic and cultural resources

Building state resilience in sub-Saharan Africa also involves recognising the existence of centuries-old political, economic and cultural resources upon which

Africa's political, economic and social development can be based. The international community has often approached Africa's problems paternalistically, offering monetary development assistance as the solution to rebuilding broken-down state institutions. This approach is flawed. Rebuilding state institutions is counter-productive because such institutions were built on flawed foundations in the first place. Although assistance is needed, it should not be for rebuilding but for reforming systems and institutions. Further, although Africans appreciate efforts by the international community to help states in distress, it must be Africans themselves driving the process.

4.6.3 Promoting national and local socially cohesive societies and institutions

Social cohesion is the root of state resilience and developing healthy economic and political systems⁹⁶ to overcome political fragmentation and weak state institutions. The key challenge is how to institute measures to unify different peoples nationally. Kaplan advocates that international assistance should be directed at facilitating processes aimed at 'fostering cohesive societies and widely accepted institutions necessary for societal governing systems to work effectively'.⁹⁷ Such assistance should be broad-based, complementing and reinforcing local capacities and institutions through a proper understanding of local sociocultural contexts and use of local capacities, instead of narrowly focusing on economic restructuring, aid and democracy. Support could take the form of promoting decentralised institutions, incorporating traditional norms into state institutions, promoting social cohesion and encouraging multiple forms of accountability. Social cohesion, particularly a sense of common identity, may be promoted in multi-ethnic African states by promoting large, inclusive, national, broad-based political parties, consociational governments and balanced representation systems in state institutions.

4.7 Conclusion

The link between colonialism and state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa is clearly evident. This chapter has shown that the colonialism practised in many sub-Saharan African states had anti-developmental consequences. It created artificial entities by arbitrarily drawing borders devoid of logic, was essentially extractive in nature and deliberately left formal state institutions undeveloped. Extraversion of colonial states and decentralised despotism were visited on colonial subjects through indirect rule. These features ensured that postcolonial sub-Saharan African states were stillborn at independence. Although decolonisation offered an opportunity to dismantle dysfunctional colonial institutions, Africa's new political elites, themselves the beneficiaries and guardians of extractive colonialism, maintained the repressive institutions'

status quo. Weak state-authority structures have since persisted, aided by the age-old problem of the separation between the rulers and the ruled, and exacerbated by the difficulty in establishing state authority over the entire population.

If Africa is to play a leading role in global affairs, the fragility crisis must be addressed urgently by building resilience. So-called responsive state-building, which focuses on legitimacy and support for civil society to provide checks and balances to ensure state accountability, is one measure. Another is approaching development by relying more on Africa's centuries-old political, economic and cultural resources. Also important is the promotion of socially cohesive national and local societies and institutions. Further, building legitimacy alongside state capacity and reforming, rather than merely rebuilding, dysfunctional colonially inherited institutions are effective resilience-enhancing measures. Finally, African leaders need to realise that unity is strength and should put the ultimate interests of the continent above everything else.

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5

Chapter

China's Links with Africa and Implications for Development and Democratic Governance: A Study of Selected African Countries

Samuel A Nyanchoga

China is emerging as a world power with massive interest in Africa. What does this mean for Africa's development and democratic agenda? Will China influence Africa to postpone democracy and prioritise poverty reduction? Will China influence Africa to choose a developmental state model, devoid of democratic content? Will the developmental agenda embraced by China, which is devoid of democratic governance, lead to the resurrection of iron-fisted authoritarian regimes in Africa?

There is no doubt that powerful forces in the world economy and international politics have used their economic muscle to link aid to democratisation. There is no doubt that structural adjustment programmes and political conditionalities in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s compelled African regimes to re-orient governance towards democracy.

Nevertheless, the increasing presence of China in Africa is viewed by many as a self-interested, mercantilist mission that threatens a new sort of colonialism, with China indirectly in control, in league with African autocrats.¹ China's presence is visible in autocratic and high-risk regions or states in Africa. It is also a major investor in the natural resource sector in Sudan, Angola, Nigeria, Zambia, Algeria, Chad, Niger, Tunisia, Mali, Mauritania, Gabon, Congo and Ethiopia. By the end of 2006 China's direct investments amounted to more than US\$8,27 billion.² By 2010 China's direct investment was estimated to be \$100 billion while trade between Africa and China was valued at \$115 billion.³ It has been argued that this has prompted economic growth, but many critics see otherwise.

Critics lament that China's economic policy is undemocratic because it bypasses international marketing and pricing protocols by securing commodities at source. It has also encourages Africa to rely heavily on Chinese commodity exports, thus creating new chains of dependency and underdevelopment on the continent. It is indifferent to Africa's democratic agenda and the danger is that governments in Africa are likely to slow the process of political and economic reforms. African citizenry is likely to suffer from the partnership. China's mercantilist approach to business in Africa does not create space in the continent to push the agenda for qualitative development and the growth of democracy.

5.1 Donor Pressure and Governance in Africa

The international community contributed to the democratisation of the African continent, particularly in the 1990s, by putting pressure on recalcitrant national elites to make meaningful democratic concessions. These include holding regular, free and fair elections, the democratisation of economic decisions, and constitutional reforms. Donor aid was linked to credible but functional economies based on liberal principles of free enterprise. The entrenchment of good governance in Africa in the 1990s was seen as a consequence of donor pressure and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe, with Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika reforms in the former Soviet Union during the late 1980s, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the dissolution of one-party states in Eastern Europe in late 1989. These events were given much international publicity and suggested to despotic regimes in Africa that their days were numbered.

The World Bank report on sustainable growth in sub-Saharan Africa linked the flow of aid to Africa to the concept of good governance.⁴ The United Nations Development Programme broadened the concept of good governance beyond merely good state management of its political, economic and social affairs to encompass good management in the private sector as well, and a vibrant civil society to act as a watch dog thus facilitating a fair social, political and economic environment.⁵

Consequently, donor governments such as the US, Britain and Norway began to put pressure on despotic African regimes to democratise their political and economic policies and processes if they were to continue receiving external aid. Good governance was intended to generate institutional effectiveness and economic growth. Accordingly pressure began to mount on Africa to initiate constitutional reforms which would provide the legal and institutional framework for democratic governance. Countries such as Kenya, under the leadership of Daniel arap Moi, were compelled to initiate constitutional reforms allowing multiparty politics after external aid was withdrawn by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other donors who cited corruption in public- and private-sector spending and poor leadership as reasons. In Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia, parliament repealed the clause in their national constitutions that accorded single-party rule monopoly status and limiting presidential period to two five-year terms. The coordination of donor activities such as those of the IMF, the World Bank, the Paris Club, Scandinavian countries, Britain and US in putting pressure on African countries to democratise, led to the adoption of multiparty politics in Africa.⁶

However, it is important to note that African countries were not entirely dependent on Western donor support for public administration and their development

agenda. The politics of the Cold War, and Soviet Union and Chinese influence in Africa enabled African countries to extract resources from the East and delay the process of democratisation. Since aid to African countries from the East was based on geopolitical factors, China and the Soviet Union did not demand economic and political efficiency before disbursing aid to Africa. For instance, the Soviet Union strengthened its grip in the Horn of Africa, while China continued to give unconditional financial support in Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, among other African countries.

5.2 Local Activism and Governance in Africa

Civil societies, opposition political parties and the media were able to flex their muscles in the democratic space created by the pressure of the international community on recalcitrant regimes in Africa. Under the auspices of national conferences, members of civil society, the church, the media and opposition political parties began to propose solutions to local political and economic crises. During the 1990s and in 2000, national conferences were held in Chad, Benin, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Niger and Togo, calling for constitutional and regime transition. Some of these national conferences led to national commissions which, as in Tanzania for example, led to the revision of the national constitution to allow multiparty democracy. In other countries, such as Kenya, Zambia, and Côte d'Ivoire, national parliaments took the necessary steps, after local and international pressure, to reformulate their constitutions to permit multiparty politics.

5.3 China and Africa from the 1960s to the 1990s

During the Cold War, the Chinese competed with both the West and the Soviet Union for domination in Africa. China was increasingly being isolated from world politics, particularly by the Soviet Union. China combated this by initiating a diplomatic, cultural and economic policy offensive in Africa. It found a hinge in the national liberation movements, which it began to support in an attempt to build a new communist movement. The Marxist revolutions of Samora Machel (for Mozambique), Agostino Neto (for Angola) and Amilcar Cabral (for Guinea-Bissau) applied the praxis of the Marxist revolution against colonial domination. They saw colonial exploitation and oppression as the most flagrant examples of exploitation of man by man. China found in this an opportunity to project itself into Africa. Since the majority of African countries were limited by their modest economic development, China began to exercise its economic and cultural influence through trade, and through granting interest-free, unconditional loans.⁷

In 1961, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana concluded a 10-year agreement on economic and technical cooperation with China, in which Ghana was granted £7 million, interest free, for industrial and agricultural development. The agreement also allowed China to bring in technical and agricultural experts to assist in building textile factories and to provide training. China was also allowed to sell textile products in Ghana. In 1961, China granted Mali an interest-free loan of \$16 million. China also opened a film and radio station in Bamako. In 1962, China entered into a technical, economic and cultural cooperation agreement with Guinea, worth \$25 million. Again an interest-free loan, it was intended to promote development in agriculture.

In 1963, China extended \$20 million credit to Somalia following the withdrawal of British assistance in response to Somalia's armed incursions into Kenya and Ethiopia. Diplomatic relations with Tanganyika, Uganda, Zanzibar and Burundi were also established after independence. This was followed by trade and economic ties, as well as cultural cooperation. China also established economic, technical and cultural cooperation with Egypt in 1956, Morocco in 1959 and Tunisia in 1961. By 1962, Chinese investment in selected African countries was as follows: Ghana \$3,8 million, Guinea \$0,5 million, Mali \$0,8 million, Kenya \$0,1 million, Sudan \$3,8 million, South Africa \$1,3 million, Morocco \$3,6 million, Nigeria \$4,4 million and Senegal \$5,2 million. The symbol of China–Africa links in the 1980s was Tazara, the Tanzania–Zambia railway built with the assistance of China.⁸

What is important to note is that although democracy and human rights were not the central issues of concern for Western donors in the 1960s, countries such as the US outlined in their foreign policy, their goal of promoting democracy in Africa. The Carter administration in the 1970s promoted human rights in its foreign policy. In the 1980s, with economic crises in Africa, the US, Scandinavian countries and various lending institutions began to voice concern that the authoritarian regimes in Africa interfered with human rights and retarded economic growth. China, on the contrary, did not rescind on its agreements in Africa and continued to work in league with the autocratic regimes, much to detriment of the democracy project in Africa.

5.3.1 China in Africa: Bad for development and democracy?

During the 1990s, China–Africa trade grew by 700 per cent, displacing traditional British, French and US interests. By 2005 there were 750 Chinese enterprises operating in Africa. China's entities increased direct foreign investment in Africa from \$135 million in 2004 to \$175 million in 2005. China had emerged as a potential trade partner with Africa, after the US and France.⁹

Over the years China's presence in Africa has increased, which has drawn many reactions from the international community, who view the People's Republic of China as engaging in a new form of colonialism in Africa and protecting the rogue states in Africa.¹⁰ The US Council for Foreign Relations 2005 report was categorical that China's actions in Africa were deleterious to African interests because they were supportive of illiberal regimes, harmful to the environment, promoted corruption and jeopardised anti-poverty efforts.¹¹ China reacted sharply to these criticisms, stating that her engagement in Africa promoted strategic partnership, equality, win-win cooperation, cultural exchange and international democratic order.¹² Further to this, China noted that US support for authoritarian regimes such as Gabon, Cameroon, Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea and Uganda was less talked about than China's support for countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. Chinese elites further argue that there is no evidence to suggest that Africa has become more corrupt or less democratic since China's presence in Africa began to rise in 2000. They argue that both China and the European Union are the largest purchasers of illegal timber from Africa and that Western pharmaceutical companies engage in bio-piracy and scientific imperialism in Africa.¹³

Obviously the West, particularly the US, is critical of China's activities in Africa while China defends her engagement in Africa as following the South-South pattern of development, as opposed to the West's exploitative North-South model. China notes that Africa's long-term relations with the West, the IMF and the World Bank damaged her industrialisation programme and created under-development. China further notes that Western capitalist policies ignore African aspirations for the more equitable international distribution of wealth and power which is the hallmark of an international democratic order.¹⁴ Western nations such as the US and Britain, on the other hand, accuse China of engaging in disadvantageous terms of trade, of exploiting natural resources, promoting and condoning oppressive labour practices, supporting authoritarian rulers and deploying undue influence to counter Western pressure on African states to improve human rights and governance.

However, critics argue that China is patronising African countries simply to serve its own selfish ambitions. Chinese companies unfairly import their own workers, thereby limiting local employment opportunities and keeping out African firms. China's approach of bartering natural resources for infrastructure (getting repaid for their project finances in oil, gas or other raw materials) is a strategy which plunders African resources to meet her domestic industrial demands. China downplays the issue of human rights, especially in conflict-prone areas, in order to advance her own geopolitical and commercial interests. China's no-interference and no-strings-attached aid and trade policy means that African governments are

incentivised, if not directly encouraged, to resist pressures from Western countries to adopt reforms that they do not want to implement.¹⁵ China argues that her model of development in Africa is to promote an international democratic order and reduce Africa's dependence on the West. At the World Economic Forum in 2006, the president of the African Development Bank noted that the Chinese model of economic development teaches Africa how to organise trade policies and subsequently move from low-income to middle-income status. Similar sentiments aired by the Nigerian delegation at the same forum averred that China's model of economic development is not informed by the policies of the Western lending institutions that stress deregulation, cutting social expenditure and privatisation. Rather, it promotes infrastructural investment and the development of support services, while the Western states buy natural resources and sell weapons, alcohol and cigarettes in what has been termed an unequal and desperate exchange.¹⁶ A South African scholar, Lyal Whi, notes that China is the first country from the marginalised developing fold to occupy the centre stage in the global political economy and is closely aligned to the countries of the south.¹⁷ Similarly, Chinese elites such as Li He¹⁸ and Tian Yu Cao¹⁹ note that, unlike Western capitalism, the 'Chinese model' helps to develop industrialisation in Africa at a lower cost, and without imposing onerous requirements on African states' policy-making. Nevertheless, there is no substantial evidence to suggest that countries such as Angola, Nigeria or Sudan have become more industrialised thanks to close economic ties with China.

Professor Goldman Sachs of Qinghua University notes that the Chinese model of development in the South is opposed to the Western, Washington and related institutions (the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization) consensus on development, which promotes unequal exchange and a hierarchy of nations.²⁰ In the words of Joshua Cooper Ramo, former *Time* magazine foreign affairs editor who, in 2004, coined the term 'Beijing Consensus' contrasting it with the Washington Consensus in its policy thinking on, and practice of, diplomacy, trade and foreign assistance:

The Beijing Consensus puts an emphasis on self-directed development and equal donor-recipient relationship. Unlike Western donors who have made acceptance by developing country governments of political and market reform packages as conditions for their aid, China provides aid with no strings attached. Unlike Western donors that select aid recipient countries (based on historical associations, such as colonialism or geo-political importance), China enters almost any country with attractive trade and investment potential.²¹

Deborah Brautigam, in *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*, says:

The West has a lot to learn from China, such as focusing aid on long-term development and making business simple and easy. In fact, the Chinese have brought badly needed investment, trade and market access to Africa. There are as many as 2 000 Chinese firms engaged in construction, mining, agriculture, manufacture and other sectors.²²

At the China–Africa Forum in Beijing in 2000, former Zambian President Frederick Chiluba, had this to say:

The Western capitalism does not promote fair play and justice in international trade. Rather the North–South relations consign African countries to perpetual poverty and underdevelopment. This may be summarised as undemocratic economic order.²³

Similarly, Sanjaya Lall argues that the US trade pacts such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) ensure that states that marketise, liberalise, privatise, de-subsidise, deregulate, and do not undermine US foreign policy, receive trade preferences.²⁴ Many African countries under authoritarian leadership have been declared eligible. In the eyes of China, the US therefore promotes undemocratic culture in Africa.

The debate between China and the West over whether China's presence in Africa is undermining democratic practices and development, is viewed across the political and ideological divide as a struggle between the neo-liberal approach to development and the socially orientated approach fronted by China. Nevertheless, China's distinctive links with pariah regimes in Africa is undermining the practice of democracy and quality development as demonstrated in the cases of Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Angola and Sudan.

5.4 China's Distinctive Links with Selected African Countries

China does not tie its aid or investment to conditions such as good governance, fighting corruption or adopting reforms, conditions that have been the mainstays for the West and international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. This therefore ends up being convenient for regimes that do not care to make reforms and undercuts efforts by other donors and investors to press for positive reforms, as is revealed in the following brief analysis of some of China's links with Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Angola and Sudan.

5.4.1 Zimbabwe

Relations between China and Zimbabwe started before independence, when China aided the liberation fighters with military support. Zimbabwe became independent

in 1980 and thereafter established bilateral relations with China. Over the years Sino-Zimbabwean relations have grown, with increasing economic and military support for Zimbabwe. Although Zimbabwe is internationally viewed as a pariah because of Robert Mugabe's anti-democratic practices, including unpopular land reform policies and resource exploitation, China has become its major international supporter and patron. Given Zimbabwe's current economic woes and estrangement from Western technology, capital and trade, China remains Mugabe's critical ally. This gives China an opportunity to unearth Zimbabwe's natural resources and secure lucrative deals for Chinese state-owned firms.


Whereas the international community has put pressure on Mugabe to democratise the political and economic space, China is doing the opposite. In December 2003, China's Premier Wen Jiabao praised Zimbabwe's unpopular land reform policies as pro social justice, and increased financial support to Zimbabwe's agricultural sector. This included contracting Chinese firms such as China International Water and Electric to farm more than 250 000 acres, which was expected to yield more than 2,1 million tons of maize annually. Payment was to be made through the purchase of tobacco from Zimbabwe.²⁵ In 2003, China gave Zimbabwe \$12 billion to develop medium- and small-scale manufacturing sectors including textile, soap and fibreglass production.

In 2010, the Chinese government called on the European Union and the United States to lift economic sanctions imposed after the disputed elections of 2002 and 2009. Although Zimbabwe continued to face isolation from its former trading partners, given her poor democratic record, China was doing the contrary. The Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, had this to say during his official visit to Zimbabwe in early 2011:

China believes that Africa belongs to African countries and African people. African people are their own masters and all other are guests ... We believe all nations should respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity.²⁶

Perhaps the most appealing to China are Zimbabwe's vast mineral and precious metal deposits. Zimbabwe has the second largest deposits of platinum in the world, with an estimated value of \$500 billion, and has deposits of more than 40 minerals including ferrochrome, gold, silver and copper. In 2005, China secured coal and coke concessions in return for mining equipment and financing. Chinese firms such as China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) and China North Industries Corporation (NORICO) also secured contracts in Zimbabwe to develop the Zimbabwean electricity sector, in return for rights to exploit natural resources. It is perhaps worth noting that NORICO had been censored by the US government for engaging in the proliferation of arms.²⁷

Figure 5.1 Chinese investment in various sectors in Zimbabwe, 2000–2007 (%)



Source Zimbabwe Investment Centre Statistics, 2008

In 2004, at the United Nations Commission for Human Rights, both Zimbabwe and China blocked resolutions that would have seen both condemned for human rights abuse. In the same year Chinese radar was installed at Mugabe's private residence in Harare at a cost of \$13 million. In April 2005, Zimbabwe bought six K8 jets, four 12FC-1 fighter planes and 100 military vehicles at a cost of \$240 million, far above its defence budget of \$136 million.²⁸ In 2006 when Mugabe launched Operation 'drive out trash', in which 700 000 people lost their businesses and homes, to clear urban slums for renewal, China blocked its condemnation in the UN Security Council.²⁹

5.4.1.1 Sectoral analysis of Chinese investment in Zimbabwe

An analysis of Chinese investment in Zimbabwe indicates its areas of concentration and point to the fact that Chinese economic interests in Zimbabwe are both extractive and predatory. By 2007 there were a total of 37 Chinese companies operating in Zimbabwe, with a total investment worth \$600 million.³⁰

Investment in manufacturing was the greatest between 2000 and 2005. It stood at 95 per cent in 2000, reached its peak in 2004 at 99 per cent, dropping to 33 per cent in 2005 and finally to 8 per cent in 2007.

In 2006 and 2007, Chinese investment shifted to mining, accounting for 62 per cent and 91 per cent of its total investment, respectively. As noted earlier, Zimbabwe has vast mineral and metal deposits including ferrochrome, gold, copper and silver, as well as the second largest deposits of platinum in the world, worth \$500 billion. Zimbabwe now hosts Chinese companies such as NORICO, Shanghai Baosteel, China Metallurgical Corporation and Bunday Technical Mining, who are engaged in extractive mining activities in Zimbabwe. Some of these companies, such as Sinosteel, have bought out local companies such as Zimasco, in ferrochrome mining, which raises questions as to whether the Chinese are sincere investors or economic vultures in need of raw materials to support their economy.³¹

Chinese investment in the agricultural sector is due to the global recession, which has led to an increase in food prices globally and has put her under pressure from her domestic population. China has made several financial contributions in support of land reform in Zimbabwe. The Chinese state company, China International Water and Electric Corporation, signed an agreement with the Government of Zimbabwe to cultivate 100 000 hectares of land for maize production, and produce an estimated 2,1 million tons per year. China is also the largest buyer of tobacco exports from Zimbabwe, and is a net importer of soya beans, coffee, sugar, cotton and beef. In the construction sector, Chinese companies such as China Building Material Industrial Corporation have gone into housing, national sports stadiums, hospitals, dams and roads.³²

Partnerships in the transport sector include the Chinese company, CATIC's, sale of long-haul planes (MA60) to Air Zimbabwe in 2004. Similarly, China Northern Locomotive and Railing Stock Industry has signed an agreement with National Railways of Zimbabwe to revamp the sector.

As regards the textile, leather, clothing and shoe manufacturing industries, the Zimbabwean market has been flooded by Chinese imports sold cheaply since 2004. Local industries have closed and people have lost jobs.³³ Several Chinese companies operating in the capital, Harare, are 100 per cent Chinese-owned while a few of them are joint ventures with Zimbabweans or Nigerians. Companies such as Likvee Investment, Afro-Chinese, Oral Hopes, Revival Fabrics, Spiid Rolling, Hongyu, Zimcha and Golden Town are Chinese-owned, while Three Star and Minota UR are joint ventures between Chinese and Zimbabweans.³⁴

5.4.2 Nigeria

China's links with Nigeria date back to the 1960s although bilateral relations increased in the 1970s.³⁵ Increased investment deals started in 2005 when China and Nigeria signed a deal for the sale of crude oil worth \$800 million between Petrochina International and Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation. In the same year, China's offshore oil producer, China National Overseas Oil Company (CNOOC), invested \$2,3 billion in oil and gas production.³⁶ In the recent past, several Chinese companies have invested heavily in Nigeria's extractive sector: China Harbour Engineering Company has invested \$1 billion in road construction; Zamfra State Corporation of China has put \$65 billion into hydropower production; China National Overseas Oil Company Limited has invested \$11 billion in oil production; Delta Services and Western Metal has committed \$80 billion to generate power using coal and Huawei Equipment has put \$250 million into telecommunications.³⁷

5.4.2.1 Nature of relations

With regard to trade relations, Chinese imports to Nigeria include motorcycles, machinery and equipment, automobiles, auto parts, rubber tyres, chemical products, textiles, garments, cement, electronics, and electrical appliances.³⁸ Nigerian exports to China include crude oil, timber and cotton. These trade relations are in favour of China and thus undermine local industries.

Migration flows between China and Nigeria include, currently, more than 70 000 Chinese people in Nigeria's major cities such as Lagos and Kano. The majority of this population works in the oil industry, in trade and in the construction industry. The number of Nigerians working in China is estimated at 1 000. This has created strains in employment and industrial labour relations in Nigeria.

5.4.3 Angola

Since 2004, trade relations between China and Angola have grown significantly. In the 1990s, the value of trade stood at about \$700 million. By the year 2000, the value of trade had risen to \$1,8 billion and by 2005, it had soared to \$6,9 billion. China is the largest importer of oil from Angola, after the US. In the first half of 2006, Angola supplied China with about 2 345 million tons of oil. Currently, approximately 18 per cent of China's total oil imports come from Angola. In 2006, Chinese exports to Angola quadrupled, with steel and iron bars, batteries, cement and vehicles as the principal goods. In 2008, the volume of trade between the two countries had reached \$25,3 billion, while the value of Angolan exports (mainly oil) reached \$22,3 billion. Angolan imports were finished products, mainly telecommunications, agricultural and electronic equipment from China.³⁹

Chinese investment is in road construction, power generation, the extractive industries, retail trade of foodstuff products, the manufacturing of rubber products and mineral water bottling. Significantly, China Petrochemical Corporation, better known as the Sinopec Group, has more than a 50 per cent stake in Angola's oil industry.

The Chinese have also shown an interest in Angola's diamonds. On 6 April 2005, the Angolan Council of Ministers accepted a joint venture agreement between China and Angola's state-owned diamond companies (Endiama). The Council also approved Endiama's participation in the creation of Endiama China International Holding Ltd (Endiama China) to prospect, produce and market diamonds, including diamond cutting and the production of jewellery. Currently, more than 100 Chinese firms are doing business in Angola. Some of them have been attracted by loans from the Chinese government and Angola's improved economic prospects. China Jiangsu and China Roads and Bridges Cooperation are two examples of such firms.⁴⁰

Angola is characterised by its possession of vast resources and its corrupt government. Chinese involvement in Angola confirms three important assertions. China is bartering Angola's natural resources in return for aid. Chinese aid to Angola is in the form of construction: hospitals, roads, schools and irrigation systems, among others. Yet the pace of Angola's democratisation process is found wanting.⁴¹

5.4.4 Sudan

'China's support for Sudan is interpreted as shielding a regime that is by all characteristics genocidal'.⁴² The Darfur crisis has killed more than 200 000 and displaced more than 2,5 million in western Sudan. A report by the Brussels-based

International Crisis Group in 2002⁴³ accused China of vested interests in the continuation of insecurity and the absence of real peace in Sudan to enhance its business opportunities at the expense of southern Sudanese civilians. The report further stated that there is an almost total disregard for the human rights implications of their (China's) investment. Angelina Teny, the State Minister of the Sudan Ministry of Mining and Energy, says that revenue collection from oil is not shared equally between south and north Sudan. She states that this is because a Chinese company, the Greater Nile Production Company which controls oil production, tends to favour the North in revenue allocation. Teny states that China continues to sell arms to the Khartoum government and backs Sudan in the United Nations Security Council when other nations seek to condemn it for human rights violations.⁴⁴ According to the report by Amnesty International, in 2005,⁴⁵ Sudan bought parts of military helicopters, arms and ammunition worth \$73 million from China. A 2006 report by the UN Security Council revealed that 222 military vehicles destined for Khartoum were procured from Dongfeng Automobile Import and Export in China. The consignee was Sudan's Ministry of Finance and National Economy, on behalf of the Ministry of Defence. Similarly, NORINCO of China supplied automatic grenade launchers to the Khartoum government, according to the same report by the UN Security Council.⁴⁶ All this happened after the UN embargo had been approved and imposed on Sudan. With this kind of military hardware, the Khartoum government is able to carry out massive violations of human rights in southern Sudan and Darfur.

In its role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has continuously blocked effective action against Sudan. China has repeatedly used its veto power to block deployment of a joint UN–African Union (AU) peacekeeping force in Darfur, thus weakening international pressure on the Sudan government to solve the Darfur crisis. It was not until late 2006 and 2007 that China began to support an expanded UN peacekeeping programme in Darfur, after much criticism by the US government. The Chinese government stressed its constructive role in Darfur prior to President Hu Jintao's visit to Khartoum in April 2007.⁴⁷ China's stand that the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Sudan must respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sudan appears hypocritical. Under these circumstances the AU and UN troops cannot play a constructive peacekeeping role in Darfur, facilitate the stability of the region and improve the living conditions of the local people. Worse still, China supports a dual-track process of AU–UN peacekeeping on the one hand and, on the other, continues to supply military hardware to Khartoum, thus continuing to fuel the conflict. While professing support for UN Security Council Resolution 1769 regarding arms control, China continues to strengthen military cooperation with Sudan.⁴⁸ In addition, China continues

to insist that political and economic pressure on Sudan is counter-productive and that sanctions are not needed.⁴⁹

China is also accused of not supporting the comprehensive peace agreement. It prefers to deal directly with the government in Khartoum and ignores the Sudan People's Liberation Movement as a member of the government of national unity in Khartoum. As oil remains central to politics in Sudan, China is accused of being a contributing factor to the conflict because Chinese firms involved in the production of oil shield records of oil production from the south and hence assist in undercutting oil revenue that is supposed to go to the south. According to Teny, the State Minister for Sudan's Ministry of Mining and Energy in Khartoum, oil profits are to be shared 50 per cent to the south, 48 per cent to the north and 2 per cent to the specific oil-producing areas. But the government of Sudan has not been honouring the deal and Chinese firms engaged in oil production fail to open their production records that could help in ensuring that there is equity in distribution of oil profits.⁵⁰

5.5 Implications for Governance and Development

5.5.1 Democratic governance

China's partnerships in Africa hinge on the principle of non-interference in internal matters, particularly on issues of democratic governance. China has developed strong ties with countries that have poor records or have shown little or no desire to democratise their political space. From the foregoing analyses, it is clear that China's distinctive links to Africa, in particular Zimbabwe and Sudan, have had serious implications for the democratisation process. China is less concerned with the pace of democratisation in these countries than in ways in which it can benefit economically

From the 1990s Zimbabwe, for instance, has dragged its heels in the democratisation process. In the late 1990s Zimbabwe implemented radical and unpopular land expropriation policies which were supported by China.⁵¹ The 2000 and 2005 elections were marred by irregularities. Several controversial laws were also passed, such as the 2002 Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and the 2003 Public Order and Security Act. The government passing these acts reigned in press freedom. In 2004 the Non-governmental Organisation Bill prohibited foreign non-governmental organisations from dealing with governance issues. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Bill signed into law in the same year empowered the president to appoint members of the commission without consulting stakeholders.

The 2008 electoral fiasco in Zimbabwe resulted in violence causing the flight of refugees to Mozambique and South Africa. While the US, the United Kingdom

and other European Union members were critical of Mugabe's anti-democratic practices, supporting political and economic sanctions and desiring democracy, China on the other hand was increasing her involvement in Zimbabwe and making her stand of non-interference in Zimbabwe's internal affairs clear through ongoing cooperation, ranging from arms deals and investment to the purchase of agricultural produce.

For China, Zimbabwe remains her exclusive resource base as long as Mugabe is in power.

China's overall foreign policy is guided by a modernisation project and how it can benefit economically by forging distinctive links with specific countries that are resource-based. Such undemocratic behaviour by China is indeed rewarding African despots. China's support for controversial regimes like those of Sudan and Zimbabwe, and especially the supply of weapons to them, is a threat to political, social and economic stability. Furthermore, China has shown a lack of concern for human rights.

Kenya's attempt to defer, for at least one year, the case before the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicting the perpetrators of the 2007–2008 post-election violence has received support from China, a member of United Nations Security Council. While other members of the Security Council such as the US and Britain do not support the deferral of the case based on concrete facts, Kenya's culture of impunity and judicial incapacity undermines the mechanism of trying suspects locally. China, however, supports the establishment of a local tribunal to try the cases. This is contrary to the commonly held view by the international community that Kenya is incapable of establishing a credible local judicial system to try the post-election violence suspects.⁵²

China has also come under attack from unions and other civil society organisations for violating human and labour rights. Chinese companies have also been accused of violating environmental rights in some local communities in Africa, such as in Niger. In the words of Hannah Armstrong:

The sun-wizened Tuareg women of Azalik have declared war on China. Like their ancestors, they once eked out a living selling dried salts from an ancestral well. Everything changed last year, when the government leased their land to the China Nuclear International Uranium Corporation (Sino-U) for uranium exploration. Left with no livelihood and no compensation, a hundred women gathered to launch stones at mining machinery. 'Now it is eternal war,' says Tinatina Salah, their 50-year-old leader, who still seeks compensation for the loss of her salt.

Tuaregs are particularly irked with Chinese investments in uranium and oil. To Tuaregs, the \$300 million SOMINA uranium mine at the desert outpost of Azalik, has come to represent all that is harmful about Chinese investment in

Niger. Nigerien workers denounced conditions at SOMINA, claiming it resembled 'a Chinese colony'. Nigerien laborers sleep in dorms, separately from Chinese workers. The rooms are located in illegal proximity to open pit uranium mines, and the Nigeriens suffer chronic diarrhea on account of an unsanitary water supply. Trouble at the mine has led Azalik to be referred to throughout northern Niger as 'Guantanamo'.⁵³

Some African leaders are particularly happy with China's offer of trade, aid and investment without political conditionalities:

... the Chinese do not peg their economic activity or aid to political conditions ... You never hear the Chinese saying that they will not finish a project because the government has not done enough to tackle corruption. If they are going to build a road, then it will be built.⁵⁴

Hilsum sums up the over-enthusiasm of African leaders for Chinese aid that is free of political conditionalities:

Most European companies abandoned Sierra Leone long ago, but where Africa's traditional business partners see only difficulty, the Chinese see opportunity. They are the new pioneers in Africa, and – seemingly unnoticed by aid planners and foreign ministries in Europe – they are changing the face of the continent.⁵⁵

5.5.2 Poverty reduction

Chinese investments and trade relations with Africa have done more harm than good. The importation of Chinese consumer goods is destroying both the formal and the informal economy in African countries such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Kenya, Angola, Ethiopia and Botswana. President Mugabe, at the second meeting of the China–Africa Cooperation Forum in December 2003, had this to say:

The Chinese cheap shops have become popular with people who cannot afford to buy at the upmarket departmental stores because many items, especially clothing, are often only a quarter of the price. For example in 2005, a modest television set was sold at around Z\$8 m (US\$450) at established shops yet at a Chinese shop it cost as little as Z\$1 m (US\$56).⁵⁶

The situation is replicated in Nigeria, where imported Chinese goods create unfair competition and loss of revenue for local industries. Local firms find themselves in a situation where they have to produce and sell goods on a playing field made uneven by the Chinese. Unlike the Chinese manufacturers who have easier access to loan facilities, lower costs of production and reduced import tariffs, the local firms operate under unfavourable conditions, with inadequate infrastructure and

social facilities, high interest on loan facilities and high costs of production. For these reasons, domestic production cannot compete effectively with the imported Chinese goods, resulting in a loss of domestic market, revenue, closures of local enterprises and loss of jobs. The local textile industry is a ready example of such a situation, where thousands of workers were laid off and households lost their major source of income. Massive unemployment and an increasing fall in people's standard of living are among the consequences.

The situation is similar in Kenya and Ethiopia. In the case of Kenya, in 2010 there were 200 Chinese firms operating, up from 44 in 2001. These include Huawei Telecommunication, Sinohydro Corporation, China Road and Bridge, Shangeli Engineering and China National Offshore Oil Corporation. Among the major projects undertaken by Chinese firms are the expansion of Kisumu Airport, the rehabilitation of the Moi International Sports Centre, expansion of the Thika-Nairobi highway, the Sondu Miriu Plant interface, Lamu sea port and oil exploration in northern Kenya. One of the major repercussions is the collapse of local construction companies, since Chinese firms have captured the major projects, ranging from road, water system, power generation and hospital construction. Local cement and paint companies have also been cut from the market because Chinese firms import construction materials such as paint, cement and glass. Similarly, cheap and substandard Chinese goods have found their way into Kenyan supermarkets and other retail outlets.⁵⁷ In Ethiopia, as noted by Brautigam, the liberalisation of the economy saw the influx of Chinese firms seize the local shoe market, driving the local firms out.⁵⁸

In fact, Chinese goods are not complementing established traders, but rather destroying them and destroying people's livelihoods, consequently entrenching poverty in Africa. With an increase in the dependence on imported Chinese goods, albeit low in quality, one of the net effects is capital repatriation and loss of foreign exchange by local economies in Africa.

5.5.3 Low human capital development and technology transfer

Human capital development is one of the key forces for sustainable growth and development.⁵⁹ Unfortunately, the various investment agreements signed between African countries and China do not cover the aspect of human capital development.⁶⁰ Consequently, the Chinese do not contribute to human capacity development and technology transfer. Some Chinese companies have been accused of bringing finished goods and complete equipment, along with Chinese expatriates, into the African countries thus starving them of the much needed technology transfer. According to Pat Utomi, given the fact that cheap Chinese labour is used, a number of the large industrial projects hardly transfer any skills to Africans.⁶¹

The implication is that China will continue technical maintenance of its projects in Africa after completion, precisely because of this failure of technology transfer. For instance, Shengli Engineering, a Chinese firm, was awarded a lucrative KSh1 billion tender by the Kenya government in 2010, to refurbish the country's biggest stadium, which was built by the Chinese in 1987. One reason given for this non-transference is that cultural and language barriers make technology transfer difficult. Another is corruption. Legal requirements stipulate that engineering skills emerging from local institutions should be tapped, but given the corrupt practices in many African countries, these stringent regulations are circumvented. The use of Chinese engineers in many of the projects undertaken thus threatens the development of local engineering talent. Whatever the reasons, the fact still remains that human capital development is given low priority by Chinese investors.

In 2010, South African trade unions, including the National Union of Mine Workers, protested the granting of visas by the Department of Home Affairs to over 50 construction workers from mainland China, to build new premises for the Chinese consulate in Cape Town. The use of cheap Chinese labour on projects funded by China is a growing problem, especially in Africa where poverty is rife and unemployment high. Brautigam puts the current Chinese workforce in Africa at 750 000, which creates tensions and resentment from the local African populations for loss of jobs.⁶²

5.5.4 Casualisation and violation of labour laws

One of the major phenomena emerging with Chinese investment in Africa is the casualisation of African labour. African labour in Chinese companies lacks membership of trade unions, and hence their wages are low and paid either weekly or monthly. There are instances where Africans are paid less than their Chinese counterparts, indicating discrimination based on either gender or race. Most companies lack training policies, prohibit industrial action and lack occupational health and safety and sexual harassment policies. Forced labour is rampant in mining and construction companies in Zimbabwe, where workers are forced to work overtime. These conditions are replicated in most of the Chinese operations in Africa. In 2005, an explosion in the Sinazongwe District of southern Zambia run by the China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group, killed 46 workers. Despite a government investigation that found the management responsible for disregarding safety measures, the company was allowed to continue with its operations. In 2006, the Chinese manager at Chambisi mine in southern Zambia shot six miners during a wage protest. In 2008, Mofani copper mine polluted water sources at Mufulira in eastern Zambia, leading to the hospitalisation of many residents. Similarly, 11 miners in the Chinese-owned Collum coal mine in the Sinazongwe district of

southern Zambia were shot in October 2010 for protesting against low wages and poor working conditions.⁶³ In another case, in Nairobi, on 16 September 2007, about 29 workers on night duty at a factory owned by the Chinese Lee Group of Companies were burned to death when their factory caught fire. The company policy was to lock the workers inside the factory at night, even though there was no emergency exit. This was in blatant contravention of Section 77(9) of the Kenyan Occupational Safety and Health Act (2007). The Acts states that ‘While any person is within a workplace for the purpose of employment or meals, the doors of the workplace, and of any room therein in which the person is, and any doors which afford a means of exit for persons employed in the workplace from any building or from any enclosure in which the workplace is situated, shall not be locked or fastened in such manner that they cannot be easily and immediately opened from the inside’. As a result of the inferno that led to the death of these workers, the government set up a panel of inquiry which found that the company management did not comply with all the relevant rules of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The company was, therefore, culpable of the death of these innocent workers. This case clearly shows that safety standards are not always upheld in Chinese companies. In addition, workers in the said company are made to work twelve hours compulsorily with incomes of less than the daily minimum wage.⁶⁴

5.6 Conclusion

From the above observations it is clear that Chinese investment in Africa is both destructive and extractive. Given its imperialistic and mercantile nature it is unlikely to promote development and good governance in Africa in the long run. It is crucial for leadership in Africa to renegotiate its current and emerging economic links with China.

There is a significant relationship between the slow pace of democratisation and the Chinese presence in some of the African countries discussed in this chapter. Countries with heavy Chinese technical and financial dependency do not experience significant pressure to initiate reforms, as compared to those countries that rely more heavily on assistance from North America and Western Europe. The case studies in this chapter demonstrate that China puts its economic interests before democratic issues. Given the undemocratic spirit of China’s participation in Africa, it is unlikely to inspire democratic ideals in the continent.

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6

Chapter

Modernity, Globalisation and Complexity: The Legacy and Future of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

Ebrahim Fakir and Chris Landsberg

Pan-Africanism as a movement and intellectual force is as old as the ruthless imposition of colonialism in Africa. Colonialism's advent was a brutal one, fashioned in 1884–1985 when European racists carved up Africa into fiefdoms, the impact of which has been felt for over 125 years and the legacy of which lingers on. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's conference of 1884 invited representatives from Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium and Germany, with America as observers, as they plotted the 'effective occupation and management' of African colonial 'possessions'.¹ It was a response to this act that triggered the continent's pan-African movement.

The strategic objective of the first 100 years of pan-Africanism was to put an end to colonial occupation and white domination in Africa. The last quarter century, from about the late 1980s to the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, has been preoccupied with two interrelated questions: How should Africa complement achievements in the area of political liberation with advancements in the area of socio-economic upliftment and development? And, secondly, having settled the question of self-determination and sovereignty (if not in practice, then at least in concept), that is, who should govern in Africa and over Africans, the strategic question that needs attention in the present conjuncture is: How should governance be exercised by Africans, over Africans, throughout Africa?

This chapter seeks to contribute to explaining how Africans proceeded over the decades to try to answer one of these sub-questions, that is: What arrangements are necessary to put in place an appropriate socio-economic and development architecture that would help Africa overcome a century of colonial domination, settler colonialism and white minority domination?

Specifically, the chapter seeks to interrogate the legacy of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as a socio-economic development and neo-pan-Africanist plan of renewal and renaissance for the continent.

NEPAD was launched in October 2001 as a new, progressive development paradigm for Africa, building on the celebrated continental development plans, like the Lagos Plan of Action and the African Alternative Plan to Structural Adjustment. When NEPAD's foremost architect, former South African President Thabo Mbeki, was unceremoniously removed from office in September 2008 by

being ‘recalled’ by the ruling African National Congress, doubts began to surface as to whether NEPAD would survive the departure of such an instrumental player. After all, one of NEPAD’s major challenges was the fact that it was personalised. It was closely associated with Mbeki, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and the Algerian president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Other architects included Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano, former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa, former Ghanaian President John Kufuor and Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi, among others.² With the departure of so many of the instrumental people behind NEPAD, it is now an appropriate time to reflect on NEPAD’s development legacy and trajectory, and to consider NEPAD’s future. This implies a consideration and reconsideration, and possibly a rethinking, of the conceptual underpinnings, theoretical precepts and philosophical basis of NEPAD. We contend, as the chapter demonstrates, that NEPAD served as both a modernisation strategy and a development plan. NEPAD bridges the earlier, and, we propose artificial, binary between development on the one hand and modernisation on the other. NEPAD aimed for social and political modernisation, as well as advancement, and sought to achieve these goals within the context of market and economic development.

In making a modest contribution to the debate on NEPAD, and contemplating what its future might be, we trace its conceptual, theoretical and ideological underpinnings by looking at NEPAD as dialectical modernisation, and at the manner in which this theory has informed its policy philosophy and political agenda. However, any consideration of NEPAD cannot remain at the abstract level. Consequently, we examine aspects surrounding the implementation of NEPAD through a consideration of the political governance strategy of NEPAD, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); the NEPAD economic and corporate governance programme; and the programme’s Environment Initiative. Because improved policy, politics and economics are meant to translate into better government for the people of Africa, the role of African people in relation to NEPAD and its programmes are salient. We examine this aspect by focusing on the critical question of public and citizen participation. In conclusion, we look at the contestation and politics of contradiction contained within NEPAD and some of the criticisms levelled at it.

6.1 NEPAD’s Historical Context

NEPAD is not Africa’s first ever development plan. Hesphina Rukato correctly observes that ‘the story of NEPAD is best explained by first understanding the social, political and economic conditions in Africa during the late 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s ... the 1980s were possibly the most difficult years for African countries, both individually and collectively’.³ But Africa did not sit idly by

and watch as crises unfolded – the continent tried to respond. At least since the early 1960s, African states, with the assistance of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, encouraged the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) member states to combine their economies into subregional markets that would ultimately form one Africa-wide economic union.⁴ Within the context of the OAU, we witnessed the adoption during summits of various resolutions and declarations that encouraged the need for the economic integration of the continent as a prerequisite for the realisation of the objective of economic integration.⁵ These summits include Algiers (September 1968), Addis Ababa (August 1970 and May 1973) and the all-important July 1977 OAU Heads of State and Government Summit in Kinshasa, which adopted the Kinshasa Declaration, calling for the establishment of an African Economic Community. In 1980, the OAU adopted the Lagos Plan of Action as a major step towards the goal of integration.

The commitments in the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos were translated into concrete form in Abuja in June 1991, when the OAU heads of state and government signed the treaty establishing the African Economic Community – popularly known as the Abuja Treaty – during the 27th Ordinary Session of the OAU. The Abuja Treaty came into force in May 1994.

The aim of the Abuja Treaty is to establish an African economic community to promote economic, social and cultural development, as well as African economic integration, in order to increase self-sufficiency, indigenous development and the mobilisation of human resources and material.⁶ This treaty made a break with the market approach to integration in Africa, and emphasised the development of the continent's productive capacity as a prerequisite for increased intra-African trade. The treaty identified six stages over 34 years to attain full economic integration through a 'gradual process'. These stages include,⁷ first, strengthening existing regional economic communities (RECs) and creating new ones where needed; second, stabilising tariff and other barriers to regional trade and strengthening sectoral integration in areas of trade, agriculture, finance, transport and communications; third, establishing a free trade area and a customs union at the level of each REC; fourth, coordination and harmonisation of tariff and non-tariff systems among RECs with a view to establishing a continental customs union; fifth, establishing an African common market and the adoption of common policies; and sixth, integration of all sectors, establishing an African central bank and a single African currency, an African economic and monetary union and creating and electing the first pan-African parliament.

The adoption of NEPAD in 2001 should be understood against the backdrop of this historical context. As Rukato argues, 'the NEPAD chronicle has to be analysed within the context of Africa's history, particularly its colonial history, as

well as global circumstances in which Africa found itself at the end of the colonial domination era, as well as when apartheid crumbled in South Africa in 1994'.⁸

Consequently, NEPAD is not the first initiative of its kind in Africa. A number of development programmes responding to a complex history of African subjugation and marginalisation have been developed and designed for the continent since the 1950s and 1960s, when most of its countries gained independence. But NEPAD came about during a fundamentally different political conjuncture and global balance of forces. As Henri Vogt argues, 'NEPAD is in many respects different to its predecessors. These differences make it possibly the most promising development framework Africa has ever had; some have even seen NEPAD as the final step along the path to true African independence'.⁹

In distinguishing itself from its ancestry of development frameworks, NEPAD constructed itself on the basis of an eclectic theoretical and ideological model, some of which we explore in this chapter. In addition, NEPAD's antecedents, in the form of the Lagos Plan of Action, the Abuja Treaty and the numerous resolutions passed at the OAU, were constructed around the ideas of immediate emancipation and liberation from colonialism and imperialism, or setting up a bulwark against them in the immediate postcolonial phase. As a consequence, their primary motivating force and focus were ensuring effective political liberation and emancipation, and sovereignty – the capture and control of the state by Africans. This focus on the acquisition of political power and state control, therefore, left a gap in terms of the requirements for ensuring social and economic development once political power and the state were captured. Most of NEPAD's forebears did not pay sufficiently deep or rigorous attention to social and economic development, and the necessary administrative and management arrangements (i.e. governance) to effect social and economic development within the state once political liberation was achieved. NEPAD's second distinguishing feature, therefore, that sets it apart from its ancestors, is the attention paid to social and economic development and the state arrangements needed to facilitate them. Hence NEPAD's focus on instruments such as the APRM as tools for promoting good governance.

6.2 NEPAD Is Dead! Long Live NEPAD!

NEPAD has been variously celebrated as the panacea to all of Africa's ills, maligned as neo-liberal and inappropriate for Africa, or rubbished as unworkable and fanciful. The present authors take a slightly different approach, one which seeks to uncover its conceptual political and theoretical structures, finding what is worth celebrating within it, as well critiquing some of its political aspects that appear inappropriate and examining policy dimensions that may be unworkable. We approach NEPAD from three main levels. First, as an articulated vision, secondly,

as a political and ideological blueprint and, thirdly, as a policy instrument. As such, we consider NEPAD's record of tangible achievements to be less a matter of concern in the immediate term (though there may be notable achievements as well as failures to document), and that it is more important to assess NEPAD in terms of what it set out to achieve.

6.2.1 *Articulating a vision*

NEPAD tries to envisage a modern, cosmopolitan and sophisticated Africa equal to the rest of the world, and certainly one not undermined by and subjugated to external powers, while also recognising past injustices and present social inequalities. In accounting for the past injustices, present social, economic and material inequalities and a future vision, NEPAD aims to address two issues relating to perception. Its primary aim is to create and instil positive self-perception and confidence among Africans. It aims to achieve this by urging a sense of solidarity and cohesion among Africans through a pan-African ethic and a black-consciousness pride in Africans' abilities to stimulate social modernisation, promote development and economic growth, manage economic development for social benefit and equality, and run modern nation-states in tandem with an emerging set of regionalised role players that works towards mutual benefit and mutual defence and aid.

The second perception issue that NEPAD aims to address – secondary but no less important than the first – is the negative perceptions, prejudices, bigotry and jingoism of so-called Afro-pessimists in their views about Africans and the African continent.

6.2.2 *Political and ideological blueprint*

Contrary to the criticism that NEPAD simply perpetuates the global pattern of neo-liberal hegemony and ascendancy at the turn of the twenty-first century, the reality is that NEPAD contains an eclectic mix of pragmatic political ideas. Firstly, in dealing with the question of identity, it unapologetically asserts an African identity that is inclusive of different races and focuses on gender equality. It adopts a cosmopolitan, progressive stance on African identity, premised on the core political virtues of equality and freedom – among Africans, between Africans and others, and from states in Africa and the African continent in relation to the outside world.

It also asserts an affiliation to the liberal, democratic values of equality and freedom in terms of the way in which states conduct their business internally and in internal political governance. NEPAD's approach to democracy appears to stake its credentials on two approaches to democracy: a 'deliberative approach and a republican approach'.¹⁰ Its approach to deliberative democracy is one that

is fostered through dialogue; the republican ethos is based on constructing open, rights-and-rules-based political communities at national and regional levels. NEPAD's stance on the economy, however, mixes a social-democratic approach – with free markets, modernised production, technological advancement and enhancement, and earmarked areas for state involvement in the economy – with radical policy approaches to wealth creation and distribution. NEPAD's approach to social development seeks the preservation of traditional values and identities alongside modern modes of social organisation. In short, NEPAD's orientation is liberal-democratic, social-democratic, and even socialist, in that it aims to achieve social and economic security for Africans.

6.3 NEPAD as Dialectical Modernisation

It was fashionable, yet rushed and poorly considered, on the part of NEPAD's critics, such as Patrick Bond, to brand this programme a 'neo-liberal' scheme.¹¹ Some of the critics even suggest that NEPAD was little more than a PR exercise crafted to impress Western powers. Yet there was something more serious about this socio-economic project, limitations and misgivings notwithstanding. NEPAD set out to build '... on earlier efforts such as the Lagos Plan of Action' and '... at the core of the transformative agenda of NEPAD was African ownership and resourcefulness'.¹² Just as significantly, NEPAD was squarely located by its founders within the context of heightened globalisation and contemporary global tendencies towards integration into the globalised international order and convergence with such a set of new global arrangements.

NEPAD's pro-globalisation approach was underpinned by convergences in the information and communications technology (ICT) sectors. Such a strategy would be precipitated by an attempt at internationalising Africa as a political entity, inserting African people into global society, internationalising African trade and getting African governance to conform to international best practices, if not in principle and content, then at least in form. Observers saw some advantage in Africa's underdeveloped ICT status. For Rukato, '... this underdevelopment meant that Africa could leapfrog certain technological steps, such as installation of land-line infrastructure, and go straight to mobile phones using satellite technologies'.¹³

Consequently, NEPAD articulates an economic and market-development project and trajectory that is based on theories of social modernity and political modernisation, and liberalisation. NEPAD, like other modernisation projects before it, is based on the core assumption that science and reason, together with massive infrastructural development and the injection of capital into the continent from abroad, will ensure the progress of human society. For NEPAD, old assumptions, such as ideas that political boundaries, national sovereignty, territorial supremacy

and the rule of law provide solid grounds for optimism about human destiny, were notions that needed to be challenged or at least realigned to fit African realities.

Let us start by examining the concept of modernisation. The theory of modernisation implies that societies gradually evolve by adopting more enlightenment ideas. This entails moving away from traditional modes of social organisation towards greater degrees of rationality exercised by sovereign individuals, who, as rational actors, would behave in ways that would maximise their own advantage and engage in modes of social and economic exchange that on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation would maximise their own utility. On a broader scale, this theory attempted to ‘... convince Third World countries that economic development and social justice were possible under capitalism’.¹⁴ The theory is based on the assumption that ‘societies develop in fairly predictable stages, through which ... they become increasingly complex’.¹⁵ Under modernisation plans, ‘development depends primarily on the importation of technology and technical knowledge, and the skills required to make use of those technologies, as well as a host of political and other social changes believed to come about as a result’.¹⁶ Further, ‘modernisation involves increased levels of schooling and the development of mass media, both of which are seen as fostering democratic political institutions. Transportation and communication systems become increasingly sophisticated and accessible’.¹⁷ A further assumption of modernisation theory pertains to the social domain and presupposes that ‘populations become more urban and mobile (both socially and geographically), and the extended family declines in importance, as a result giving way to the nuclear family model’.¹⁸ In this model, ‘cash-driven markets take over as the primary social mechanism through which goods and services are exchanged, replacing more informal, traditional ways in which people help one another to meet their needs’.¹⁹ Modernisation in this context is taken to mean then that the gradual change in less developed countries towards increasing similarity with the developed/highly industrialised countries is a desirable outcome. In this view, the basic notion of development centres on economic and material conditions, though the concept of human development has recently come to be extended to include less tangible, non-economic aspects. NEPAD does not see any hint of irony in the fact, or recognise, that development itself is a contested term, with a multiplicity of meanings, but it has reduced development to a materialist, growth notion.

Largely within the modernisation paradigm, development is a structural change process where the traditional, backward, Third World countries develop towards greater similarity with the Western, or rather, the north-western world. Martinussen argues that ‘among the features of the imitation-worthy modern societies which were especially highlighted are an extensive division of labour and specialization, high productivity, self-sustaining economic growth, a well-functioning

and active state apparatus, a democratic form of government and equality before the law'.²⁰ These features were considered desirable in order that this kind of development would lead to real national independence and self-generated economic progress, and away from the margins and periphery of the world economy and the dependency of less developed countries on the developed world.

Therefore, as doubts begin to surface about NEPAD's future as a continental development plan – in the main because of a lack of continental leadership to embrace and, where necessary, improve the plan – it is worth reminding observers about this plan's ideological foundations.

6.3.1 The policy instrument

Such an eclectic ideological and political stance is a strategic posture by NEPAD designed to achieve two aims. Firstly, to remind the West and Africa's traditional colonial dominators about their transgressions against and responsibilities towards Africa, to elicit support from the West for both aid to Africa and to foster greater trade with Africa; and, secondly, to promote a sense of collegiality among African leaders, cooperation among African states and greater support for the policy platforms (detailed later in this chapter) and the peer review mechanism that form part of NEPAD's policy ensemble. As a policy blueprint, NEPAD, therefore, boasts clear internal and external dimensions. Although the common refrain by critics is that NEPAD hardly addresses the intra-African factors and responsibilities to Africa's malaise, the reality is that NEPAD does speak candidly about African contributions and responsibilities. But NEPAD is also unapologetic about reminding the West about its racist and oppressive past when it comes to Africa, and that it has a historical obligation to right its wrongs in Africa.

6.4 NEPAD: The Philosophy and Policy Agenda

The debate on what should inform initiatives aimed at elevating Africa beyond its current political and economic quagmire has always been a topical one. It has been made more robust by the adoption of NEPAD in 2001.²¹ And wherever one stands on the question of NEPAD's foundations and philosophies, at least African leaders provided us with a framework that has provided the agenda for many a debate about the continent's development future. NEPAD espoused an agenda. We now sit in the precarious situation that not only is NEPAD being ignored by the current generation of African leaders, but, more seriously, it is not clear what exactly the continent's development agenda would be today if one were to lay aside or ignore NEPAD.

In terms of its legacy as a policy prescript, the NEPAD initiative was defined by its chief architects as a development paradigm that should respond to the pervasive

problems of sociopolitical conflict, economic mismanagement and deepening poverty in Africa. It was aimed at reversing the deepening marginalisation of the continent from the global economy – and, indeed, seeks to integrate Africa into the modern global economy.²² It sought to do all these things in a manner that is underpinned by a spirit of ownership that allows Africans to be in charge of their own destiny.

For the past nine years, NEPAD's aim, the alleviation of poverty by incorporating Africa into the mainstream global economy and promoting the development and consolidation of democracy with Afro-centric initiatives, was admirable,²³ but highly contested by many scholars and observers. NEPAD sought to respond to the challenges of globalisation. In the words of one NEPAD document, 'Africa considers itself to be a part of the globalisation process'.²⁴ Another NEPAD document states that 'African leaders recognise that globalisation can facilitate much needed inflows of private investment and transfers of technology, in addition to increasing the access of their countries' exports to world markets'.²⁵ In 2003, Adebayo Olukoshi argued that '... NEPAD offers a creative framework for public–private partnerships within parameters that are market friendly and which are capable not only of attracting private capital but also enhancing the participation of Africa in the processes and structures from which it remains largely marginalised'.²⁶ It is fair to say that NEPAD adopted a highly conservative conception of globalisation, and presented the continent at times as the mere victim of an unstoppable force. It did not appreciate African agency in the process. Yet this too represented a perspective that one could wrestle with and debate, rather than simply dismiss or ignore.

For a long time, NEPAD was associated with the policy outlook – and even the personality – of former South African President Thabo Mbeki. Its inception and evolution can be traced to Mbeki's speeches about the need for an African renaissance, which culminated on 11 July 2001, when the OAU summit approved the New Africa Initiative, born from the merger of Mbeki's Millennium Partnership for Africa's Recovery Programme and Senegalese President Abduolaye Wade's infrastructure investment, known as the Omega Plan.²⁷ The meeting of the Heads of State and Implementation Committee of the OAU in Abuja, Nigeria, on 23 October 2001 agreed on NEPAD, finalised a policy document and accepted a governing structure for NEPAD. This launched the implementation phase of NEPAD. The communiqué issued thereafter claimed to be based on a common vision and a firm shared conviction and realisation that the eradication of poverty was imperative if African countries, individually and collectively, were to plan a path of sustainable growth and development and become globally competitive. Integral to this strategy was the need for Africa to become intrinsically and positively involved in the global economy. NEPAD was, therefore, inextricably linked to the politics of what

could be called here Mbekism – the political ideas, worldview and paradigmatic thinking of this complex political actor, whose ideas straddled Marxist, liberalist, Africanist, southern solidarist, anti-imperialist, internationalist, realist as well as constructivist contours.

In the end, NEPAD was essentially a ‘modernisation’ project. In section 6.3 we argued that modernisation strategies are fundamentally concerned with accelerated growth and trickle-down economics. Central to the conceptualisation of NEPAD was the positioning of free markets as the key to development in the region. NEPAD was the tool with which the African Union (AU) would strive to meet its economic development objectives. Included in NEPAD’s priority areas were market access and foreign direct investment (FDI). One NEPAD document states that ‘Africa’s claim consists of urging developed countries to make massive investments in the development of the continent ... These investments are bound to bridge existing gaps in priority sectors at the regional level’.²⁸ Its aims, through this, were to achieve overall annual economic growth of 7 per cent in African countries and halve continental poverty by 2015, and to achieve annual financial development flows of US\$64 billion. The NEPAD initiative identifies a number of key priorities to facilitate these developments.

NEPAD officials worked tirelessly to move away from the external world’s colonial and paternalistic historical relationship with the continent. It pushed for a new relationship of ‘strategic partnership’ based on the pillars of mutual accountability and mutual responsibility with the G8 and other industrialised powers, and to agree to a doubling of foreign aid to the continent, as well as a new aid regime, which included a call for an aid regime and aid-delivery system that addressed ‘an appropriate level of aid flow’, which would come from a combination of new sources of financing, including debt cancellation, private flows, intra-African flows, domestically mobilised resources and the benefits of trade.²⁹ It also called for ‘an appropriate ODA [official development assistance] relationship for African countries’, in which ODA would be focused on ‘nationally defined policies and priorities ... and integrated into a nationally defined implementation process’.³⁰ NEPAD was determined to see that industrialised states live up to their 0,7 per cent target of GDP to go to aid. NEPAD has supported the UK’s proposal for an International Financing Facility to double development assistance between 2005 and 2015 to \$50 billion per year to support the delivery of the Millennium Development Goals. Whether this constituted a progressive agenda or not is debatable. What is beyond dispute is that it is a coherent agenda with specific achievables and deliverables. In the absence of the AU, African leaders or the NEPAD Secretariat coming up with a more robust agenda to engage external actors in development financing, the continent would do well to mobilise around this one.

Although not openly recognised by NEPAD's critics, one of the most novel contributions of this plan is the clear and unambiguous link it makes between politics and development (read: politics and economics). Although this may appear to be a trite point to make, in the African continent it is nothing short of politically pioneering. In the words of the NEPAD mantra, there can be 'no peace without development, and no development without peace'. On this score, NEPAD identified a number of conditions for development:³¹

1. Peace, security, democracy and political governance
2. Economic and corporate governance, with a focus on public-finance management
3. Regional cooperation and integration, through which the continent's RECs would assume the role of the 'building blocks' of continental integration

Therefore, in NEPAD's modernisation scheme, there was an explicit link between politics and economics, or, more precisely, democracy and economic growth. In its outline, NEPAD took encouragement from the fact that there is a rise in 'democratic regimes that are committed to the protection of human rights, people-centred development and market-oriented economies'.³² This orientation further stated that what was needed is a 'commitment on the part of governments, the private sector and other institutions of civil society, to the genuine integration of all nations into the global economy'.³³

NEPAD is, therefore, a modernisation plan on a political plane. It is equally a modernisation project in the realm of economic development. When NEPAD identifies priorities such as infrastructure and development; information and communications technology; human development, with a focus on health, education and skills development; agriculture; and promoting diversification of production and exports, with a focus on market access for African exports to industrialised countries,³⁴ it confirms that the plan was effectively a modernisation one, but it was a modernisation plan reoriented to resolving in the shortest possible space of time the multiple challenges faced by Africans in Africa.

NEPAD placed great emphasis on the mobilisation of resources, including increasing savings and capital inflows via further debt relief, increased ODA flows and private capital, as well as better management of public revenue and expenditure.³⁵ It also included 'maximising the gains from globalisation; accelerating growth; reducing poverty; and creating a more stable, predictable macro-economic environment'.³⁶ NEPAD's architects developed strategic plans that were aggressively marketed at international, subregional, regional and international levels, with the aim of mobilising domestic support and facilitating private–public partnerships.

While on social aspects NEPAD appeared to be couched in a social-democratic ethic with a focus on poverty alleviation, its actual practice posited solutions

through an increased integration of Africa into the global capitalist economy, with all of its attendant risks, crises and skewed distribution patterns. NEPAD did ask for a reform of the global order, and for African states, and regional and continental representative bodies to be given a voice in the Western-dominated political and economic order. So even though NEPAD remained determined to foster trade and investment, and stressed the importance of regional cooperation in investment, it pushed for a new 'strategic partnership' between Africa and the industrialised global north on the basis of 'mutual accountability' and 'mutual responsibility' as it challenged the old paternalism of the West towards Africa. This is where much of its innovativeness comes from.

6.4.1 Democracy and political governance initiative

We make the point earlier that modernisation theory posits '... a host of political and other social changes'.³⁷ As a modernisation strategy the NEPAD initiative is premised on the acknowledgement that development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and 'good' governance. Accordingly, African states undertook to respect representative democracy as well as global standards of democracy, whose core components include political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several political parties and workers' unions, and fair, open, free and democratic elections periodically organised to enable the people in African countries to choose their leaders freely.³⁸ The purpose of NEPAD's political governance initiatives were to contribute to strengthening the political and administrative framework of participating countries in line with the principles of democracy as periodic plebiscites, transparency, accountability, integrity, respect for human rights and promotion of the rule of law.

The initiative consisted of the following elements:³⁹

1. A series of commitments by participating countries to create or consolidate basic governance processes and practices
2. An undertaking by participating countries to take the lead in supporting initiatives that foster good governance
3. The institutionalisation of commitments through the leadership of NEPAD to ensure that the core values of the initiative are abided by.

NEPAD's peace and security, conflict prevention, management and resolution initiative of 2002 committed NEPAD member states to 'promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in their respective countries and regions, by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and participatory governance at the national and subregional levels; and building the capacity of the states in

Africa to set and enforce the legal frameworks required for these standards, as well as maintaining law and order'.⁴⁰

There were, however, serious drawbacks. Instead of a focus on democratic governance, NEPAD stressed the importance of 'good governance' without necessarily spelling out what good governance initiatives entailed and, insofar as it did, it had in fact appropriated and elucidated a concept closely associated with the World Bank. It specifically called for a strengthening of governance institutions and the rule of law in Africa, and placed emphasis on the need to curb corruption, build strong and efficient civil services in Africa and forge strong public–private partnerships.

NEPAD included a strong emphasis on democracy and governance, which makes it different from past attempts at fashioning Africa-wide initiatives for African development. Two related characteristics that stood out were its broad spread and the level of generality at which actions are discussed. Thus, the document declared that African leaders would take joint responsibility for several areas: implementation of NEPAD; democracy and political governance; an APRM; an economic and corporate governance initiative; an environmental initiative; and, as modernisation projects largely depend on infrastructure, an infrastructural development initiative. On the question of infrastructure and development, notable success was achieved in that the African Development Bank mobilised \$1,6 billion, to finance infrastructure⁴¹ development and infrastructure improvement projects across the continent in the rail, road and energy sectors. Civil society actors have often raised concern about both the priority areas in which developments take place, as well as the ability of the African Development Bank to see this process through effectively and on a sustainable basis. Civil society groups were worried that the African Development Bank did not have a track record of effectively monitoring or mitigating the negative impacts of the projects it supports. Affected communities often bore the heavy environmental and social costs associated with the construction of large-scale projects, such as major dams and highways, while the intended benefits of these investments frequently passed them by.⁴²

Although on paper and as a policy design there is little doubt that NEPAD will leave a legacy of modernisation, whether future African leaders will rise to the challenge and adapt NEPAD into a more suitable development plan that will help address the African condition remains in serious doubt.

6.4.2 African peer review mechanism

Modernisation theorists have long made the case for a new type of politics to advance modernisation agendas. A key sign of NEPAD's politics of modernity was the African peer review mechanism (APRM), meant to ensure that the policies

and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate-governance values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration of Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance Initiatives. In terms of the APRM, African heads of state and government agreed to an external peer review to assess how well they are fulfilling the obligations of democracy and political governance initiatives. While the APRM has many sceptics, it remains Africa's most original continental governance instrument. The purpose of the APRM was to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that would lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated subregional and continental economic integration. Participation in the APRM was voluntary and open to all member states of the AU. Countries wishing to participate in the APRM may do so by notifying the chairperson of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee. The operations of the APRM were directed and managed by a panel of seven eminent persons. The APRM consisted of four types of review:

1. The base review carried out within 18 months of a country becoming a member of the APRM process
2. Periodic review that takes place every two to four years
3. A member country may for its own reasons request a review that is not part of the periodically mandated review
4. Early signs of impending political or economic crisis in a member country would also be sufficient for instituting a review

In 2003 the APRM met with scepticism and criticism, but there is recognition today that the APRM has achieved a lot. While scepticism still abounds as to whether African states would develop the wherewithal to police each other, five countries have thus far been reviewed – Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Mauritius and South Africa – and other reviews are underway in Nigeria, Lesotho, Uganda, Ethiopia and others. All the reviews completed have been criticised for tensions between government representatives and civil society actors, and for the domination of processes by the former.

Although participation in NEPAD is voluntary, all countries participating in NEPAD are expected to comply with the requirements of the APRM, and to date 29 African states have signed up to it.

One of the strongest legacies Mbeki and his continental allies leave behind as part of their efforts in the first decade of the twenty-first century is the APRM. As a tool for promoting democracy, the APRM provides for states to assess each other's performance with regard to principles of good political and economic governance, and in signed-up states society is invited to participate in governing councils of the APRM processes at national level. In spite of some of its obvious weaknesses, the

APRM remains the only governance advancement tool of its kind. However, one weakness is that the APRM rests on the assumption that states will always act in the interests of the poor and in the public interest. In addition, there seems to be little common popular ownership of NEPAD between states and societies, and the manner of its evolution seems intent on revisiting immediate post-independence trends in Africa, in which African leaders and states saw themselves, by virtue of their liberation or independence credentials, to be the automatic, sole and authentic representatives of the public and of social interests. This was a mechanistic view over-optimistically (or perhaps instrumentally and rationally) premised on a conflation and coincidence among variants of public, social and private interests. It also over-optimistically views nation, people and state as one. It fails to recognise that the assumption that the state or leader automatically imbues, aggregates and represents the public and social interest without subjecting it to popular test and consensus, or at least providing a chance at consensus built by subjecting it to a process of competition and contestation over content and orientation, serves to erode the legitimacy and credibility it would require to succeed. Nevertheless, the APRM remains the most innovative governance tool of its kind, and it is crucial that the AU Commission and other interested parties ensure that it survives and that some of its main weaknesses are addressed.

6.4.3 Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative

Whether one sits on the left or right of the African and ideological divides, if one is serious about developmentalism and the developmental state in Africa then one has to engage with the role of the market and issues of growth and economic development. Indeed, given modernisation theory's belief in economic growth, it is hardly surprising that NEPAD has developed an Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative, which was related to the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative. There is general agreement that postcolonial Africa inherited weak states and dysfunctional economies, which were aggravated by poor leadership, corruption and poor governance in many countries. It is against this background that this initiative gave priority to the capacity building of governments to enable them to fulfil their roles. The objective of the initiative was to promote throughout the participating countries a set of concrete and time-bound programmes aimed at enhancing the quality of economic and public financial management, as well as corporate governance.

The Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative was based on the premise that 'good political governance is a prerequisite for good economic and corporate governance'⁴³ and the key factors that 'enhance good governance of an economy are transparency, accountability, an enabling environment for private sector

development and growth, and institutional capacity and development'.⁴⁴ Again, NEPAD showed its seriousness about modernisation. People on the left and right had better get more serious about corporate and economic governance issues – stumbling blocks to Africa's development.

6.4.4 Environment Initiative

In line with NEPAD's modernisation orientation, Mbeki and his African allies' visionary politics in the context of NEPAD did not stop at the political and economic. In an era in which the climate change question and the politics of the environment are on the agenda, NEPAD was visionary in articulating positions regarding the environment. For example, it was recognised that a healthy and productive environment was a prerequisite for NEPAD. It was further recognised that the range of issues necessary to nurture this environmental base was vast and complex, and that a systematic combination of initiatives was necessary to develop a coherent environmental programme. This would mean that choices are made and particular issues are prioritised for initial intervention. It was also recognised that a core objective of the Environment Initiative had to be combating poverty and contributing to socio-economic development.

6.5 NEPAD and the Notion of Participation as Modernised Politics

As argued earlier, politics forms an intrinsic part of a modernisation strategy, and NEPAD called for the 'democratisation' of African politics. However, in spite of the recognition of the central role of democratic politics, and of the central role African people can potentially play in the future development of Africa, popular participation in the conception, design and formulation of NEPAD was absent. It might be worth noting that NEPAD made vague provision to 'promote community and user involvement in infrastructure construction, maintenance and management, especially in poor urban and rural areas, in collaboration with NEPAD's governance initiatives'. This was in principle a useful strategy, which in practice had the unintended effect of placing financial and technical obligations, which are the responsibility of the state in most societies, onto the shoulders of Africa's most impoverished communities.

NEPAD set out to become a genuine democratic programme for African development. Its challenge was taking the question of participation seriously. Participation is about access to power and decision-makers, and the democratisation of power. In most democratic systems, certain people or interests have greater access to power and decision-makers than others – it is especially urban elites and the affluent who have access to decision-makers and those with power. Patterns of

access tend to reflect the socio-economic landscape and inequalities of particular societies. Where continental decisions are made, one needs to be cautious that it is not only national continental elites who cohere to form a consensus about what is good for Africa. Even relatively well-functioning democratic systems at the subcontinental level tend to favour the views of the powerful and organised over the poor and unorganised. Although there were elements of participation in NEPAD, these tended to include elite civil society formations, like favoured think tanks and research organisations, and excluded the traditionally marginalised, namely the poor, the unorganised, the unemployed and those on the periphery of societies. The African Association of Political Science (AAPS) noted in 2003 that ‘conscious effort should be made to involve the people (i.e civil society, African intellectuals, professional and labour groups, and the private sector) in the structures and processes of the two major continent-wide initiatives – AU and NEPAD’.⁴⁵ A civil society Continental Experts Meeting on NEPAD and the AU, in June 2002, similarly argued that ‘partnership between African governments, organic intellectuals, and civil society organizations, including trade unions, women’s and youth organizations, was of cardinal importance’.⁴⁶ One of the major drawbacks of continental initiatives like NEPAD, and continental institutions like the AU, is that they did not make enough progress in giving the poor a voice in continental affairs.

6.5.1 Democratic participation in NEPAD

There is widespread recognition that NEPAD was disappointing when it comes to the question of democratic participation. Questions on participation were poorly defined, and poorly practised in the context of NEPAD. What do we mean when we talk of NEPAD’s democratic participation strategy? Does it mean that everyone had to be consulted about every decision that was made that affected them? Does it mean that they had to actually be a part of the decision-making process, again on every decision that potentially affected them? Or did it simply mean that they had to be given the opportunity in which they could meaningfully participate in decision-making processes, or that they had to be seriously consulted about issues regarding the pending decision?

What we actually mean by a participating public is that key principles around participation and engagement needed to be respected by NEPAD. Such principles include guaranteed access, equality, freedom to express opinions, the notion of a public good and the democratic ideal. Applying these criteria, one can begin to measure the extent and degree of public participation and how this affects different sections of the public.

In the meantime, there are three prerequisites for what is considered fundamental to any participatory process:

1. Information provision
2. Consultation
3. Actual participation in decision-making processes

6.5.2 Suggested criteria for public participation

This chapter makes the point that NEPAD should take democratisation and democratic participation seriously. On the basis that NEPAD should take engagement seriously, and that the public should have a say in the decisions and actions that affect their lives, one may consider certain criteria for public participation over the next five years of NEPAD's future.

Public participation should encompass a sense that the public's contribution will influence the agenda-setting stage as well as the final outcome of NEPAD policies, not just implementation.

The public participation process must communicate the interests and meet the process needs of participants, notably Africa's poor. The process must seek out and facilitate the involvement of those potentially affected. That means that consideration must be given to how unorganised communities or interest groups can be brought together as participants.

Participants should be involved in defining the manner in which they wish to participate, and engagement should involve strategies ranging from protestation and contestation, to competition and collaboration, to shadow civil-society processes and projects, and influencing policy directly. Participants should be provided with the information they need to make their contribution meaningful. Participants need to be informed as to the manner in which their submissions were accounted for and how they are reflected in the decisions made.

The criteria are relatively modest. They include no guarantee that participation will necessarily lead to an outcome that is advocated or lobbied for. They do, however, imply that participation will be taken seriously, and that NEPAD's leaders and actors will learn from poor lessons in participation over the past six years and become better over the next six. Their significance is to be found in their potential to generate a palpable sense of involvement in the political process, together with a sense that democracy can and does work at a practical level.

The criteria focus on notions of participation beyond the mere rhetoric of involvement and periodic participation through elections and referenda. At their heart lies the unwritten idea that effective public participation is not achieved simply by making opportunities available, but is determined by setting up processes that encourage, aid and promote the fullest possible participation by the public.

Therefore, effective public participation and engagement depend on dedicated education, information and outreach strategies aimed at providing the knowledge and means to access what may otherwise appear to be a set of remote and incomprehensible institutions. The purpose of such strategies is to bring those who exist on the margins and periphery of society into the mainstream political and social processes, creating a system of governance that is inclusive, responsive and transparent. The goal is to consolidate a form of democracy that engages with and recognises the interests of all. Therefore, public participation may play a valuable role in the transformation of what is still a fundamentally underdeveloped and unequal continent characterised by similar relations of inequality within particular societies.

Effective public participation and engagement are not achieved simply by making opportunities available, but are determined by setting up processes that encourage, aid and promote the fullest possible participation by the public.

6.6 NEPAD: The Philosophy and Politics of Contradiction

Because of NEPAD's determination to integrate Africa into the global economic system, it perceptibly perpetuates and reinforces the subjugation of Africa in the international global system and surrenders terrain to international structural power relationships, which are responsible for Africa's last quarter century of social dislocation, austerity on public spending in the social sector, deindustrialisation, ecological degradation and state fragmentation. Apart from its support for immediate debt cancellation, NEPAD seems to support existing poverty-reduction initiatives at the multilateral level. Such initiatives include the Comprehensive Development Framework of the World Bank and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers approach developed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and are linked to the Highly Indebted Poor Country debt-relief initiative, which thus far has had limited to no real success.

With respect to democracy, NEPAD failed to delineate and balance the dimensions of 'democracy as popular sovereignty'³⁴⁷ with aspects of what may have come to be understood as 'democracy' but which are, in fact, notions of a liberalising agenda, namely a focus on individual human, economic (property) and political rights, and the separation of powers and functions in law making, state administration the execution of policy and the adjudication of disputes (judicial services). The democratic focus of the late twentieth century, and in particular the democratisation agenda sought to balance the tampering of democracy as popular sovereignty with the liberal aspects of the separation of powers and individual human, economic and property rights. NEPAD appears to have adopted this notion of democracy without necessarily disaggregating it in its different dimensions.

The most manifest weakness in NEPAD's conceptualisation of democracy and governance is that it ignores the fact that they are both products of the political sphere. In formulating a democracy and governance agenda, NEPAD ignores aspects of power, and the fact that democracy and governance are both products and functions of politics and are shaped by the political, rather than being purely instrumental and functional. Consequently, the conception of democracy and governance devoid of 'politics' leads to an understanding of social and political process and progress as purely consensus-driven, which fails to account for power struggles on the basis of competition and conflict (a direct by-product of democratic politics) within states in the national sphere and between states in the international sphere. This purely consensus-driven approach was consistent with the late modernist epoch in Western European, metropolitan politics, democracy and governance, as expressed in Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder and Göran Persson's national 'third ways' and international 'progressive governance' agendas.

The NEPAD document acknowledges that the impoverishment of the African economy has been accentuated by the legacy of colonialism, the Cold War, the international economic system and the inadequacies of the IMF and World Bank policies pursued in post-independence Africa. NEPAD asserts that Africa's inclusion in the global economy has been mainly as a 'supplier of cheap labour and raw material', which has led to a depletion of skills and accumulated capital on the continent. NEPAD also recognises that Africa's ability to compete effectively in the global economy has been hampered by unfair global rules in terms of trade and economics.

Further, NEPAD asserts that globalisation is a product of scientific and technological advances that are mainly market-driven. Governments in the developed world and the private sector have determined the outcome of the global system: 'Experience shows that, despite unparalleled opportunities that globalisation has offered to some previously poor countries, there is nothing inherent in the process that automatically reduces poverty and inequality'.⁴⁸ In addressing this situation, NEPAD offered African leaders a chance to reverse the social, political and humanitarian crises on the continent. Many leaders have now acknowledged the need for a renaissance in Africa, and accept the concepts of democracy, accountability, transparency and peer review.

The promotion of markets in Africa, and greater reach for African producers in the global economy has created the chance for African producers to reach consumers in the developed countries. If the present trading conditions are shifted this could potentially lead to efficient poverty reduction and job creation. However, further integration of African states into the global economy without some change in global terms of trade, restructuring of economic relations and the current policy

hegemony dominated by the World Trade Organization, the IMF and the World Bank, however, is likely to further disadvantage Africa not only in terms of trade, but in state consolidation and social cohesion. NEPAD should question more forthrightly the current inequitable global economic system, which significantly contributes to Africa's continued marginalisation.

Building from this contradiction, among the primary contradictions in NEPAD was the privileging of the role of free markets in the distribution of public goods and services. Indeed, NEPAD errs on the side of emphasising a neoclassical approach to economic development. NEPAD's neoclassical statement of intent was picked up by Adebayo Olukoshi when he rendered a devastating criticism and asserted that

what sets NEPAD apart from the other initiatives ... is its decisively neo-liberal bent ... In other words, the uniqueness of NEPAD lies less in its accommodation of the market and the private sector as such and more in its wholesale embrace of the kinds of orthodox, narrowly focused market economic policy framework that underpinned the adjustment programmes pursued by the Bretton Woods institutions across Africa during the 1980s and 1990s.⁴⁹

The 2002 civil-society Continental Experts Meeting also stated that 'the NEPAD initiative was located within the Washington consensus and as a result was likely to perpetuate and reinforce the subjugation of Africa in the global system, the enclav-ity of African economies and the marginalisation of African people'.⁵⁰

To be sure, there is in NEPAD an attempt to enhance the role of governments and the state. It recognised that traditionally, in Africa states are weak – a colonial legacy, which has seen fragmentation and unresponsive systems of governance – being further weakened by the effects of negative economic globalisation. NEPAD does make the point that the role of the state is pivotal, but does not say anything near sufficient about the role of the state, and points to only cursory references to the state. In particular, the lack of focus on the regulatory, administrative, executive, technical, coercive and extractive capacities of the state in Africa undermines NEPAD's own emphasis on the need for strong, capable and democratic states and provides few clues to the areas of capacity required for state effectiveness. According to Fakir:

The regulatory function, in which the state is able to manage and enforce the laws and contracts to protect property rights, and the presence of a well functioning, effective judiciary whose functions and decisions are respected and enforced are necessary. In the absence of a strong and effective regulatory function, predatory interests begin to take root. The technical ability, in which the state has the ability to handle technical issues effectively is also a precondition for effective states.

Increasingly, this is needed at a fairly complex level in engineering and public works, the delivery of basic services (like water, sanitation and electricity/power, public health [in the primary care sector], and in education, and in devising economic policies such as industrial policy, manufacturing and mining, financial and commercial services, devising systems of taxation, concessions and subsidies). States that lack the capacity to address this face fragmentation and lack of effectiveness in policy and an erosion of legitimacy and authority. The administrative function, where the state requires capacity to manage its human and other resources effectively, is required beside the need for managerial capacity, corruption has to be fought, mismanagement minimised and lack of discipline in the public service has to be countered. The extractive capacity is required to generate revenue and promote rule compliance amongst all social and economic actors.⁵¹

The coercion and enforcement function requires the legitimate rather than the capricious use of state power, like the judicial system and the police and defence forces, to extract compliance with obligations, and enforce the rules, laws and regulations in society. Enforcement refers to predictability (that while rules will be equally and fairly enforced, wrongdoing will be caught and appropriately punished). These, while essentially modernist in orientation, and key aspects of the state-building enterprise in Africa, appear to be ignored in the conceptualisation of NEPAD. This represents a lacuna in its philosophic basis, and will need some attention in order to transcend its current philosophic and political limitations.

Given NEPAD's commitment to modernisation, its framework relies heavily on an injection of private capital and FDI (which will serve to make states dependent on the vagaries of the global financial markets), and depends on the trickle down of social and economic benefits.

In a more nuanced fashion, NEPAD accepts that the relationship between states and markets is not mutually exclusive. It is complex, but nevertheless one whose coexistence is possible. It would be perfectly possible to allow free markets to flourish to a relative degree, with a degree of state intervention in the provision of basic services, including health, education, crime prevention, welfare, housing, water and electricity, and other essential public goods and services. The state need not exist, as the currency of thinking informing NEPAD seems to suggest, to merely ensure that favourable conditions exist for the market to operate, nor should the role of states be limited to facilitating economic growth, which while necessary, is insufficient to ensure a relative level of equitable distribution of the benefits derived from economic growth. For sustainable development in Africa, governments need to play an active, leading role in ensuring that developmental states emerge to enhance the quality of life of their citizens and provide good governance that is accountable, transparent and open for the benefit of both citizens and markets.

As Rawia Tawfik has observed:

A development paradigm that depends on the state only is not adequate for socio-economic development, but depending totally on the market cannot maintain a fair distribution of resources or help fight poverty. One can also argue that what Africa needs is not just a market-friendly state interventionism but also a *society-friendly* private sector. Balancing the two models requires governments to fight corruption, ensure transparency and develop technical expertise to negotiate the terms of cooperation with the private sector and the private sector to act with social responsibility and play its role in African renewal.⁵²

While NEPAD punted a strategy of integrating the continent more rapidly into the world economy through ‘export-led growth’, the ability of African economies to grow equitably declined in real terms. Moreover, the ‘export-led growth’ trajectory lacked any dimension of a distribution strategy regarding the accrued benefits of perceived growth, limiting capitalisation of its benefits to those who were already significant beneficiaries in African economies. Such an export-led growth strategy, along with the perhaps unintended consequences of many of the suggestions contained in the NEPAD document, addresses the question of economic growth in isolation from questions of distribution. In any reconstructive or developmental agenda it is crucial that these elements should be simultaneously addressed.

6.6.1 Criticism of NEPAD's modernisation strategies

More than a decade after NEPAD was established as Africa's development plan, the most important question which still lingers is whether NEPAD really does represent a new framework of interaction with the rest of the world – a framework based on the needs and aspirations of the African people, and on mutual accountability and mutual responsibility between Africa and the industrialised world. Sceptics have voiced their concerns about the skewed and possibly inappropriate, if ambitious, objectives of the NEPAD document. But unless NEPAD's critics and detractors, especially at heads of state and government level, can actually present an alternative blueprint, the continent had better address some of these weaknesses to ensure that a developmental vacuum at the continental level does not persist.

Another major criticism levelled against NEPAD was that it was exclusively discussed and formulated by governments in the absence of popular civic participation. This notion of elitism represented a fair degree of justifiable cynicism about this initiative's ability to adequately address problems affecting ordinary Africans in the light of this top-down approach. Given that many African governments, including some that played key roles in NEPAD's articulation, have a poor track record of accountability, transparency and good governance, the absence of popular

participation in the crafting and later implementation of NEPAD's objectives is perceptibly dangerous, in that it could lead to the recurrence of failures that characterised many post-independence development initiatives that were driven exclusively by the state. Those who thus make the case for NEPAD's retention would want to avoid failure, and push for societal involvement, especially in the area of one of NEPAD's key governance programmes, the APRM, which was envisaged as a check on the compliance of standards in governance consistent with those required by the AU.

Almost a decade after NEPAD's launch with much fanfare, there are other important criticisms that can be highlighted. A 2003 AAPS congress stated that '... there are serious concerns around the issues of external reliance, its market ideology, and the debt problem'.⁵³ And there are at least eight further criticisms:

1. Privatisation, especially of what should be public infrastructure investment, such as water, electricity, telecommunications and transport. The legacy of privatisation has been greater poverty and inequality, increased unemployment, increased costs for food, basic social services and energy which across Africa has led to increased conflict, instability and social dislocation.
2. Greater integration of Africa into the world economy in a context of declining terms of trade.
3. Encouraging multiparty elections typically between variants of neo-liberal parties, which are an insufficient substitute for the genuine democratic competition that is required to restore legitimacy.
4. Over-ambitious visions of ICT, which are hopelessly unrealistic considering the lack of reliable electricity supply across the continent.
5. A peer review mechanism that is not compulsory and lacks incentives for compliance with governance recommendations.
6. The complete absence of addressing questions regarding the continental protection of labour markets and labour standards. Indications are that NEPAD's concentration on global integration would require greater labour market flexibility, which in Africa is described by the International Labour Organization as already 'very flexible'.
7. Lack of focus on the extrication of children involved in armed conflict and war, the eradication of child labour and the promotion, enhancement and consolidation of children's rights across the continent.
8. A lack of any serious gender focus and a lack of focus on promoting, enhancing and consolidating fundamental political, human, socio-economic and other rights.

These issues have forced debate on NEPAD into polar extremities. One view suggests it is simply another vehicle with which industrialised economies can harness the wealth of Africa's fragile economies at little cost to themselves.

The fact that NEPAD creates controversy in so many areas is, ironically, testament to the fact that these discussions should have taken place before its inception. The depth and range that NEPAD sought to cover is comprehensive and often complex, yet at the same time contradictory. In the instrumentalist conceptualisation and terminology that NEPAD employs, it is unclear what its real effects may be in key areas of Africa's development. It is not clear how investment and development in Africa under current global conditions will aid the realisation of human security, sustainable development, poverty alleviation and social justice.

6.7 Implementation of NEPAD

Any policy is only as strong as its outcomes, and we, therefore, also have to focus on the question of implementation. At the implementation level, there had long been tensions between NEPAD's heads of state champions and officials at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa on an appropriate mechanism for its implementation. A need was identified for core technical support for the implementing mechanism in areas of research and policy formulation. Indeed, by 2009, many had proposed that NEPAD should become an implementation agency akin to the United Nations Development Programme. Accordingly, the NEPAD Secretariat based in Midrand, South Africa, now provides management to direct the day-to-day operations of NEPAD and provides technical support for implementation. NEPAD's Heads of State Implementation Committee are entrusted with functions, which envisage the following:

1. Identifying strategic issues that need to be researched, planned and managed at the continental level
2. Setting up mechanisms for reviewing progress in the achievement of mutually agreed targets and compliance with mutually agreed standards
3. Reviewing progress in the implementation of past decisions and taking appropriate steps to address problems and delays

This is an important issue because NEPAD has to become better at two levels of implementation: it has to build in mechanisms to ensure that African states take NEPAD provisions and policy directives more seriously; hence the need for greater inter-African accountability. NEPAD and the secretariat, together with the secretariats of the RECs and the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, also have to become better at holding NEPAD's international partners to account for their obligations and commitments. We have had for a long time the odd situation that NEPAD has relied on information and sources from the very donor partners which it has tried to hold to account. It is crucial that Africa in general and NEPAD in particular build their own accountability capacities to ensure that continental

and international partners become more responsible and accountable and a 'new partnership' with the continent is genuinely feasible. All of the above will come to naught unless NEPAD in fact has a future.

6.8 Future of NEPAD

Whatever perspective one takes on the economic and philosophical underpinnings of NEPAD – whether it is a modernisational, developmental, neo-liberal or democratic programme – there is a more important and strategic question: in the absence of an alternative plan crafted by Africa's leaders, what is the current and future status of NEPAD? Because an alternative plan to NEPAD is yet to emerge at the continental level, we have to work on the assumption that NEPAD remains the official development programme of the AU. But therein lies the problem: there appears to be a leadership vacuum in Africa playing itself out in the current juncture, and no leaders or states have stepped up to take ownership of NEPAD – or many other continental plans, projects and structures for that matter. In South Africa, for example, NEPAD, like so many domestic and foreign-policy initiatives, appears to have become a victim of the 2007 African National Congress (ANC) Polokwane leadership contest, at which Thabo Mbeki was defeated in the ANC presidential race, and subsequently removed as president in September 2008. The Mbeki–Zuma psycho-drama continued after the transfer of power to Zuma and his government, and a political situation prevailed in which many in the new government distanced themselves from policies and initiatives associated with Mbeki. NEPAD became one example of this fallout, and although the new government did eventually commit itself to NEPAD, this appears to be a rhetorical and even financial commitment, without the necessary strategic leadership from South Africa to drive and support NEPAD continentally and further field.

The disengagement from NEPAD in South Africa appears to be replicating itself in other countries in Africa, notably Mozambique, Tanzania, Egypt and, most importantly, Nigeria. In all these countries, the heads of state and leadership appear to have retreated from openly committing to, and campaigning for, NEPAD. Nigeria's new leaders, President Goodluck Jonathan and his government, appear to be far less adventurous in continental and global affairs and foreign policy than their predecessors. And in other African states, leaders appear to adopt decidedly low-key foreign-policy postures. The end result of this shift in the policy balance of forces in Africa is that Africa appears to be in the midst of a continental leadership vacuum, which has adverse implications, not only for NEPAD and a continental development programme in particular, but also for the broader continental policies of peace and security, governance and development architecture.

Added to this unfolding continental policy leadership vacuum is the fact that the international donor community has over the past three years or so exploited this African policy void and also grown lukewarm about their embrace of NEPAD, making their future support for the plan and honouring pacts like the G8-Africa Action Plan and others mere pipe dreams.

In short, in the absence of any credible alternative to NEPAD as a continental development plan, it would be prudent for African governments and intercontinental and subregional bodies to continue to mobilise around NEPAD as Africa's modernisational plan. Yet NEPAD appears at best to be in limbo, and at worst to be dying a slow death, and Africa could go through a long and painful period of having no development plan that it can call its own. The blame for this should fall squarely on the shoulders of the current crop of African leaders, the connivance of external powers and an increasingly docile African civil society.

6.9 Conclusion

NEPAD leaves in its wake an indelible, if controversial, imprint and legacy on Africa's policy landscape as the continent struggles to address 125 years of colonialism's footprint after the European colonisers decided to partition the continent and rob it of its possessions and riches. Yet its future is very uncertain, if not outright gloomy. In terms of legacy, NEPAD represented a modernisation project, it was substantially dominated by technologically driven dictates and was premised on the belief that it was capable of producing either emancipation or the promise of a brighter future for most of humanity. Yet, there is no gainsaying that its legacy also leaves some scars, and, as such, it is important for NEPAD's architects to appreciate that projects premised solely on modernist principles have contributed to widening inequality.

Although there is very little hope of repudiating the achievements of the modern world overnight, NEPAD's architects would have done well to strive to acknowledge the insufficiency of modernity in relation to contemporary challenges. Those designing the path to reconstruction should be deeply aware of the actual and potential role of social forces and democratising energies as historical factors embedded in the public space. Regarding the world that is moving rapidly toward a more integrated economic, cultural and political reality (the shrinking world), there is a need to critically assess the significance of being a citizen in a nation-state. The fact that the development in production and communication technology has introduced significant opportunities for global dialogue, both public and private, does not detract from what these developments engender at local levels, especially in the economic, social and political spheres.

NEPAD's enduring legacy is that it came about in the first place, despite its flaws and drawbacks. Its proponents subscribed to the idea that, although modernisation

projects have at times been disastrous failures, it is still *the* paradigm in which the dominant structure of our world system is framed, and has delivered impressive development results. NEPAD believed that a modernisation strategy could fast-track African development. To be sure, as modernisation processes go, NEPAD is among the plans that embody very serious conflicting and contradictory impulses. Yet within the conflicting and contradictory impulses, NEPAD was quite clearly premised on an interpretation and an idea of modernisation as a process towards achieving greater integrity, effectiveness, efficiency and independence of development efforts and of states in Africa and the way in which they relate to states in the developed world.

Free markets are by their very nature exploitative and unconcerned about protecting and preserving social rights. Moreover, their manner of distributing goods and services is based on procuring maximum profit rather than on the delivery of public goods and services. In addition, they only function at optimal efficiency under specified conditions, relying on economies where workers are highly skilled, infrastructure is well developed and capital accumulation is significant. It is because of the pre-existence of these conditions that markets thrive, rather than thriving to meet these conditions. In essence then, it is these preconditions that are essential, and they must pre-exist the market rather than the market pre-existing them in order to bring them about. Across Africa there is a lack of well-developed infrastructure and the concentration of accumulated capital is vested among relatively few elites, multinational corporations and listed companies – most of which repatriate profits in any case, and consequently capital reinvestment in African economies has been far short of what may be required for effective markets to act as social arbiters.

But there is no alternative on the horizon to rival NEPAD, certainly not one that would come from the current crop of leaders, in which diffusion and lack of cohesion appear to be the order of the day. NEPAD contains some anomalies that need to be addressed if it is to be revised and refined into a credible and legitimate development plan for all of Africa. What is of even more serious concern is whether the African leaders today at the helm of politics, and the continental and inter-state bodies over which they are supposed to preside, will show the political acumen and strategic leadership to ensure that the continent has political, development, peace and security, and cooperation projects. Unless African leaders reclaim some of the continent's international agency, the affliction that the Europeans brought about when they met in Berlin in 1884–85 to carve up Africa for their own possession will continue to haunt the continent.

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7

Chapter

SINO-led Development in Lesotho: Power Cruise or Sustainable Development?

Vusi Mashinini

Tensions, controversies and periodic bloody conflicts cloud the Kingdom of Lesotho regarding the role of Chinese-led development interventions. Lesotho has had relations with China since colonial times. Depending on the ideology and foreign policy of the ruling party, these Lesotho–China relations have been either covert and controversial, as was the case during the rule of the Basotho National Party (BNP) of Leabua Jonathan, which was pro capitalist and Anglo-American propped, or open and overt, as the relations have been since 1994, when the pro-social democracy Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) under Ntsu Mokhehle took government. Since the latter phase, the Lesotho development landscape has been characterised by an unprecedented escalation of support from the Far East, especially from China. Simultaneously, there has been an increase in the inflow of Chinese nationals masquerading as businessmen, with and without families, who stream into Lesotho weekly, to invest and/or work legally or illegally, especially in the commercial and industrial sectors. Moreover, diplomatic embassies in both Lesotho and China have been strengthened.

Despite the Chinese influx being heralded by the government of Lesotho as a measure of the strategic and smart partnership in response to globalisation and economic liberalisation, there is heated debate among the Basotho about the fact that over 70 per cent of Lesotho's industrial and commercial sector is in the hands of the Chinese. Ironically, the public outcry that the government should limit or at least regulate the inflow and involvement of the Chinese in the economy seems to be strengthening state and government support for them. Increased corruption, bribery and the very poor quality of goods and services offered by Chinese businesses have fuelled tensions and prompted xenophobic attacks by locals, with the intention of cleansing and 'purging' them out. Yet somehow the Chinese have persistently stayed on, with the number of both residents and businesses increasing, officially and unofficially. The moot question is, has this tenacious grip been fuelled by a benevolent drive to pursue sustainable development in Lesotho, or is it driven by sheer self-interest on the part of China and the Chinese?

The objective of this chapter is to explore and assess the contribution of Chinese involvement to sustainable development initiatives in Lesotho, against the background of globalisation and the new scramble for Africa. Sustainable development

refers to development that satisfies the needs of today's generation without sacrificing the needs of tomorrow's generation. Indicators used to measure sustainable development are economic, financial, social/human, political and environmental security. Desktop methodology was used in the collection of data, and purposive random sampling techniques were used to identify people with whom interviews were conducted about some Chinese businesses in Roma and Maseru.

The chapter begins with an overview of the conceptual framework on globalisation, economic liberalisation and the new scramble for Africa, and provides the history of cooperation between Lesotho and China before presenting the current Chinese-led development initiatives in Lesotho. The nature and impacts of these development initiatives are interrogated, and the chapter concludes with a summary of the implications of the Chinese development initiative in Lesotho.

The chapter argues that China's development support for Lesotho before the 1990s was pro development and based on a clear ideological and moral conscience to help fight neocolonialism in all its forms. Yet with the collapse of the Soviet Union and socialism in 1989 and the post cold war ideological globalisation of capitalism since the 1990s, China's development support has shifted to being driven by its own ambitions to build itself into a superpower position, as a possible global balance factor against the US from the East; hence its developmentalist onslaught with all its state, state-corporate enterprises and ventures, and its purely private corporate investments in Africa. Lesotho is used to propping up this case by showing that Chinese initiatives were mainly self power driven because they failed to live up to the measurements of sustainable development which are economic, financial, human/social, political and environmental security. Instead, China's involvement in African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) industries firmed up its position to challenge the US; its commercial activities displaced local businesses, exploited local labour and resources; promoted corrupt political practices, endangered locals' health through the sale of unhealthy foods, imported poor quality products, promoted illegal immigration and converted Lesotho into its dependent dumping ground and peripheral economy.

7.1 Globalisation and the New Scramble for Africa: A Conceptual Overview

Globalisation has become the most controversial issue in contemporary development and political discourses. Controversies centre on the definitions and historiography of globalisation, as well as its impacts on the world political and economic order and its emerging geopolitical dispensations at national, regional and global levels. Some analysts argue that globalisation started in the mercantile period, with European imperialism, and has only changed its forms and tactics since then; while others regard it as a phenomenon of the post-1989 era, when capitalism

became the sole dominant global ideology, fuelled by electronic technology, which minimised distance and enabled it to engulf the rest of the world in its centrifugal economic, social and political manifestations and manipulations, resulting in the simultaneous promotion of development and exploitation in poorer countries and regions. Therefore, whether before or today, globalisation has been the driving force behind the scramble for world resources, in which being very rich, relatively unexplored and the weakest in power, Africa has always been the centre of attraction and focus by the rich and powerful states – first Europe, then the US and the USSR, and now Japan, China, India and South Africa.

The Africa Policy Institute presents a three-pronged historical periodisation of the Scramble for Africa, namely the colonial period; the post-Second World War era from 1946 to 1989; and the post-1989 era, after the collapse of European Socialism.¹ It argues that the first phase consisted of the mercantile period through to the colonial era, when the European super-powers such as Britain, France, Germany, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Belgium and Italy, forced by the voracity of their industrial revolution for resources, competed for and carved Africa into exclusive trading areas or colonial territories where they controlled access to natural resources, labour and trade markets, as enforced by the Berlin Conference Declaration of 1884.

The second phase consisted of the period after the Second World War which was typified by the superpower struggles between the US and the USSR, culminating in 1989 in the collapse of the USSR and the end of socialism as a global ideology, providing an alternative political and economic development model to capitalism. The third and current phase, beginning with the post-cold war era after 1990, coincides with contemporary globalisation, neo-liberalism and multi-lateralism as cornerstones of global capitalist development ideology and practice.

The Africa Policy Institute further argues that:

China is the newest kid on the block and evidently the most aggressive and determined in the African scramble. As a result, analysts have strongly accused China of its 'neocolonialism' policies that exacerbate political instabilities and undermine democratic progress. The main focus of China's scramble for Africa is oil, and to a lesser extent timber and mineral resources with investments and trade penetrating deep into rural areas and undermining indigenous entrepreneurs with cheap imported Chinese products. China has gained unhindered access to oil supplies in major African countries including Algeria, Angola, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria, Sudan and even South Africa. China's trade with Africa reached US\$55.5 billion in 2006 and is expected to reach US\$100 billion by 2010. This success is aided by China's history of supporting African liberation struggles; a policy that, unlike the West, does not tie Sino-African relations on demands for good governance, respect for human rights, democracy and transparency

(except the requirement that partners do not recognize Taiwan); and generous aid packages and the use of the China–Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF).²

During the first 11 months of 2010, China–Africa trade volume reached some US\$114 000 million. Naidu argues that ‘a common feature of China (and India’s) policy in the region is large-scale concessional finance coupled with development assistance.’³ The resource factor has become the backbone of China and India’s foreign policy in the region and the rest of the continent. However, the region also represents an attractive market’.

Some major Chinese deals include a \$230 million ferrochrome mine and smelter project in South Africa, a \$200 million copper project in Zambia, a rural fixed-line telephone project by the Chinese telecommunication firm Huawei in Angola, the Chirundu Road Rehabilitation World Bank Tender by Chinese construction company CHICO, infrastructure projects in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Mozambique and Madagascar.⁴

Naidu goes on to stress that China sees Africa as a source of raw materials, especially natural resources, and a strategic trading area and a market for China’s finished products such as electronic equipment, clothing and textiles. Additional factors of attraction to China in Africa are cheap labour (which is made so by the over-permissive labour laws enforced through state coercion, and state violence against the trade union movement protesting for just pay from Chinese investors in Africa), concessional access to AGOA industries and EU trade markets for African-made products.

Naidu notes the poor record of Chinese investors regarding human and environmental security in Africa, but he concludes that despite these drawbacks, Chinese involvement in development in Africa under its bilateral aid model has been instrumental in the provision and rehabilitation of infrastructure, the provision of interest-free loans, creating and connecting markets, setting up joint ventures with the region’s private sector, and acting as a catalyst for industrialisation and development.⁵

However, controversies surround China in Africa. Despite the positive aspects of China’s development cooperation and efforts in Africa, there are abundant problems associated with them as well. These include, among others, the exploitation of cheap labour and resources, unethical business tactics, the influx of its immigrants into Africa, poor skills transfer, the poor quality of its products, its marginalisation of local enterprise, smuggling, bribery and corruption, the promotion of illegitimate governments, and capital profit expatriation.⁶

7.2 History of Sino-led Development in Lesotho: Policy Overview

Lesotho started to have official ties with China during the 1950s. Then, the relations were between the only nationalist movement of the time in Lesotho, the

Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). From the outset, the relations were ideologically driven by the need to promote the decolonisation of Lesotho from Britain by decolonising the mind through training opportunities offered to Basotho belonging to the BCP. As a result, in the 1950s and 1960s, a large number of BCP followers, especially the youth, left for training in both the USSR and Communist China. Needless to say this offended the British colonial government greatly and laid the basis for their dislike of the BCP leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, whom they saw as a communist bent on destroying the British Empire in Africa, like his friend Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, through pan-Africanism. On completion of their training and studies, these youth were therefore seen as a security threat and not allowed back into Lesotho by the colonial government, thus having to remain in exile.⁷

After winning the 1965 election and assuming government, the BNP-led government of Leabua Jonathan, through pressure from both its Western allies and the Roman Catholic Church which strongly contributed to its founding and support, continued with the ban on the USSR and China relations with the BCP and its trained personnel because the former were socialist. According to Sixishe, '[t]he Roman Catholic Church, through its propaganda network had presented the Socialist countries as an evil closely akin to the devil'.⁸

Instead, the new BNP government forged relations with Taiwan – a province of China, which had seceded in protest against the hardline leadership of those such as Mao Zedong, to form the capitalist western ideology-driven 'China' during the Indo-China wars of the 1950s. Lesotho-Taiwan relations intensified in the 1970s, after the BNP unilaterally declared the 1970 election outcome null and void and imposed itself as the government, by force,⁹ until 1986 when it was deposed by its own disgruntled military.¹⁰ Thereafter, military training and logistical support from Taiwan increased significantly in Lesotho, to ensure the effective despotic autocracy of the BNP regime. This was accompanied by much support for agriculture, through intensive rice-growing experimental projects in places such as Maputsoe and Koro-koro-Mokema, among others, and the national Food Self Sufficiency Programme (FSSP) carried out by the Taiwanese Technical Mission in Lesotho.

From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, before being toppled, the BNP undertook a quasi-ideological somersault and embarked on the policy of international diversification of allies to embrace both Western and Eastern countries, in line with the spirit of the Non-Aligned Movement of which it had become a member;¹¹ what Jonathan called '*Ho ralotsa*' in Sesotho. The BNP changed from being what Machobane calls 'fanatically anti-communist',¹² and its declared enemies – the USSR and communist China – gradually became embraced as its friends, from whom all forms of cooperation and support were sought. Indeed, following the

Lesotho leader's first visit to these socialist countries in 1983, the Roman Catholic Church, through its mouthpiece newspaper, *Moeletsi Oa Basotho*, made a melancholy lamentation and condemnation of the visit and Lesotho's friendship with the five countries of the communist bloc.¹³ In return, Jonathan declared that those within the BNP and the Roman Catholic Church who questioned his political tango with the socialist countries should be aware that he was not apologetic about his political move because communism is not paint – '*Bokomonisi ha se ferefe e tlotsang motho hang ha a e atamela*', meaning it is possible for one to coexist on a bilateral basis with communists, without one necessarily being communist oneself.¹⁴

Indeed, shortly afterwards, the USSR, Communist China and Cuba had official diplomatic missions opened in Maseru, the capital of Lesotho. This was followed shortly afterwards by the BNP sending many of its youth to study law, medicine, engineering, agriculture and the arts in these three communist countries.¹⁵ The diplomatic and foreign relations cacophony that ensued between Lesotho, Taiwan and Western countries led by the US and Britain on this turn of events is covered in detail by Sixishe and is not a direct subject of this chapter, but it is relevant in many ways.¹⁶ Firstly, this event laid the basis for the power struggle and scramble between China and the West for Lesotho, which continues, today. Secondly, it provided opportunistic space for China to position itself more strategically and increase development support for Lesotho starting with the completion of the work in agriculture abandoned by the Taiwanese,¹⁷ the construction of the national stadium and the Qhobsheaneng Government complex that houses the Prime Minister's offices and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thirdly, it laid the foundation for long-standing Lesotho–China cooperation, which has stood up to changing international and national challenges right up to the present, with only moderate changes as perceived necessary by the two.

The Chinese scramble for Lesotho has always been driven mainly by power considerations based on its strategic location in relation to South Africa. During the apartheid era in South Africa, Lesotho offered a political window through which China could not only peep into apartheid South Africa but, together with its ally, the USSR, contribute to planting the seed of socialist ideology in the region. It was the fear of this possibility that incensed the apartheid regime in South Africa about China's, Cuba's and the USSR's new friendship with Leabua Jonathan's BNP government and their subsequent deployment of full Embassy Missions in Maseru.¹⁸ This was, inter alia, a policy outcome for which Lesotho paid dearly, with lives lost and economic embargos from Pretoria, culminating in the overthrow of Jonathan and his BNP from government in 1986.¹⁹

After the end of apartheid in South Africa, China's economic considerations seem to be mostly used to take advantage of access to European markets for

Lesotho products, and lately access to AGOA markets for Lesotho products as well. Another economic consideration, less visible in overt policy, is that products from South Africa flow freely into Lesotho under the Southern African Customs Union Agreement. It would seem that some Chinese companies invest in Lesotho to have easy access to these products, based on which they create the copy-cat products that are now found flooding the consumer markets under the same labels, but are lower in quality and standard.²⁰

When China and Taiwan reunited, the political leadership in Lesotho took pains to convince China that Lesotho would honour the One China policy and constantly renews this vow when diplomatic occasions arise between the two countries.

7.3 Sino-led Development Trends in Lesotho under the New Scramble for Africa Phase: A Situation Analysis

As is the case all over Africa, Chinese-led development initiatives in Lesotho have become a cause for heated national debate and controversy. On the one hand, the government of Lesotho, spearheaded by the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) Prime Minister and the Government Secretary, defends Chinese-led development as being positive and necessary for progress in Lesotho,²¹ while on the other hand, opposition parties such as the All Basotho Convention Party (ABC), the Lesotho Workers Party (LWP) and the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) support the opposing viewpoint that condemns Chinese-led development in Lesotho as being exploitative, self-interested and in need of drastic reform.

Current China-led development initiatives in Lesotho are many and diverse. Firstly, there are Chinese companies that are running textile and clothing industries under the aegis of the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC). The LNDC industrial development estates in which these companies operate are in Maseru at Ha Thetsane, in the Maseru Bridge area, at Maputsoe, Mafeteng and Mohales' Hoek. It is estimated that there were 23 Chinese companies in 2000, and this had risen to 70 companies in 2008.²²

Concerning education, Basotho students are granted opportunities to study in China on a long-term basis of one to three years, and since 2005, also for short training courses of less than a year's duration. China also contributes to the construction of schools used to provide Lesotho students with free primary education as part of the implementation of the United Nations declared Millennium Development Goals to which Lesotho is a signatory. The Chinese have also contributed financial and technical aid to some hospitals.

Chinese development assistance in agriculture and food security has helped significantly in the past, but is of low significance today. However, now and then, China helps Lesotho with technical and financial aid aimed at food production

and aid relief. For instance, in 2005 and 2008 Lesotho received about \$1 million and ZAR10,1 million for food emergency support.²³ In the field of mining, some Chinese companies are engaged in sandstone mining and export around Teyateyaneng town and soil brickmaking at Maqhaka area in the Berea District.

A further development intervention is the construction of infrastructure projects with Chinese expertise and/or capital, including the new parliament buildings constructed with Chinese aid to the tune of R70 million, the National Convention Centre, the State Library,²⁴ Government Complex 1 and 2, a DTF lectures block at the National University of Lesotho (NUL), and water installation projects under the Water and Sewerage Authority (WASA) in places like Roma, among others.

Perhaps the largest involvement of the Chinese in Lesotho is in the field of private and corporate trade and commerce. Commercial activities in which the Chinese are involved cover a wide range, from cafes, shops, tailoring, liquor stores, petrol stations, restaurants, fruit shops, printing shops, garages, electrical appliances and warehousing to butcheries and fast-food outlets.

China also gives interest-free credit support to Lesotho and does not question the LCD government about its political legitimacy, as other development agencies have been apt to do since the unilateral usurpation of power from the democratic BCP government in 1997 by the newly born LCD, under the leadership of the then Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle, and in view of the controversial legitimacy of LCD rule since the 2007 national election.

7.4 Sino-led Development in Lesotho: An Interrogation

Analysis of the Sino-led development endeavours in Lesotho indicates positive and negative impacts for sustainable development in the country.

7.4.1 Positive impacts

On the positive side, the textile industries run by Chinese companies have been reported by the Minister of Trade and Industry to have increased foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from garment industries from R198,9 million in the year 2000 to some R1 329 million in 2008.²⁵

The textile industries have also generated employment for thousands of Basotho who could have otherwise remained unemployed, especially as many local businesses have closed due to the current economic meltdown. Estimates are that their employment generation increased from 16 417 workers in 2001 to 53 000 in 2005, then decreased to 45 650 workers in 2008 countrywide.²⁶ Moreover, this has enabled Lesotho to effect its participation in the AGOA and reap the associated financial, economic and political benefits of the new scramble for Africa.

A further positive impact is the contribution Chinese companies make to government revenue through the payment of corporate and sales taxation per annum.²⁷ Another contribution accrues to Lesotho through the generation of GDP to which industry contributes about 42 per cent, of which some 18 to 20 per cent comes from textile manufacturing.²⁸ In addition, there is the contribution from exports' foreign exchange earnings, in which the share of garments is 70 per cent of exports per annum.²⁹

The Chinese expertise and cheaper prices involved in the construction of infrastructure projects has also meant that Lesotho can enjoy quality infrastructure at least cost.³⁰

Chinese companies that are engaged in sandstone mining have created employment and household income for the adjacent communities and the nation as a whole. The support to agriculture and the occasional food aid from China help Lesotho to implement the poverty reduction policies entailed in its poverty reduction strategy.

With regard to education, the assistance given by China promotes basic literacy, training and higher level education and skills acquisition for sustainable development in Lesotho. In a country like Lesotho, where the unemployment rate is about 45 per cent, and more than 49 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line (Index Mundi 2010),³¹ Chinese commercial activities have created much needed employment for local communities, and provide affordable commercial goods and services. Chinese businesses have thus made goods and services relatively affordable for the poor while also improving the purchasing power of local communities via income earned from the employment.

7.4.2 Negative impacts

On the other hand, despite their positive impacts, the Chinese development activities have caused harm to the economic, social, political and environmental security of Lesotho.

7.4.2.1 Economic insecurity

In the case of economic insecurity, there is currently low Chinese involvement in food production and agriculture so as to assist Lesotho to boost domestic food production and meet the Millennium Development Goals related to food security. This is paradoxical and contradicts the earlier policy with China–Taiwan, wherein technical support for agriculture was a heavy component of the bilateral cooperation package. In Lesotho, where more than 70 per cent of the national food demand is met through food imports, this error of omission seems to be an error of commission, with self-interest at the forefront. The fact that the ruling government

has failed to exert pressure on the food issue in the China–Lesotho cooperation equation, equally points to the self-interest of the ruling class in Lesotho, which has pronounced a policy of poverty reduction but conveniently forgotten to allocate sufficient policy implementation resources to boost food production, leaving it to pursue food aid-driven poverty reduction instead.³²

Moreover, the heavy involvement of the Chinese in the textile industries is tantamount to drawing water with a sieve, in that there are no local linkage effects with the national economy. All the backward linkages, by way of inputs into those industries, are imported from outside Lesotho, mainly from Asia and South Africa, and usually from companies in which China itself has share.³³ Lesotho thus becomes a market for China's goods, instead of boosting the use of its own raw materials such as wool, mohair, hides and skins which have been exported in abundance since colonial times. Equally, the market for the textiles is the US; it is illegal for the Basotho to consume these products. According to the Managed Funds Association (MFA) Forum, '[t]he three main buyers of Lesotho garments are Gap Inc., Levis and Sears. They are all major buyers and Gap alone is responsible for around 35 per cent of Lesotho's total garment export'.³⁴

The net effect is that Basotho labour is cheaply exploited to produce these T-shirts and jeans, which are exported to the US from where some are sold to the rest of the world – Lesotho might eventually also be purchasing them later at a higher cost. This is reminiscent of the old colonial economic exploitation chain where a country like Britain would get Lesotho's wool cheaply, take it to London to produce blankets out of it and resell them back to Lesotho at exorbitant prices, instead of simply setting up factories in Lesotho.

A further economic insecurity is that the Chinese running these factories are footloose and runaway. Time and again Chinese proprietors close shop overnight, packing up and leaving without any legitimate, let alone sustainable, exit strategy and leaving the employees and the government unpaid, stranded and frustrated. The runaway problem is aggravated by the fact that the AGOA-destined garment industries have deepened the integration of Lesotho's economy into the global economy and its fluctuations, leaving Lesotho vulnerable to the negative impacts on global economic performance in the current financial meltdown. The fluctuations impact negatively on Lesotho as well because of the changes in the AGOA market viability and consumer spending capacities and preferences, which create negative backward ripple effects in the supply chain in Lesotho. The MFA Forum noted in a footnote that:

According to the LNDC, exports declined 25 per cent in the first six months of 2005 and seven of their factories and three others have closed in 2005. According to trade union reports, in Maputsoe nine out of 12 factories have closed in 2005.³⁵

Worst of all, sometimes the government of Lesotho, through the LNDC, has to give financial support to some of these Chinese companies to stop them from closing down and leaving. An example is the CGM company which was given R30 million by the LNDC in 2009 as a financial subsidy to this effect.³⁶ In principle, foreign investors are supposed to be financially self-sufficient at all times; it is unacceptable when they start to get financial support from the host country, as this situation promotes financial exploitation instead of financial generation for the host country as the norm for foreign investment ought to be.

Therefore, another issue of concern is how far and with what resources the government of Lesotho, through its parastatal, the LNDC, meets investors – the Chinese investors included – some way with capital, subsidies and incentives. As observed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),

Lesotho is unusual in that industrial and commercial credit to foreign as well as local enterprises is also provided by the state-owned LNDC and its sister organization the Basotho Enterprises Development Corporation. The LNDC is also mandated to promote and facilitate foreign investment.³⁷

To this end, the LNDC provides, inter alia, a tax holiday, a low 10 per cent corporate tax, a subsidy for water, direct financial subsidies or bailouts, and so on.³⁸ All these incentives take place at a high economic and social opportunity cost to the Basotho. An editorial in *The Voice of Free Democrats* observes on this point that:

There is also an issue with generous concessions the government has given these investors, particularly as regards tax breaks, which heightens the perception that the investors are not contributing to the economy meaningfully, and if anything, are exploiting the Basotho (rather than providing employment and income they might otherwise not have).³⁹

In pursuit of trade liberalisation, an influx of Chinese businessmen and women has flowed into Lesotho since the late 1980s, when the era of the new scramble for Africa started. They dominate every economic activity, from the biggest, such as running garages, wholesalers, retail outlets, restaurants and construction companies, to the smallest, such as running village cafes and selling paraffin, fat cakes, potato chips and so forth in the towns and even the most remote areas of the country. This has marginalised the Basotho small business entrepreneurs, who fail to succeed in the ensuing business competition and are forced to close shop and rent out their premises to the Chinese instead. At present more than 70 per cent of the commercial sector in Lesotho is in Chinese hands; this has occurred within a period of only about 20 years. Even most of the South African wholesale and retail outlets, such as Fraser's,

among others, that had dominated this sector since the British colonial times, have drastically scaled down operations or closed shop to seek better business opportunities elsewhere in Africa. What is long overdue and needs immediate attention, is that the government should capacitate and enforce its institutions entrusted with the responsibility of implementing the trade laws that limit small businesses to the preserve of Basotho small and medium entrepreneurs only. Equally, the government of China, through its embassy in Lesotho, should warn its potential business investors in Lesotho to refrain from the temptation of doing small-business investment as well.

In addition, economic insecurities and problems cloud these Chinese business operations in Lesotho. Firstly, they sell goods that are either legally or illegally imported from their home country or other countries, but from companies in which they have vested interests. Lesotho imports 26,3 per cent of its total imports from mainland China and 20,1 per cent from Taiwan. This makes a total of 46,4 per cent of imports from One China.⁴⁰ This effectively digs Lesotho into a deep market for some Chinese products. Therefore this fails to effectively integrate their business operations into the national economy in that they fail to act as increased local demand to stimulate increased local supply and increased production as a result. In so doing they undercut the demand–supply chain for sustainable development through the absence of internal economic linkages.

Secondly, most of the Chinese goods and services are of poorer quality and standards than their South African counterparts, a problem which has earned them the nick name ‘*Fong-Kong*’ or ‘*mo tenoa hang*’ among Basotho consumers. The *Fong-Kong* problem is aggravated by the absence of a bureau of standards that monitors the quality of goods and services being dished out to consumers in Lesotho. Therefore, the economic and technical sustainability of the Chinese products is far from satisfactory. An editorial of the *Voice of Free Democrats*, a mouthpiece of the ruling LCD party, succinctly captured this problem as follows:

The hostility against large Taiwanese presence is exacerbated by the criticism that they are drawing many Chinese traders to Lesotho who are selling sub-standard goods to Lesotho, such as out of date foodstuffs, and are also starting to dominate the retail trade sector with lower prices and faster supply chains, even in outlying areas, that Basotho believe is their preserve. Some believe they are undercutting prices through corrupt practices such as smuggling.⁴¹

Clearly, it is necessary to set up a bureau of standards that will work hand-in-hand with the National Consumer Council in order to address this problem of standards and quality control.

The third economic security concern is that most of the businesses operate beyond legal working hours, on Sundays as well, and they make their Basotho

employees work for more than eight hours a day in an effort to extract what Salm et al. call 'superhuman performance from the workers under them'.⁴² This happens despite the labour laws that stipulate the contrary, because they are not fully enforced. The problem is that the workers are underpaid for their normal working hours and overtime hours. This exploitation of labour undercuts its purchasing power to become an effective demand pool, thus creating sustainable development. Moreover, it deprives the employees of their fair cut or share in the profits they have sweated to generate, thus allowing the Chinese businesses to extract surplus value and accumulate super-profit at the expense of workers. The labour laws need to be stringently enforced on these Chinese businesses by the government, and active trade unionism should be supported, instead of being harassed by the government and other stakeholders.

Yet another economic insecurity generated by the Chinese businesses in Lesotho relates to lack of control in terms of the profits generated by foreign investors. The policy pursued by the government in order to attract foreign investment to Lesotho is that the 'sky is the limit'. Consequently, most Chinese business investors do little banking in Lesotho, but repatriate the profits either to nearby towns in South Africa where most of them stay temporarily, pending the grant of their permanent residence permit, or back to China. As noted by UNCTAD:

Lesotho maintains foreign exchange controls and central bank approval is needed for the transfer of profits and the proceeds of disinvestment. There has never been a case of blockage of such transfers. Lesotho's BITs provide for free funds transfer for a wide range of payments associated with an investment. Under both treaties funds transfer may be delayed in the event of economic difficulties. Lesotho is a member of the Southern African Common Monetary Area (CMA) and the South African rand is also legal tender exchangeable at par with the local currency, the maloti. In effect, Lesotho residents can readily repatriate funds in rand to South Africa. Thus there are no exchange controls to concern South African investors.⁴³

The critical result is that this limits the finance available to generate multiplier effects in the country. The bottom line is that there is very limited domestic finance to use for development in Lesotho and the government has, at present, asked the Central Bank of Lesotho to make a clarion call to Basotho people of good will, to lend the government money for development through the purchase of Treasury bonds.⁴⁴

There are also issues surrounding tax evasion and brushing against the law in terms of the legality of some of the goods (such as drugs) that some Chinese traders try to bring into Lesotho.⁴⁵

The most serious economic insecurity relates to the possibility of loss of land to the Chinese under the new Land Act 2010, which allows the purchase of land by foreigners. The Land Act 2010 was enacted in order to respond to a perceived insecurity of ‘Lesotho land tenure [which] is problematical for business in general and foreign investors in particular’ owing to the lack of rights for foreigners to hold or lease land title. Moreover, it was argued, ‘[t]he current land system is based on genuine sensitivities but is archaic and cumbersome and not suited to a modern business environment’.⁴⁶ Preliminary results from research into the views of the people on the potential impacts of this new Land Act, which is being done under the aegis of the Department of Geography at NUL, show that there is a fear that the new policy will lead to loss of land to foreign investors, causing Lesotho to lose economic benefits. In addition, there are also fears that the urban renewal schemes advocated in this land law might result in some communities – notably Sea-point in the centre of Maseru – being subjected to a Phase Two relocation project, in order to make way for a Chinese-driven, Chinatown model, renewal scheme. These fears are real, since Sea-point was subjected to Phase One relocation of some households to make way for the new bus stop near the Sefika Mall in Maseru.⁴⁷

7.4.2.2 Environmental insecurity

Within the context of environmental security, tremendous problems also abound. The safety standard of most of the infrastructure constructed by the Chinese contractors is poor. It lacks structural stability and is not sturdy enough if it is multiple floor structures and the roofing leaks, as do the water basins and toilets inside them. These problems are common in the Transport and Home Affairs Complex, the National Convention Centre, the State Library, the DTF Lecture Complex at NUL, and the Government Complex 11. The safety, health and environment situation at the Chinese factories is a nightmare that appears to have no consideration for human life security at all.⁴⁸ A tour of these factories by the Minister of Labour and Employment in early 2011 led her to the conclusion that very few of them complied with international and national standards on labour practices, safety, health and environment.⁴⁹

The physical environment in the vicinity of these factories has air polluted by chemical-laden fumes which pose a danger to the health of both workers and adjacent communities; rivers are polluted with chemicals and have turned blue, posing a danger to children, animals and plants that use this water.⁵⁰ Moreover, these blue rivers drain into the Caledon River that forms the international boundary with South Africa nearby. As UNCTAD points out:

There are problems with the treatment of effluent from the garment factories, and recycling of water is not practised (or anticipated). Water taken from the

Caledon River reduces flow rates and the availability of water to residents of Maseru. Discharge of untreated effluents in the watercourse creates pollution (this is about to be banned in Lesotho, and is illegal internationally). The burning of solid waste creates air pollution. The Lesotho Government has not imposed any penalties for pollution, but the clothing industry may face future pressures from buyers. The South African government which shares the Caledon River has already complained about water pollution.⁵¹

The point is that maintaining safety, health and environmental standards is seen as expensive by the Chinese investors in the textile factories, so human and environmental security are compromised to allow for cheaper operating costs and maximisation of the profits. Therefore, compliance with the safety, health and environmental laws of Lesotho have to be enforced on these investment companies, by all the stakeholders mandated to do so, in order for sustainable development for all to be promoted and achieved.

In the case of some Chinese commercial businesses, health, environment and safety are equally bad. Most of their commercial outlets are squalid, congested and dirty inside and outside, and some of the Chinese workers sleep inside these premises, which are used as homes. Despite some efforts by the Ministry of Health to inspect business premises and goods sold, some of the goods sold have passed their expiry date and have gone rotten. Yet these goods are still sold albeit at a cheaper price, with potentially fatal impacts on the consumers who are either unaware of their expiry date or lured to buy them by their cheap price. For instance, TV Lesotho, on the 8 March 2011 during the 19:30 news bulletin, reported that a police crackdown found 16 Chinese sleeping in their business premises, where they washed clothes and themselves, cooked and had toilet facilities alongside the commercial goods due for sale in the shops at Roma. Clearly, the Ministry of Health has to monitor and enforce environmental, health and food safety standards in these commercial retail outlets more stringently than it has done hitherto.

7.4.2.3 Social security

As regards social security, there has been an influx of illegal Chinese immigrants into Lesotho since the late 1980s. This creates internal human insecurity and raises concerns about human trafficking as well. What is more worrying is that some of these immigrants come holding Lesotho passports already, which might be one of the reasons why Basotho people have recently had to get visas to visit countries in Europe, where none were needed before. This echoes the situation in the 1990s, when Britain threatened to impose visas following the Lesotho passports scandals.⁵² According to Pitso, the government has had to repeal some of the 276 passports initially granted under what was called the 'Lesotho citizenship

investment scheme' wherein passports were sold for \$3 000 to attract Chinese investors into Lesotho.⁵³ Some, caught with passports acquired outside of the scheme, appeared in court to face fines and/or repatriation back to their home country. This attempt to stop the illegal sale of passports has been met with differing levels of success. Intensified action by both the government of Lesotho and China is urgently needed to remedy this problem.

Another social security concern is that some Chinese immigrants now have citizenship status; others have applied and are waiting for it, while many bring their wives and children to make babies that are born in Lesotho, who can then claim nationality as Lesotho-born Chinese. This makes the Basotho feel socially insecure about the future of their children because of the negative and predatory attitudes displayed by the Chinese towards them. In particular, their concern is that ordinary Basotho seem to be fast becoming third class citizens, about to live in near enslavement conditions in their own land. Ntaote notes that this feeling is also gaining political attention, as expressed by the current leader of the MFP who comments that:

Right now, a typical example that the ruling party has no intentions of securing a better future for us all is its support for the enslavement of Basotho women in the textile industries. Yet the original thinking was that those who came here to set up business would train Basotho, and capacitate them to eventually take over such companies. But this government is not interested in that at all. It is only interested in turning over people into slaves, which is why it has facilitated that it be easy for foreigners to acquire our land.⁵⁴

A further social security issue is the increase in the number of Chinese unskilled workers brought into Lesotho legally or illegally, to do supervisory and menial jobs like checking parcels and purchase slips at the doors of shops, and working as clerical assistants. In 2004, Cobbe estimated, based on data from the Chinese Embassy in Maseru, that there were over 5 000 Chinese present in Lesotho.⁵⁵ The social insecurity arises because the Basotho feel that these kinds of job ought to be left for them to do instead, as a nexus to the community. Employing Chinese labour also makes it difficult to impart any skills to Basotho. The UNCTAD remarked that:

There is little doubt that export-oriented manufacturing FDI has created new skills in Lesotho. All employees are given some form of training in the clothing industry, to handle sewing machines, cutting, pressing and the like. However, the full potential for skill transfer and capability building even in these simple activities has not been exploited. Whatever the cause, many supervisory, technical and managerial jobs remain with expatriates, even in firms that have been in Lesotho for a decade or more.⁵⁶

Moreover, the employees in the Chinese factories have no social benefits. So that when their productivity is no longer seen as viable, they are treated as disposable by the factories with no social security benefits to fall back on. This occurs regularly since, given the coincidence of a high HIV/AIDS prevalence among factory workers, and unhealthy working conditions, their health often deteriorates rapidly within a few years of their working lifespan in the factories; they become less productive, and they are dismissed.⁵⁷ While there have been recent attempts by the International Labour Organization-assisted Better Work organisation to promote the 'better work' idea among the factory owners, the fruits are slow and as yet negligible because of the continued quest for short-term profit maximisation by the Chinese investors. Therefore, what is needed is for the governments of China and Lesotho to incorporate this idea in the cooperation agreement and enforce its implementation, in order to bear the fruit of social security for Basotho employees.

Despite the benefits that all the Chinese investors get from the factories and commercial investments and the negative impacts they have on communities, very few have corporate social responsibility policies with obligations and commitments to these local communities who, thus, do not see or feel any benefits from Chinese presence.⁵⁸ However, since 2008, Chinese investors have been compelled to step up their efforts by the 'Better Work' idea of a 'sweat-free label' and 'red label' imposed upon them by the changing international ethical consumer market for garments.⁵⁹ The corporate social responsibility programmes must be legally enforced upon investors in order to foster plough back mechanisms to the communities and the nation.

Social attitudes have also become a social security concern: what is regarded as the disrespect and class displayed by most Chinese business persons and their Chinese employees to the Basotho. Many Basotho feel that the Chinese treat them as cheap labour, not worthy of respect and humane treatment in terms of work ethic, food sold, language used and general human relations. In an interview broadcast on TV Lesotho, during the 19:30 news bulleting on 31 January 2011, the Commissioner of Labour confirmed that there was a serious social attitude problem in the factories regarding the manner and language displayed by some Chinese employees towards Basotho workers, which had prompted her office to intervene from time to time. This is regarded as both a personal and a social insult by the Basotho. It is this social misunderstanding, among other things, that creates tensions and occasional bloody conflicts between the Basotho and the Chinese.⁶⁰

7.4.2.4 Political insecurity

In the case of political security, the Basotho are worried that their government and its public institutions seem to be unable to apply the laws controlling Chinese

businesses and activities effectively.⁶¹ The Chinese are perceived by the Basotho as being above the law in Lesotho, especially because they use corrupt practices to silence, or to silently partner with, some of the rulers and law enforcement agencies and their officers.⁶² Therefore, while the long-standing political ties between China and Lesotho have endured changing national and international political temperatures and environments over time, the increased political visits of Lesotho top brass to China lately, sends fear among the ordinary Basotho that their country is perhaps being fast signed off by their political leadership as part of the Lesotho–China cooperation package to become a modern colonial extension of China under the new scramble for Africa. As one interviewee who participated in this study observed: *‘Muso oona le Machaena ke maja moho. Joale Machaena a iketsetsa borata ka Basotho le Lesotho’*, meaning that the Lesotho government and the Chinese are joint partners in the exploitation of the Basotho. In a country like Lesotho, where the suspicion of corruption between the Chinese, government politicians and some top civil servants has captured headlines since military rule in the early 1990s,⁶³ this creates political insecurity. One Mosotho concluded during the research interviews: ‘Given the current fast political foxtrot between China and Lesotho, it would not be surprising if in the next government Lesotho has a Chinese in Parliament’.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed and discussed Sino-led development in Lesotho. While it recognises some positive impacts that China’s development initiatives have had on Lesotho, it has found that these initiatives are greatly instrumental in creating economic, social, environmental and political insecurity in Lesotho, as China pursues the achievement of its own ambitions for power in the era of the new scramble for Africa. In doing so, it has not exonerated the political leadership in Lesotho from comprador alliance with China’s ruling and business classes, in their pursuit of the emergence of this neocolonial dispensation of Lesotho to China.

In conclusion, it is important to note, with reference to the new scramble for Africa, that the Chinese development initiative in Lesotho has the following implications:

- It operates through the use of legitimisation via the official bilateral Lesotho–China Cooperation. However, where this has limitations, other investors also use chicanery or subtle strategies to gain access to and a hold on the economy.
- It also covertly uses cooptation of the majority of Basotho business persons as its allies through the formation of informal Basotho–Chinese business partnerships and networks which in effect dispossess the Basotho business class of its rightful economic place. This chameleon-like character of being Chinese

but using properties and licences owned by Basotho businessmen enables the Chinese to slip through the net of laws that limits small and medium enterprises to Basotho people only.

- Above all, it has coopted the ruling class in Lesotho to either turn a blind eye to, or enforce regulations half-heartedly on, its infringements on people's economic, social, environmental and political security in Lesotho, thereby precipitating comprador alliances for super-exploitation. Examples are the maintenance of a low minimum wage level and state suppression of active trade unionism against exploitation by Chinese firms.
- It uses cheap prices for commodities as a carrot strategy to entice poor Basotho and blind them to its exploitative nature, thus giving them a false consciousness that the Chinese care about their poverty and have their welfare at heart. Some have even developed a patron–client relationship network with the poor in some communities, which creates progressive indebtedness and dependency. (In this way, the Basotho also make themselves available for Chinese exploitation.)
- There is a settler character in the Chinese scramble for Africa and in Lesotho which is reminiscent of the settler colonialism of the old scramble for Africa in places like South Africa, Kenya, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia. It appears that Chinese foreign investment is simultaneously used as a Chinese immigration policy in Africa as well.

A final note of interest is that there is collusion between scramblers for Africa as well. The US, through AGOA, uses Chinese investors to exploit Basotho and others in Africa as cheap labour. The US has allowed the zealous and ambitious young China to prove itself by belling the cat and bringing the spoils home to America, get its share of the loot and leave the high table to the US to feast on. But eventually who is fooling who between the two?

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8

Chapter

The European Union's Economic Partnership Agreements with Africa and the Scramble for the African Market

Martin Kaggwa

The European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) countries, including a number of African countries, have been negotiating economic partnership agreements (EPAs) since 2002. Negotiations are still ongoing. A conclusion was expected to have been reached at the end of 2010, but this did not happen because many countries still had reservations about the contents of the agreements. Economic and development cooperation is one of the issues still being negotiated. EPAs are supposed to be development tools that facilitate increased trade between the EU and developing countries. The introduction of EPAs marks a new phase in the cooperation between Europe and its former colonies in the ACP countries. Underlying the EPAs is a radical departure from non-reciprocal trade preferences enshrined in the Lomé Conventions (1975–2000), which hitherto characterised the trade relationship between the EU and African countries. The EU presents EPAs as development tools that will foster sustainable development and poverty eradication in signatory countries in Africa despite the continent's failure to take advantage of previous non-reciprocal trade dispensation with the EU that has been in place since 1975.

Renewed focus on trade as a development tool follows persistent failure by foreign aid to support sustainable economic growth in many developing countries. Trade is thought to be a more effective means of promoting development than direct funding of projects, which is vulnerable to mismanagement, abuse and sometimes outright corruption. The overriding interest of African countries in the EPAs is to take advantage of the opportunity to supply high-value products to the lucrative EU market. Such an opportunity could potentially encourage increased domestic production, and with the right supportive policies and institutions could lead to industrialisation. Industrialisation is a prerequisite for creating high-paying jobs in many developing countries. In addition, remittances from exports supplement local incomes and increase effective local demand, which, in turn, stimulates production in various sectors to meet the increased demand. Ultimately, trade between African countries and the EU presents an opportunity for improved standards of living in African countries.

Precedent indicates, however, that if not carefully structured and aligned to national development challenges, offer of preferential trade to African countries

is ineffective in supporting high-value outward trade. Without stimulating significant trade, all the envisaged benefits to the continent emanating from exports of goods and services become unrealisable. Civil society has been active in lobbying and cautioning governments not to sign EPAs in their current form. Civil society contends that the major preoccupation of EPAs is the opening up of ACP markets to EU goods and services. Because many African countries have not yet reached a stage of economic development at which they can produce goods and services that can compete with EU products in a free market, the agreements provide limited potential for such countries to benefit from envisaged trade. Moreover, most African economies are consumer economies. With the exception of food, African countries largely consume what they have not produced. Even if unconditional access to EU markets is permitted for products from these countries, there is little that they can supply. Yet the importance of external trade cannot be discounted in the development conundrum of these countries. Against this background, this chapter examines the extent to which EPAs can be developmental tools for African countries and recommends what ought to be included explicitly in the final EPAs to be signed if the continent is to increase the likelihood of benefiting from the seemingly irreversible coming into effect of the EPAs.

8.1 EU Preferential Trade Arrangements and Development in Beneficiary African Countries

Preferential Trade Arrangement (PTA) between the EU and African countries can be traced as far back as 1971. Goods coming from countries classified as developing could receive preferential treatment on being imported to the EU. The preferential treatment had to be non-reciprocal, in other words, the developed countries could not request any preference from the developing countries in return. The preference was a ‘no return of favour’ dispensation for developing countries. Most important was that the preference could not be part of any contractual agreement with the receiving countries. Benefiting countries were free to take advantage of the preference without any contractual obligations that could potentially constrain their respective domestic development policy.

8.1.1 Trade performance of African countries benefiting from EU PTAs

The desire to increase external trade by African countries is based on the assumption that trade is a vital tool for a country’s economic growth and subsequent improvement of the livelihood of its citizens. Conventional economic theory claims that trade benefits all parties involved as long as it is based on comparative advantage. In reality, however, there are winners and losers when it comes to trade. And

Table 8.1 Trade balance account for selected African countries (1985–2008 in USD)

Country/Year	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008
Benin	-0,2	-0,1	-0,4	-5,2	-9,3	-10,5	-13,5	-13,0
Burkina Faso	-0,3	-0,4	-0,3	-11,9	-10,3	-8,4	-8,9	-11,0
Cameroon	-0,4	0,4	0,5	7,0	1,7	3,2	2,3	1,9
Côte d'Ivoire	1,2	1,1	1,3	1,8	-2,6	0,2	4,4	-0,6
DRC	-0,4	0,1	0,0	13,9	14,3	17,5	12,6	13,8
Djibouti	-0,2	-0,2	-0,3	-31,6	-33,6	-36,5	-48,9	-51,9
Ethiopia	-0,7	-0,8	-0,7	-1,7	-22,7	-23,7	-20,2	-19,8
Ghana	-0,2	-0,4	-0,1	-16,7	-23,7	-24,1	-26,5	-31,0
Kenya	-0,5	-1,1	-1,0	-10,0	-11,4	-14,5	-15,7	-18,6
Lesotho	-0,3	-0,7	-0,8	-68,2	-49,6	-47,0	-50,6	-45,9
Madagascar	-0,2	-0,3	-0,2	0,0	-11,7	-9,7	-13,6	-19,8
Mali	-0,3	-0,3	-0,3	-1,8	-2,6	1,2	-4,1	-7,3
Mozambique	-0,3	-0,8	-0,6	-16,1	-7,6	-3,8	-5,0	-10,0
Nigeria	6,9	9,3	3,8	22,5	26,0	18,5	19,8	16,4
Rwanda	-0,2	-0,2	-0,2	-9,2	-9,2	-9,6	-8,4	-9,2
Senegal	-0,3	-0,8	-0,7	-8,9	-15,1	-17,1	-22,1	-20,8
Sierra Leone	0,0	0,0	-0,1	-8,2	-11,9	-4,8	-5,2	-9,2
Tanzania	-0,7	-0,6	-1,0	-6,9	-9,3	-13,6	-15,7	-16,7
Togo	-0,1	-0,3	-0,2	-10,5	-13,8	-15,0	-16,2	-14,5
Uganda	0,1	-0,4	-0,5	-7,4	-7,3	-9,3	-6,4	-8,1

Source Economic Commission for Africa, African Union & African Development Bank, 2010. *African Statistical Year Book 2010*

in this game of winners and losers, many of the African countries have been on the losing end. Considering the trade balance account of a sample of 20 African countries during the period 1985 to 2008, within which period the EU preferential agreement with Africa was in place, it is noticeable that apart from three countries, Nigeria, Cameroon and Congo, the rest of the countries recorded increasing trade deficits (see Table 8.1). In other words, these countries have been losing more to external economies than they have been earning in the process of their trade participation in international markets.

The countries that have managed to maintain a trade surplus, have largely been exporting natural resources that have uncontested high demand in developed countries. The trade surplus for Nigeria, as an example, was mainly a result of oil

export, a natural resource that does not need any trade concession to be exported to or sold in international markets.

As regards Africa's trade with the EU alone, the continent's trade deficit increased from some €20 billion in 2001 to €40 billion in 2008.¹ The increase in the trade deficit despite the EU's preferential treatment of the continent points to the inherent weakness of PTAs in stimulating trade.

The fact that most African countries have been net losers in trade with the EU and the rest of the developed world, despite receiving preferential trade treatment, indicates that the PTAs are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for increasing trade in Africa. It should also be noted that the transmission mechanism between increased trade and the realisation of socio-economic objectives of individual developing country economies is not a linear process. If the enabled trade does not involve reasonable value addition by the poor population or prices at which products are sold in international markets do not permeate to the products' producers, then the poverty-reduction effect of such outward trade would be minimal.

In all, despite the preferential treatment of products and services from African countries to the EU market, there has not been a significant increase in exports from the continent. As such, the hypothesised positive link between preferential trade and the continent's development has not taken place. Some of the reasons behind this dismal trade performance of African economies have been the continent's failure to progress towards global competitiveness, rules originally appended to the trade agreements and ambiguity in funding the adjustment costs of implementing the agreements. These are examined in the following sections.

8.2 EPAs and Africa's Competitiveness

Competitiveness refers to the degree to which a nation can, under free and fair market conditions, produce goods and services that meet the test of international markets while simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real income of citizens.² The latter is particularly important to African countries because it contributes to the objective of reducing poverty. Achieving competitiveness is a complex process that involves drastic improvement in production and supply efficiencies. In most cases, it involves significant investment in physical and human capital. For many countries that have achieved competitiveness, technology has played a pivotal role.

Achieving competitiveness is closely linked to technological progress. Global competitiveness is inseparably linked to productivity improvement and technology upgrade.³ Carayannis and Roy⁴ postulate that a firm's long-term competitiveness is directly proportional to its speed and acceleration of innovation. Global technology improvement has led to a decrease in product life cycles. Facilities, equipment

and worker skills are rendered obsolete long before their useful lives have been realised.⁵ In order to remain competitive, firms have to innovate continuously and need to ensure that they realise a positive return on innovation-related investment over shorter periods.

In recognition of the role that technology plays in putting a particular economy on a competitiveness trajectory, a number of authors on the topic contend that not all investment is equally important for competitiveness. Investment related to research and development and subsequent knowledge creation is more relevant to long-term competitiveness. By implication, for African countries to become globally competitive, it is not sufficient for them to attract increased investment in machinery and equipment alone – there should be significant increase in technology-related investment.

Since 1975 under the successive Lomé Conventions, the EU has recognised the need for enhancing the competitiveness of African countries in order for them to take advantage of the preferential access to the EU market. The Cotonou Agreement, which provided for the negotiation of EPAs, included specific clauses addressing the competitiveness challenge facing ACP countries. Article 21.1 provides that:

Cooperation shall support the necessary economic and institutional reforms and policies at national and/or regional level, aiming at creating a favourable environment for private investment, and the development of a dynamic, viable and competitive private sector.

The only way that the EU endeavoured to support the competitiveness of participating African countries was to include technical assistance as a core element of its cooperation with beneficiary countries. Although a preparatory period (September 2002–31 December 2007), under which ACP economies would be shielded from more competitiveness in terms of products from the EU, was also provided, there were no competitiveness-enhancing interventions during the period. The draft EPAs maintain the status quo pertaining to supporting competitiveness among trading partners, despite the precedent that there has been no visible progress towards global competitiveness in most African countries in the last decade.

Achieving long-term competitiveness by African countries is a complex process, but one that is nevertheless pivotal for them to take advantage of any preferential trade that may be availed to them. It cannot be limited to simple technical assistance in the form of policy advisors. It requires the identification of potential niche areas in which particular countries have comparative advantage, acquisition of technology or development of technology needed for efficient production in the niche area(s) and developing a dynamic knowledge-based labour force

to use the technology in production processes. It is critically important to keep track of changes in technologies pertaining to identified niche areas to avoid loss of competitiveness due to technological innovations in other parts of the world. Ultimately, competitiveness requires harmonisation of trade, industrial and technology policies among African countries. Trade policy in isolation, under which EPAs fall, is a weak intervention when it comes to supporting competitiveness among African countries.

8.3 EPA Rules of Origin Constraint

According to the Kyoto Convention, Rules of Origin (RoOs) are ‘the specific provisions, developed from principles established by national legalisation or international agreements applied by a country to determine the origin of goods’.⁶ The rules stipulate conditions that a product must satisfy to be deemed as originating in the country from which preferential access to a particular country or region is being sought.⁷ In other words, RoOs define the method of establishing the ‘nationality’ of products and the basis of determining that a product has undergone sufficient working or processing in the trade partner to qualify for preferential market access.⁸ Ultimately, RoOs provide a qualitative formula to adjudicate that products being traded originate from a country covered by a particular trade agreement and hence qualify for preferential treatment.

RoOs may be preferential and non-preferential. Preferential RoOs are those that are set out under PTAs. Such preferential rules facilitate trade with developing countries by offering them a reduced or zero rate of duty on goods they export. Non-preferential RoOs, on the other hand, are laws, regulations and administrative determinations of general application applied by any country to determine whether goods qualify for preferential treatment under contractual or autonomous trade regimes. Preferential RoOs can be more restrictive than non-preferential RoOs, as they must ensure that only those goods that meet the criteria agreed upon will qualify for preferential treatment.⁹

RoOs are inevitable in any trade agreement or partnership because at the centre of every trade agreement is the offer of preferential trade treatment to products originating from countries forming part of that agreement. To avoid non-partners from taking advantage of the preferential trade treatment or to stop partners from abusing the dispensation, rules that will guide identification of a product as originating from each country have to be put in place and clearly specified.¹⁰ Without these rules, preferential trade agreement enforcement would be difficult, vulnerable to abuse and the benefit is likely to be less for the ‘partnering’ countries or regions. A key argument in support of RoOs is, as such, the avoidance of trade deflation under any PTA between regions or countries.¹¹ The rules may also serve

as policy tools for a wide range of trade policy measures, including anti-dumping and embargo enforcement, and the collection of statistics.¹² Of special interest to developing countries is that RoOs can be manipulated to achieve other objectives, which include the protection of domestic producers of intermediate goods and securing export markets. Coyle¹³ contends that RoOs can act as a means through which countries may seek to protect domestic industries from foreign competition. Overall, RoOs are a major determinant of the economic benefits that may accrue to a preferential trade agreement between countries or regions.

8.3.1 Trade concerns about EU Rules of Origin under EPAs

RoO requirements between the EU and African countries have their basis in the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000. Under the agreement, the EU offered duty-free entry to the EU market for most products coming from African countries that were wholly obtained within beneficiary countries or products obtained from beneficiary countries that had undergone sufficient working or processing, as predetermined in the agreement. Further, under the Everything but Arms (EBA) dispensation, the EU granted duty-free access to imports of all products from least developing countries with the exception of arms and ammunition, without any quantitative limitations.

The EBA dispensation did not fundamentally change the RoOs under the Cotonou Agreement. The only noticeable difference was that in the Cotonou Agreement, full cumulation could occur with any ACP country, and there was no requirement concerning value added at the final stage relative to the customs value of inputs used. Under the EBA, non-origination materials could still be used in the manufacture of a product intended for export to the EU provided that their value did not exceed 10 per cent of the ex-works price of the product.

Recently, RoOs have become even more important because of the rising number of PTAs worldwide, fragmentation of production in the globalisation era as a means of gaining production efficiency and how the architecture of such rules challenges some of the World Trade Organization (WTO) trade regulations.¹⁴ Notwithstanding their increasing importance, RoOs are often characterised by technical opaqueness, which makes it hard to quantify them. Details pertaining to the rules are frequently included as an appendix to the bilateral agreement, conveniently relegating them in the negotiation process. Brenton and Manchin¹⁵ point out that despite the rules' importance in influencing international trade, it appears that there is no process to negotiate on them, leaving out an important aspect that determines the success or otherwise of international trade.

The rules are an important trade control lever in the hand of the EU despite the seemingly good intentions of EPAs. They can even be used to divert trade

in partner African countries. Countries may be compelled to source production inputs from high-cost countries in the quest for the finished goods to qualify for EU preferential duties.

Many authors on international trade agreements have pointed out that a major difficulty faced in obtaining preferential access to the EU market relates to the RoOs that the EU attaches to all trade agreements with its 'development partners'.¹⁶ Without a change in these rules, it is very likely that envisaged trade of goods and services from Africa will remain low.

The revised RoOs in the Interim Economic Partnership Agreement (IEPA) are not significantly different from those under the previous Cotonou Agreement and EBA dispensations, although there are some changes relating to the textile and clothing sector, fisheries and particular agricultural products.¹⁷ For textiles and clothing, the revised RoOs allow the sourcing of fabric from the most competitive country without the previous restrictions to use only fabrics made locally in ACP countries. This requirement had been a significant disadvantage to African countries because of a general lack of competitively priced textile inputs in most ACP countries. Overall, the relaxing of the RoOs in the IEPA is not fundamental to allow desired flexibility for developing countries to produce products competitively for the EU market.

8.4 Funding of EPAs

Recognising the challenges that will be faced by their respective economies upon the coming into effect of the EPAs, African countries have been demanding for substantive funds to address these. Without this funding, they argue, EPAs would not be genuine development tools, as proposed by the EU.

8.4.1 Revenue losses

Under the IEPA, African countries committed themselves to gradually opening their markets to goods from the EU over a period of 25 years in three phases. The first phase was to run from 2008 to 2010, during which countries would liberalise 64 per cent of their imports from the EU. The products covered at this phase would mainly be industrial inputs and capital goods, such as machinery and pharmaceuticals. The second phase would run from 2015 to 2023. An immediate consequence of the coming into effect of EPAs would, therefore, be revenue loss as a result of duty-free import of products coming from the EU.

The extent of this revenue loss has been predicted as being significant. For example, an impact assessment study for Uganda¹⁸ undertaken in 2004 to assess the extent to which the EPAs would impact on Uganda's economy and the livelihood of

its people found that the impact of the EPAs would include, among others, revenue loss estimated at some 40 billion Ugandan shillings per annum. A related study conducted by the United Nations Economic Commission of Africa (UNECA)¹⁹ to assess the revenue loss for the East African Community (EAC) countries as a result of the EPAs is summarised in Table 8.2.

Despite potential differences in figures among the studies regarding the revenue losses, it is indisputable that African countries in general will incur fiscal revenue losses when the EPAs come into effect. Moreover, in a study by Buffie²⁰ it is suggested that the coming into effect of EPAs would also have an adverse effect on local economies in the form of de-industrialisation or contraction, lower capacity utilisation, increasing expenditure of scarce foreign exchange on imports, lower rates of economic growth and subsequently job losses and unemployment.

Table 8.2 EPAs and revenue loss to EAC countries

Country	Revenue shortfalls (USD)
Burundi	-7 664 911
Tanzania	-32 490 659
Kenya	-107 281 328
Rwanda	-5 622 946
Uganda	-9 458 170

Source UNECA, 2005. *Economic welfare impacts of the EU–Africa economic partnership agreements*

The EU is a major source of imports for many African countries and subsequently a major contributor to the continent’s revenue pool via customs duties. Extending duty-free dispensation to a larger share of EU imports will definitely lead to a loss of this important revenue source. To address this revenue shortfall, EPAs should be accompanied by adequate and readily disbursable funds, which is not the case in the IEPA.

8.4.2 EU initiatives for funding EPAs

In partial recognition of the adjustment costs of EPAs, the EU offers to provide resources to address these under the Aid for Trade, European Development Fund (EDF) and EU Budget initiatives. However, each of these funding initiatives has its limitations.

8.4.2.1 Aid for Trade

The Aid for Trade intervention was conceived outside the EPA negotiating framework. Its scope is wider than simply addressing concerns of EPA implementation.

It is, therefore, a challenge to incorporate this ‘external’ funding initiative, with already prescribed rules and procedures, into an EPA. Because Aid for Trade is a WTO initiative, its administration protocol cannot be determined by the EU alone. Neither the EU nor the African countries have exclusive control over the direction and focus of the initiative. The Aid for Trade initiative structure and operation details are determined at WTO level. There has also been a lack of clarity on the effectiveness of the Aid for Trade funding initiative in terms of its previously addressing African countries’ development challenges. The most widely cited positive outcomes of trade-related donor assistance include improved understanding of the potential contribution trade can make to development, increased awareness and knowledge of trade policy issues and strengthened national dialogue. Such achievements fall short of African countries’ expectations from the reciprocal EPAs.

8.4.2.2 European Development Fund

Since the EDF has been funding non-trade-related, but critical, services in many African countries, such as education and healthcare, there is a fear that funding EPAs under the initiative may lead to a diversion of funds from these essential services in which case trade will be supported at the cost of existing development programmes already being funded under the EDF. It is also notable that given the five-year funding cycles of the EDF, if EPAs scheduled for completion in 2010 were to be funded under the EDF, the relevant ‘EPA adjustment funds’ should already have been included in the 10th EDF, which commenced in 2008 and runs until 2013. This has not been the case.

In addition, the cost of implementing the EPAs is contested by the parties involved in negotiations. The Commonwealth Secretariat estimated that the overall EPAs’ cost of adjustment would require €9,2 billion in assistance.²¹ However, not all parties involved in the negotiations agree on the Secretariat’s figure. In addition, adjustment costs will differ from country to country, making them even more contentious. The differing views on the real cost of EPA adjustment complicate budget allocations to support EPAs under the EDF. Finally, utilisation of the EDF has been previously characterised by differences between funds allocated and actual funds released to countries, further complicating consideration of the initiative to fund EPA adjustment costs.

8.4.2.3 EU Budget

Funding EPAs under the EU Budget is the most ambiguous of the three proposals being put forward by the EU in the EPA negotiations. The European Budget channel of funding does not have a documented structure and its conception is unclear. For example, in the case of Uganda, an indication was given in the Uganda–EU

Country Strategy Paper that some activities could be funded externally by the general budget of the European Commission, subject to special procedure and availability of funds. Activities that could be funded under this dispensation could include programmes investing in people and non-state actors in development, the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources as well as food security, for which calls for proposals were made annually. Trade-related support was not mentioned. Furthermore, a qualifying statement that funds under the initiative would be made available ‘subject to special procedure and availability’ point to the fact that this funding initiative is a doubtful source for supporting EPA adjustment costs.

8.5 Conclusion and Recommendation

The proposed EPAs by the EU do not adequately cater for the continent’s progress towards global competitiveness. The RoO restrictions contained in them limit the potential of African countries to enter the EU market. The agreements are also unclear on how adjustment costs needed by the continent to take advantage of the proposed trade dispensation will be funded. EPAs, in their current form, can only serve as subtle tools to capture and control the African market by the EU against the same intentions by the US and the fast-growing Asian markets. The EU presents EPAs as development tools that will foster sustainable development and poverty eradication in Africa. There is, however, less recognition of the fact that Africa has been a recipient of preferential trade treatment by the EU since 1975, which the continent failed to benefit from. Moreover, the previous preferential treatment was non-reciprocal.

For the EPAs to benefit African countries, provisions on supporting attainment of global competitiveness, RoO restrictions and funding of related adjustment costs should be significantly changed. In particular, technology sourcing and management by African countries, liberal regional cumulation in determining product-origination status, and determination and funding of economic adjustment costs that will be necessitated by the coming into force of the agreements should form part of the final version of the EPAs. Regional groupings in Africa need to coordinate negotiations pertaining to these issues by using access to the continent’s markets, investment opportunities and resources as leverage and strategic instruments to negotiate for better terms.

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9

Chapter

From Hegemony to Cooperation: A Comparative Analysis of India and China in Africa

Sushmita Rajwar

9.1 China and Africa: Some Issues

In 1968, George Yu, a leading contributor to China–Africa research, wrote that ‘studying China in Africa is much like pursuing a dragon in the bush. The dragon is imposing but the bush is dense’.¹ The notion of the Chinese ‘dragon’ operating in the African ‘bush’ persists in much of the language and assumptions used to describe the relations between China and Africa. Mostly, the expressions used by scholars reveal a certain perception of the Chinese: the ‘dragon’ stripping the African ‘bush’ of all its historical, political and cultural heritages.² However, the Chinese–African relationship has gone far beyond this. The relationship is certainly asymmetrical, but it is not that of a dragon denuding a bush. I propose that we stop perceiving the relationship in such a monolithic way, and start thinking beyond the usual.

Although China’s engagement with Africa dates back to the 1955 Bandung Conference, the recent reinvigoration of its economic activities on the continent began in the 1990s, with an exponential increase in trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and aid. In the first half of the 1960s Beijing’s activities in Africa were particularly intensive. The key factor for change in its foreign policy was China’s diplomatic isolation following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, bringing to an end China’s ‘honeymoon’ with the West. Tiananmen Square protests were a series of demonstrations near Tiananmen led mainly by students and intellectuals, sparked by the death of pro-market and pro-democracy official, Hu Yaobang. The participants generally were against the authoritarianism of the government and voiced for economic change. The demonstrations lasted seven weeks, until the tanks had cleared Tiananmen Square, resulting in the death of at least 2 000 to 3 000 civilians. This led to wide criticism of the Chinese government by the West. Isolation was further bolstered by the collapse of the Soviet Union which positioned China as the remaining communist power. The other factor that led the Chinese leadership to steer a more active foreign policy course in the post-1989 period was the expected emergence of the uncontested international hegemony of the US which, it was feared, would hold back China’s ascendancy as a global political power.³

In order to mark its presence in Africa and compete with the multinational corporations from Western countries (especially the US), the Chinese government,

according to Alden, developed a three-point strategy based on the following: competitive political advantage – in which China was willing to invest in any of the African states, regardless of its international standing on human rights and rule of law; comparative economic advantage – in which China aggressively employed low-cost bidding based on the use of low-skilled labour; and management and diplomacy and development assistance – in which China used aggressive and intensive diplomacy and lavished African states with projects and low-interest development assistance.⁴ The result of this strategy was that over the past decade, more than 800 Chinese enterprises have operated in parts of Africa with more than US\$1,6 billion FDI in Africa in 2005 alone, and numerous infrastructure projects dotted across parts of the continent. If we look at the operation of Chinese companies in Africa today, these strategies have been well maintained by them, which makes it comfortable for unstable African governments to do business with them.

The reasons behind the Chinese–African trade boom constitute China’s drive for resource security. As the world’s second largest consumer of oil and with only limited natural resources, China was attracted to countries with relatively under-exploited petroleum deposits. China has 2,3 per cent of the world’s known oil reserves and 1 per cent of the known natural gas reserves. Thus, the first reason behind the Chinese–African trade boom is the fact that Africa is rich in terms of the natural resources required to feed Chinese industry. Second, Africa’s population of over 700 million was singled out as an enormous potential market for China’s relatively inexpensive low- and medium-grade consumer products. Third, economic reform in many African countries has opened the door to economic co-operation. And fourth, several African countries were identified as key targets for profitable long-term investments, where the emphasis was clearly on oil-producing nations and those with growing economies. China’s turning point for energy came in 1993, when it changed from a net exporter to a net importer of petroleum. Another factor that corroborated Beijing’s view that a global foreign policy had become a sheer necessity was the financial crisis in Asia in 1997, which alerted the Chinese leadership to the risks of economic interdependence as it exposed the vulnerability of the country’s outward-oriented economy to external shocks.

Apart from the above, what was most important is the One China principle, the fundamental exception to China’s ‘no-strings attached’ policy, which has seen the Chinese government use African support in its cross-Straits campaign. This was seen, for example, when China’s African allies rallied behind its Anti-Secession Law in March 2005. Formal support for the One China policy is routinely expressed in official exchanges. With the official abandonment of its claim to represent the whole of China in 1991, Taiwanese authorities began a new initiative to carve out a special status within the international community that seemed, to many

observers, to be a prelude to a declaration of independence. Accounting for almost one-third of votes in the UN, Africa retained its importance as a battleground for the struggle with Taiwan.⁵ Benefiting from its image as an emerging global power, China has been continuously winning this battle with Taiwan to establish diplomatic relations with African countries, particularly after South Africa had recognised Beijing in 1998.

9.2 China's Network with Africa

It is argued by various scholars that the Chinese presence in Africa is motivated by two main dynamics: a political and an economic one. On one hand, the desperate search for natural resources to sustain high levels of economic growth drives Chinese leaders to enter into partnership with African leaders. On the other hand, through its strong presence in Africa, China tries to avoid the recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state. China is achieving these goals through its soft power diplomacy and through principles of 'non-interference' in the internal affairs of sovereign states. By 'soft power', I mean the capacity to influence, through persuasion and not coercion, using strategies such as humanitarian aid, culture, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and also economic investment. Thus today, China is using its ideals and capacity of economic attraction to achieve its interests in Africa. By strictly following the principles of non-interference in its relationship with countries that fear international sanction, China has been continuously gaining important energy sources. For the African leaders, this collaboration is a way of escaping Western sanctions and control over the human rights and good governance issues that have long been conditions attached to agreements with the West. In this context, China seems to be an ideal partner to most of the African leaders in their strategy to resist pressure to adhere to a Western development model.

Chinese foreign policy in Africa is fed by strong internal economic and political motivations: to secure access to energy resources aimed at guaranteeing the current levels of economic growth, and to avoid the recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state and continue feeding Chinese nationalism, one of the most important factors in building national unity.

From Africa's point of view, this relationship has provided various opportunities for Africans. African governments welcome Chinese engagement because increased trade, investment, aid and debt-relief have resulted in economic opportunities and benefits – at least for the African elites. China has put Africa in the global spotlight which, in turn, is considered good for African development. Moreover, Chinese aid is an alternative to aid from Western countries and international financial organisations which Africans look upon as representing Western interests. The Chinese have the say in choosing their partners now. They have the

option to say 'no' to the Western aid that they have been receiving for decades. However, the degree to which local African manufacturers and businesses have been marginalised by the arrival of Chinese competitors is difficult to quantify. The tendency of Chinese companies to employ labour from the People's Republic of China (PRC) to work on infrastructure projects in Africa is also a contentious issue. On the basis of the literature available in English by African authors, the picture that emerges is complex. China poses both 'a tantalising opportunity and a terrifying threat'. While China's aid projects have resulted in the training of Africans in areas ranging from irrigation to malaria treatment, as well as the building of nuclear power plants and telecommunication networks, Chinese aid has also been channelled into constructing large prestige projects 'linked to the institutional interests with the state', for example foreign ministry buildings and stadiums.⁶ Scholars have also pointed out that the reason that China has been able to win major mining projects in Africa is the heavy support extended by China in various African construction projects, at comparatively low cost.

From the point of view of Western and other Asian countries, China's growing engagement in Africa constitutes competition – competition for resources, for markets, and for political and military influence in the continent. In addition, international aid organisations are wary of the promise by Chinese leaders to provide development aid 'with no strings attached' because of the fear that this undermines efforts by international organisations to promote accountability, sustainable development and environmentally sensible projects in Africa. Furthermore, Western governments have expressed concern that by providing economic, political and military support, Beijing is encouraging and legitimising regimes known for their abysmal human rights records. China–Sudan ties are a case in point, along with Zimbabwe.

Since 2000, China's trade with African countries has grown quite rapidly alongside the number of Chinese investments in Africa. China's largest trading partners in 2007 were Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Egypt and Nigeria, accounting for 58 per cent of all African trade with China in 2007. China's imports from Africa consist overwhelmingly of mineral products (80 per cent), which is mainly crude oil (71.1 per cent), while African imports from China include textiles and clothing, machinery, transport equipment, base metals and footwear. Though reliable figures for Chinese investments do not exist, the PRC Ministry of Commerce investment data for 2006 indicate a nearly six-fold increase from 2003, which clearly reflects the interests of Chinese companies on the African continent.⁷

Increased trade with China, coupled with Chinese investments, have spurred economic growth in African countries, which (excluding Zimbabwe) has been on average around 5 per cent per year since 2000. Oil, certainly, is the critical factor.

Four out of the five African countries China imports the most from (Angola, Sudan, Congo and Equatorial Guinea) sell their oil almost exclusively to China; these are also the African nations which have shown the most robust economic growth over the past decade. Of Africa's exports to China in 2007, five oil- and mineral-exporting countries accounted for 63,7 per cent. The three top countries (Sudan, Algeria and Nigeria) that China invested in during the period 2004 to 2006 were all oil producers; each recorded an average annual investment inflow of over \$50 million from China. Surprisingly, China invested less than \$5 million in most other African countries during these years.⁸

Politically, Africa has been important to China for decades because of the support by the majority of African nations for the 'One China' principle, and consequent deterrence of Taiwanese independence. As of January 2008, only four African countries maintained ties with Taipei rather than Beijing. Besides relying on the African voting bloc on all issues related to Taiwan or China's human rights record at the United Nations and its sub-organisations, Beijing relies on the African nations' support in a number of international multilateral settings.⁹

More broadly, China's increasingly close relationship with African countries reflects China's spiralling foreign policy as it strives to establish itself as a world power. Beijing's leaders do indeed want China to be regarded as a responsible stakeholder (though this term, coined by then US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in 2005, has not been adopted wholesale by China's top foreign policy officials). They recognise that a world power is expected to address the challenges and crises that afflict the international order. But at the same time the leadership is finding it increasingly difficult to deal with the demands of China's diverse national interests. In Africa, multiple contradictions coexist because the continent encompasses some of the world's most resource-rich countries, most fragile states, poorest nations, most severe humanitarian crises and most harsh regimes. While China benefits from its relationship with Africa because of the economic opportunities and diplomatic support that Africa offers, China is simultaneously running the risk of losing political capital in the international arena because of its close ties with dictator regimes and its disregard for transparency or accountability when providing aid.¹⁰

9.3 Deciphering Delhi's Mood: Politics of Fear and Enthusiasm

Historically, the main thrust of India's policy regarding Africa has been support for the struggle for decolonisation and ending racial discrimination in South Africa. It is important to stress this historical character of the relations between India and Africa to avoid any comparison with Chinese involvement in the continent. During the colonial period, India played a significant role in the freedom struggle and has been

an important component in its economy too. Currently, the scale of India's economic engagement with Africa is swiftly expanding, although it is not new. This has been facilitated by the changing African outlook in recent years. On the political side, there has been an end in sight for some of the debilitating conflicts that have ravaged the continent. India has supported various African nations in the international forums. At the same time, Africans are more interested than ever before in taking charge of their own destiny. For its part, the Indian government laid out its broad economic cooperation framework during the India–Africa Forum Summit in April 2008. This conference gained significance because of an attempt to forge a closer partnership between India and African countries and to address the common goals and challenges they face. An important aspect of India's approach towards Africa is the growing presence of the private sector in African countries. Private companies are flourishing in Africa at a great pace – for example, the Indian company Oil and Natural Gas (ONGC) Videsh Limited has a remarkable presence on the continent.

India at present does not have the financial capacity to match the grants in aid to Africa by China and the West and is left out in many of the African countries. However, India recognises and appreciates the African countries' focus on capacity-building and human resources development. In this context, Africa today is the largest recipient of India's technical cooperation programme. India's growing synergy with Africa is quite visible in the recent trade trends. Bilateral trade has increased from \$967 million in 1990/91 to \$25 billion in 2006/07. India institutionalised its relationship with African countries by launching the India–Africa Forum in April 2008. During the summit, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh announced a number of initiatives, including a duty-free trade preference scheme for 34 African countries. India has also enhanced its relations with African countries in the energy sector. Currently around 24 per cent of India's crude oil imports are sourced from Africa. Indian national oil companies like the ONGC Videsh Limited has invested in equity assets in African countries.

However, China's booming investment in Africa has generated heated debate on the African continent and elsewhere, and calls into question the sustainability of Indian companies in Africa. One of the challenges that India faces among the Western media and Western intellectuals is to mention in the same breath the Indian model of engagement with Africa and the very different Chinese economic approach to Africa.

9.4 Clash of Interests: India and China

As discussed above, India lacks the capacity to compete with China in Africa at various levels. Simultaneously, it cannot ignore the growing presence of China all over the continent, which is at loggerheads with the Indian presence. A cursory reading

of the different views on Chinese presence in the continent suggests that Africa is just another strategic context in which India will have to follow and match China's manoeuvres if it wants to keep its great power ambition intact.¹¹ In contrast to this, there are others who refuse any possible comparison with China and emphasise India's 'absolute uniqueness' and authenticity. It seems that Indian diplomats have harnessed the belief that eventually Africa will realise the cost of the Chinese development model and opt for India as their privileged partner. Both these approaches have failed to serve Indian interests in Africa and have often led to suboptimal policy-making. In fact, the above views have overlooked the fact that India simply lacks the financial and political capacity to compete with China. ONGC Videsh Limited has lost out to Chinese companies in quite a number of countries in Africa, for example, in Angola, in Nigeria and a rail project in Ethiopia.¹²

The Chinese approach is largely focused on resource extraction and necessary infrastructure, while India's economic presence in Africa is marked by the predominance of its private sector, including a significant number of small and medium enterprises.¹³ Beyond resources and infrastructure, India has carved out niches in sectors such as information and telecommunication technologies, education and health services. The Indian-sponsored Pan-African e-Network (in partnership with the African Union) links 53 countries through tele-medicine, tele-education and e-governance, and plays a crucial role in fostering skills and human resources that are critical for Africa to develop in a sustainable way. These projects require considerable investments but, in the long term, they will pay off as African countries start to recognise India's added value in contributing not only to the *quantity*, but also to the *quality* of their economic growth.

India has also moved beyond the narrow Chinese economic focus on resources in order to protect African countries from the Dutch disease – dependence on the export of natural resources and a high exchange rate that stifles the productivity and international competitiveness of the domestic industrial and services sectors. While China's economic relations with Africa are actually fuelling this perverse effect, India's business model offers healing instruments by stimulating local productivity, especially in the private sector. India should not shy away from underlining and publicising this in bilateral and multilateral settings: instead of just 'giving fish' (which has been the Chinese model) and perpetuating Africa's dependence on external powers, it is teaching the continent how to 'catch its own fish'.

In terms of security, India again has an advantage over China because of its geographical location. It is on the East African coast that India faces a specific advantage as a potential security provider. The piracy threat along the Somali and East African coast, often stretching wide across the ocean, offers the Indian Navy a superb opportunity to develop its blue-water ambitions. By keeping these crucial

sea lanes of communication and strategic chokepoints (including the Gulf of Aden and the Mozambique Channel) secure, and by developing the naval capabilities of the East African states through increased joint exercises, the creation of new listening posts and the supply of vessels, India will increase its delivery capacity and assume a strategic position, at least in the East African security context.

A final potential advantage for India resides in the cultural proximity between Africa and India. The large Indian diaspora plays a vital factor in this regard: a 2001 estimate identified close to 100 000 Indian citizens residing in Africa, with more than half in eastern and southern Africa. On top of this more recent immigrant community, there are more than one million people of Indian origin who have settled in Africa for many generations (close to one million in South Africa; 25 000 in Madagascar; 15 000 in Zimbabwe; and 8 000 in Nigeria).

China's labour diaspora that has recently settled in Africa is radically segregated and has often led to friction and protests in Africa. In comparison to this, communities of Indian origin are fully integrated and often interested in offering their business expertise as consultants to Indian investment projects. At the same time, beyond geographic proximity, India also offers a much more familiar and open society: racism against Africans in India is not uncommon, but well below the levels experienced in China. For the increasing number of African investors and students who seek opportunities abroad, English-speaking India therefore offers a much more attractive destination: an increasing number of African businessmen permanently reside in Delhi and Mumbai, and more than 10 000 African students enrol annually in Indian universities, many of them sponsored by the Indian government.¹⁴

9.5 Conclusion

Indian interests in Africa are not very different to those of the Chinese, but the approach of the two countries is vastly different, and the presence of each differs. The countries have had differing relationships with Africa: one has developed over a period of time and gone through good and bad times, while the other is a more recent phenomenon. Today, it is not only external pinches that have awakened African countries, but they themselves have realised the urgent need to sustain themselves. Therefore, we should try not to impose solutions from outside and should respect and recognise the capability and capacity of Africa itself to sustain itself in the age of globalisation. Any *just* solution for the Africans rests on the world's awareness of the fact that Africa can decide for itself.

As for India, there is a need to check its focus areas and to also understand what, when and where Africans really want to engage. The private sector involvement is really important in Africa in the present context of global interdependence. India

should also try to identify the areas in which more positive relations with African countries can be developed, such as, for example, health, medicines, education and building infrastructure. There is also a need to formulate a new policy on Africa, working along the lines of the ‘look east policy’. Finally, the comparison of India with China should be avoided but, at the same time, not overlooked.

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10

Chapter

Economic Integration in Africa: The Systems of Innovation Approach

Mario Scerri

The 2010 McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) report on the performance and prospects of African economies points to the accelerating growth rates of African economies in the first eight years of the twenty-first century, the almost seven-fold increase in foreign direct investment over the same period, as well as the rapid rate of urbanisation, as strong indications of a take-off onto a steep growth and development trajectory.¹ Combined with projections of various dimensions of the economic size and performance of the continent as a whole, Africa is placed alongside China and Brazil as a new emerging economic giant. These indicators are certainly a welcome sign of a potential break with the continent's dismal performance trajectories in previous decades and offer the hope that a take-off onto a sustainable development trajectory is now possible. However, a few cautionary notes are necessary if we are to uncover the main remaining bottlenecks and impediments in the path to sustainable long-term development.

The MGI report classifies African economies into four categories, in order of their potential for take-off: diversified economies, oil exporters, transition economies and pre-transition economies. Egypt, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia are listed in the first category and much is made of the role of these economies in leveraging the shunting of the growth and development path of the continent onto a new track of self-sustaining expansion and structural transformation. The major part of the economic growth of these countries is accounted for by the services sector (construction, banking, ICT and retailing), urbanisation is proceeding at a rapid rate and consumer spending is increasing. Because of these features, in spite of the acknowledged problems of high unit labour costs, due mostly to a skills deficit, these economies are seen as the 'growth engines' of the continent. Algeria, Angola and Nigeria are the continent's main oil and gas exporters, but are still seen as caught up in the resource trap, with a low level of diversification of their economic base. The transition economies are those such as Ghana, Kenya and Senegal, which are in the process of diversifying away from their dependence on the agricultural sector towards manufacturing. The pre-transition economic category covers countries with very low GDP per capita figures (at \$535 per annum), where the main impediment to development is posed by weak governments and public institutions, poor macro-economic performance and sustainability problems in their agricultural sectors.

The growth rates recorded in the 2000s have been spread across sectors, with growth rates in most of the services sectors exceeding those in the resources sector, and across 27 of Africa's economies. Inflation, government debt and the budget deficit as percentages of GDP all improved considerably in those economies that recorded high growth rates. Overall, the MGI report presents a continent where the performance of the leading diversified economies seems to be having ripple and demonstration effects across the continent, pulling an increasing number of African economies onto a promising development trajectory.

However, the evidence for this encouraging portrayal of the development prospects for the African continent can be read in a number of ways and through different analytical lenses. The one immediate fact that commands attention is the small number of diversified economies that are supposed to offer the model for economic development across Africa. The second is that three of these four economies are in North Africa. The third fact, emerging from recent events, is that the political economy of two of these countries has collapsed.

The question then arises as to the manner in which we interpret information and even the choice of information that is judged as relevant to the understanding of economic performance. While standard economic indicators may yield encouraging signs of economic development, a political economy perspective may perhaps enable us to understand developing economies better. One such approach is based on evolutionary economics² and the adoption of a particular version of the systems of innovation approach³ to development economics.

10.1 The Systems of Innovation Approach to Economic Development

Progressively, in the search for a new unifying framework for a 'new' development economics, innovation has come to the fore as a theoretically plausible explanation of change. The concept of national systems of innovation owes its origin to List, who argued against Adam Smith's advocacy of free trade.⁴ As economists focused increasingly on technology and innovation as prime determinants of economic dynamics, a new economic paradigm emerged. National systems of innovation are defined as networks of institutions within which innovation is developed, diffused, adapted and adopted. However, this definition is subject to a wide range of interpretations. The resurgence of interest in the nature of innovation and its role in economic change since the late 1960s arose from the residual thrown up by Solow's production function-based analysis of US productivity.⁵ The exhaustion of growth accounting exercises during the 1970s brought to the fore the limitations of neoclassical economics in the understanding of innovation and ushered in a reassessment of alternative approaches. Evolutionary economics started attracting more attention, especially with the work of Nelson and Winter,⁶ followed

by the collection of contributions edited by Dosi et al.⁷ The concept of national systems of innovation was introduced by Lundvall⁸ and Nelson⁹ at the start of the 1990s. Since then, the concept has rapidly gained a groundswell, not only within academia, but also in the arena of policy design.

While the adoption of an innovation systems approach to the analysis of change in economics has brought in a refreshingly interdisciplinary perspective, the fluidity of the concept and the difficulties encountered in pinning it down to a precise definition are possible sources of confusion. The commonly accepted definitions of national systems of innovation are

- ... the elements and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge ... and are either located within or rooted inside the borders of a nation state;¹⁰
- ... a set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative performance ... of national firms;¹¹
- ... the national institutions, their incentive structures and their competencies that determine the rate and direction of technological learning (or the volume and composition of change-generating activities) in a country;¹²
- ... the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies;¹³
- ... that set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually contribute to the development and diffusion of new technologies and which provides the framework within which governments form and implement policies to influence the innovation process. As such it is a system of interconnected institutions to create, store and transfer the knowledge, skills and artefacts which define new technologies.¹⁴

From these definitions we can see two main sources of possible confusion in the definition of the concept. The first is the nature of innovation itself. Patel and Pavitt, Freeman, and Metcalfe tie innovation to technology. Freeman's definition of innovation systems omits any definition, even by inference, of innovation. Lundvall links innovation to knowledge, with the proviso that it be 'economically useful' and, moreover, allows a slippage of the delimiters of national systems across national borders. The second definitional confusion concerns the types of institution that are considered as forming the innovation system. To a large extent, the type of institution that are considered as part of the system of innovation depends on the definition of innovation that is adopted. In this case, we can think of degrees of proximity to technological innovations as the point of reference of the numerous variations of the systems of innovation that can be conceptualised. The greater the proximity, the more specific the range of institutions to the science and technology sector. As the definition of innovation widens so too does the range of institutions

that are seen as part of the innovation system. If the science and technology sector is seen as integrated in the economy, then institutions other than those directly concerned with the generation and diffusion of technology will be included. Those institutions that affect the impact of technological change on the economy and the effect of economic policy on technological innovation would not also be included in the institutional network. If Lundvall's broader definition of innovation as the generation of new knowledge is adopted, we would then move away from the strict attachment of innovation to technology and move to a Schumpeterian definition of innovation. In the process, the institutional base relevant to this approach also broadens considerably.

There is also a wide range of informal institutions, in the form of established routines, practices and social formations, that are brought into consideration when adopting the broader definition of the system of innovation. It is here that history becomes relevant to the analysis of systems of innovation. This component of the innovation system is probably the most problematic, since the definition of informal institutions is imprecise, the effect of such institutions on the evolution of national systems of innovation is often highly complex and opaque and they are rarely as amenable to change through strategy as formal institutions. It is within the web of these informal institutions that tacit knowledge forms, and it is ultimately tacit knowledge, in a world economy where the mobility of resources is approaching zero effective cost and where most codified knowledge is free and can be transferred virtually instantly and freely, that defines the competitive advantage of nations and the specificity of their system of innovation.

The consideration of which institutions should be included as relevant to innovation depends to a large extent on the definition of the national system of innovation that is adopted, and whether it is seen as sectoral or as broadly systemic. If the grounding of innovation, even if restricted to technological innovation, is seen as lying within a broad political economy context, the category of science, technology and innovation (STI) institutions becomes wider and will include aspects of policy that are ancillary to the science and technology sector. If the concept of innovation is broad enough to encompass all change, and if systems are seen as being in a constant state of flux, then it is difficult to set the limits, or delimiters, to what can be included within the innovation domain. Therefore, for example, a decision to review state support for single-parent households holds implications for the welfare and education of children, which, in turn, has inter-generational effects on the development of the broad human capital base, which, in turn, determines the long-term development of technological capabilities, core competences and the competitive advantage of nations. This approach does make planning more difficult than one that segments the planning framework into clearly defined, and

implicitly separate, sectors. However, we could also propose that the failure of development planning can often be traced to the inability to draw out the complex interdependencies of all the facets of national systems of innovation and, consequently, to predict comprehensively the effects of particular policy initiatives.

The common focus on the higher end of the capabilities spectrum, that is scientists and engineers, research and development (R & D) laboratories, technological creativity and scientific output, tends to reflect more a system of science and technology than a system of innovation. When the range of institutions that are considered in most innovation surveys mostly reflect those that are engaged in one way or another with formal R & D, then it is possible that a distorted picture of the system of innovation may be presented. In developed industrialised countries, this distortion may not necessarily be problematic, since we can reasonably assume that the requisite institutional context is stable and suited for the translation of science and technology activity into economic prosperity. In the case of developing economies, on the other hand, we cannot make this assumption about the transmission mechanism linking technological performance with economic development so easily. So, for example, the pursuit of some goal regarding the spending on R & D as a proportion of GDP as the benchmark for STI planning may, in the absence of appropriate sets of complementary policies, have little or no effect on the development process. In fact, the isolated pursuit of such an objective may set up a misleading diagnostic of the health of a particular system of innovation. It can also prove to be a poor indicator of the nature and extent of innovation in developing economies. For example, the relationship between innovation activity that is captured by formal institutions, such as R & D laboratories and universities, and informal innovation may be such that too excessive a focus on formal institutions may seriously underestimate innovation activity.

The spread of STI institutions across Africa is quite uneven, and probably becomes more so as the category of institutions that we consider as relevant widens. We can, therefore, map this distribution at several levels of inclusivity, until possibly we end up mapping the entire spectrum of economic institutions of specific countries. As the complexity of our institutional mapping increases, so would the probability of unevenness in the institutional map of the continent. As the definition of which policies are relevant to the evolution of systems of innovation grows, so does the level of complexity of the interaction among policies and the higher would be the degree of differentiation among systems of innovation across Africa.

If the theoretical base for the understanding of economies and the development process shifts from orthodox, neoclassical economics to the political economy framed within an evolutionary articulation, the identification of the economic 'fundamentals' shifts accordingly. From within an innovation-systems perspective, the

fundamental determinants of the long-term structural transformation process that is required for sustainable development that engenders an equitable enhancement of the quality of life of the population relate more to the appropriate conditions for the development of the broad-based human capital base of the economy. From this perspective, fiscal and monetary policies become the supporting policy tools for this long-term process. In this case, it may well be decided that appropriately planned and implemented redistribution would take precedence over growth-driven policy options. The development of sound governance, of a healthy and participatory civil society and the fostering of an economic, as well as constitutional, democracy would be brought to the foreground in the planners' canvas, drawn in as legitimate tools of economic policy instead of being relegated to the spheres of social and administrative policy.

From this perspective, the structural adjustment programmes imposed on Africa by the World Bank and the neo-liberal macroeconomic paradigm adopted by the post-apartheid state placed the immediate exigencies of the fiscal and monetary sectors, with an emphasis on fiscal discipline and inflation targeting, at the forefront of economic policy. In this case, economic policy ceased to be development policy, in that it abjured the type of structural transformation required to shunt the growth trajectory of African systems of innovation onto the path of sustainable development. The pre-eminence of conventional fiscal and monetary policies and the sidelining of other, more developmentally oriented policy areas have failed to engender the required rupture with the colonial past. Instead, they have perpetuated a continuity of dependence from colonialism to a neocolonial relationship, masked as the postcolonial state. The last term is often used with the implication of commonalities, or even homogeneity, among previously occupied territories, a situation that is at odds with the range of diversity among the nation-states that emerged after the Second World War. It is this diversity that is reflected in the successful development scenarios of various types and degrees, and those of failed development, mostly within Africa and western Asia. The successful development stories have been associated almost inevitably with those cases where the support of human capital development, in its various forms, was at the centre of policy. This is where international competitiveness was based on productivity gains rather than overtly cheap labour. The conventional tools of economic policy in such countries have consistently been used in a supportive manner in a long-term programme of sustainable development.

The requirements of the modern learning economy, as the basis for the successful evolution of the system of innovation, require a shift of policy focus away from the standard bag of macroeconomic policy tools. The focus has to move to those areas of policy that directly affect the conditions under which the institutional


context within which human and social capital growth can be secured. In this sense, distribution issues and sustainable programmes of poverty alleviation assume priority in the ranking of policy tools.

One of the earliest debates in development economics concerned the priorities assigned to economic sectors when it came to investment allocation and the application of stimulus packages. The debate boiled down to the two camps of balanced and unbalanced growth approaches to the ‘big push’ theory of economic development. Although both sides of the debate agreed that an incremental policy was unlikely to lift underdeveloped economies out of low-level equilibrium poverty traps, their proposals for the deployment of resources to implement the ‘big push’ were diametrically opposite. The balanced growth proponents focused on the interdependence of sectors, especially in terms of consumption power, within a closed economy framework. Those who advocated the unbalanced approach, on the other hand, started off with the assumption of limited resources, not the least of which were decision-making capabilities (Hirschman’s ability to invest), and advocated the ‘big push on a narrow front’ with priorities assigned on the basis of industrial linkages and potential spillover and multiplier effects. This early approach to the prioritisation of state intervention has been refined to reflect the increasing rapidity of techno-economic paradigm shifts that make it increasingly difficult to predict future states on the basis of current ones. Moreover, it is increasingly acknowledged that over-reliance on existing inter-industry linkages, which has led to the increasing popularity of cluster analysis, may sometimes lock economies into industrial development paths that reproduce current structures. Often what is needed when assigning development priorities is an exercise in ‘imagining the future’, as exemplified in foresight planning.

The narrow definition of systems of innovation ties the concept down to science and technology, and, as such, relegates this area to a subsystem of the economy. A broader approach widens the definition of innovation to include institutional change and expands the notion of institutions to cover not only a wide array of formal institutions that affect innovation, but also informal institutions in the form of established routines and practices. The various elements of the broad and narrow approaches to systems of innovation, and their relation to each other, are depicted in Figure 10.1, taken from Cassiolato and Lastres.

The narrow version of the systems of innovation concept, which focuses on formal science and technology, implies that systems of innovation are planned and can be created through planning. Conversely, in the absence of planning these systems do not exist. From this perspective, most African economies that lack formal public or private science and technology institutions of much significance would be seen as lacking a national system of innovation.

Figure 10.1 The narrow and the broad perspectives on the national system of innovation



Source Cassiolato, J.E. & Lastres, H., 2008. Discussing innovation and development: Converging points between the Latin American school and the innovation systems perspective? *GLOBELICS Working Paper Series 08-02*, p. 10.

The broad version, on the other hand – with its expanded definition of innovation and inclusion in its definition of institutions to incorporate socially constructed routines and practices – sees the national system of innovation as existing, whether planned or not, as long as the sovereignty of the state is assured. From this perspective, the role of planning is to try to shape the evolution of the national system of innovation in order to enhance its ability to achieve the development imperatives of the country. We accept the national system of innovation as a given and look at its viability within the context of economic flux and development.

10.2 Viability of Systems of Innovation

The viability of systems of innovation can be assessed in terms of the potential of these systems for their own reproduction, growth and evolution.¹⁵ Viable systems are those whose structure can reproduce and grow, but also, increasingly, react rapidly to the accelerating rate of change in the global political economy. These are systems that tend to have diversified economic bases and an appropriate and flexible institutional base. These dynamic systems exhibit a wide range of core competences and demonstrable competitive advantage based on value-added

production. From this perspective, most African systems of innovation are not viable and have not, for various reasons, mostly historical, attained the threshold levels of the complex sets of preconditions for sustainable viability. There have been numerous approaches to understanding the economic development of the African continent, rooted in different disciplines and combinations of disciplines. Except in the most anaemic of economic analysis, history has always entered into the analysis of the generally admitted parlous state of most African economies. There is a general feeling that more than anywhere else in the developing world, Africa is still caught up in the chains of its colonial history. One reason for this, which is commonly accepted, is that the very existence of modern African states is the result of the ersatz apportionment of the continent by the colonial powers in the nineteenth century.

We can perhaps go even further and propose that the colonial creation of African countries, and eventually states, in combination with the fact that Africa mostly missed out on the developmental opportunities offered by the pre-liberalised global context of protectionism, implies that the prospects for the viability of individual African national systems of innovation are poor. Cooke et al. point out, following Gellner and others, that a state is usually composed of several nations, each with its own ethnic specificities, however these may be defined, which are often manifest in different informal, and perhaps formal, institutional networks, which often determines different economic and industrial development paths.¹⁶ Modern viable national systems of innovation have usually over time successfully resolved the sources of conflict inherent in the multinational state.¹⁷ Moreover, viability has often been gained within a protectionist environment, which allowed for a successful application of List's 'infant industry' strategy.

From within the broad version of the systems of innovation approach, the core of the system is based on the availability and deployment of broad-based human capital. The usage of the concept of human capital within the context of systems of innovation requires a definition of the term. Within this analytical framework the definition of human capital is far removed from the neoclassical full information optimising model of human behaviour. This rightly draws a Marxist critique on a number of levels, especially in its commodification of labour, its exclusion of social formation and power, and its inference that in competitive markets labour is paid the equivalent of its marginal revenue product.¹⁸ From the perspective of innovation theory, human capital is assumed to be a less than perfectly known composite datum, including social capital, which is relatively open to a multitude of determinants. Human capital formation is similarly a process that is not subject to full specification. It is a social process that also serves to reinforce existing power relations through socialisation and the internalisation of norms and values. It is a complex process – both overt,

as in the explicit skills transmission of education, and covert, as is the case with the more subtle forms of socialisation – and has to be contextualised in space and time in order to allow an understanding of its specificities. The introduction of this concept also allows for an engagement with the heterogeneity of labour and the different abilities of the different fractions of wage earners to reduce the surplus value of their work that would have been appropriated by capital.

Human capital is essentially a public good, given that it holds large potential externalities and only a small portion of its returns can be captured by the individual and they are usually outweighed by the returns on human capital to the economy as a whole. This high externalities content is usually present in viable systems with the appropriate institutional context for the effective deployment of human capital. Where the institutional framework is deficient, brain and skills drains are often evident, as well as the deployment of human capital into antisocial activity in the form of organised crime and widespread corruption. Given that human capital is a dynamic concept, the result of streams of investment contending with depreciation and obsolescence, there is always the danger that human capital formation may fall below specific thresholds, rendering it impossible to reproduce its base, let alone develop it. The abnegation of the state as the main source of human capital formation means that the returns on human capital will then tend to be mainly private, with little or no spillovers to the economy at large.

Human capital is a complex phenomenon. Its formation is the result of a convergence of various elements, including education, health, secure basic needs provision and a secure base of social capital. Using neoclassical language, we could say that human capital formation is a production process with several inputs that can be combined in different ways to produce a complex output. The effectiveness of any single input is highly dependent on the other inputs. Therefore the effectiveness of public spending on education, for example, is strongly dependent on the availability of the other inputs.

Human capital development is the result of a long-term investment process requiring a stable, guaranteed environment. The extent of the outlay on this long-term investment, combined with its high externalities content, requires state intervention on a wide front, which covers much more than education. The long-term nature of this investment requires a set of stability conditions that would guarantee long-term planning horizons. Although the specifics of the location of human capital formation is often contingent on cultural, political and economic factors, it is generally the family unit, however that is defined, that is the main formative context for human capital. The stability conditions of the average family would, therefore, have to be guaranteed and protected from the vagaries of economic fluctuations in order to protect the source of this, the most important

economic resource. From this perspective, a welfare system that guarantees adequate housing, healthcare, food and education should be seen not only as a right of the country's citizens, but also as a basic requirement for the country's development. The failure of adequate state provision in this area will result in human capital formation becoming more of a private good, belonging to the privileged few, since human capital formation is normally too costly a process for all but the wealthier families to bear and certainly much too costly, given the externalities, to be provided by the private sector. The responsibility for a country's human capital formation thus lies fundamentally with the state.

The conditions for viability, therefore, emerge from an understanding of the core components of the national innovation system concept. The particular definition of innovation that is adopted as relevant immediately identifies, through its emphasis on specific aspects, the context within which it is being applied. The less viable the innovation system, the more all-embracing has to be the definition of innovation. This relationship between the broadness of definition and the stage of development of innovation systems also applies to institutions. In less developed systems the implicit institutions that govern economic relationships cannot be assumed as given and suitable for the attainment of viability. Finally, the foundation on which the integrity of the national innovation system concept is premised is the effectively uncontested nation-state.

10.3 Viability Conditions for African National Systems of Innovation

The possibilities for viable innovation systems in Africa have been seriously compromised by the history of the development of nation-states within the region. Most of the modern African states were an ersatz colonial creation whose subsequent independence was marked by the colonial demarcation of borders. The Cold War period also helped to stunt the evolution of African systems of innovation with often extremely authoritarian regimes propped up by one or other of the Cold War superpowers.¹⁹ The crippling foreign debt burdens and the effects of structural adjustment programmes imposed by international financial institutions have further constrained the policy space of African economies.

The development of human capital and the emergence of core competences are further compromised by the modern increasingly integrated global economy. The relationship between labour and capital in most African economies is often distorted by high unemployment rates, weakened labour unions and the labour cost requirements to attract foreign investment, further weakening the bargaining power of labour and depressing its prospects for upward mobility.

Human capital formation has consequently become the main bottleneck in the formation of viable innovation systems. Armed conflict, the displacement of

populations, foreign debt and structural adjustment programmes all contribute to a degradation of the human capital base. The delayed process of effective political and economic democratisation and the endemic corruption of administrative structures whose main *raison d'être* is a crude form of accumulation further dispossess whole populations across the continent of a sustained human capital formation process. The spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases, such as TB, malaria and cholera, all of which are correlated to poverty and the inability to address poverty, have exacerbated the erosion of the human capital base of the continental labour force. Wars and economic conditions have caused large ongoing migration of skilled labour across national borders. These factors have considerably shortened the planning time horizon for human capital investment.

Scerri points out that it is


... useful to focus on human capital formation as the nexus of the symptoms of ailing innovation systems within the region and consequently as the prime yardstick of the effectiveness of policies which affect the prospects for systems. There is within the region a recognition that the obstacles to the development of innovation systems require a direct and overt direction by the state. Thus the recommendations of a report quoted in the IDRC study²⁰ points to a '... need for the state to display a more interventionist role in the underdeveloped countries than in the industrialised ones. Implicitly what is being argued for is a set of national systems of innovation with the state actively laying down the regulatory, physical, human and social infrastructure.' Emphasis is placed on an overt interventionist role of governments in the fostering of broad-based human capital development in order to increase absorptive capacity.²¹

Even so, however, the narrow base of most African economies still imposes a severe constraint on the evolution of individual national systems of innovation. Coming back to the findings of the MGI report, we can argue that the potential for self-sustaining economic development on the continent can best be served through a process of economic integration. From the systems of innovation approach we can translate this as the shift away from national to continental systems of innovation where complementarities and economies of scale and scope can be exploited and developed within a framework of mutual benefit across regions.

The current state of human capital development in Africa with respect to the rest of the world and within Africa across countries and regions can be reasonably represented by mapping levels of the Human Development Index (HDI), as shown in Figure 10.2.

Figure 10.2 illustrates two striking facts. The first is that the continent as a whole exhibits the worst levels of HDI globally. The second is the disparities in

Figure 10.2 World map of the Human Development Index



Source United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/map/> (accessed 10/4/2012).

this measure of economic success within the continent. In North Africa only Morocco has an HDI value lower than 0,6 whereas in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding Mauritius and Seychelles), only South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Gabon show an HDI higher than 0,6.

10.4 Prospects for an African Continental System of Innovation

Regional economic integration across Africa has not as yet been significant. Intra-African trade in manufacturing commodities is still low, with South Africa being notable with 17 per cent of its manufactured output sold to other countries within southern Africa. By contrast, trade among North African economies represents

Table 10.1 African exports (USD millions): 2000–2007

	Year								Average 2001–2007
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	
A	12 044	11 438	13 130	15 603	19 196	23 215	28 050	35 573	19 781
B	153 435	134 841	141 167	173 467	222 532	286 063	347 875	400 906	232 536
C	2,4	2,2	2,2	2,3	2,4	2,7	2,9	2,9	2,5
D	7,8	8,5	9,3	9,0	8,6	8,1	8,1	8,9	8,5
Legend: A = Intra-African exports; B = African exports to world; C = Africa's share in total world exports (%); D = Intra-African exports as a share of African exports to the world (%)									

Source United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2009. *Developments in intra-African trade*, p. 2.

Table 10.2 African imports (USD millions): 2000–2007

	Year								Average 2001–2007
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	
A	11 631	12 466	13 224	15 572	20 994	24 854	31 660	39 565	21 246
B	13 3416	129 508	144 445	176 929	232 189	273 509	329 785	418 931	229 839
C	9	10	9	9	9	9	10	9	9
D	6 653 669	6 414 806	6 664 703	7 771 121	9 462 990	10 776 488	12 337 928	14 056 584	9 267 286
E	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	2
Legend: A=Intra-African imports; B= African imports from the world; C=Share of intra-African imports to Africa's total imports (%); D= Worldimports; E=Share of Africa's imports in world imports (%)									

Source United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, *Developments in Intra-African trade* (2009)

only 2 per cent of manufacturing output.²² Tables 10.1 and 10.2 further demonstrate the low levels of intra-African trade.

The performance of economic blocs as a force for economic integration across Africa is also quite poor, in spite of the longevity of most of these blocs. This is shown by the trade flows depicted in Table 10.3.

On the other hand, the glaring fact that less than 10 per cent of all trade requirements are catered for internally within the continent indicates an opportunity for a considerable expansion of internal trade, provided that the diversification of the production base is pursued as a programme across the continent, rather than within national borders.

This second feature shown in Figure 10.2, namely the disparities in economic performance between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, should introduce a note of pragmatic caution in the pursuit of effective economic integration and the development of regional innovation systems within the continent. An argument can be made for a two-step approach in this integration programme, which focuses on North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa as two distinct regions. These two regions can be seen as fundamentally distinct on a number of levels. In the first place, the history of the colonisation of these two regions is quite different. On a general level we can propose that colonisation in North Africa was largely for strategic reasons, owing to the imperial imperative to control the Mediterranean trade and military space. Colonisation in sub-Saharan Africa was, apart from a few exceptions, such as the Cape, mostly extractive and driven by the presence of vast mineral resources and the slave trade. In the postcolonial era, we can also discern a dual political focus. In the case of North Africa, this focus is on a pan-Arabic identity and on the unresolved Palestinian question. In the case of sub-Saharan

Table 10.3 Intra-African trade by economic grouping, 2008

Economic grouping	AMU	CAEMC	COMESA	ECCAS	ECOWAS	Franc Zone	SADC	WAEMU	Africa	World
Imports in <==== from (%)	(% of Total imports)									
AMU	4,8	0,2	1,7	0,2	0,9	0,8	0,1	0,6	6,7	100
CAEMC	1,2	2,6	0,6	3,2	2,6	3,7	1,0	1,1	7,6	100
COMESA	1,8	0,1	3,7	1,0	0,2	0,2	2,7	0,1	7,4	100
ECCAS	0,5	0,9	1,2	1,3	0,9	1,3	7,8	0,4	10,5	100
ECOWAS	0,5	1,3	0,2	1,5	7,4	5,6	2,0	4,3	11,2	100
Franc Zone	1,1	1,5	0,5	1,9	9,8	6,5	0,9	5,1	13,3	100
SADC	0,2	0,1	6,0	1,9	1,2	0,4	9,8	0,2	12,4	100
WAEMU	1,0	1,0	0,5	1,4	12,9	7,8	0,9	6,8	15,9	100
Africa	1,6	0,5	3,0	1,2	2,3	1,7	3,7	1,2	9,3	100
Exports >==== to (%)	(% of total exports)									
AMU	2,5	0,1	1,2	0,1	0,6	0,5	0,1	0,4	3,9	100
CAEMC	0,3	0,8	0,2	1	0,9	1,3	0,3	0,5	2,4	100
COMESA	1,6	0,1	4,3	1,1	0,2	0,2	3,1	0,1	8	100
ECCAS	0,1	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,4	0,5	2,9	0,2	4	100
ECOWAS	0,3	1,4	0,2	1,6	8	5,9	2,1	4,6	11,7	100
Franc Zone	0,7	1,2	0,4	1,5	7,9	5,3	0,7	4,1	10,5	100
SADC	0,3	0,1	6,1	1,9	1,2	0,4	9,9	0,2	12,7	100
WAEMU	1,9	2,1	1,1	3,1	28,3	17,1	2	14,9	34,4	100
Africa	1,2	0,4	2,8	1,2	2,3	1,6	3,5	1,2	8,5	100

Source UNECA, 2010. African Statistical Yearbook 2010, p. 65.

Africa, the focus is largely on the enduring political and economic instability of the postcolonial heritage of dependency. One possible implication of this is that the endeavour to start off with a continental programme of economic integration and the development of a continental system of innovation may be politically futile. A more feasible integration agenda may be to look at the prospects for integration, paying attention to the historical specificities of the two regions, on a dual front, with continental integration as a longer-term part of the programme.

Even so, given the current state of fragmentation of the two regions, the prospects for integration are poor if we think along a linear progression. Theoretically, the case for the necessity of a regional system of innovation is quite clear. It is also clear, however, that left to itself, the development trajectory of the political economies in the two regions will not lead to an integrated system of innovation. The successful pursuit of the integration agenda, therefore, boils down to what we may call an exercise of ‘imagining the future’, contingent on a continental political will to break with the colonial definition of the African map. The formation of the European Union provides a historical precedent for this possibility. The economic rationale for the establishment of an integrated European economy was virtually non-existent in the immediate post-war period. The drive was rather the political imperative to avoid the re-emergence of historical divides which could lead to another European war. The now evident economic rationale for the union followed the political determination. In the case of Africa, the reverse could be true. The dire straits of the political economies across the continent have to push the political will towards integration.

10.5 Conclusion

This imperative for political will as the driver of the evolution of a regional system of innovation in Africa is explicitly acknowledged in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) document, which states in its introduction that

the resources, including capital, technology and human skills, that are required to launch a global war on poverty exist in abundance, and are within our reach. What is required to mobilise these resources and to use them properly, is bold and imaginative leadership.²³

And that ‘today, the weak state remains a major constraint to sustainable development in a number of countries’.²⁴

This statement is reminiscent of Hirschman in its identification of political will and decision-making capacity as the crucial scarce resource in the development process.²⁵ It identifies the fundamental judicial, political and social preconditions for the establishment of a viable regional innovation system. This is a political will

that requires the determination and power to override the vested power concentrations that were entrenched by the history of colonialism in Africa.

To come back to the MGI report's statistical comparison of the African continent to China and Brazil, I would like to draw attention to the anomaly that has been thrown up by the extension of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) group to include South Africa (now BRICS). The addition of South Africa to this grouping has raised sceptical voices about the incongruence of an economy of South Africa's size, in terms of population and GDP, with the other countries in the group. The counter-argument to this objection has been that South Africa comes in, as it were, as the entry to Africa and it is here that the size comparison between the whole continent and some of the BRICS economies is valid. There are, however, limits to the extent to which this argument can be carried. These limits have been obliquely explored in this chapter. The argument for South Africa as somehow representing the continental economy on the BRICS forum can only hold water if the economic integration that is here proposed, as a prerequisite for the economic viability of what we may call the 'continental system of innovation', were effective. In the absence of this integration, Africa will still be a collection of 53 disparate and largely ailing political economies. The proposed size comparison of Africa as a whole to China, India, Russia or Brazil can only be valid if there is an equivalent unified coordinating mechanism on the continent. This ideal of the NEPAD and AU mission is, in this context, the unstated condition for the logic of the expansion of BRIC to BRICS. Should this condition be attained, BRICS would be more legitimately be termed BRICA.

The political economy of Africa has been generally formed by the strategies of extraversion,²⁶ which have supported crude accumulation regimes significantly independent on local revenue streams. As Bayart points out:

... Africa has a tendency to export its factors of production in raw form, whether in terms of the working capacity which it exports in the form of migration, or the agricultural or mineral resources which it exports in either formal or informal systems, or the capital which it expatriates in the form of flight capital and, more rarely perhaps, as debt repayment. The people who manage this unequal relationship with the international economic system are able to derive from it the resources necessary for their domestic overlordship.²⁷

This is perhaps the single most significant obstacle to the development of viable African national systems of innovation. It poses a formidable obstacle to the emergence of the requisite political will required for the attainment of the NEPAD objectives. From this perspective, the move towards a regional system of innovation, with the concurrent weakening of national systems, may enable the start

of a process of introversion and the development of more complex accumulation regimes associated with increasingly diversified economies marked by burgeoning indigenous production and consumption capacities. Ironically, the weakening of the national systems of innovation in the evolution towards the regional one may serve to enhance the legitimacy of the state and to strengthen it. It may be the vehicle for the transition from coercive and permissive social contracts to a prevalent productive model of the social contract,²⁸ which is one of the more solid guarantees of the long-term sustainable viability of innovation systems.

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- 25 Hirschman, A.O., 1958. *The strategy of economic development*. Yale University Press.
- 26 Defined as '... the creation and the capture of a rent generated by dependency and which functions as a historical matrix of inequality, political centralisation and social struggle ...'. See Bayart, J.F., 2000. Africa in the world: A history of extraversion. *African Affairs*, 99, pp. 217–267, 222.
- 27 Bayart, 2000. Africa in the world, p. 231.
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11.1 Questions of Legitimacy

In the first years of the twenty-first century, well over a decade after the formal demise of apartheid, one of the startling features in the institutional set-up of most of southern Africa would certainly be the strong implantation of traditional institutions. In contradistinction to other parts of Africa, this is true not only in terms of their social importance but also on account of the rather secure and prominent position these institutions are accorded within the constitutional framework of most, if not all, states in the region.

At first sight, this observation seems rather surprising, particularly in a medium- or long-term perspective. In various ways, colonial regimes have adapted, remodelled and coopted traditional institutions, or even contributed towards the creation or formation of completely new ethnic clusters along with the relevant structures of power and leadership. Such institutions, considered by many as prerequisites of tribalism, can be shown as having been, to a large extent, ‘invented’ in the course of colonisation and by the practice of colonial rule.¹ Colonial dispensations used the guise of traditional institutions to deny political and civic rights to Africans, claiming that patriarchal rule was ingrained in African culture, even if the colonial governor or administrator was styled as paramount chief of all ‘natives’ in a given territory. In South Africa and in Namibia under South African rule, for instance, the chief even was given the right to dissolve or create tribes.² In this way, contrary to some of its claims, indirect rule was anything but a conservative measure and in fact spelled considerable upheaval for large parts of the population.

Further down the timeline, the apartheid regime radicalised this general approach in a giant feat of social and ethnic engineering. The strategy of ‘grand apartheid’ involved the cooption of traditional leaders, but in some cases also the ousting of those who resisted, usually followed by a more amenable replacement. Such resistance should not be underestimated when discussing the longer-term trajectory of traditional leadership in the region. This refers, besides celebrated cases such as Paramount Chief Dalindyebo of the Thembu in South Africa, also to an array of leaders in Namibia, and in particular in the southern region of the country.

Nevertheless, the resurgence of chieftaincy after the attainment of majority rule in South Africa has given rise to a debate concerning the actual support for

traditional leaders as well as the strategies that helped to insert them into the democratic dispensation,³ their illegitimate power based on their assumed rights over land,⁴ and the dynamics of dispensations that seek to negotiate the challenges of institutional pluralism.⁵ All these developments revolve around the issues of the legitimacy accorded to traditional leaders and/or the institutional dispensations of the democratic constitution. This is not limited to South Africa, but can be seen as a common trait in the southern African region, albeit with clear variations.

In this chapter, I would like to relate a longer-term trajectory of legitimacy of traditional institutions with the current issues touched upon here in an introductory fashion. To do so, I give some structural background on the very specific situation in southern Namibia and then detail aspects of resistance during late apartheid which, in Namibia, is usually associated with the armed liberation struggle of the 1970s and 1980s. I then turn to observations that concern developments after Namibia attained its independence in 1990.

11.2 Traditional Communities in the Aftermath of Genocide

For central and southern Namibia, the wars of anti-colonial resistance of 1903 to 1908 and the genocidal campaigns staged by the German colonial *Schutztruppe* at the time set the stage for structural change at a very deep level. In particular, the wholesale expropriation of most of the indigenous groups involved in the war from their land, along with the physical extermination of more than half of the population, cleared the scene for a sweeping reordering of spatial structure and property relations throughout the region. The German 'native ordinances' stipulated that all 'insurgent' ethnic groups would lose their land, which was converted into crown land and opened up for white settlement, preferably by Germans.⁶ The consequences of this policy, which can be understood as a kind of proto-apartheid, are still visible in a countryside mostly emptied of settlements and characterised by large commercial farms.

Under German rule, further policy stipulations were designed to prevent any reorganisation of indigenous communities. Africans were meant to be converted effectively into a cheap, readily available, and above all, atomised labour force. To this end, the colonial power envisaged large-scale removals of population which, however, were only partly implemented. Still, an important centre in the south, such as Gibeon, the traditional capital of the Witbooi group (/Khowesin), was devoid of Nama speakers for some years while Ovaherero from the centre were settled there by force.⁷ Plans to deport Ovaherero as far as German Samoa did not materialise, while groups of Nama were deported to Togo and Cameroon, in the latter instance, as late as 1911.

At the same time, since this policy did not encompass the entire territory, but left out the heavily populated northern areas, a bifurcation in the form of colonial rule as well as in social structure was instituted which persists today. Whereas the

aptly termed Police Zone in the south and centre was targeted for white settlement, the regions known as Owambo, Kaoko and Kavango as well as the Caprivi Strip in the north were, in effect, not subject to effective control under German colonialism.

11.3 South African Reserve Policy and Communal Resilience in Central and Southern Namibia

Many black Namibians hoped that the defeat of the Germans and the occupation of the country by the South African army in 1915 would open up the path for redress of the wrongs and losses they had suffered during the previous three decades.⁸ Such expectations were disappointed almost instantly. South African policy in Namibia was set on ‘annexation in all but in name’, as Prime Minister Jan Smuts worded it.⁹ During a brief period of ‘tentative liberalism’¹⁰ shortly after the occupation, and while the new regime was still consolidating its grip, people had been able to relocate to their former home regions in ‘a spontaneous drift to traditional centres’.¹¹ Frequently, they were also in a position to keep their herds on unused land, sometimes in the way of informal reserves.

However, these manoeuvring spaces were restricted swiftly once South Africa had formally received the League of Nations mandate over the territory, which it used to pursue its own ends. Decisively, such ends included white settlement. The influx of settlers encompassed in particular ex-servicemen and poor whites, later supplemented with Angola Boers.¹² Enhanced white settlement drove home the consequences of the structural and legal reordering of space effected after the genocide, two decades before. Africans were regimented to serve as a labour reservoir. This was also the main purpose of the one major departure that affected Africans. Whereas under the German dispensation, the great majority of Africans had been denied access to land in the Police Zone, with the exception of a few territories, the new administration set out to create a system of ‘native reserves’.

As stated officially early on, the administration considered ‘native policy’ as ‘synonymous with the labour question’.¹³ Consequently, the 1921 report of the Native Reserves Commission¹⁴ called for a quite specific reserve dispensation in the zone of white settlement. The northern regions were subjected to more intensive colonial control than before, which basically conformed with the practice of indirect rule in British Africa and was geared towards mobilising male migrant labour for the settler economy.¹⁵

In keeping with the basic provisos of ‘native policy’, the reserves created in the south and the centre were situated in marginal areas wherever possible, to ensure effective segregation. They were explicitly not meant to provide a basis for the sustenance of African communities. Rather, the reserves were meant to serve as labour reservoirs, where the families of migrant workers would live and where old people

would spend the rest of their days. It should be borne in mind that notwithstanding that the administration saw the main function of the reserves as reservoirs of labour, the great bulk of migrant workers was increasingly mobilised from the northern regions outside the Police Zone, while the central and southern reserves played a lesser role, often supplying more short-term labour for seasonal farm work.

In keeping with the overall reserve policy, control of the southern and central reserves by superintendents, later styled welfare officers (*welsynsbeampste*), was rather strict, in particular where stock numbers, grazing fees as well as other taxes, and the mobilisation of the labour force were concerned. In turn, these local agents of the state were closely controlled by the Native Department in Windhoek. Finally, these reserves were formally severed from ethnic or tribal identities.

The trappings of self-administration in the form of headmen and councillors appointed by the colonial authorities, therefore, bore no formal relation to traditional communities. The Native Reserves Commission acted on the premise that 'unbroken tribes' no longer existed in the Police Zone.¹⁶ The African functionaries of the reserve administration were treated as lowly assistants of the superintendent, and the right of admission was vested in the administration.

Nevertheless, on an informal level the reserves were important mainstays for the resilience of ethnic groups which had begun to reorganise, even under German rule, in rudimentary ways. Now Ovaherero as well as Nama clearly articulated collective identities and aspirations. Traditional leaders filled the administrative posts, but the informal, traditional hierarchies were not congruent with those ordained by the colonial authorities. Significantly, the latter refused to recognise chiefs or *kapteins* within the Police Zone, insisting they had appointed only headmen. In this way, salient figures such as Herero Paramount Chief Hosea Kutako or consecutive *kapteins* of the Witbooi group were appointed as 'headmen' of small and marginal reserves.¹⁷ For the colonial authorities, this served as an additional lever of control, since such appointments also implied the obligation to reside in such reserves rather than in Windhoek.¹⁸ At the same time, the appointment of traditional leaders with standing in their communities to positions within the reserve system can be understood as a systematic attempt to harness the legitimacy enjoyed by traditional elites. As will be seen, such endeavours were not always successful.

The way traditional communities could refer to a reserve as their communal home area was thus ambivalent at best. While the large reserves created in the eastern part of central Namibia, in particular Waterberg and Epukiro, belonged, albeit somewhat ambiguously, to Ovaherero, the position was much less clear in southern reserves such as Krantzplatz in the vicinity of Gibeon. This had been created after prolonged controversy since its position gave returned the Witbooi a chance to live near their traditional capital and church; still, inhabitants belonged to Damara and Herero identities

as well as to Nama or Witbooi, and the authorities claimed the right to determine who was entitled to reside in the area. In sum, reserve residents, as well as the traditional leaders who became office holders within the reserve system, found themselves in a profoundly subaltern position, frequently at the whim of administration officers who aggressively asserted their superior status and power to command.

Against this backdrop, it may almost appear as a paradox that the reserves still played an important role in the processes of communal resilience that began to be articulated openly during the 1920s. In 1923, on the occasion of the burial of Paramount Chief Samuel Maharero, a new and resuscitated Herero identity was openly displayed.¹⁹ The anniversary of this burial has been observed ever since, in the form of Herero Day ceremonies at Okahandja, late in August every year. A similar communal memory event was instituted shortly after this: the Herero White Flag Day, observed annually at Omaruru, to commemorate their late chief Willem Zeraua.²⁰ In a roughly parallel development, the Witbooi leadership began to mark the date when the legendary *Kaptein* Hendrik Witbooi had died in action during the Nama–German war in 1905.²¹

For all their differences, these events which started to evolve under the watchful and often distrustful eyes of the South African administration, combined appeals to the ancestors with rehearsals of communal history. These were sustained and articulated drives at forging and reasserting communal identities. Nor did this stop at the symbolic level, as is attested by demands for the restitution of alienated ancestral land, raised time and again by the Witbooi leadership, with a detailed catalogue of the farms they were meant to occupy.²²

Another dimension concerns the spatial aspects of the memory events just referred to, which entailed reclaiming and reoccupying the traditional capitals that now served as centres of the colonial administration. One common and indeed core element of these events has always been the visit to ancestral, and in particular to chiefs', graves. The burial of Samuel Maharero in 1923 took place at the site of the earlier graves of chiefs of the Tjamuhua/Maharero house. The annual parades proceed above all to these graves, which are situated in the central part of Okahandja; not by accident, the authorities have tried to regiment this event over many years.²³ In colonial times, this meant a massive show of symbolic Herero presence in the 'white' town centre. In other ways also, in Gibeon, processions to this day mark the /Khowesin community's claim to specific places and to its special role in the town at large.²⁴

11.4 From Petitioning the UN to Party Politics: Trajectories of Traditional Leadership after World War II

The tendency of certain traditional leaders to resist demands and designs of the colonial power came to the fore more clearly for the first time during the fight against South

Africa's intended full incorporation of Namibia, which began in the wake of World War II.²⁵ In an attempt to gain legitimacy for this move, which reneged on the obligations of the League of Nations mandate and the United Nations (UN) trusteeship accrued from it, the South African government presented a list of communities that allegedly had been 'consulted' about their opinions on incorporation. In reality, such 'consultations' were held at least partly on false premises.²⁶ Criticism of this ruse was instrumental in the failure of the incorporation venture, particularly the voices of chiefs, who steadfastly opposed the idea of Namibia becoming South Africa's fifth province.

This implied a clear rejection and criticism of South African colonial rule and the living conditions this imposed on the overwhelming majority of Namibians. The leading figure here was Chief Hosea Kutako, who liaised with Samuel Maharero's son, Friedrich, during his exile in Serowe, Botswana. There, the regent of the Ngwato, Tshekedi Khama²⁷ helped to arrange connections with Reverend Michael Scott, who, working with Hosea Kutako and other chiefs, such as David Witbooi in the South, and after various visits to Namibia, eventually brought together evidence which was presented to the UN in order to refute the South African claims.²⁸

Subsequently, petitioning the UN went on for more than a decade, with traditional leaders taking prominent roles. Again, Hosea Kutako and David Witbooi, as well as his successor, Hendrik Samuel Witbooi, were at the forefront.²⁹ There were also petitions to the incumbent authorities with a number of requests, ranging from the right to vote to the right to suppress the sale of alcoholic beverages.³⁰ The administration noted that David Witbooi was in contact with Michael Scott.³¹ Frequently, the petitioners met with stern reactions by the colonial authorities. In such cases, David Witbooi apparently resorted to a 'weapon of the weak', feigning ignorance of the petition and compliance with the authorities.³² Nevertheless, such petitions seem to have made a difference, especially after the arrival of a new breed of young politician.³³

Possibly more importantly, links were forged in this way between various traditional leaders and their several communities, quite regardless of the conflicts and confrontations among the various groups in southern and central Namibia that had marked the period immediately prior to colonisation and are well remembered even today.³⁴ In any case, these bitter memories could now be bridged in the interests of a common concern in the present. In this sense, one may really speak of a revival of African nationalism, initiated by the chiefs; this became 'the main source of modern nationalism'.³⁵

Still, while at pains to underscore the consonance of resistance among the various ethnic groups, particularly in the Police Zone, and noting that 'at first the opposition against South Africa was conducted by the traditional leaders', Ngavirue also pinpoints the limitations: 'African nationalism was hardly more than an aggregate of the separate responses of the different ethnic groups to European rule'.³⁶ Accordingly, the emerging intelligentsia started to posit 'an essentially state-based nationalism'.³⁷

This does not preclude that traditional leaders began to adapt the language of such nationalism, as is testified by the letter *Kaptein* Hendrik Samuel Witbooi addressed to the UN shortly after his accession in 1955:

The Inhabitants
Mandated Territory (SWA)
c/o Capt. H. Witbooi
P.O. Box 17
P.O. Gibeon, SWA.
13 July 1956.

The Chairman
United Nations Organization
New York, N.Y.

AN URGENT REQUEST

Sir,

We, the Inhabitants (non-European) of South-West Africa beg you humbly to express our wishes as follows:

a:- We ask earnestly to put the whole of South West Africa into the direct control of the International Trusteeship of the United Nations Organization. This wish is expressed by our late Capt. D. Witbooi and is repeated here so that our people also enjoy liberty.

b:- That the whole of South West Africa be placed under UNO without delay and without divisions as suggested for we are oppressed harder now.

For example:

1. The discriminating Pass law
2. And that we are removed from our own Reserve without any proper notice, and without any compensation.
3. And that such Reserves are to be divided under European farmers, etc.

c:- We ask the UNO to free us from slavery.

d:- Our people are not willing to be under the South African Govt. and its supervision. We beg to place us under UNO very soon.

We beg to remain,

Yours obediently,

Capt. H.S. Witbooi

on behalf of the non-european inhabitants of SWA.³⁸

This petition is particularly remarkable since it documents a clear tendency to advocate national, clearly not sectional or ‘tribalist’, concerns. One may even query the credentials for *Kaptein* Witbooi to speak ‘on behalf of the non-european inhabitants of SWA’, who of course had no formal means of representation at that time. This approach links to the tradition claimed by the /Khowesin, on account of the outstanding figure of *Kaptein* Hendrik Witbooi, of being early and extremely articulate critics of colonialism.³⁹ Specifically, Hendrik Samuel Witbooi’s action also highlights the way in which the initiatives of traditional leaders were enmeshed with the emergence of a nexus which began to encompass all inhabitants of the territory.

Nevertheless, during the second half of the 1950s, it was above all the Herero Chiefs’ Council, which combined with the *Ozohoze*, a group of activists gathered around Hosea Kutako,⁴⁰ that became one of the mainstays of nascent Namibian nationalism. Significantly, this body comprised persons from other ethnic groups besides Ovaherero.⁴¹ Its authority was not limited to ethnic Ovaherero, rather, the Council worked to organise across ethnic boundaries, despatching persons into exile – to work with the United Nations – and making arrangements to help those who were forced to flee the country.⁴²

Still, the chiefs came to be superseded, to a large extent, as the main actors of indigenous politics by the nationalist organisations that emerged around 1960. This development was linked to a larger movement, emerging from migrant workers from northern Namibia and Namibian intellectuals who converged in Cape Town,⁴³ and the nationalist movement was sparked further by the dramatic events around the removal of the Windhoek Old Location and the shooting of 10 December 1959.⁴⁴

While the Chiefs’ Council had originally been part of the first nationalist organisation, South West Africa National Union (SWANU), which had been conceptualised as an umbrella body for various groups, relations soured within a short while and the intelligentsia started to confront the chiefs. In the words of one of the main actors, the party ‘was originally founded by the chiefs’, yet again, ‘SWANU’s struggle to extricate itself from the grip of the council of a prominent and popular chief such as Kutako, and the party’s eventual establishment of its own identity as a national organisation’ was also constitutive for the coalescing of Namibian nationalism.⁴⁵

Along with the process of the formation of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) – soon to emerge as the leading organisation within the liberation movement – these developments brought to an end a transitory period. During that period former, seemingly non- or pre-political expressions of resistance to colonial rule, such as breakaway churches or Garveyism, were supplanted by more outspoken challenges to colonial rule.⁴⁶ In the case of Namibia, owing to the unique standing of the territory in international law, this was mediated by a movement petitioning the UN which dominated the decade after World War II.

In this movement, traditional leaders were involved mainly as petitioners, who, however, were not able to present their case in person in New York. Those who actually presented the petitions and lobbied at the seat of the UN were, rather, representatives of the emerging intelligentsia.

The formation of SWAPO also reflected the growth of organisation among migrant workers, largely from northern Namibia. In addition, the processes of political organisation were closely related to the experiences and observations Namibians could make in South Africa, both in their capacities as students and as migrant workers. From the ranks of these migrants sprang important leaders of the incipient liberation movement.

The formation of specifically political organisations did not imply that chiefs were completely superseded within the emerging political process. Activities by chiefs in the context of anti-colonial resistance did not terminate, nor did the emergence of parties mark the end of the chiefs' political aspirations. Still, the attempt in 1964 to form a political front, the National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO) on the basis of 'corporate groups under their traditional leaders',⁴⁷ while not stillborn, resulted in a party with a clearly Ovaherero complexion which still exists today. Lack of consultation with other groups and leaders seems to have contributed to this narrowing of organisational scope. Still, as Ngavirue reports of the mid-1960s, when the armed liberation struggle was just beginning, '[t]he members of the chief's council – sometimes as NUDO – also played a part in local resistance, though they might often avoid situations that might lead to arrests'.⁴⁸ This is in clear contradistinction to the outright collaboration practised by other traditional leaders, for instance in much of northern Namibia, who apparently enjoyed only scant popular support and were supplanted by 'new elites'.⁴⁹

Further developments, in particular in Herero politics, led to much more ambiguous results. The Turnhalle process, which commenced in 1975, was an attempt to forge an 'internal' constitution, an attempt at institution building that was in effect a unilateral way of solving the problem of Namibia's international status. It was also hard to see how this would not leave Namibia under the hegemony or tutelage of the South African apartheid regime. The central figure of this move was Hosea Kutako's successor as Herero Paramount Chief, Clemens Kapuuo.⁵⁰ His credentials as an opponent of colonialism up to the early 1970s can hardly be questioned, yet his accession to the paramountcy was highly controversial among Ovaherero.⁵¹ During the run-up to the Turnhalle process Kapuuo tried to negotiate a very intricate and risky situation.

Kapuuo objected to the ascendancy of SWAPO and its incipient armed struggle on the grounds of the diverse regional situations and historical experiences in Namibia. In particular, he pointed to the suffering of 'the tribes of the central and southern parts of South West Africa' under two consecutive colonial regimes.⁵² As

Gewald notes, Kapuuo ‘opposed all calls to arms’ and he ‘knew full well what war had brought to the Herero of central Namibia’.⁵³

At the same time, Kapuuo’s reasoning revolved around the issue of land, which the great majority of Ovaherero and Nama had been deprived of after the wars of anti-colonial resistance. As Gewalt argues further, the South African assurance that the Aminuis reserve in eastern central Namibia (where the homestead of Hosea Kutako had been located) would be allocated to the Ovaherero ‘was to be the factor that ensured Kapuuo’s willingness to begin cooperating with the South African administration’.⁵⁴ In this way, the crucial issue of land would have spurred Kapuuo to give priority to Herero over national concerns, at least for the moment, also with the aim ‘to consolidate his own power base within the Herero and, by implication, that of the Herero in society’.⁵⁵

Prioritising ‘sub-national politics’ over ‘national politics’⁵⁶ in this way, at least for the moment, thus appeared as an outflow of the logic of Kapuuo’s traditional office, as well as of his perception of the situation in which the Ovaherero, whom he represented first and foremost, found themselves. Even though it may be hard to tell how such a strategy might have evolved, had it not been cut short by Kapuuo’s assassination on 27 March 1978, it appears safe to say that this turned out to be one of the successes in South Africa’s divide-and-rule policy.⁵⁷ It is equally hard to evade the conclusion that Kapuuo’s choice was premised on the priority of sectional over national concerns, insofar as ‘national’ referred to colonised Namibia.

It seems that this overall rationale of preserving land and pursuing traditional claims to land has informed the strategy of other traditional leaders and authorities as well.⁵⁸ At the same time, it is obvious that the experience of large-scale and, generally, wholesale land dispossession that informed this strategy was particular to the southern and central regions of Namibia, whereas the northern parts had been subjected to a very invasive version of indirect rule but had nonetheless not experienced land alienation in this form.⁵⁹

Clearly, the trajectory of political options represented by Clemens Kapuuo is an intricate one and certainly cannot be captured in simple terms, such as a turn towards collaboration. It is rather to be understood as a complex web of sub-national, ethnic loyalties and national aspirations. In this, Kapuuo did not represent a singular case in the Namibia of his time. However, the quest for land and its preservation for any particular community did not necessarily result in a congruency of political options on a national scale. This can be exemplified if we contrast the experience of Clemens Kapuuo with cases in southern Namibia.

11.5 The Experience of ‘Namaland’

In southern Namibia, the extension of the South African homeland system by the implementation of the Odendaal Plan⁶⁰ spawned a wide range of concerns over

ancestral land. In this region, the South African strategy of ethnicisation called for the creation of a homeland called 'Namaland' in the area between the regional centres of Keetmanshoop in the south and Mariental in the north. The projected homeland was formed out of existing reserves and a considerable number of commercial farms that were acquired for the purpose by the government. It was situated on what a number of Nama groups – in particular, the !Aman of Bethanië, the /Hai-/khauan of Berseba, the /Khowesin or Witbooi – regard as their ancestral area.

At the same time, the plan called for resettling a number of Nama groups that lived hundreds of kilometres away from the proposed homeland. Among other issues, this created permanent friction over the right to control specific stretches of land.

At issue here was both space, in the sense of the extent of available communal land, and place, in the sense of the control of particular spots that carried special symbolic meaning. These issues contributed towards the mobilisation of opposition to the homeland dispensation. At the same time, stakes were created for specific groups that could prosper under this dispensation, or at least saw reasons for hope, to advance their ends. In this way, both old conflicts, as well as the more recent ones spawned through the removal and resettlement process, were politicised within the framework of the evolving party structure in Namibia. Traditional leaders took prominent roles on both sides of these conflicts, which by and large evolved on a local scale, although at least some of them took on national importance.

Traditional leaders in southern Namibia had already shown a readiness to object to the administrative fiat throughout the 1950s. The attempts of the administration to evolve 'tribes' such as Ovaherero, Damara and also Nama as organised entities on a national scale had afforded venues for community leaders to meet and arenas also for airing grievances and concerns. While many of the issues raised at these occasions were of a purely local and pragmatic nature, there were also issues that were given symbolic weight. An important one was the renaming of the Department of Native Affairs to the Department of Bantu Affairs in 1955. Nama traditional leaders objected to being categorised in this way as 'bantu'. In one instance, they blocked the road leading to their proposed venue and refused to receive the rations which the administration routinely provided for the occasion of their gathering.⁶¹

At least implicitly, such apparently more subdued resistance resonated with the petitioning campaign aimed at the UN, which was going on at the same time. An inadvertent observer (or reader of the archival record) might surmise at first glance that some of the grievances voiced by traditional leaders at that time were subsequently met: the Nama no longer resorted under Bantu Affairs, but were transferred to Coloured, Nama and Rehoboth Affairs; queries about the small size of existing

reserves were seemingly met by the addition of large tracts of land, formerly in the hands of white farmers, in preparation for the homeland dispensation; and on the face of it, traditional leaders were also given more powers vis-à-vis their subjects.

It may seem all the more surprising that, in reality, the homeland strategy, particularly in southern Namibia, was anything but a clear success with the traditional leadership. This largely relates to the merely formal nature of these much-heralded gains. Taken to the praxis test, they turned out to be paltry or even illusory.

Under such circumstances, the campaign the South African authorities staged in southern Namibia to popularise the Odendaal Plan and to pressurise traditional leaders to accept it, played an important role in pinpointing existing oppositional sentiments and in turning many traditional communities and their leaders against the proposed dispensation. At the same time, this process worked towards producing new cleavages and reinforcing old ones. As indicated, these tensions were intimately linked to the control of land.

Taking Gibeon and the territory of Berseba (/Hai/khauan) as examples, one can map two rather different trajectories. Gibeon was the only 'white' town that was incorporated into a homeland, in this case Namaland, according to the Odendaal Plan. The modalities of this move created instantaneous conflict. Since the spot was considered as the traditional capital of the Witbooi (/Khowesin), that group had entertained the idea of recuperating control ever since its defeat and dispossession by the German colonial powers. Similarly, the area around the town, where the administration now acquired many farms for inclusion into Namaland, was considered traditionally as Witbooi territory.⁶²

Administrative planning for Namaland followed an entirely different vision – that of a consolidated homeland for all those who were considered to be Nama. By that token, the territory that was allocated to the homeland was basically treated as one unit, to be shared out among all those deemed entitled to participate. These were 'tribes' who were given areas according to a masterplan drawn up in Pretoria. The plan envisaged moving the Bondelswarts (!Gami=nūn) from the south-easternmost corner of Namibia around Warmbad and Karasburg, which their forebears had occupied for centuries, into an area some 500 kilometres away, south of Gibeon. The Kuiseb Topnaar (≠Aonin) were to be resettled from the area east of Walvis Bay to the confluence of the Fish and Lever rivers, since they were considered a 'river people'.⁶³ Other portions were parcelled out to the long-dispersed Afrikaners (/Eixa//ain), the Red Nation (Gai//khaun) and the Simon Koper group (!Khara-gai-khoen).

The compartmentalised pieces of land that were to be allocated to these groups would all have to be cut out of what up to 1904 to 1907 had been Witbooi territory. Above all, Gibeon was to become the shared administrative centre for all the 'tribes'

placed within its wider vicinity by administrative fiat. It was in particular this feature of the plan that raised issues of territorial jurisdiction and generated conflict. When the colonial authorities installed a separate headman⁶⁴ in Gibeon for those Bondelswarts who had arrived from their deproclaimed reserve, the immediate and determined opposition by *Kaptein* Witbooi was aroused. He was not prepared to tolerate a second pretender in what he considered his exclusive jurisdiction.

Significantly, the arrival of the Bondelswarts was initially construed as a measure to afford them emergency grazing in times of severe drought. The institution of a separate headmanship – in addition to the Bondelswarts *Kaptein* who still remained in Warmbad – underscored the perspective that the newcomers would remain in the area for good, and thus consolidated their presence. Above all, however, this process helped to constitute the Bondelswarts in the Gibeon area as a separate entity. Since additional groups kept being earmarked for settlement on traditional Witbooi territory, the situation in the northern portion of Namaland became rather crowded.

The South African authorities reinforced the tendency towards fragmentation by, for example, according a separate ethnic identity to the inhabitants of a small reserve which had been established on the farm Neuhoof on the fringes of the Namib desert, and who were designated as ‘Neuhofs’. Significantly, the Witbooi elite argued against the idea that the area in question had been used by the old *Kaptein* Hendrik Witbooi as a sanctuary against the seasonal horse sickness which is endemic in the region.⁶⁵

These episodes give a further dimension to the generally anti-colonial attitude of the Witbooi, which had been articulated only a few years before during the petitioning campaign. Whereas the petitions addressed national issues and even claimed to speak for Namibians at large, the issues of land and jurisdiction concerned the local, and even seemingly parochial. Still, one might argue that the underlying approach of the colonial authorities reflected the technocratic grip of the modern state as well as the specific apartheid agenda geared to safeguard a distinct ‘white’ sphere for continuing settler rule unabated. In this way at least, seemingly particularistic concerns could and did link up with national issues and, in this case, with the liberation struggle. From this angle, the adherence of a range of southern traditional leaders to SWAPO in 1976 may be seen as a point of convergence of smaller conflicts and struggles, often taking place on the local and everyday scene.⁶⁶ We shall return to this shortly, after recounting a quite different conflict where land also played a pivotal role.

The Berseba (/Hai/khauan) community located immediately south of the traditional Witbooi realm contrasts the trajectory of most of central and southern Namibia, since this group were never expropriated from their land.⁶⁷ Against

considerable internal opposition, *Kaptein* Johannes Christiaan Goliath stayed out of the Nama–German war and thereby established a distinct image of Berseba as a tradition-oriented ‘haven of peace’. At the same time, the sovereign rights of the *Kaptein* and his council (*Raad*), in particular with respect to controlling and policing the land, were preserved up to 1938.

That year marks the turning point, when the South African officials made use of long-term intra-communal conflict to bring down the incumbent *Kaptein* Ruben Diederik Goliath, drive him into exile, and install in his stead one ‘headman’ from each of the two warring factions of Goliath and Isaak, who were deemed to be suitably pliable collaborators. Still, the internal strife remained unresolved and rekindled precisely around the issue of how to position the community towards the homeland dispensation.

After some wavering, Headman Diederik Isaak, who by now had not had a counterpart from the Goliath side for some years, opted for the developmental opportunities the homeland seemed to offer. Given his former record of protest against moves by the South African administration, this was a somewhat surprising turn. Given, too, the persistent sectional tension, it may have seemed almost natural that the Goliath group once again installed their own headman and came out strongly against all aspects of the homeland structures.

One central and recurrent rationale for this resistance was the fear of losing Berseba – encompassing the village and the surrounding territory – to a structure that would amalgamate the lands claimed by the various Nama communities into one. In contradistinction to the Witbooi case, the Berseba community still retained a legal claim to their land. Therefore, whereas the Witbooi argument on land revolved around claims that were founded on tradition and violated by the ongoing resettlement processes, in the Berseba case, the issue was one of actually preserving and defending existing and effective rights against perceived dangers of encroachment. Nonetheless, the role of traditional leaders as guardians and custodians of ancestral land was strongly highlighted in both cases.

At the same time, ongoing as well as newly emerging conflicts were increasingly couched in the language and constraints of party politics. As we have seen, the first half of the 1970s saw a measure of realignment in Namibian politics. There was a clear tendency for the situation to polarise between SWAPO and its exiled leadership combining diplomacy and armed struggle as the main instruments on the one hand, and those who for various reasons opposed SWAPO’s claim as sole representative of the Namibian people, to the extent of aligning themselves with representatives of the colonial power.⁶⁸

Under such auspices, the Turnhalle process attracted a rather motley array of actors. It resulted not in a stable constitutional structure, which was subject to

repeated revisions and South African interventions during the following years, but rather in a political formation that was able to bring together and represent a comparatively broad coalition, aptly termed the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA).

Accordingly, the local conflicts – intra- as well as inter-communal – we have just touched upon crystallised in party political alignments. Witbooi and Goliath, along with other traditional leaders in the south, opted for SWAPO, whereas their local opponents, Isaak and Bondelswarts, came out on the side of the DTA and their leaders took up positions in the homeland structures.

Once again, this attests to the ambivalent performance of traditional leaders in late colonial Namibia. To some extent, the party political alignments may also be related to local conflicts. This is the case in particular with the age-old conflict in Berseba. Here, one may well wonder how much contingency was involved, in particular since, for decades, the Goliath faction was considered rather more amenable to the colonial administrations, whereas the Isaaks were known to be more ‘Africanist’. However, the developmentalist rhetoric which accompanied the propagation of the Odendaal Plan may have swayed the incumbent chief Diederik Isaak to wager an alliance with an administration that also held out the prospect of strengthening traditional leadership.

A further argument that appealed precisely to the ‘Africanist’ strand among the Isaak section was the hope – quite mistaken, as it turned out – that the processes leading up to the Turnhalle would speed up Namibian independence.⁶⁹ On the other hand, the opposing Goliath camp may have found it harder to see such a perspective and, under such circumstances, accentuated more the need to preserve the community’s land – an issue that had dominated the entire colonial experience of the /Hai/khauan.⁷⁰

One might suspect that the conflicts which evolved within the much broader Ovaherero community around the political turn of Clemens Kapuuu had a somewhat similar dynamic. Here also, very germane issues concerning the entire community coalesced with competing leadership pretensions, in this case stemming from the dualism between the paramountcy, which had grown out of a commission to Hosea Kutako by the exiled Samuel Maharero to represent him in Namibia, and the genealogically founded dynastic claims of the Tjamuaha/Maharero house. This also resulted in opposing party political line-ups.⁷¹

Both issues – the dimension of party politics and the opposed legitimacy bases of popular consent or election and of genealogy – persist up to the present. While the differences in the legitimacy that is invoked may be clear enough, the reasons why those opting for dynastic rights aligned with SWAPO, while those claiming popular consent sided with the Turnhalle process and became important figures in

DTA and later a resurrected NUDO, seem less evident. Again, Clemens Kapuuu's decisive turn seems intimately connected with his concern to preserve for his community established land rights and symbolically important sites in the Aminuis reserve, which included Hosea Kutako's homestead.

The situation in the northern part of the Namaland homeland appears much more clear-cut, at least as far as the main confrontation is concerned – that between Witbooi and newly removed Bondelswarts. In the immediate situation, the Witbooi claim to jurisdiction over their traditional territory and capital meant they confronted the colonial authorities almost naturally. Besides, this corresponded well both with the community's august tradition of resistance, and with their experience during the first decades of South African rule in Namibia when their hopes for redress for the suffering experienced under German colonialism were dashed.⁷² In the situation, the pretensions of a second headman in Gibeon, claiming equal jurisdiction, meant a clear infringement on all claims that had been staked out and pursued for such a long time.

However, in this case there was clearly more at stake than just communal or particularistic concerns. When Hendrik Witbooi succeeded *Kaptein* Samuel Hendrik Witbooi in 1978, the community leaders departed from the prescribed procedure and merely notified the authorities of their choice, instead of asking for approval and gazetted appointment.⁷³ The new *Kaptein* pursued the policy that had been developed in the preceding years and set out to link up with national policy in ways that went far beyond mere adherence to SWAPO. Gibeon became a centre of liberation politics in southern Namibia, inter alia, by pushing further its role as a centre of education.⁷⁴ Out of the Nama teachers' strike in 1977, in which Hendrik Witbooi took a central role, grew the initiative of an independent school which was founded under the auspices of the African Methodist Episcopal Church in which Hendrik Witbooi was a pastor. This initiative of an English-medium school that did not obey the writ of colonial authorities spawned other, similar schools in places in southern Namibia, generally under the auspices of traditional leaders sympathetic to SWAPO, or themselves members.⁷⁵

An initiative that drove even more clearly beyond communal concerns and energetically tried to link up with national issues, was the transformation of the traditional festival into a Heroes Day that appealed to support the liberation struggle. While firmly set in the resistance tradition embodied by the legendary national hero, *Kaptein* Hendrik Witbooi Sr, and thus the contribution of the community to anti-colonial resistance, the festival pageant was evolved into an effort to symbolise alliances on a much wider scale. Significantly, this involved presenting as guests traditional leaders from other ethnic groups, such as Damara King Justus Garoeb.⁷⁶ Resistance politics had their harsher dimensions as well, including the detention of the *Kaptein* and a police presence.

The decisive point here is the merging of traditional leadership, albeit in a grand tradition of anti-colonial resistance, with the liberation movement. Thus *Kaptein* Hendrik Witbooi occupied important offices within SWAPO. He served as vice president for many years, as well as in the first through to the third Cabinets of independent Namibia. For members of the /Khowesin community, the identification with liberated Namibia and 'Witbooi' even coalesced to statements that claimed that 'Witbooi' liberated Namibia, and as proof, one research partner produced one of the banknotes which carry the old *Kaptein*'s image on its back.⁷⁷

In this particular case, then, the concerns of a community whose leaders had set out on a long-term strategy of recuperation coalesced seemingly quite logically with the national liberation struggle. Even then, however, there were contingent aspects, in particular those connected with the ethnic engineering around Namaland and the attendant large-scale removals which resulted in serious and persistent conflict over land and jurisdiction. The choices of other traditional leaders in the south may not have been quite as clearly grounded in the past experience of their communities. However, one may refer to the stubborn, and in the end successful, resistance put up by the Red Nation from the 1950s onwards, against their removal to the farm Itsawisis near Keetmanshoop. One of the main actors in this affair was Reverend Markus Koper, who was driven into exile and became a leading SWAPO stalwart.⁷⁸ Later his son, Petrus, became *Kaptein* at Hoachanas and helped to found one of the community schools that followed roughly the model set at Gibeon.⁷⁹

As we have seen, the position in Berseba was also marked by local concerns and conflicts. Here also, the Goliath section helped to found a community school after a heavy fight with opponents, mainly from the Isaak section, backed up by police.⁸⁰ By and large, it can be said that traditional leaders played an important role in the process of establishing these schools which represented a big step forward in responding to students' aspirations for up-to-date, English-medium education.

The stand made by some of the important traditional leaders in southern Namibia against the colonial authorities was answered with repression. Chief Joel Stefanus of the Orlam group was deposed and a person more amenable to the administration's policy installed in his stead.⁸¹ David Christiaan Goliath was also deposed, but there was no attempt to install a successor.⁸² The authorities contemplated a similar move against Hendrik Witbooi, but thought better of it because of his well-known popular support.⁸³ Still, he was subjected to detention.

A range of important traditional leaders in southern Namibia thus opposed the homeland institutions and continued South African occupation of the country during the 1970s and 1980s. Others cooperated with the incumbent authorities and played important roles within the institutions that were set up in implementing the

ethnically centred blueprint of the Odendaal Plan and the Turnhalle Conference. If we now take a brief look at the situation after Namibia finally achieved independence in 1990, the roles of traditional leaders appear once again to be more contradictory than one might expect. From the vantage point of 21 years of independence, it would be far too simple to project a dichotomy of supporters of the liberation movement on the one hand, and collaborators on the other. At the same time, the institutional dispensation that was created for traditional institutions after independence created specific conditions and constraints.

11.6 Ambivalence Enhanced: The Situation in Independent Namibia

If we take the Witbooi group as a very prominent, and certainly not average, example, hopes connected with the termination of colonial rule ran high. Such hopes were closely related to the recuperation of land.⁸⁴ However, land restitution based on ancestral land rights has been explicitly ruled out in terms of key constitutional clauses. The only way open to land reform is through the acquisition of individual farms by the government, on the basis of the willing seller, willing buyer principle. Moreover, the farms that are acquired in this way are generally placed within the commercial as opposed to the communal farming sector. Thus, the land situation, as one central grievance connected to colonial rule, has not been addressed in a way that would satisfy traditional communities and their leaders.

On the other hand, as was to become characteristic for most of southern Africa, the Namibian Constitution of 1990 provides for the recognition of traditional communities and their leaders, as well as respect for customary law. These general provisions have been moulded into statutory law, which, *inter alia*, means that traditional communities are accorded rights to their lands and traditional leaders are empowered to allot land. However, recognition of traditional communities resides with the Namibian government and has been denied in a number of cases and hotly contested in others.

Even on this very basic level, the post-independence dispensation is a far cry from any recuperation of sovereign rights lost through colonial rule. Rather, traditional communities are subject to administrative and governmental scrutiny. Succession issues, if proving otherwise intractable, are submitted to the High Court or the Supreme Court.

According to the Traditional Authorities Act, traditional leaders are recognised by the responsible line ministry, according to a set procedure. The law also provides for the composition of councils, including female representation. Above all, the law prescribes, besides the remuneration of recognised traditional leaders, their duties. These comprise many ancillary functions that need to be discharged by local government, and partly for such functional reasons, resonate to a surprising degree

with those under the former colonial dispensation. Moreover, traditional leaders are required to be loyal to the government and they are barred from holding political office.⁸⁵ The latter provision has proved a major problem for those protagonists of the liberation movement who entered such offices after independence, among them *Kaptein* Hendrik Witbooi and Stephanus Goliath, who was governor of the Karas Region for a number of years.

This list is by no means exhaustive, but it demonstrates that independence has neither solved all the problems confronted by traditional leaders (insofar as they sided with the liberation movement) during colonial times nor met their aspirations. My contention is that one main reason for this lies in the structural difference that exists between traditional legitimacy and rule on the one hand, and the institutions any modern state and administration needs to evolve if they are to function, on the other.

From this angle, the present dispensation bears the marks of an uneasy truce. This may also be one reason why there have been attempts in recent years at alliance-building that cuts across old divides, in particular across the rifts of the confrontations during the 1970s and 1980s. In some ways, they rehearse dynastic diplomacy and alliances, in others they forge new forms of common action for common concern. The first case was evident in the celebration of Heroes Day in Gibeon in 2008, where chiefs of other Nama groups featured prominently to honour, besides the 103rd anniversary of the old *Kaptein* Hendrik Witbooi, the 30th anniversary of the incumbency of his named great-grandson.⁸⁶ The second case is exemplified in the large grouping that has come together during the last few years to pursue the issue of restitution and compensation in connection with the still unredeemed consequences of the 1904–1908 genocide. Here, traditional leaders and activists from an array of ethnic clusters – Ovaherero, Nama, Damara, San and Baster – have converged to pursue a common cause. In a way, this transcends the issue of traditional leadership, at least in part, and provides a link to an alternative form of its existence in the post-colony, as an important component of and actor in a broad and multifaceted civil society.

However, it should be borne in mind that such a perspective stands against the backdrop of a colonial heritage that is marked by the consequences of genocide and a century of direct and intense colonial administration, including repeated reshuffling of populations. Apart from its traumatising effects both on an individual and a collective, as well as on a trans-generational level, this experience entails further consequences for the present. These include the institutional set-up, which has been conditioned by the colonial experience of direct rule in the Police Zone, by the harnessing of traditional elites to the reserve and, later on, homeland institutions, but also by the resistance put up by some of these elites and traditional leaders.

As has been shown, land claims play a central role in this framework. Such claims have to be seen against the backdrop of wholesale expropriation under German colonialism, as well as the exclusion of land restitution by constitutional provisions in independent Namibia. This predicament feeds into the overall ambivalence of traditional institutions within a modern state setting.

Coming to terms with this contradictory and ambivalent institutional situation is a challenge that exists all over southern Africa, and beyond. It is a challenge to post-colonial administrations, and not least, a challenge to institutional creativity.

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12

Chapter

Utilising Indigenous Knowledge to Enhance Food Security: Tapping Zimbabwean Experiences

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One of the major attacks that colonisers meted out to Africans was on the culture of the people. The indigenous cultures of the African people within the 53 colonial states created by the Berlin Act of 1885 invariably suffered from purposeful and calculated demonisation as part of the subjugation agenda of the colonisers. The colonisers, who were of Western origin, sought to dislodge African ways of life, including their language, religion, belief systems, even their diet and, indeed, their entire knowledge systems. These were to be replaced by Western ones. The whole idea was to trash indigenous practices and to make Africans view their own cultures as backward, inferior and retrogressive, while viewing Western culture as modern, superior and progressive. Once this mindset was achieved, it was easy for the colonisers to foster their own agenda in all facets of life, from political to economic and social. The colonised Africans, assumed the colonial masters, would be forever grateful to them for bringing a better language, better religion, better clothes, better food and a better life – in short, a better culture.

This chapter looks at the concept of indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) against the backdrop of the failed Western knowledge systems that were forced upon Africans during colonisation; knowledge systems and technologies that have rendered the earth a dangerous place for human life. The advent of climate change and the real threats of a nuclear disaster that could wipe out the entire human race are some of the dire consequences facing the human race today. The incidents in Fukushima, Japan are a case in point, where technologies of the West have put the human race, and indeed the entirety of life on earth, in real danger of extinction. The radiation from nuclear plants damaged by an earthquake and subsequent tsunamis that hit the nuclear plants in Fukushima is a cause for concern. We argue that African IKS have a remedy for some of the challenges that the world is faced with today as a result of the Western so-called ‘civilisation’. IKS provide safer, sustainable and environmentally friendly technologies that the world can borrow from Africa. More specifically, we will focus on how IKS can be utilised to foster food security and sustainable development by adopting and adapting indigenous food production, preparation and preservation technologies. Zimbabwe is used in this chapter as a case in point.

12.1 Indigenous Knowledge Systems: A Conceptual Framework

Definitions of IKS are many and varied, to the extent that it is rather difficult to come up with a clear-cut, unequivocal definition. However, a working definition should be possible. According to Mapara, IKS are a body of knowledge, or bodies of knowledge of the indigenous people of particular geographical areas, that have survived for a very long time.¹ Zimbabwe, for instance, has a store of knowledge systems that has been bequeathed to the present generation, largely through oral traditions. Such knowledge systems endured the colonial onslaught over a period of a hundred years, until Zimbabwe attained political independence in 1980. IKS are local and unique to a given culture or society. They are knowledge systems that have originated and evolved naturally over the years.² Put differently, IKS are an indigenous people's ways of knowing, manifesting themselves in the way the indigenous people do their agriculture, medicine, crafts and linguistics, among many other practices.³ IKS include indigenous people's technology as well.

Mapara cites examples of IKS, used by farmers, which were quite effective in predicting weather patterns.⁴ For instance, a 'smoking' hilltop in the neighbourhood meant that rainfall was imminent. Mavhunga cites examples of indigenous medical knowledge that was largely herbal, most of which plants have since been stolen by Western medical researchers and taken to their laboratories for analysis, refinement and packaging for resale to Africans as Western medicine.⁵ Mavhunga also gives an example of appropriate roofing technology using thatching grass that the savannah bequeathed the greater part of Africa in abundance.⁶ Roofs made of grass thatch are suited to tropical climatic conditions – cool in summer and warm in winter. Colonialism presented such roofing technology as a symbol of backwardness in preference for tin roofs, which were alien, unsuitable for hot tropical weather and expensive.

As can be gleaned from the conceptual framework on IKS presented above, much debate has tended to focus on theoretical issues regarding the conceptualisation of IKS and their philosophical underpinnings. Although this approach is academically sound, it has, unfortunately, also brought with it some fragmented theoretical conceptions and a plethora of terminologies, some with negative portrayals of IKS – terms such as ethno-science, local science, traditional science, people's science, village science, traditional wisdom, local knowledge, among others.⁷ The negative connotations presented are that IKS are static, conservative and backward, and therefore of no constructive use,⁸ a view that is part of the colonial baggage that Africa continues to grapple with. This chapter argues that, on the contrary, IKS are dynamic. They are continually and gradually changing in response to local environmental factors and the internal creativity that Africans are well known for. Above all, technologies generated from IKS tend to

be environmentally friendly, thereby presenting opportunities for addressing and, in some cases, reversing environmental damage that has resulted in global climatic changes with their attendant problems such as hunger and famine. These, to a large extent, are byproducts of the so-called Western modern technologies.

Negative perceptions of IKS have resulted in Africans abandoning some technologies that have been deemed backward in favour of 'modern' (Western) technologies which, unfortunately, as pointed out above, have led to excessive pollution and environmental degradation, among a host of other contemporary problems. While it is indisputable that the Western sciences and technologies have contributed much to global economic development, it is, at the same time, indisputable that they have also created serious problems that humanity has to grapple with. Evidence is abundant that modern industrialisation has contributed enormously to climate change which, in turn, is playing havoc with rainfall patterns which, in turn, have affected food production the world over, but particularly in poorer continents such as Africa. Droughts and floods, which have become frequent phenomena, are not conducive to food production. Consequently, incidents of food shortages, especially in developing countries, have become common, worse so for marginalised groups in most nations, including developed ones. This poses a serious threat to the United Nations Millennium Development Goal (MDG) Number One, which aims to 'eradicate extreme poverty and hunger'.⁹ Among other issues, the MDG goes further to set a target to 'halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger by 2015', a date less than four years from now. While acknowledging that IKS have solutions to problems in many sectors, in this chapter we have chosen to focus on IKS as they relate to food security issues.

While food production is declining in most developing countries, the amount of food lost in these countries as a result of poor methods of processing, preserving and storing the scarce commodity is significant. The concern about increasing crop production to alleviate hunger has not been confined to the present century. African IKS have it that plant breeding can be done by natural selection of heritable variations of seed, for example, maize seed may be selected according to ear size and groundnut seed according to kernel size and the seeds are then grown near each other resulting in a natural hybrid. African traditional expertise in food preparation discouraged preparing certain types of food for consumption later in the day, likely to be contaminated in a hot climate, but advocated safe approaches. An example that African IKS has is the preparation of a traditionally fermented and highly nutritious beverage called *mahewu* in the Zimbabwean Shona language, for use throughout the day. Indigenous people also have a broad knowledge of how to store food sustainably. An example in Zimbabwe is that of keeping sweet potatoes for use when out of season by harvesting them, adding ash as a preservative

and re-burying them until needed. Indeed a simple but very efficient form of post-harvest technology! This chapter, therefore, takes the position that IKS have an answer to food security problems that developing countries such as Zimbabwe face. A number of examples will be cited.

12.2 Utilising Indigenous Knowledge Systems to Enhance Food Security

As the vagaries of climate change continue to take their toll on food production, developing countries are bound to suffer the consequences, given their weak economies. Food production costs continue to escalate as droughts continue to be more and more frequent. Expensive food production technologies centring on irrigation become more and more necessary. It is also a known fact that soils become increasingly impoverished through the use of chemical fertilisers, among other factors. Greater quantities of such fertilisers become necessary to achieve the same tonnage, thereby increasing the costs of food production.

Another factor affecting food production, particularly in Africa, is that colonialism introduced food crops that were not really suited to local climatic and other conditions for sustainable production. Maize, which has become the staple cereal in Zimbabwe and other Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, is not indigenous to this region. It is known to require high levels of soil nutrients in order to grow well. As a result, expensive chemical fertilisers have to be applied in order to make the soil sustain its growth. The cereal also requires high rainfall and a fairly long growing season, both conditions which cannot be guaranteed in most regions of Zimbabwe, particularly in recent times when rainfall seasons have become significantly shorter and are yielding less and less rain. Added to these factors are the problems of disease and pests, which necessitate the use of chemicals and different types of pesticide at great cost. This is in contrast to indigenous small grains that require fewer soil nutrients, less rainfall, a shorter growing season and no pesticides. Inadvertently, therefore, food production in many countries continues to decline, more so in developing countries such as Zimbabwe.

This chapter argues that IKS have great potential for Africa in terms of food security. IKS provide alternatives to the unsustainable agricultural practices in Zimbabwe that are the vestiges of colonialism and neocolonialism. For a start, the right food crops should be grown in the right climatic regions. As pointed out above, small grains that have always been grown by indigenous people in Zimbabwe continue to do well even under current climatic conditions, with the decline in rainfall. Such crops as *mhunga* (finger millet), *zviyo/rukweza* (rapoko) and *mapfunde* (sorghum) are good examples. These are known to thrive well in poor rainfall conditions and in poor soils and are quite resistant to diseases. Furthermore, nutritionists have proved that these crops have a high nutrient content.

What is required is a deliberate and concerted effort to encourage both subsistence and commercial farmers to start growing these cereals on a larger scale. Instead of needing expensive and unhealthy chemical fertilisers, the small cereals are known traditionally to grow very well in soils enriched with organic ‘fertilisers’ obtained from foliage (*murakwani*) which is in abundance in the savannah. Cattle manure can also be used with exceptionally rewarding yields. Disease is almost non-existent in these cereals because they are well adapted to the local conditions. The only major threat to the production of these cereals are the menacing quelea birds that are known to feed on the grains of the cereals in large numbers. However, indigenous people of Zimbabwe know and have perfected the skill of trapping the birds for food, thereby turning a negative into a positive, and adding to further food availability.

However, before working on increased production of the small grains mentioned above, a bigger problem has to be tackled first, that of the ordinary Zimbabwean’s appetite and pattern of food consumption. The introduction of foreign foods by colonialists altered indigenous people’s consumption behaviour, and resulted in their opting for foreign foods that are refined, less nutritious, prone to causing ‘Western diseases’ such as hypertension and diabetes, and that have become in scarce supply, thereby threatening food security for the majority of people. A re-educative strategy has to be put in place through government policies that promote the production and consumption of these indigenous foods that are easy to grow under local conditions.

Small grain cereals have historically been used to prepare the popular indigenous dish, *sadza/isitshwala* for lunch and supper. This is a thick porridge expertly prepared from meal produced by grinding the cereals. The thick porridge, rich in starch, among other nutrients, is consumed together with a relish of one’s choice to increase palatability as well as balancing the diet. Meal from the ground cereals is also used for the preparation of *bota* (thin porridge) for breakfast and a beverage called *maheu* that can be consumed any time of the day. The cereals are also used in the preparation of *doro/utshwala*, a traditional brew that is sometimes described as ‘food and drink in one’ because of its nutritious nature. The point being that the three cereals – *mhunga*, *rukweza* and *mapfunde* – have all that is required for preparing food that is needed by the indigenous people of Zimbabwe at low cost but with a high nutritional value. Most importantly, the cereals help to bring back aspects of identity lost by Zimbabweans through the advent of colonialism, thereby dealing with the scourge of neocolonialism as well.

Apart from the cereals, IKS provide us with knowledge of a whole range of vegetables that have been consumed by Zimbabwean people over the years and have played an important role in their diet. Like the cereals, these vegetables grow

very well in the tropical conditions and are less prone to diseases and pest attacks than those that have been introduced by colonialists. Their nutritional value, it has been noted, is quite comparable. Among the cultivated vegetables, *muboora* (pumpkin leaves) is the most popular. Other varieties include *munyemba* (leaves of the cowpea plant) and *tsunga* (mustard plant). These vegetables are easy to grow and have a high rate of leaf production. Their preparation is also very simple. Young and tender leaves are gathered, soaked to remove dirt and boiled for five to ten minutes. Salt is added to taste. Cooking oil or peanut butter may be added to increase nutritional value and palatability. Onion and tomato may also be added if preferred.

One major advantage of the vegetables mentioned above is that they do very well with intercropping. They can be easily intercropped with the three indigenous cereal crops featured earlier, without affecting either. Another advantage with *muboora* and *munyemba* is that, apart from providing an invaluable source of nutritious vegetables, the plants also produce fruits that are an important source of food. The *muboora* plant, for instance, produces the popular fruit, *nhanga* (pumpkin) and the *munyemba* plant produces *nyemba* (cowpeas), a kind of bean that is rich in protein. In terms of food security, the three vegetables cited above can be preserved for later use when they are out of season. This is done by gathering the young and tender leaves of the plants and partially boiling them before drying them in the sun. The dried vegetables are then packaged in airy sacks and stored in traditional granaries – a simple post-harvest technology. The dried vegetables are known to last for over a year, as long as they are kept in a dry, aerated place. Similarly, the *nhanga* and *nyemba* fruits can be harvested when fully mature and stored in the traditional granary for future use, thereby ensuring food security beyond the growing season.

Apart from indigenous cultivated crops, local forests are another major source of ‘easy’ food for Zimbabweans to enjoy naturally, without sweating for it. Good examples are wild vegetables such as *morwa* (*Amaranthus*), *nyevhe* (*Cleome gynandra*), *mutsine/mhuu* (*Bidens biternata*), and various types of *derere* (*Corchorus*), to name but a few. These grow in the wild and are well adapted to their environments, especially in relation to temperature, moisture and soil fertility. Most of them, such as *morwa* and *nyevhe*, are fast growing and are ready for harvesting within a few days of germination, with the onset of the first rains. Their leaf production is often extensive, thereby providing enough quantities even for large families. Their preparation is known to be simple, requiring very little use of additives.

Scientific studies have shown that these wild vegetables have high nutritional value. A study carried out by the Department of Biochemistry, at the University of Zimbabwe, on selected wild vegetables proved that, indeed, most of them contained

nutrients such as vitamins, proteins and minerals. For instance, compared to exotic rape, *mowa* contains twice the amount of calcium, with other nutrients being almost in the same range. Compared with spinach, *mowa* contains three times more vitamin C and calcium and seven times more iron.¹⁰ *Mowa*, therefore, has the potential to solve nutritional problems in Zimbabwe as far as vegetables are concerned.

Like the cultivated indigenous vegetables, the green leafy wild vegetables in Zimbabwe are often harvested during periods of abundance, dried in the sun and stored in traditional granaries for future consumption. The preservation process involves boiling the selected leaves for a few minutes. They can then be blanched and rolled into balls before drying them. Storage can be for periods of a year or longer. Before preparation, the dried vegetable balls are de-constituted by soaking them in water before cooking. Peanut butter is usually added to augment the nutritional value and to add palatability. As for *derere*, the preservation process is even easier. Because the leaves are slimy, they are simply sun-dried without being boiled first. Others prefer drying *derere* in a shed in order to preserve the taste which might deteriorate if dried in the sun.

There is a point to note, however, regarding wild leafy vegetables. They usually present a bitter taste which might reduce palatability. In order to reduce the bitterness to palatable levels, cooking water may be drained once or twice before final preparation. However, dried vegetables do not present this problem of bitterness.

Clearly, wild vegetables are not only a source of cost-free food, they are also a potential source of highly nutritious food, and they are found in abundance in Zimbabwean forests and vleis. A study carried out by the Natural Plant Products Group of the University of Zimbabwe, in the Buhera District, established that there are in excess of 80 edible wild vegetables in Buhera alone and about 17 edible wild mushroom species.¹¹ Like wild vegetables, wild mushrooms can be cooked and eaten fresh but can also be preserved by partial boiling and drying before being stored for future use. The study also proved that the mushrooms, which are consumed as a relish for a *sadza* dish, are highly nutritious. However, wild mushrooms can also be very poisonous and care should be taken to collect the non-poisonous, edible species only. Community elders, who are a potent repository of indigenous knowledge, are mostly relied upon when people are doubtful about whether a given species is safe for human consumption or not.

Wild fruits are yet another source of food that remains largely untapped in Zimbabwe's quest to enhance food security. Some of the most popular and abundant indigenous fruits are the *mazhanje* (*Uapaca kirkiana*), *masawu* (*Ziziphus mauritiana*), *mauwuyu* (*Adansonia digitata*), *marula/mapfura* (*Sclerocarya birrea*), *matamba* (*Strychnos coculoides*), *makuyu/muonde* (*Ficus sycomorus*), *matohwe*

(*Azanza garckeana*), *hacha/chakata* (*Parinari curatefolia*), to name just a few. Fruits are either picked directly from the tree when ripe and consumed, such as in the case of *makuyu/mawonde* and *matohwe*, or they can be picked from the ground where they fall when ripe, as in the case of *mazhanje*, *masawu*, *matamba* and *mapfura*.

In a study carried out by the Natural Plant Products Group of the University of Zimbabwe, in the Buhera District, it was established that most of the wild indigenous fruits had higher nutritional value in the form of minerals, proteins, and vitamins than the exotic fruits that are now grown in orchards and farms around Zimbabwe at great cost.¹² The *marula/mapfura* fruit, which has a pleasant acid taste when eaten raw, is known to contain three times more vitamin C than oranges in its pulp, which also contains up to 6 per cent oil. Apart from being consumed raw, the fruit has been used for centuries to prepare a traditional brew, an idea which has since been modernised and commercialised as *marula* liquors, jams and jellies. In addition, the root bark of the *marula* tree has since time immemorial been used to prepare medical concoctions to treat malaria, dysentery, ulcers, diarrhoea, boils, fever, toothache and a range of infections. The seed within the fruit is very rich in oil content (60 per cent) and is also rich in protein and minerals.

Another very popular fruit is the *masawu*, which is found in abundance in the lower rainfall regions of Zimbabwe, particularly in the Zambezi valley. Ripe fruits fall off the tree and can be collected from the ground in abundance (one tree can yield up to half a tonne of fruit). The fruit can be consumed directly, or can be made into a non-intoxicating drink, *maheu*, or a highly intoxicating spirit, *kachasu*. In recent years, the fruit has been put to commercial use through the production of *masawu* jam. *Mawuyu* and *mazhanje* are equally abundant in Zimbabwe and are consumed in a more or less similar manner. Zimbabwean forests are home to hundreds of different types of nutritious edible fruit, apart from the ones mentioned by name in this chapter. In its study, the Natural Plant Products Group of the University of Zimbabwe found out that Buhera alone had in excess of 113 species in the forests.¹³ It must also be pointed out that the bulk of the fruit species can be preserved in various ways, largely through drying and storing in traditional granaries for consumption when not in season.

12.3 Conclusion and Recommendations

The discussion above has shown that indigenous knowledge systems are replete with information about sustainable sources of highly nutritious foods, most of which can be harvested from the wild without any cost going towards their production. Wild vegetables and wild fruits thrive in the wild and can be used as an important source of food for many Africans who are going without adequate food

because the foods that were brought by Western colonisers are difficult to produce and, therefore, are either in short supply, or are too expensive for the average African. Indigenous knowledge systems also provide ways of preparing the foods and preserving some for future use, using cheap, inexhaustible and environmentally friendly forms of energy, largely the sun's heat.

Those indigenous cereals and vegetables that are cultivated are well adapted to the local climatic conditions and therefore grow very well, even during seasons when rainfall is scanty. They also have a higher resistance to pest and tropical plant diseases compared to the exotic crops that Westerners have introduced over the years as part of their colonial and neocolonial agenda. The icing on the cake is that indigenous foods tend to be more nutritious and healthier to consume than Western foods. The research conducted in Buhera District in Zimbabwe, cited earlier, proves this.

As part of reclaiming their heritage, Zimbabweans (and Africans in general) need to reinvent, rebrand, repackage and promote IKS by, for instance, re-educating nationals that the consumption of indigenous foods is a healthy and sustainable practice which assures the nation of food security. More research needs to be done on how to cultivate, harvest, prepare and preserve indigenous foods in a sustainable way. While fruit trees in the wild should be harvested for food, they also need to be nurtured and conserved. Williams and Muchena note that IKS have vital information on sustainable resource utilisation and conservation through proverbs, myths, rituals and ceremonies that can be adopted and adapted to suit modern times, while at the same time achieving the same results.¹⁴ IKS also demonstrate ways of sharing resources that are found in the wild, through the age-old concept of communalism. Disputes regarding how wild foods can be harvested, consumed and even commercialised need not arise.

The Ministry of Agriculture has a critical role in ensuring food security in Zimbabwe. While farming is undoubtedly the major source of food for the country, this chapter urges the Ministry to consider forests as another source of cheap, yet very nutritious food, as proved by the research carried out in 2007 and 2008 by the Natural Plant Products Group of the University of Zimbabwe. Although it can be argued that the motivation for the study was the drought and hunger that ravaged Zimbabwe during that time, the findings remain valid to date. The Ministry of Agriculture should follow up the study cited above by conducting further research to establish, among other things, the quantities of plant food available in the expansive natural forests of Zimbabwe in order to ascertain the viability of commercial harvesting. This can be done in partnership with potential investors in the food manufacturing industry. A case in point is the Baobab Fruit Company of Senegal, where the application of indigenous knowledge has made

strides in commercialising wild baobab fruit products such as fruit pulp, yoghurt and beverages.¹⁵ Another example is the rooibos herbal tea of South Africa which is popular, not only in that country, but in Zimbabwe as well. One of the major problems with promoting the consumption of indigenous plant foods is that their consumption is usually considered inferior and associated with poverty. In order to remove this unfavourable perception regarding indigenous foods, there is a need to process, package and present them in accordance with commercial standards and in a form that is acceptable in current food markets.¹⁶ There is also the need to change the westernised appetites and consumption behaviours among Africans brought by colonialism. A rigorous process of 'exorcism' has to be conducted. The most effective approach would be to revisit the school curriculum which, according to Mavhunga, is still largely Eurocentric more than thirty years into Zimbabwe's independence.¹⁷ Siyakwazi once lamented:

The problem of the African school system is that it originated in a European environment that was alien to the African people and divorced from African daily life and in this way failed to prepare the African youth for life within an African environment.¹⁸

The central issue in any curriculum discourse is that of relevance. Any curriculum framework that seeks to alienate nationals from their culture lacks relevance; it does not address the needs of the people that it purports to serve. In this regard, the school curriculum is, therefore, the most appropriate and effective vehicle for social re-engineering. Negative attitudes towards the consumption of indigenous foods can be addressed through a well-crafted Food and Nutrition syllabus for primary, secondary and tertiary institutions that train personnel for the catering industry. Students and trainees could learn how to prepare and serve indigenous dishes. Research needs to be carried out on better ways of preparing and serving indigenous meals so that they are not looked down upon. A more radical approach would be to require all Zimbabwean hotels and restaurants to have indigenous meals as part of their menu. Curricula in primary, secondary and tertiary institutions that teach agriculture and horticulture also need revision, with a view to strengthening crop husbandry as it relates to indigenous crops and vegetables. More research should go into ways of improving their production, with emphasis, of course, on organic methods. In this way, IKS will be transformed from a negatively tainted backward culture to a positively viewed knowledge system that seeks to revolutionise food production, preparation and preservation in an appropriate and sustainable way. African countries in the SADC region and beyond can also draw lessons from this for food security in their respective situations.

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13

Chapter

Blessed be the Tie that Binds: African Diaspora Christian Movements and African Unity

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Christianity and Christian religious thought played a significant role in the justification and implementation of the transatlantic slave trade and the African and American colonisation projects. Christianity would also play a significant role in the abolition of slavery, the fight against colonisation and the work towards the redemption of Africa. The current quest for African unification in an age of globalisation is a noble and necessary one. African unity is critical to the overall development of the 53 nations of Africa and their people, who require and demand a higher standard of living. This desire is pan-African in nature. It is the idea that together development is possible and this unity has to make room for those of African descent living outside of the African continent.

For over four centuries, the children of Africa and their descendants were uprooted by transatlantic slavery and scattered across the Western world. During that time, some of them were able to sustain their sense of African-ness and/or their collective memory of Africa, even though the weight of that peculiar institution called slavery attempted to purge and discredit every remnant of their African identity. African retentions permeated their value systems, familial relations, folklore, dreams and especially their religious spaces and rituals. Although many of the descendants of Africans enslaved in the Americas would abandon their identity with Africa or claims to be African, some did not. They developed an acute awareness of their ancestral connections to Africa, amid the commonality of their diverse experiences of oppression. This, in turn, raised the sceptre of Africa in their consciousness even though they were completely surrounded by Eurocentric and Western values and structures.

During the era of slavery, there were many religious movements that sought to reconstitute an African-centred worldview, such as Santeria, Vodun and Shango, all combining with some aspects of Christianity. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, several black African Christians in the US separated themselves from their oppressors and enslavers in their collective pursuit for freedom found only in the fatherhood of God and the dignity that comes through the brotherhood of men. They organised institutions that were 'African' in name and liberative in purpose. Their association with Africa was deeply entrenched biologically, sociologically, spiritually and psychologically. Their decision to name themselves 'African'

was a conscious one: they endeavoured to recapture the dignity and integrity of their African ancestry and purify their character and homeland, which had been much maligned and denigrated during slavery. And therein lay the nascent spirit of pan-Africanism.

13.1 African Developments

The challenge today to place the existence, sustenance and future of the African Union (AU) and the African nations within the consciousness of the African diaspora populations is no less difficult now than it was in the eighteenth century. At that time, people of African origin were caught up in an all-consuming struggle to gain their freedom from slavery and attain a semblance of human rights and development. Similarly, people of African origin living in the African diaspora are also caught up in their own struggles for survival and wellbeing in the twenty-first century. It is important that those with connections and interests in Africa and its future should communicate the message of this neo-pan-Africanism and illustrate the common and integrated struggle that is neocolonialism and globalisation.

13.1.1 A pan-African legacy

Pan-Africanism was created out of ‘black’ African people’s need to rid themselves of African slavery and colonisation. It was the devout enemy of, and constant challenge to, European colonialism, imperialism, and white racism and discrimination. The African diaspora played a major part in extending pan-Africanism. This is not to overlook the important role continental Africans played in fostering a pan-African consciousness. The tenets of pan-Africanism can be summarised as follows:

- Africans and persons of African origin recognise Africa as their homeland
- Solidarity among men and women of African descent
- Belief in a distinct African personality
- Restoration of Africa’s history
- Pride in African cultural heritage
- Africa for Africans in church and state
- The hope of a glorious and united future Africa¹

We do recognise that it may not be considered politically correct to define present-day pan-Africanism in the same tenets as stated above or in terms such as the redemption of Africa, as would have been common in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, the principle objectives remain the same. The personalities, agencies and movements that identified with some or all of the above tenets were diverse and included religious figures and institutions.

The role of the African diaspora's Christian communities is no less important now with the creation of the AU than in the eighteenth century with the establishment of the nations of Liberia and Sierra Leone. These religious institutions were involved in the development and maintenance of pan-African thought and practice in the African diaspora and on the African continent.

The author wishes to point to two fundamental contributions made by religious institutions that had a major impact on how their members saw and dealt with Africa:

- They were able to fuse pan-African thinking in the consciousness of their congregations and beyond with the folk beliefs of Ethiopianism and Black Millennialism.
- They linked the concept of African redemption with African missions.

This writer believes that the roots of pan-Africanism were to be found in black religiosity and a desire for nationhood and self-governance. Eighteenth-century black Christian leaders were impressed by the nations of Haiti, Ethiopia and Liberia, and by the existence of their separate black 'African' denominations, such as the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) and African Methodist Episcopal Zion (AMEZ) churches. Their black religiosity had embedded within it the teachings surrounding Ethiopianism and Millennialism.

13.1.2 Ethiopianism

Ethiopianism as a religious thought was prominent between the eighteenth and early twentieth centuries. It engaged the attention and commitment of black African Christian communities.

There has been a complex relationship between Christianity and pan-Africanism based on the Book of Psalms: 'Princes shall come out of Egypt; Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her hands unto God. Sing unto God, ye Kingdoms of the Earth'.²

This passage has been variously appropriated and interpreted by generations of clergy and laity of African descent on both sides of the Atlantic. It gave rise to a biblically rooted pan-African hermeneutic – this hermeneutic would serve as primary inspiration and legitimisation for pan-Africanism in its multifaceted expressions.³

The sermonising and teachings surrounding this verse of the Bible stimulated missions and migration to Africa and gave a high regard for things African. Religious folk belief was based on the premise that Africa would 'soon' experience a dramatic, political, industrial and economic renaissance, based on the prophecy of Psalm 68:31.⁴ This folklore was propagated by such luminaries as Martin R. Delaney (1812–1885), Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832–1912) and Alexander Crummell (1819–1898).

Ethiopianism spread like wildfire within the imagination of black African Christians. The spread of Ethiopianism in southern Africa, for example, testifies to the power of its message and its growth.⁵ Those giving credence to Ethiopianism believed that Africa could be converted and redeemed only by black African Christians.

13.1.3 Black Millennialism

Millennialism is a belief rooted in the eschatological Christian tradition and thought; it anticipated a golden age based on the interpretation of Revelation 20: 1–7: ‘And I saw an angel come down from heaven ... and he laid hold of the Devil, Satan and bound him for a thousand years ... blessed and holy is he that hath a part in the first resurrection; but they shall be priests of God and of Christ and shall reign with him a thousand years.’

Black Millennarian sects or movements pictured salvation as collective, terrestrial, imminent, total and miraculous.⁶ Black Millennialism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries identified this golden age of a thousand years with ancient Israel and the hope of entering the Promised Land of Canaan. Black Millennial thought was categorised into three groups: Cultural Millennialism, Millennial Ethiopianism and Progressive Millennialism.⁷

These are the roots that were deeply entrenched in the black religious movements in the Americas, unleashed upon hundreds of agents of salvation in the pursuit of African redemption.

13.2 African Redemption: The Goal of African Missions

According to St Clair Drake, African redemption was understood as a ‘holistic missiological programme for the total liberation of Africa’s peoples (wherever they maybe) and their resources be they physical, spiritual, cultural and economic. Nothing less would do’.⁸

There was for the black African Christian a deep desire to share the Christian faith with their original homeland, Africa. They were convinced that this would bring a total transformation to Africa’s spiritual, social and economic future. There were those who sought the redemption of the continent through the influence of the religious myths, such as Ethiopianism and Millennialism. There were others who felt that their own future was only assured by a return to Africa.

As the impact of the folk beliefs of Ethiopianism and Millennialism increased, the awareness of Africa’s needs together with financial support for the missions, the recruitment of black missionaries and the desire of many individuals allowed Africans to migrate to Africa.

There are several African-American denominations, some with a long history of missionaries serving on the continent. This chapter pays particular attention to two of these denominations – the AME and the AMEZ. Both played a significant role in the spread of a pan-African vision on the continent and in the African diaspora. Their roots run deep in the African diaspora and their branches are present in no fewer than 15 African states.

Isichei notes that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century there were 115 black missionaries from the Americas serving in Africa.⁹ By 1900, the AME and the AMEZ Churches were both present in Liberia.¹⁰

The black missionary was a thorn in the flesh of the colonial establishments and a provocateur in the hearts of the Africans. In this regard, it is important to mention briefly the work of two individuals. Reverend George Washington Williams (1849–1891) was an American Civil War veteran, Baptist minister, politician and historian.¹¹ After his visit to the Congo, he wrote an open letter to King Leopold of Belgium and through his canvassing influenced the international condemnation of the Belgium colonisation project in the Congo.¹² Reverend Dr William H. Sheppard (1865–1927), a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, spent 20 years as a missionary for the Southern Presbyterian Church in the Belgian Congo.¹³ It is outside the scope of this chapter to explore the immense negative impact of missionaries on indigenous cultures in Africa and the sense of superiority held by many, both black and white, over African nationals. This was a part of the European colonisation experience and the Western education they imposed as a civilising tool. However, the overriding philosophical motive of the black African missionary towards Africa was that of its redemption.

13.3 The Struggle for Independence

The struggle out of slavery, colonialism and racial discrimination for Africans forged ties through oppression for both the African continent and the African diaspora. It would also be true to say that Africans on the continent and in the diaspora did not always consider that their struggles were common and their joint freedom intertwined. This pan-African struggle had as one of its main objectives political independence, and a variety of organisations would engage the issues. Several milestone events proved significant, such as the Pan African Conference of 1900, organised by Henry Sylvester Williams and Dr W.E.B. Du Bois, and chaired by Bishop Alexander Walters of the AMEZ Church. Then there were the Pan African Congresses, a series of meetings held in 1919, 1921, 1923, 1927, 1945, 1974 and 1994. These had the specific intention of addressing issues pertaining to Africa and the West Indies.

On another track, but with the same pan-African agenda, was the mass populist movement of the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African

Communities League (UNIA). At the forefront of the back-to-Africa movement, the UNIA was the largest black organisation in the twentieth century, with over 2 million members in more than 30 countries. The UNIA was a mass movement of pan-Africanists. It was the brainchild of Marcus Mosiah Garvey, a Jamaican who settled in Harlem in the early 1900s, and as a result of his efforts the UNIA members became known as Garveyites. Reverend George Alexander McGuire and Marcus Garvey¹⁴ went about constructing Garveyism as a religious movement, also called ‘evangelical pan-Africanism’ by some commentators.¹⁵

Garvey scared the living daylight out of the colonial authorities and the US government. They took exceptional steps to frustrate at every turn the UNIA and Garvey, for he threatened their very existence in the colonial territories and opposed the notion of black inferiority to whites.

Ministers from Christian churches and religious bodies openly associated with the Garvey movement came from the AME and AMEZ churches, the Baptist Church, the Congregational Church¹⁶ and the Church of the Living God,¹⁷ a small Pentecostal group¹⁸ – such was the religious nature of this movement. Research has identified over 255 members of clergy as prominent members of the UNIA.¹⁹

Later Marcus Garvey was charged with and imprisoned by the US government for mail fraud. The movement began to disintegrate with Garvey in jail and then later with his exile to Jamaica. By the mid-1940s, the zenith of the Garvey movement had past. Although the vision Marcus Garvey had for a united Africa survived his passing, it was for the next generation to make this a reality.

13.3.1 Independence

In the Caribbean and Africa, independence ushered in a new era for selfhood. The peoples of Africa developed a greater sense of hope for equity and equality on the African continent and among the African diaspora. The African (black) Church responded by continual support for its mission-planted congregations.

An indication of the direction the AMEZ Church was heading in was revealed at its 1976 General Conference by its bishop, Ruben Lee Speaks. He stated that the AMEZ Church was determined to serve the new Africa. Among his many proposals he suggested a seven-fold ministry plan for the support of the church in Africa. These were a Ministry of Christian Evangelism, a Ministry of Reconciliation, a Ministry of Health and Social Services, an AMEZ Hospital Ministry, an Education Ministry, an Agriculture Ministry and an Artistic and Recreation Ministry.²⁰

The AMEZ Church has been working in Africa since 1876, first in Liberia; it then expanded into Ghana and Nigeria. The church’s emphasis on education has seen it become a major contributor to education and, as a byproduct, it contributed to the creation of a cadre of African intellectuals and professionals. In 1976 the

AMEZ Church in West Africa had 800 churches, 21 presiding elders, 200 pastors and religious workers, 62 000 members and 150 schools with 22 500 students.²¹ In the last 40 years, the church has further expanded into South Africa, Ivory Coast, Togo, Malawi, Mozambique and Angola.

Independence did not fulfil its promise to Africa's masses. Indeed, many saw their standards of living drop. Ethnic conflict, war, famine, corruption and bad governance compounded by the imbalance of trade and political arrangements made with the former colonial powers led to further suffering.

The above example of an African diaspora church's ability to bring development to the advancement of the African populace points to new possibilities. However, the potential for transformation and cooperation cannot be left to just a few black African faith-based organisations on an ad hoc basis. Deliberate and consistent partnerships are required to meet the enormous needs of Africa's peoples both in the African continent and the diaspora.

13.4 Partnerships for Transformation and Cooperation

The present generation of pan-Africanists need to create new and lasting partnerships and/or networks that will bring transformation for the long-term development of Africa and its diaspora. The religious communities of the African diaspora and their co-religionists on the African continent have their part to play. In the agencies of the All African Conference of Churches (AACC), the Organization of African Instituted Churches (OAIC) and the Association of Evangelicals of Africa (AEA) reside the possibilities for interaction, cooperation and partnership that could lead to substantial transformation for both Africa and the African diaspora. The following sections look at two examples of such institutions for furthering African and African diaspora interaction, cooperation and partnership. No doubt there are many more.

13.4.1 *The All African Conference of Churches*

First, the AACC's stated primary role is to accompany the churches as they wrestle with the challenges facing Africa. This organisation has a large membership on the African continent and represents African Christians in many of the historical churches, such as Anglicans and member churches in the OAIC. Having recognised that the continent's priorities had changed, the AACC revisited and re-evaluated its role and tasks accordingly. Mandated by its members in the 2002 general assembly to restructure the organisation, the AACC has reorganised its structure to operationalise a new strategy, which included the creation of the African Union Liaison Office.

Today the AACC sees its role and function as being the ‘think tank’ of the churches, the interpreter of major issues, such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, globalisation and economic justice, among others.

Furthermore, the AACC established the African Union Liaison Office to enable African churches and ecumenical partners to develop and sustain active, consistent, coherent and critical witness to Africa’s peace and security, and to monitor issues of human rights, justice, democracy, good political governance and socio-economic development through active ecumenical accompaniment with the AU and its related organs. The timely action taken by the AACC in creating the office of the ecumenical envoy to the AU is a significant political and diplomatic move, addressing the issues and justifying its activities.

The OAIC covers a plethora of indigenous churches. Their membership numbers are too numerous to ignore and their impact in local and national communities too dynamic to be sidelined in any discussion of African issues. Their vision is to build on their African cultures and values and see their people transformed by the good news of Jesus Christ and blessed by the spirit of God.

This provides an avenue for a creative partnership between the National Council of Churches in the US, of which the African-American churches are members, the Latin American Council of Churches, the Caribbean Conference of Churches and the AACC. These churches are all members of the World Council of Churches. The author believes that proactive networking is needed to facilitate a pan-African agenda. This can be facilitated by discussions between the AACC’s African Union Liaison personnel, the AU secretariat and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union (ECOSOCC). There can also be corresponding discussions at the ecumenical regional levels in the diaspora such as at the Caribbean Conference of Churches with the political equivalents such as the Caribbean Community on pan-African issues.

These should then lead to a number of priorities and objectives approved at the highest level of the AU, leading to faith-based initiatives that enhance the development of the people of Africa and the African diaspora.

13.4.2 Associations of Evangelicals of Africa

The second example is a collaboration among evangelicals, as they represent some of the fastest-growing Christian churches in Africa. Evangelicals include what is sometimes called the Full Gospel Churches and the Pentecostal Churches. To date there seems to be no formal relationship between the AEA and the AACC.

The AEA, however, can play a pivotal role in calling on black African evangelicals outside the African continent to engage with Africa’s development, such as the National Black Evangelical Association and the Evangelical Association of the

Caribbean. As they are members of the World Evangelical Fellowship, they would need to expand their structures to allow for this avenue of development.

As a former director of the African and Caribbean Evangelical Alliance UK (1990–1994), the author was able to gain membership of the AEA through the influence of the late Dr Tokunboh Adeyemoh, its general secretary in 1992. So what is being proposed is not far-fetched. There is a clear understanding among African evangelicals of a pan-African concept of partnership on the continent. This is actively modelled in the Pan-African Christian Leadership Assembly and the Pan-African Christian Women Alliance, both commissions of the AEA. The latter was established in 1989 as a fairly conservative body but has moved on to radically engage social, educational, health and political issues in respect to the needs faced by African women.

The two examples given above of possible partnerships could lead to the systematic engagement of pan-African challenges. The needs of the African continent and the African diaspora communities could be well served if there were channels for this type of pan-African collaboration. This collaboration should be structured to allow for the mutual exchange of ideas, personnel, resources and good practice. This exchange should be spiritual, academic, social, political and economic.

The interaction, cooperation and partnership spoken of is by no means a one-sided affair. The focus speaks to development of the continental fatherland. In the Americas there is a need for interaction and exchange that will create theological, educational, social, technological, political and economic ties with the African continent. The only limits to the extent of the partnership would be set by the participants themselves. One example, theological partnership, could see the establishment of collaborations between theological institutions. Subjects of comparative research exist, such as African theology and black theology, African and African-American missions, divine healing and African traditional healing practices, and Christian social thought and Ujaama philosophy.

This writer is, therefore, calling on the AU to become a catalyst for the development of partnerships similar to those suggested above. At present the ECOSOCC seems to be the most natural site for this level of interaction.

13.5 Challenges to Pan-African Partnership

The great King Solomon from north-east Africa warns us that ‘where there is no Vision the people perish’.²² The pan-African vision has to be brought into the everyday consciousness of the people in the African diaspora and on the African continent. The AU and its agencies are not known by most African people, and the relevance of the AU to the daily existence of African people has not been made known to the people. In the Caribbean Islands where the author lives, most

politicians do not even know of the existence of the AU. The pro-black and African civil-society organisations are ignorant of the AU's agencies and what the AU does. I consider this to be the number-one challenge of all pan-African organisations, including the AU itself. There has to be an effective mechanism to bring to the people the relevance of the pan-African vision. The establishment of the sixth region of the AU entailed a political decision to have an administrative structural accommodation of the African diaspora. For this we must be thankful. However, we need to quickly move on to create the mechanisms for ideas, people, programmes and projects that will make a difference to the lives of our people. Furthermore, we have to publicise the facts in that regard through our communications networks.

The second challenge is to find effective and efficient ways to bring about development initiatives for people in the areas of food security, health, housing, education and good governance. Even in the absence of the above-mentioned organising mechanism there is still the capability and resources to make significant contributions in partnership with our African brothers and sisters. The vision has to be there, the challenge has to be made and the facility of delivery prepared and operationalised. A precedent has been set as seen in the Louis Sullivan initiatives, which include the African-American summits.

The third challenge is the enlistment of a significant number of Christian churches in pan-African initiatives. It is clear that not all churches, black and African alike, play a part in the development of Africa. For many Africans residing outside the continent, out of sight of Africa can also mean out of mind.

In the Caribbean, Canada, US and UK, I cannot help think that Africa has been sidelined by many other priorities. These priorities include dealing with twenty-first-century racism and discrimination, the pursuit of securing church and educational real estate, seeking acceptability or respectability from mainstream (read Eurocentric and white) Christianity, fighting the underachievement of black youths, high unemployment, spread of chronic diseases and HIV/AIDS, and the search for a comfortable life in the 'developed world', to name just a few. There is a dialectic tension between the demands of the local diaspora and a practical commitment to the motherland Africa.

13.6 Conclusion

The creation of the sixth region of the AU offers tremendous possibilities for the future of African people throughout the world. The hopes of the African people on the continent of Africa and in its large and disparate diaspora hinge on the ability of pan-African agencies to mobilise all of their resources. These resources will include the black 'African' church in the African diaspora. Partnership arrangements between the churches on the continent and in the diaspora have the capacity to be transformative and empowering.

This mobilisation has to reach the villages, slums, cities, refugee camps, farming communities, street children and AIDS sufferers. Governments, local, national, regional and continental, have to be committed to the pan-African ideal, as propounded by the AU. The public, private and labour sectors will all have to engage in this monumental task of seeing Africa rise.

The pan-African movement has to engage in the issues of empowering the people of Africa. Its conferences, congresses and symposia will be seen as yet more academic posturing and rhetorical chatter until people's opportunities change for the better.

Pan-Africanism and pan-African institutions have to address the current position of Africa in the context of a globalised world. Mechanisms will have to be found to facilitate improvements in the quality of life for Africa's poor, especially its youth and female populations. Furthermore, it will have to develop opportunities to help its diaspora in its own demands for dignity, development and social upliftment.

Bishop Walter Alexander reminded us in his address to the Pan African Conference in 1900:

Let not the cloak of Christian missionary enterprise be allowed in the future, as so often in the past, to hide the ruthless economic exploitation and political downfall of less developed nations, whose chief fault has been reliance on the plighted faith of the Christian Church.²³

The African Christian community, wherever they are located, have a biblical, moral and religious duty to bring about the holistic development of the African extended family. Blessed be the tie that binds that brings Africa into her glorious reign.

God protect Africa
Raise high its glory
Hear our prayers
God bless us, her children

– Enoch Sontonga, 1897

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14

Chapter

Unscrambling Africa's Future: The Role of African Youth in Pan-African Empowerment

Baba A Buntu

We believe in the rights of all peoples to govern themselves. We affirm the right of all colonial peoples to control their own destiny. All colonies must be free from foreign imperialist control, whether political or economic. The peoples of the colonies must have the right to elect their own government, a government without restrictions from a foreign power ... The object of the imperialist powers is to exploit. By granting the right to the colonial peoples to govern themselves they are defeating that objective. Therefore, the struggle for political power by colonial and subject peoples is the first step towards, and the necessary prerequisite to complete social, economic and political emancipation.

– Kwame Nkrumah¹

Africa – this vast continent of diversity – rises from a history of relating to ‘power’ in many different ways. Several constellations of words can be construed to define its many affiliations to the concept of power. Power-ful. Over-powered. Empowered. Power-struck. Disempowered. Power-less. And, to many, it is this last word, power-less, that seems to resonate most prevalently. Powerlessness in confronting challenges such as Africa’s positioning within the world economy and international politics, food distribution, peacekeeping, governance, resource management and health policies.

Nkrumah’s statement, quoted as an opening to this chapter, awakens the sentiments of both hope and impatience in anticipation of Africa’s freedom. However, the message rings with a clearly ironic tone against the backdrop of present-day reality, many years after Nkrumah’s dream is said to have been accomplished. Was it really accomplished? Which power has the ‘colonial and subject peoples’ inherited, taken over or won?

Africa has been dismissed as a continent void of power. And, too often, this assertion is made without interrogating its truth, or investigating how it could be that Africa, once associated with great civilisations, has been so firmly engraved in the human psyche as a peripheral continent. Peripheral, but obviously not insignificant, if the relentless efforts of rich nations to ‘get a piece’ of Africa is anything to go by. For, ‘getting a piece’ of Africa has been, and continues to be, the dominating factor in many African countries’ interactions with the rest of the world.

Africa is one of the richest geographical areas in the world, abundant with minerals, flora and natural resources. Resources that, even by narrow definitions, should

constitute a foundation for a superpower. So, why is Africa not a superpower? And, moreover, why is Africa seen by many as nowhere close to becoming one?

This chapter seeks to demonstrate and discuss some of the many root causes behind African powerlessness and will make some observations – and outline some recommendations – as to what empowerment processes should involve. Committed to a practical future orientation, we will see African youth as instrumental in this process, which we shall call *unscrambling*. The analysis will be broad and, when outlining some solutions, go from the general to the specific. While cognisant of the need to look critically at governance, nationhood and international policy-making, as fundamental aspects of power, our focus here, rather, will be on how issues of power can be invoked in African communities, both on the continent and in the Diaspora.

14.1 Contextualising History: The Race to Define Africa

The Scramble for Africa mostly refers to the process surrounding the Berlin Conference in 1884/85 where a handful of European nations divided Africa into colonial pieces. Although the Berlin Conference is often talked about as the beginning of the scramble for Africa, it was, in fact, the culmination of a scramble that started much earlier. Or, one should perhaps rather say, scrambles in the plural. Many foreign nations had, over the years, sought to seize ownership, governance and control over Africa's resources and land. The Berlin Conference differed from other attempts to control Africa in that it divided the entire continent into smaller or larger states and assigned power over specific territories. These state borders have, to a large extent, remained unchanged in today's map of Africa. The conference gave Europe control over most of Africa, including its hinterland. However, it could also be argued that the Berlin Conference marked the start of anti-colonial wars that would eventually lead to African independence some 80 years later.

In this chapter we will look at the history preceding and following from the Berlin Conference, as the actions it carried out did not take place in isolation from a greater context. We shall look at the various races to dominate, dictate and seize power over Africa. The races we will be looking at are the many accounts of militant invasions undertaken by foreign nations to out-compete one another in – or work jointly in – exercising control over Africa's resources and people. We will do this to demonstrate that what happened at the Berlin Conference was simply the follow through of a 'culture' established many centuries prior to it, and that it added a building block towards cementing a reality which the continent continues to be affected by, even today.

The races for Africa portray a long and devastating history of external forces ambushing their way by military power, political rule, trade operations, legal

practices and cultural values foreign to the continent. While studying the chronology of destruction in Africa we should not lose sight of the other side of the story. It is often said that history is our greatest teacher. It should also be said that if the history told is full of gaps, misrepresentations and errors, it would be our greatest source of ignorance and misunderstanding. Alarming, few popular history books about Africa seek to capture ancient African history. Largely written from a Eurocentric angle, African history has essentially become the history of European presence in Africa. Thanks to the impressive academic work of many African scholars, Eurocentric theses have not remained unchallenged. Through their work, light has been shed on the many African civilisations that flourished for thousands of years throughout the African continent: Ta-Seti, Kemet (Egypt), Kush, Axum, Nubia, Songhay, Ghana, Mali, Oyo, Benin, Congo, Carthage, the Swahili coastal states and Great Zimbabwe.² According to historian Robin Walker there is ample evidence that African civilisation dates back a good 10 000 years.³ Despite disagreements between some scholars about research details, it is increasingly accepted that Africa played a significant part in contributing to other world civilisations and laying foundations for developments within the sciences and philosophy.⁴

Sadly, African scholarly work has not been published and acknowledged with the same respect as the work of European academia, a testimony to the imbalances that have formed our idea of Africa. As we are seeking to trace the races for Africa, we can identify much of Eurocentric historiography as a race in itself – a vehicle for ‘capturing’ Africa and dominating the discourse about the continent.

Basil Davidson has probably been the most authoritative European voice to reveal Africa’s glory before the invasions of white people. He sees the racism entrenched in European schools of thought as an inherent problem which obscures a full understanding of African history:

The advocates of this [racist] discourse – Hegel, most typically, but duly followed by a host of other ‘justifiers’ – declared that Africa had no history prior to direct contact with Europe. Therefore the Africans, having made no history of their own, had clearly made no development of their own. Therefore they were not properly human, and could not be left to themselves, but must be ‘led’ towards civilization by other peoples; that is, by the peoples of Europe, especially of Western Europe, and most particularly of Britain and France.⁵

And, as much as the views of proto-racism have been challenged and disbanded in mainstream, contemporary academic work and popular knowledge, their foundations are far from eradicated. There is clearly a deep-rooted fear seated at the bottom of Eurocentric research and, equally, the races to dominate Africa. Senegalese historian, Cheikh Anta Diop comments on this as follows:

The racist is someone who feels threatened by something or someone he does not and cannot control. This feeling of anxiety and fear in face of an uncontrollable foreign element is most certainly an essential feature of racism both in ancient and modern times.⁶

It is these underlying currents that have shaped – or mis-shaped – our understanding of Africa. To examine the past, present and future of Africa, we also need to understand the power relations under which its history has been written and presented. In the words of Fari Supiya:

The writing of a proper history for any group of people must take account of the contemporary power relationships that the particular group has with the other major groups on the planet. This is important because history is always written within a given psycho-social context.⁷

It is with a contextualised understanding of history in mind that we shall embark on a journey through the many races for Africa. When studying the invasions, enslavement and exploitation of the continent, we see that foreign nations have fought vigorously for the dominance of Africa and continue to do so in present times.

14.2 Races for Domination of Africa and Africans

The most dangerous of all dependencies is to depend on your powerful oppressor to free you and share power with you, because powerful people never train powerless people to take their power away from them.

– John Henrik Clarke⁸

14.2.1 Invasions: The first races for Africa

Both African and European scholars have described the Nile Valley as host to the world's first kingdoms and some of the greatest civilisations.⁹ It was home to 6 000 years of Pharaonic culture, starting with the Ta-Seti kingdoms around 5900 BCE, through the Egyptian dynasties and Nubian civilisations to the culmination in the Kush Empire in 350 CE. It was also here that the first races for Africa led to the dismantling of African civilisations.

From the year 2729 BCE parts of Black Egypt were ruled by Asians who had, over the years, infiltrated the area.¹⁰ They were the first non-African kings to rule any part of African territory. However, it was the next set of Asian invaders that would usher in more than 700 years of destruction. The Hyksos, according to Egyptian historian Manetho, burnt cities, massacred people, and enslaved women and children. Under their leadership, Asian-led trade became dominant in the Nile Valley and they foiled Egyptian attempts to overthrow them owing to their

military advantages. In 1709 BCE King Ahmose defeated the Hyksos and founded what is known as the 18th Egyptian Dynasty, a distinguished period in African history and the last great epoch of Egypt. Asian interests in the region had been firmly established and from around 500 BCE several invasions led to the downfall of many African civilisations. The Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans and Arabians, one nation succeeding the other, occupied the Nile Valley, destroying much of its culture and gradually changing the demographics of the region. These conquests represent the earliest races for Africa and were motivated by the desire for control over highly profitable trade routes in the area.

Studying the effects of these races for Africa, historian Chancellor Williams asserts that the many brutal invasions by Asians and Caucasians from the north completely changed the course of African development. In *The Destruction of Black Civilisation*, he carefully describes how Africans fled the northern regions of the continent to avoid being captured, colonised or enslaved.¹¹ According to Williams' analysis, these migrations constitute the root of the downfall of Africa. Nonetheless, they also had a dual effect, in that one can trace, along the lines of the migration routes, both the spread of African culture, springing more or less from one source, and the tragic destruction and degeneration of the same culture by slavery and colonialism.

It was not only profit opportunities that motivated the invaders. For example, the re-conquest of North Africa by the Romans in 525 BCE was said to have largely destroyed and depopulated vast regions in their attempts to exterminate populations.¹² Reflecting on these accounts one is led to ask what would cause such brutal invasions? What motivated a seemingly total onslaught on these areas? What powers did African states possess at that time that seemed to so utterly provoke attacks from outside? These are some of the many questions that we still need to grapple with in order to fully understand the devastation caused by races for Africa. Certainly, these invasions laid the foundation for a more vulnerable Africa.

14.2.2 Enslavement of Africans: Races for African human capital

Several scholars have found popular presentations of slave trade in Africa to be incomplete.¹³ Their critique concerns underestimations in numbers, impact and duration. By their assertion, the nature and magnitude of the slave trade in Africa grew to such devastating proportions that it has been labelled the African Holocaust.¹⁴ According to recent research it is estimated that more than 100 million Africans were kidnapped or killed during the roughly 1 000 years that chattel slavery was a sizeable mode of trade in various parts of the continent.¹⁵ The commercial trade of humans as slave labour in Africa was established by Arab traders in the fifth century. It was also the same Arab traders who started the 'divide and

rule' tactic of pitching one nation against the other. This tactic was later taken to the extreme by European slave traders.

Arabs established three major routes of slave trade: Cross-Sahara, Cross-Red Sea and Cross-Indian Ocean.¹⁶ The dominant trend was that African women were captured and taken as concubines to serve wealthy Arabs and African men were castrated and used as workers, soldiers and guards. The main period of Arab slavery was between 900 and 1300, although it both began earlier and lasted longer in parts of Africa. Researchers have estimated that 15 million Africans were abducted between 650 and 1900 and that, in addition, millions of people died in the brutal raids.¹⁷

Robin Walker states that the European slave trade was started in 1441 by Portuguese mariners who kidnapped Africans in northern Africa and presented them to Prince Henry of Portugal.¹⁸ From here, seizing Africans for labour rapidly grew into a trade. Arab enslavers laid the foundations for slave trade as a 'culture'. The routes thus established were further taken advantage of by European traders, incentivised by immense profit-making opportunities. Africans were used as capital in a growing economy built on exploitation.¹⁹ Portugal dominated this slave trade for a good hundred years. At the same time, Spanish conquistadors were enslaving indigenous Americans as they searched for gold and silver. Millions died from inhuman treatment and the smallpox virus brought by Europeans. By 1520, the Spanish had made agreements with Portugal to supply African slave labour, and routes were established to today's Haiti, Dominican Republic and, later, Peru, Mexico and Panama in South America.²⁰ The British, the Dutch, the French, and other European nations got involved in this lucrative trade, which reached a peak in the 1700s. Slavery was by now part of the triangular trade in which spirits, linen and glassware were brought from Europe to the African coasts in exchange for Africans, who were then taken to the Americas and traded for tobacco, cotton and sugar which was brought back to Europe. A highly advanced machinery of capital-intense conquest was thus established.

European nations were now out-competing each other in this race to profit from the exploitation of human capital. The European slave trade grew to bestial proportions and has gone down in history as one of the worst crimes against humanity. The fact that this has not been atoned for by European nations in modern times has brought on the awakening of a global African reparations movement.²¹

14.2.3 Explorers, travellers and missionaries: Races for conquest

What have been described by some as courageous travellers and explorers played a significant role in the races for Africa. Many European and Arab nations took advantage of the findings from travellers who wrote down their experiences, and

applied them in their conquest of Africa. There are accounts of travellers visiting Africa as early as 2 000 years ago, but few travel diaries have been preserved. Chinese travellers visited parts of East Africa in the eighth century and undertook several trading expeditions across the Indian Ocean over the next 500 years.²² By 1550 the Chinese were quite knowledgeable about Africa. Early European knowledge of Africa came from writings by Greeks, most notably Herodotus, and Berbers. Ibn Battuta travelled from North Africa in the fourteenth century, crossed the Sahara and visited Mali and the city of Timbuktu. His writings from these travels greatly contributed to the knowledge of African geography in the Muslim and Western worlds.

The first European expedition to Africa was a Portuguese mission spearheaded by Prince Henry ‘The Navigator’ in the fifteenth century. Europe’s interest at this time was to explore trade routes, take over the Muslim dominated gold trade and get a bigger share of the spice trade. Portugal dominated European exploration of Africa at this time and saw it as a major achievement when Vasco Da Gama became the first European to sail around the Cape of Good Hope and into the Indian Ocean in 1498. But the findings from these explorers were not lost on other European nations. After 1600, Portugal’s presence in Africa was superseded by British, Dutch and French travellers. The documentation of Africa’s geography, resources and peoples led to the formation of the Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts of Africa – also called the African Association – in London in 1788.

A point often left out in the writings about them, is that the early European travellers were in awe of the high level of civilisation they came across.²³ They documented libraries, well-constructed roads, vast crop production fields, intricate architecture and highly advanced city states. This certainly contrasted the more general picture European scholars drew, claiming that Africa was a dark continent which needed help to develop. Much effort was spent in creating ‘academic proof’ that Africa was a ‘dark continent’ with degenerated populations, and void of civilisation, culture, logical sense or human worth. This popularised picture of Africa, described by Amos N. Wilson as European mythology and propaganda, provided the necessary legitimacy for European exploitation of Africa.²⁴ Additionally, this misconstrued picture, although heavily criticised, has continued to inform the common view of Africa in modern times and has helped to enforce white supremacy.

The races for Africa also attracted religious invasions, by both Moslems and Christians who sought to convert the African populations. During the period of transatlantic slavery as well as the later colonial period, Arab and European missionaries played a supportive role in conquests.²⁵ Under the guise of ‘civilising’

the African ‘heathens’ they contributed largely to cultural and spiritual degeneration.²⁶ In sum, explorers, travellers and missionaries assisted the races for Africa through their penetration of the continent, paving the way for foreign domination.

14.2.4 The Berlin conference: The race for colonialism

Still suffering from the effects of the slave trade, Africa was hit by another devastating phenomenon towards the end of the nineteenth century: colonialism. The growth of European capitalism and rivalry over territorial expansion in Africa had led European nations to gather in Berlin to partition the continent. The Berlin Conference might not exactly have initiated colonialism, but it certainly legitimised and formalised a process for it to happen.

John Henrik Clarke documents that in the rationale for the conference the following countries were mentioned: France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the United States, Great Britain, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Norway and Turkey. The task was for these countries to agree on how to best ‘regulate development and civilization’ in Africa.²⁷ Popularised as an attempt to ‘increase the oral and material well-being of the indigenous population’, Europe effectively seized control and ownership of the whole of Africa, save for Ethiopia and Liberia, and chopped the continent up into new colonial states and territories.

This period [1880s] should be more correctly called the last of the scramble for Africa. The actual scramble for Africa began in the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries with the start of the slave trade and subsequently colonialism. During this period Europeans not only colonized most of the world, they colonized the information about the world. The rationale for European world dominance was now an evolving theme in Western social thought. The pretence of ‘freeing the slaves’ had created a new form of slavery called colonialism.²⁸

The haphazard drawing of lines to demarcate new states in Africa had a drastic effect on the continent. As Clarke observes, it forced into place the concept of a modern nation-state with its tight borders and security check points, while ignoring the territorial states based on cultural formations and affiliations that were already established throughout the continent.²⁹ Colonial administrations were established from coast to interior, and Africans were forcibly recruited to carry out much of the European conquest’s subjugation. Within 50 years most of Africa’s populations were forced to pledge allegiance to nations that lacked the heritage of common language, shared memories and other attributes that are normally prerequisites for emerging nation-states.³⁰ The people’s fight against colonial powers and the claims for national sovereignty had to be located within these superimposed identities.

The new African nations became vulnerable through the divide and conquer tactics of Europe and it seemed that the idea for Europeans was to conquer, not some, but all of Africa.

Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Jeffrey Herbst, asserts that the presence of European power in Africa was minimal prior to the Berlin Conference.³¹ He also argues that the domination exercised by European nations based on the agreements of the Berlin Conference were not, in fact, so much about conquest as they were about sovereignty. Herbst might have a point in that European power was not in all instances, effectively, rule over nations, especially in the interior areas. However, he fails to admit that the main drive for sovereignty still equals a race for domination. And, whether Europeans effectively ruled in all areas or not, the fact remains that the whole continent was affected by the brutal and unnatural invasions.

Europeans, through the powers of the Berlin Conference, could now postulate 'legitimate' claims to ownership of geographical areas of Africa. In areas where European nations did not already have an administration, this was acquired by tricking African leaders into signing treaties in order to gain control of their territory.³² These treaties constituted forms of control not recognised in African traditional law, where control was exercised by councils with several members, rather than one single individual leader. The imposed power structures were thus in direct conflict with existing systems of governance and can be seen as a root cause of the nepotism and corrupt leadership that would later plague many African nations. It is likely that most African leaders who signed treaties were not made aware of what the repercussions of their signatures would be, and were lured into agreements with gifts and compensation.³³

It is essential to see the scramble for Africa in the context of history prior to the Berlin Conference. Otherwise, one hastens to see Europe as powerful and Africa as weak. Guyanese scholar Walter Rodney states:

It is widely accepted that Africa was colonised because of its weakness. The concept of weakness should be understood to embrace military weakness and inadequate economic capacity, as well as certain political weaknesses; namely, the incompleteness of the establishment of nation-states, which left the continent divided, and the low level of consciousness concerning the world at large, which had already been transformed into a single system by the expansion of capitalist relations.³⁴

Colonialism was built on foreign-dominated extraction of profit – to the colonising mother country – and the process of draining Africa of its resources was deepened during this period. A foundation for exploitation had been built over many years

of foreign domination and, through colonialism, Europe expanded its powers into new dimensions, where its motivation was to control the whole continent. It is ironic to analyse this excessive eagerness to control Africa when, after all, Europe had stamped it as a continent of little value.

14.3 Contemporary Races for Dominating Africa

So far we have examined various historical races for Africa. We have seen that since the early invasions thousands of years ago, a climate of superimposing powers became dominant in Africa. The accounts of great civilisations in ancient Africa inform us that the continent once constituted a superpower, possessing an advanced degree of scientific development which served as an inspiration for other civilisations outside of Africa. Invasions, enslavement, explorations and missionaries all played a part in the races for Africa. These races came to a climax in the European competition for African territory at the Berlin Conference in 1884/85. At the table in Berlin was also Belgium's King Leopold II, who laid claims to Congo as his personal empire. He introduced a regime of land confiscation, forced labour and mass killings of people. Replicas of this story took place throughout colonised Africa. By 1900 Europe had claimed 90 per cent of Africa's territories. The presence of European powers constituted absolute changes in most African societies and had a destructive effect on the continent as a whole. An awakening force of pan-African philosophy and resistance movements grew simultaneously with these developments, and led to anti-colonial wars and, eventually, independence for much of Africa in the 1960s.

The Berlin Conference was both a culmination of power competition and a starting point for a phase of colonialism. But did it not also lay the foundation for current imbalances and ongoing injustices through its partitioning and consequent structures of foreign dominance? A number of pertinent questions must be raised today: Have the races for Africa stopped? Has Africa become an independent master of its own destiny? Is Africa regaining its power? Do African countries have a say, internationally? Taking a glance at some of the dynamics controlling Africa's position in the world today gives us a less than optimistic picture:

- Claims of foreign NGOs being a front for Western policy development
- Gross amounts of debt inherited from unfair loan agreements offered by the West, taking advantage from the vulnerable state of African countries
- Neo-liberal structural adjustment imposed on most African states since the 1980s, institutionalised through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
- Active support for government structures led by corrupt and power-hungry elites and self-serving Western capitalist interests

- Ushering in of Eurocentric democracy as an absolute ideal and, simultaneously, strong efforts to disempower and make redundant systems of traditional governance
- Conditions of escalating poverty which allow for the exploitation of the labour force, an increase in child and women trafficking and no real economic growth
- The continuation of structures – such as NEPAD – that are promoted as being of empowering benefit to African civil society, but tend to only consult with private entrepreneurs and Western representatives
- Foreign investments and on-site production by multinational companies that extract resources for own gain, at the expense of cheap labour in ways that do not boost African countries' economy
- The extraction of minerals, precious stones and oil for Western benefit
- Military occupation and terrorism
- Bio-piracy
- Western-based recruitment agencies headhunting top students from African universities
- The debate on whether Asia has the same 'right' to seek domination in Africa as Europe has enjoyed
- The negative presentation of Africa in the world media and the incomplete recollection of Africa's history
- The perpetuation of perceiving African languages, culture and philosophy as marginal and inferior

The obsession with conquest might have changed in form and means, but its impact has not. Foreign powers still dominate Africa. And the idea of Africa as powerless remains; an idea that must be challenged on all levels. Western governments still count on Africa as a source of power – for their own benefit. To stage a challenge that will result in practical change, Africa and Africans will have to make some strategic decisions that may not be favoured by foreign governments. As observed by John Henrik Clarke, powerful people never train powerless people to take their power away from them.³⁵

14.4 From Powerlessness to Empowerment

You don't get liberated through morality. You get liberated through power. Of course, those using power must be moral, but if morality could make us free, we would be free, because our oppressors are certainly immoral.

– Kwame Ture³⁶

We have so far established that the races for the conquest and domination of Africa and Africans, having taken place over hundreds of years, have left a legacy of

servitude and powerlessness. What power should the African seek, then, we might ask. Marimba Ani asserts that a diametrical difference in understanding power can be identified within African and European culture.³⁷ Whereas a European definition largely equates power with force and might, and hence the ability to dominate, an African-centred definition explains power as the ability to do, to create and to shape. Hence, an African counter-strategy, as it relates to power, is not a replication of European oppression, but a re-creation of cultural legacies interpreted for, and applied to, contemporary needs.

In our quest for practical empowerment, we shall define empowerment as follows: a process by which latent resources and abilities represented in an individual or a group are strengthened, so as to enable improved capability to overcome challenges. To advance our argument we will look at some of the aftereffects of historical oppression, how they have manifested themselves and how they can be countered.

14.4.1 The effects of historical oppression

To discover our history is to discover our somethingness (beingness) before someone else created us. To come to know ourselves as we were prior to our re-creation by aliens means we will be in charge of our own becoming, the creators of our own consciousness, the creation of ourselves as names of the world, the namers of ourselves which gives us the power of self-determination and self-direction.

– Amos N. Wilson³⁸

Being aware that history – and how it is documented and understood – has a social impact on people's lives, we will here outline some effects that historical oppression has had on African people on the African continent and in the African diaspora. We are not doing this from a perspective that views African communities solely as victims of their history. In our view, rather, we acknowledge that Africans have been – and still are – *victimised* by historical oppression. The difference between these two perspectives is that the latter is based on an action-oriented outlook, where liberation is possible and necessary, as opposed to the former, where it can easily be concluded that Africans are completely held hostage by their oppressive past. For the purposes of this chapter, we shall outline some recommendations for implementation at community level.

The chapter will refer to 'the African community', by which we mean the groups, organisations, populations and nations of Africans and African descendants all over the world. While cognisant of the fact that this is a broad definition, we shall still employ it, given that the purpose of this chapter is to look specifically at the social effects of oppression as they relate to history and culture, since these

constitute fundamental aspects of a people's ability to operate and navigate in their self-assertion.

Scholars, such as psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, psychologist Dr Na'im Akbar, anthropologist Marimba Ani and literary critic Chinweizu, have all convincingly demonstrated the mental effects of oppression on the African psyche, personality, behaviour and socialisation. Emphasising the importance of knowing one's history, Professor Amos N. Wilson has described the collective case of most Africans as being that of suffering from amnesia: not remembering history, not remembering culture, not remembering a sense of self:

Amnesia means an undiscovered self, an emptiness, a self incapable of self-understanding its own motivations, a self incapable of self-direction and self-determination, a reactionary self, a self that does not understand others or the world in which it exists – a fatalistic externalized self. To rediscover one's history is not only an act of self-discovery; it is an act of self-creation – a resurrection from the dead, a tearing away of the veil, a revelation of the mystery.³⁹

Further, Chinweizu has described culture as an immune system with an inherent defence mechanism against external destructive forces.⁴⁰ Referring to how Africans have been so gravely dislocated from their cultural ethos he talks about 'the niggerized consciousness of the populations of PanAfrica'. With the use of this term he is implying that the African has internalised a misconstrued understanding of self, which impacts on all social behaviour he/she engages in. Embedded within this analogy is a strong notion that perpetuated oppressive behaviour (e.g. enslavement), in the case of Africans, has led to self-alienation and, on a deeper level, acceptance of its 'truth' (and so, to continue the example, performing the role of the enslaved). This not only poses a serious limitation on the African personality and purpose, but also separates the African from his/her potential to assert power. The African becomes inherently powerless because he/she believes this is his/her final destination – a notion which the African must vehemently debunk and liberate him- or herself from.

14.4.2 Manifestations of historical oppression

Africans have to battle against an internalised disbelief in their ability to actually achieve something positive, and are forced constantly to prove that they are as good as white people. As white superiority is projected in all spheres of life, so is black inferiority. In African communities all over the world we can observe many social problems related to African families and communities. They might manifest in varying degrees, but constitute tendencies that seem to hold an increasingly strong, collective grip that hinders African development:

- A corrupted sense of self
 - Dependency syndrome
 - Eurocentric self-development and socialisation
 - Health hazards stemming from unhealthy diets and lifestyles
 - Low self-esteem and confused self-image
 - Increasing numbers of suicide, and suicidal or self-destructive behaviour
- Breakdown of family structures
 - Unhealthy relationships
 - Lack of cultural guidelines for raising children
 - Children producing children
 - Abuse of children and women
 - Neglect of family responsibilities
 - Gender disparities
 - Generation gaps
- Cultural dislocation
 - Divorce from African religion and spirituality
 - Lack of cultural integrity
 - A culture of knowledge and professionalism rooted in alien philosophies
- Systemic imbalance
 - Dependency on wage-employment rather than entrepreneurship
 - Obsession with materialism and consumerism
 - Careers within criminal activity as the only financial solution to survive
 - Large percentage of unemployed and under-employed
- Failure to sustain political structures
 - Underrepresentation or misrepresentation in business management and governing bodies
 - Corrupted leadership
 - Eurocentric leadership roles and governance
- Social disintegration
 - Overrepresentation in prisons and correctional facilities
 - Involvement in acts of crime, violence and antisocial behaviour
 - Abuse of alcohol, drugs and medicaments
 - War and conflict
 - Escalating black-on-black crime
 - High numbers of male dropouts in schools
 - High numbers of single mothers
 - Low numbers of students in higher education

The list is not exhaustive. In acknowledging the challenges facing many African communities, we are not intending to fall into the stereotype of demonising

Africans as non-progressive or unable by default. Quite the contrary! First of all, there is a great need to acknowledge the many positive, wholesome, balanced and productive African people, organisations and communities that have worked relentlessly for change, set good examples to follow and demonstrated the potency in African liberation. Many opportunities have been lost to an overly negative – and disempowering – emphasis on Africa’s problems and impossibilities. However, there is also a need, not only to critically engage with current and historic challenges, but to engage constructively in strategies to combat them.

14.5 The Unscrambling of Africa

We chose to risk new paths to achieve greater happiness. We chose to apply new techniques and to look for forms of organization better suited to our civilization.

– Thomas Sankara⁴¹

Knowledge is power! Education is the key! These, and other slogans – popularised throughout the nineteenth century – suggest that there is an instrumental relationship between knowledge and power.⁴² However, a quick review of the experiences we have listed so far will lead to the conclusion that educating the African has not necessarily led to liberation. Having noted that powerlessness has been an intrinsic result of the many layers of the Scrambles for Africa, we now need to develop a response that can help to reverse this process. Beyond understanding the many economic and political obstacles that bar the majority of Africans from quality education, it seems pertinent to interrogate what education means, what its exact role should be and – perhaps more importantly – what form of education is of relevance to African realities? If education is a key, it follows that we must ask what doors it enables us to open.

As noted by Ani, a fundamental ontological objective within African philosophical thought is that the purpose of human behaviour must be to bring back to order what has been brought into chaos.⁴³ For the sake of this chapter, we shall call this process ‘unscrambling’. If we look at scrambling as a sense of competing, contending and fighting over ownership of African resources, we shall be able to look at the process of undoing this process as unscrambling.

Such an unscrambling process will take a huge amount of ambition, bravery and commitment. It will be essential that, as future leaders, youth take centre stage on all levels, carrying out strategic activities. Hence, our quest is to identify practical approaches that will appeal to young people, will manage to even out imbalances and create lasting improvement.

Further, we shall see this unscrambling process as depending on a pan-African worldview, which employs a broad scope in its approach to observing, analysing

and understanding the challenges facing African people internationally, and finding appropriate solutions. Afrocentricity advances such a view, which has been explained by Molefi Kete Asante as

... the belief in the centrality of Africans in post modern history. It is our history, our mythology, our creative motif, and our ethos exemplifying our collective will ... The songs, poems, stories, sermons and proverbs demonstrate our ancestors' inexorable movement toward the humanizing function ... our people affirm in the Diaspora and on the continent the mission of spirit.⁴⁴

This approach, essentially, is about *locating* African people at the centre of African reality and seeing Africans as *agents* of their own destiny. We will pitch the process at community level, advocating for a people-centred approach and ownership. The discussion about what role African governments can play in transforming societies is complex. An overarching trend, however, shows that African governments – tied up in loyalties with foreign powers who dictate their priorities, and having attracted leadership that often is out of tune with the needs of their constituencies – need to be challenged from the grassroots level.

The objective of a community-based strategy must be to counter the circle of negativity trapping Africans in a continuum of destructive – or disempowering – behaviour. By addressing critical issues and implementing practical strategies, activities must seek to foster a process of healing, liberation and self-determination. We have now outlined what we are looking for: an African-centred, youth-led unscrambling strategy, based on relevant education for sustainable liberation and empowerment.

14.5.1 Six arenas for unscrambling

Inspired by action points set out in writings by Buntu, Chinweizu, Perkins and Williams,⁴⁵ we shall expand and add brief recommendations speaking to practical development. We will look at six arenas for unscrambling and outline some examples of activities:

- Education
- Entrepreneurship
- Organisation
- Community development
- Culture
- Governance

Neither the arenas, nor the activities, are to be seen as an exhaustive or conclusive list. They are merely a starting point, chosen for their direct impact on, and

relevance for, human transformation. These arenas cannot be approached in isolation; they are all interdependent and must coexist, mutually feeding into each other.

14.5.1.1 Education

Education, as a multi-process of learning must, in an unscrambling strategy, enable its students to gain a strong sense of self. This means that it needs to start by locating the students in their own history: past, present and future. Students must experience themselves as change agents, not as mere objects of a 'repeat-after-me' indoctrination.

Educational programmes, in addition to regular subject-based knowledge, must include vocational training, capacity building and leadership development. Also, African history, culture, science and wisdom must be at the centre of everything that is taught. This means a radically different perspective on education as a liberating and enabling process. The goal must be to implement a reorganised educational system which is suitable and appropriate to the needs of African young people. In its initial stages, this process can be initiated at community level, with an emphasis on alternative and complementary education: Saturday schools, weekend camps and afternoon classes.

In line with the proverb 'You cannot teach what you do not know', there is a critical need to develop teachers and trainers with adequate information. The starting phase must include teacher training and the development of relevant teaching material. As there are many African communities around the world that have embarked on this, networking and sharing of best practices will be of key importance.

14.5.1.2 Entrepreneurship

Prosperity and power are closely linked to wealth creation, which again requires the cultivation of entrepreneurial creativity. The development of businesses, new markets, technological inventions and new systems for both the accumulation and the distribution of wealth must be prioritised. As a basic principle of the unscrambling strategy, every community member must take part in some form of productive resource development activity.

Training programmes for young people to develop entrepreneurial and social responsibility skills must be developed and disseminated. There are many systems for economic development, for trade and for investment in ancient African cultures that can be revived and modified to suit contemporary needs. A value-based understanding of creating wealth for the common good, not just individual gain, must be part of the foundation.

Mentorship programmes strengthening already existing African businesses and encouraging the development of new business ideas will be of great importance. In

addition, attention must be given to training on how to identify economic opportunities without exploitation, on how to serve the needs of African communities, and on principles for the regulation of external interests in African wealth.

14.5.1.3 Organisation

The unscrambling strategy must emphasise the need to organise and introduce – and revive – systems for social, political and economic organisation. This must start with the first unit we encounter for socialisation and education: the family and the kinship group. Traditional institutions, such as rites of passage, cleansing ceremonies and traditional systems for problem solving, will be of great benefit in this regard. Family and kinship units must be able to ‘train’ their members in both self-improvement and empowerment, and group collectivism.

The understanding of how gender was organised in African traditional society must also be reintroduced. Reviving matrilineal family systems, collectivism and the role of elders could help to change the marginal position women and elders have been relegated to, as well as help change the dysfunctional behaviour that has become prevalent in many homes and communities.

Cooperative community structures will have an instrumental role to play both in relation to families and kinship groups, as well as businesses and all organised activity. Through these institutions, members will learn how to develop on an individual level while also interacting in a collective manner with the greater community.

14.5.1.4 Community development

Community development articulates what the community, as an entity, sees as priority areas for improvement and engagement. This can include beautifying the neighbourhood, improving health conditions, providing recreational activities, ensuring a good climate for small businesses, ensuring a balanced food supply, welcoming new inhabitants and looking after one another.

As part of an unscrambling strategy, a communal approach means a greater sense of ownership and responsibility for the local environment, both physically and socially. Preserving the community, also in terms of political and cultural awareness, will play an important part. The objective is not mere survival, but sustainable empowerment for everyone who lives in the community. It also guides a particular community’s relationship with other communities and external structures.

14.5.1.5 Culture

Culture, seen as the expressive articulation of meaning, the guiding principles for coexistence and the cosmological identity of the community, plays an important role. Ancient wisdom, oral traditions, indigenous knowledge, health and medicine,

spiritual practices and moral codes all help to shape and regulate society. In the same breath, as culture is not stagnant, there will be a need to demystify and review some traditional practices. Not all practices are necessarily relevant or useful anymore. Secrecy should be avoided – where possible – as it can clutter information and give grounds for intimidation. Yet such a ‘revision’ process must take place in accordance with the moral codes and ethics that underpin African cultural knowledge in order to avoid exploitation and misinterpretations.

Cultural expression must also be given high priority. However, the tendency of making poetry, dance, music, arts and crafts for pure entertainment should be questioned. Cultural expression should, first and foremost, have a particular purpose for those who participate, perform and craft. African culture has a rich dynamism of functionality and ritualistic value that should be carefully preserved.

As an instrumental part of the unscrambling process, it should be remembered that culture is not only about looking to the past. Young people continue to interpret, revive and rearticulate cultural codes as new challenges appear. As long as they have received information to understand original concepts, they must be encouraged to find new cultural expressions.

A symbiotic relationship between old and new will be beneficial. Spiritual strength, as articulated in the order of Ma’at, the reclaiming of an authentic African history and the centring of African values, location and agency, will make African modernisation an ideal, not a threat.

14.5.1.6 Governance

Governance stipulates the rules of engagement, qualifies leadership and articulates the codes people must live by. Within African culture there are systems of people-centred governance, democracy and spiritual–moral legal practices. The development of what Chancellor Williams has referred to as cooperative democracy could be seen as an ideal.⁴⁶ The term identifies a governing style in which built-in freedom and individual initiative are actively endorsed, yet it advocates that one serves oneself best when one serves the community first.

14.6 Conclusion

We have, in this chapter, looked at the magnitude of oppression as it has manifested itself in African communities. We have located some of the historical root causes of some of the social challenges experienced by African communities today. As much as we are locating root causes in oppression and domination – scrambles – by external forces, we are in no way implying that this incapacitates the African or should determine the African within a single-tracked blame game. We are simply pointing at some of the historical factors as a means to understand the effects of oppression

and, from there, outline strategies of healing and liberation to be enacted by Africans themselves. The power that the African should seek is the power to reassert him- or herself, rediscover him- or herself and enact a practical, liberated sense of self.

We have also identified some guidelines and recommendations for an unscrambling strategy for Africa: a people-centred strategy that understands the historical challenges, is centred in an African worldview, advocates an African-centred purpose, has a new approach to education and will lead to sustainable liberation and empowerment. We have motivated that the strategy must be youth-led and we have looked at education, entrepreneurship, organisation, community development, culture and governance as six initial arenas in which to implement unscrambling. We have underlined the fact that empowerment is a process by which the latent resources and abilities represented in an individual or a group are strengthened so as to enable improved capability to overcome challenges. The liberating focus is here explicitly implied in that African youth can, must and shall be responsible for their own freedom.

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15

Chapter

Beyond the Berlin Conference: The Renaissance of Twenty-first Century Pan-Africanism – Setting Standards to Measure its Effectiveness

David L Horne

Early in the nineteenth century, pan-Africanism, particularly as emigrationism, began as a clarion call from dispersed Africans and African descendants to re-establish African identities for the offspring of former involuntary migrants from the African continent. Names like David Walker, Henry Highland Garnett, Samuel Cornish and John Russwurm, as lecturers, journalists, authors and activists, crowded the field of those spreading a distinctive gospel of African remembrance, African heritage and abolition.¹

After the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference, which Balkanised Africa, the pan-Africanism that was originally focused on anti-slave trade and anti-displacement quickly evolved into a consistent call to end the European colonisation and exploitation of the continent.² From its inception through the era of African independence, then, pan-Africanism has essentially been recognised as a political ideology associated with intellectual, mass public, and later self-autonomy appeals for change.³ That initial status as a political ideology became a static, stone-engraved identifier for the concept, and the vast majority of even modern authors have continued to view pan-Africanism only within the range and scope of that narrow political perspective.⁴

However, relatively unnoticed, pan-Africanism over the last thirty years or so has evolved into a much broader and intellectually substantive concept. As a paradigm and worldview, for example, pan-Africanism, in line with ubuntu, sees the world as a humane place and as a set of geographical locales that must return to African consensus agreements, mutual respect for one another and for the environments in which we live, and for the recognition of all significant contributions by various groups towards the progress of humankind. As a set of theories, pan-Africanism explains the relationships between our ancient and modern origins with the hierarchical, nationalist and corporate-based world in which we now live, the connections between Kemetic and Nubian civilisations with humankind's forward progress, the origins and consequences of colonisation and neocolonisation, the evolving relationships between the diaspora and continental Africans, and the relationships of African development and nation-building with the factors relentlessly trying to reduce Africa and Africans to insignificance. As a set of methodological and analytical approaches, pan-Africanism asks questions of

African-centred import, including how the current and predicted future circumstances can be reshaped for Africa's benefit. Pan-Africanism is not now, and never has been, a simple, one-dimensional concept.

Since at least the latter part of the nineteenth century, pan-Africanists advocating a conceptual perspective of Africa's redemption and restoration have come and gone. This conceptual perspective led to conferences, congresses, inspiration for an anti-colonial struggle, and eventually, two relatively well-known continental pan-African organisations (the Organisation for African Unity [OAU] and currently the African Union [AU]). Beyond that, pan-Africanism (aka pan-Afrikanism), as a theoretical explanation of where and why Africans on the continent and in the diaspora were and are in the shape they are in, and pan-Africanism as an African-centred analytical tool to evaluate and measure pan-African progress and problematics, have expanded the conceptual range and significance of pan-Africanism as a life-changing worldview. In the twenty-first century, however, more than that is demanded; more is required if pan-Africanism is indeed to be recognised as a realistic, viable set of goals rather than as merely a pleasant-sounding fantasy. It is the argument of this chapter that pan-Africanism is a practical, achievable and valid objective, but it will be and must be accomplished through an accumulation of small-scale and large-scale interventions rather than as one big ceremonious event.

There is no single version of pan-Africanism – conceptual, theoretical, analytical, or ideological – that has yet proven itself more quintessential than any other.⁵ The most consistently accurate determinant of whether one brand of pan-Africanism is as good as or better than another – or whether one version is mere armchair pan-Africanism or action-oriented pan-Africanism – is what work or accomplishment one's pan-African perspective has produced. To effectively evaluate the worth and significance of one version of pan-Africanism as compared to others is to look at the real-life consequences of that pan-Africanism. Activist pan-Africanism – combining ideological and analytical – is applied pan-Africanism. It is pan-Africanism in action in the real world.

Based on a summary interpretation of Blyden, Williams, Turner, Garvey, Du Bois, Kenyatta, Nkrumah, Touré, Nyerere and Cabal on the concept, in its various permutations, twenty-first century pan-Africanism involves the following principles that will be used for consistent movement forward:⁶

- Africa must be self-sufficient, autonomous, and free of neocolonial and capitalist exploitation.
- Africa must be united, politically, economically and spiritually – a United States of Africa, or a Union of African States.
- The African way of life must be redeemed, restored and used to help Africa reclaim its rightful place in world history, world politics and world development.

The global reparations movement is a distinctive part of modern pan-Africanism, as is radical curricula development through pan-African education.

- African land and resources, plus the authority to utilise them, must both be reunited with African people, not just with designated African leadership.
- Repatriation to the African continent and/or dual citizenship opportunities must be consistently and seriously explored and resolved.
- Since international and inter-regional communication between pan-Africanists is crucial, a consistent and reliable network of African-centred and pan-African (pan-Afrikan) nationalist organisations must be established and maintained. The use of any African-centred conference, meeting or gathering to establish and build such network lists is legitimate.
- Pan-Africanism – on a large and small scale – will be achieved by a combination of government action, non-governmental organisation (NGO) forward thinking, and consistent, principled pressure and activism from community-based organisations and individuals. The task is too enormous and the stakes are too high not to recognise that relying on only one sector would be disastrous.
- Government leaders will have to choose ‘short-term interest suicide’ (i.e. voting against their short-term interests for immediate gain, in favour of Africa’s long-term interests, redemption and security) several times during the journey towards the achievement of pan-Africanism, and discernible, situational self-sacrifice will be required of all NGOs and community activists to get this job done. An addiction to business-as-usual tactics will not bring pan-Africanism to fruition.
- One’s pan-African commitment must be measured by one’s pan-African work. At the end of every day, a pan-Africanist should ask and answer, ‘Did I help or hinder the pan-African movement today?’
- It must be accepted and acknowledged that pan-Africanism is a viable, winnable movement with a common set of objectives and a common vision.

The twenty-first century, whether one is pan-African in orientation and activity, or merely engaging in lip service and specious grandstanding, will be measured by one’s adherence to the ten principles listed above. One’s pan-Africanism should only be measured by one’s consistent work as a pan-Africanist: *it is what one does that determines one’s pan-Africanist commitment, not merely what one says.*

So engaging in conversations with those who quickly espouse their pan-African credentials, ticking off the names and writings of Williams, Garvey, Du Bois, Nkrumah, Kenyatta, Nyerere, Danquah, Azikiwe, Bethune and others, and adding Fanon, Cabral, Touré and so on for good measure, should no longer fit the bill. Question these espousers. Hold them accountable for what they claim to be. What have they done for pan-Africanism lately? What pan-African projects are

they working on, or have recently helped to complete? How is whatever they are doing contributing to the achievement of a viable pan-Africanism in their own neighbourhood, region, school, club, or the world? If they stutter, if they begin to duck and dodge rather than to provide an answer, then you are dealing with, at best, a pan-African wanna-be, and at worst, a pretend pan-Africanist, a play-actor or masquerader. Pan-Africanism is serious business that cannot be left to those looking for style points, or to those who only want to sound hip or cool in today's political engagements.

If you claim to be a pan-Africanist and you are working for government, then you should be promoting, assisting and advocating some aspect of the AU's multidimensional approach to pan-Africanism. If you are working with, or are otherwise involved with an NGO, you should focus some important energy on making sure the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) regional integrations, among other necessary African interconnected links, actually work (currently there are major problems left unattended, such as, for example, the refusal to exchange one another's currencies for equivalencies, continuing to demand visas or their equivalents for country-to-country travel, and so on). If you are an artist, musician or craftsman, you should include in your daily work stringent efforts to promote, advocate and/or organise pan-African cultural integration events and combined country exhibits, concerts and the like. Pan-African cultural arts are an extremely valuable part of the equation and should not be lightly regarded. Pan-Africanism is not all politics and economics. If you are a student, demand that your instructors include pan-African courses in your curriculum and ensure there are pan-African books and research materials in your school library. Initiate pan-African clubs whenever and wherever you can. Hold African multicultural parties, panel discussions, and so on. Confront and challenge any attempts to denigrate Africa and its people. In other words, there is no limit to the pan-African activities and creative projects in which one can get involved. It will be the accumulation of all of these small tasks that will eventually lead to the huge accomplishment of real pan-Africanism in the current and future world.

Finally, the long career of colonialism and the scramble in and for Africa and their combined residual effects have created several levels of obstacle, intractable contradictions and relentless complexities as the continent tries to recover. Among those intractables is sovereignty – absolute and conditioned. Suffice it to say at this juncture (the discussion of African sovereignties would be another chapter) that the three major approaches to twenty-first century pan-Africanism discussed below, and which carry the rest of the argument in this chapter, do not face a greater challenge than the consequences of nationality and sovereignty on the continent.

15.1 Contemporary Pan-Africanism, Government Level: The African Union

Standing on the shoulders of many other documents, meetings and activities, including the African Economic Communities Abuja Treaty of 1991, and the Sirte Extraordinary Session of the OAU in 1999, the AU officially came into being in the aftermath of the 2000 Lomé (Togo) Summit, at which the AU Constitutive Act was adopted, and the subsequent Lusaka Summit in July 2001 which laid out the implementation steps for the evolution of the AU. The Durban (South Africa) Summit in 2002 convened the first full meeting of the AU's Assembly of the Heads of State, and by so doing publicly announced the commencement of AU operations. The Constitutive Act originally identified Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) as the AU's first capital and in July 2004, a second capital for the AU, specifically for the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), was designated in Midrand (South Africa).⁷

The AU represents the present and future hopes for the achievement of government-level pan-Africanism. At least on paper, the AU is the type of pan-Africanist body that Kwame Nkrumah, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and Sekou Touré urged and advocated during earlier times. According to the AU's two websites and those of other supporters, the AU has a dual identity.⁸ On the one hand, the AU is the African continent's primary mechanism for establishing and maintaining complete economic, military and political integration. On the other hand, based on the point of view of the African Unification Front (AUF), a pan-Africanist NGO, the AU is the very embodiment of the United States of Africa and represents the new self-governing and democratic country of Africa with its own all-African Parliament, head of state, and military.⁹ However, since the latter does not yet involve an agreed-upon sovereignty, and there has been no international recognition of the Union of African States – both of which are required characteristics of contemporary nation statehood – the view of the AU already representing a United States of Africa as a single entity is very premature.¹⁰

From either perspective, however, it is clear that the decisions made to create and institutionalise the AU demonstrate some of the finest moments for African leadership. Those who aspire to future policy-making positions in Africa should orient themselves well to the pan-Africanist plans promulgated by the AU. They should recognise and understand that it is only as a unified, integrated body, either federalist or confederalist, that Africa will be able to transcend its long-term role as merely a supplier of raw materials and cheap labour, and play a major, authentically voiced role in the evolving globalisation of trade, resources and politics.

The AU is based on the eventual full operation of ten major components, including at least twelve specialised technical committees and financial agencies:¹¹

1. The AU Assembly, or Assembly of the Heads of States and Government, is designated as the supreme governing body of the AU. One head of state will be

elected for a one-year term as the Chairman of the Assembly and will be the official spokesperson for the AU during that time. The Assembly will meet at least once each year, hosted by different African member states.

2. The Executive Council, or Council of Foreign Ministers, is responsible to the Assembly, and is authorised to carry out policy decisions made by the Assembly and to make independent decisions regarding international and regional trade issues, resources issues (water, energy, food, mineral, industry, animal and live-stock, and so on), disaster relief, science and technology, immigration, social welfare and other matters of mutual importance to members. It meets at least twice every year.
3. The PAP, an elected representative body which is to eventually legislate continent-wide policies in an African consensus and democratic process, is the heart and soul of what the governmental level of pan-Africanism is all about. Currently, the PAP, inaugurated in March 2004, has approximately 265 members – five each from the 53 member states – and a President or Speaker of Parliament, elected for a five-year term. Although the African diaspora has been recently included, with observer status, in the PAP and the AU in general, a decision as to exactly how representatives for that community will be chosen has not yet been taken.¹²
4. The AU African Court of Justice (ACJ), inaugurated in July 2004, is based on the 1998 decision of the OAU to create an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. As of late 2011, Arusha, Tanzania had been designated as the principal operational site for the ACJ, and the name had changed from the ACJ to the current African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which is a united legal approach. This court will adjudicate cases regarding human rights violations in Africa, based primarily on the regulations within the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the 1981 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and on other relevant UN human rights instruments ratified by AU member states. It will also settle disputes over AU treaties, property controversies and other legal issues. The court is to have 11 justices who are nominated by member states from a compiled list and elected by the Executive Council of the AU, and confirmed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The justices can serve up to a maximum of 12 years. Cases are to be submitted to the ACJ by African member states, the AU Commission, and African intergovernmental organisations. NGOs and individuals can file petitions with the court, but the court will not entertain such petitions unless the African state to which the petition refers agrees to be filed against.¹³
5. The AU Commission is the Secretariat of the organisation. It is composed of the Commission Chair, the Deputy Chair, and at least eight commissioners, and

their staffs. The Commission runs the day-to-day operations of the AU, and coordinates all AU meetings. Each commissioner is responsible for a specific portfolio relevant to the AU. These permanent portfolios are the Peace and Security Commission, the Political Affairs Commission, the Infrastructure and Energy Commission, the Social Affairs Commission, the Human Resources, Science and Technology Commission, the Trade and Industry Commission, the Rural Economy and Agriculture Commission, and the Economic Affairs Commission.¹⁴

6. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established to provide an all-Africa military and defence force which would handle disputes between the various African states, protect the states against outside invasion, and provide a consistent vehicle promoting peace, security and integrity within all member states. The authorisation for the PSC and the Continental Defence Force was contained in the Common Security and Defence Charter approved at the Maputo Summit in 2003, but both have had trouble being implemented. Although African troops have been sent to Darfur and other trouble spots recently, building the African peace-keeping forces necessary to acquire the credibility and leverage to handle African crises effectively has not yet occurred.¹⁵
7. The Permanent Representatives' Committee is the body of regular bureaucrats accredited by the AU member states to work for the organisation. This group's primary function is to work with and for the Executive Council, preparing agendas, analyses, special reports, minutes, and so on.
8. The Specialised Technical Committees are ministerial-level bodies intended to focus on and handle smaller sector and regional issues in seven distinct topical areas, with the number and subject areas expandable at any time by the AU Assembly. The current topical areas are the Committee on Rural Economy and Agricultural Matters; the Committee on Monetary and Financial Affairs; the Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters; the Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment; the Committee on Transport, Communications and Tourism; the Committee on Health, Labour and Social Affairs; and the Committee on Education, Culture and Human Resources.
9. The AU financial institutions consist of the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund (AMF) and the African Investment Bank, along with the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). All four are in various stages of development but none is in full effect. According to Muammar al-Qaddafi, one of the principal architects of the AU, in his speech opening the 2005 AU Sirte Summit, the AMF has not yet been established in any African country, and the other two banks are not yet up to speed. NEPAD, which is operational, has been criticised as running a separate process, divorced from the AU, although

publicly promoting itself as an AU organisation. Recently, NEPAD has had a complete overhaul and is substantially different from its initial signature.¹⁶

10. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council is a permanent advisory body consisting of a wide variety of community-based groups, professional experts, activists and creative coordinators selected by AU member states. The primary function of this body, as an official component of the AU, is to provide recommendations for people-based projects and grass-roots activities that can enhance the overall mission of the AU and pan-Africanism. It has been consistently recommended (based on Article 3(q) of the Constitutive Act, 2003), whenever the topic has been discussed at length, that at least 20 elected African diaspora representatives should become members of this AU body.¹⁷

The AU, as the government-level future of continental pan-Africanism, needs help. Although the start-up has been tremendous and inspirational, the process has been too amorphous thus far and it has already become waterlogged by over-bureaucratization. Al-Qaddafi mentioned in his 2005 opening speech that given the access to and availability of modern technology, the snail's pace of AU growth and operational development was clearly counterproductive and too reminiscent of previous OAU failures.¹⁸ In 1963, Kwame Nkrumah said that in order for real African unity to occur, there had to be a common African defence force, a common currency, a joint foreign policy, a common African citizenship for the masses, a common monetary zone and an African central bank, among other essentials.¹⁹ Al-Qaddafi bemoaned the fact that not enough current African nation-states were fulfilling the task of implementing those necessities. For example, there was virtually no follow-through, for a long time, on who was responsible for supervising and coordinating the African Peace and Security Council that has been increasingly and crucially needed in Africa. No states seemed interested in following through on building and operationalising structures such as the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund, the African Investment Bank and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, to name but a few. There was no Minister of External Trade to negotiate for Africa with the G8, China and other commercial behemoths, and individual African countries trying to negotiate deals are always taken advantage of in those arrangements. He opined that the Executive Council was misnamed and misdirected. There was no one in charge of a unified African foreign policy. The Executive Council, made up of foreign ministers from 54 African states, clearly had the diplomatic expertise necessary to formulate and regulate a unified foreign policy for the AU and the continent. However, those ministers did not have the expertise to handle *all* African affairs, as the Executive Council was charged to do, including, for example, environmental issues, health issues, transport and communications issues, rural development and agriculture issues, and primary, secondary and post-secondary education issues.²⁰

Direct adjustments in the AU process were in order, according to Al-Qaddafi. If he was correct – and the record certainly supports his view – then the future path of change and courageous implementation and enforcement of policy decisions publicly made must be recognised and appropriately followed. Pan-Africanism still is and will continue to be measured by the work done, not by the paper victories claimed.

15.2 Regional Economic Communities

At its July 2007 Assembly of Heads of State ordinary session in Accra, Ghana, the AU formally voted to use the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) model as the designated approach to achieve pan-African unification on the continent. According to that decision, the RECs are to be the building blocks of African integration and unification.²¹ The collective grouping of African states in each territorial area would work out tariff relaxations, common currencies, the elimination of visa and passport requirements for intra-African travel, and other forms of integration. Once those are working to some degree, they are to be gathered together into a set of working references for a federation of united African countries. Currently, there are 14 such regional groupings, but the AU officially recognises just eight of them – the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).²² Looking at the progress of those RECs thus far, major obstacles to success are still to be overcome:

- Too many multiple, overlapping memberships within the RECs, each with its own rules, maintains confusion, duplication, conflicted commitments, divided loyalties and inefficient operations. Currently, of 53 AU members, 26 are members of at least two RECs, 20 are members of three, the DRC is a member of four, and only six or seven African countries are members of only one REC
- Continued competition for the same resources
- Insufficient technical and analytical support
- Lack of central authority
- Too much dependence on a single country's economic dynamics
- Continued impact of national economies on the entire REC
- Lack of monitoring and evaluation protocols
- Lack of political will and leverage to stay the course
- Continued challenges to legitimacy and reliability

- Continued colonial rivalries (Anglophone, Lusophone, Francophone) among the African members.²³

15.3 Contemporary Pan-Africanism and NGOs

An NGO is a relatively permanent group that has not been established by a government, nor has it primarily been financed by, or become monetarily dependent on, a government for its continued existence. NGOs, in general, have regularly scheduled meetings, a paid staff, and a discernible decision-making process. Local and/or state registration and licensing is a common, though not universal, characteristic of NGOs, while membership is generally a coalition of several groups, representatives from independent organisations, and/or individual activists.²⁴

NGOs are distinct from intergovernmental organisations, which share the above traits, by not being parented by countries, states or local officialdoms. Although some NGOs started off as grass-roots groups, NGOs are generally distinct from grass-roots organisations, the latter usually being one-issue, local, temporary gatherings to protest, support or otherwise engage a governmental entity regarding an important community concern, principally through volunteer action. NGOs are also differentiated from parastatals, which are quasi-governmental in either origin or financing, or both. NGOs are not usually profit-making businesses, they are not multinational corporations, and they generally eschew violence, advocating non-violent (although not always non-controversial or non-adversarial) means to achieve their ends.²⁵ NGOs are also distinct from ‘civil society’ projects, although they are regularly perceived as equivalent in contemporary media renditions. ‘Civil society’ activities are generally broader, looser and less consistent than NGO work and will include, inter alia, church group advocacies, political protest rallies, clandestine grass-roots meetings, mobilisations of student demonstrators, and anti-government rallies. Civil society actions are frequently inclusive of prevailing NGO collaborations and joint efforts.²⁶

If there is a current conceptual equivalent to NGOs, it is community-based organisations. In fact, one of the signature assets of NGOs in the modern world is their continuing capacity to translate aid, governmental regulations, trends, food procurement, medicines and messages to the masses in the absence of governmental ability or willingness to do so. In the past 10 years, NGOs and ‘civil society’ actions have increased enormously in Africa. This is partly due to the HIV/AIDS crisis, and also due to the growing disconnect in too many African societies between the government and the governed. The current list of African-oriented NGOs (although not necessarily pan-African-oriented) stands at well over 10 000 entities, with several having consultative or other status with the UN, while most simply labour in anonymity.²⁷ One distinguishing feature of this massive array of projects,

activists and organisations ‘in Africa to help Africa’ is that the vast majority of them are ‘help and distribute’ groups; for example, they get wells dug, HIV/AIDS clinics up and running, health brochures and condoms passed out, assistance funds delivered, women abuse centres started, orphaned children cared for and placed, and so on. While these are all great and laudatory actions that should continue and even expand, most of these caregiver NGOs are not primarily pan-Africanist in nature, design or operation. Their aims are neither for African unification nor for an end to African dependence. That is not a criticism, just a fact.

Representing the hundreds of distinct and distinguished pan-African NGO groups that are out there, eight examples of twenty-first century pan-African NGOs are discussed in the following sections to show the diversity and flavour of the community activism still needed to push the pan-African project forward. The precise number of such NGO groups is unknown at the present time.

15.3.1 Africare

Founded in 1970, Africare is one of the largest African-oriented NGOs currently operating. It has projects going on in over 26 African countries, including a continuing HIV/AIDS initiative, food security, child survival, digital divide activity, aid to victims of war, and grass-roots leadership training. According to its brochure, Africare has provided ‘more than \$450 million in assistance – 2 000 projects – to 36 countries Africa-wide’.²⁸ This NGO also has consultative status at the UN and uses that access to lobby for reparations and pan-African economic independence. In addition, since 1994, Africare has offered continuous training for other NGOs in Africa, on how to fundraise, develop proposals, do financial management and handle accountability issues in their organisations, and Africare’s Training for Governance Project in South Africa helped prepare over 200 activists and professional politicians for the transition to democracy in that country.

15.3.2 African Centre of Meteorological Applications for Development

Founded in 1993, this NGO has its headquarters in Niamey, Niger. Its primary mission is to contribute to the overall development of the African continent through investigations and reports of climate control and prediction activities that can help sustain socio-economic progress. It continually does short-term and long-term weather forecasting, seasonal environmental outlooks and on-the-job training of African meteorologists, and provides advisory services for the reinforcement of resource capacities and resource management in African countries. The ACMAD operation includes representatives from 53 African countries, and it prepares a continent-wide assessment of all weather patterns and environmental conditions

which may hurt or help African agriculture and sustainable development. The Centre is responsible for training (usually in 3-month modules) the next pan-African generation in climatology, new technologies of information and communication, and accurate weather prediction so that African productive activities can be regionally integrated more efficiently.²⁹

15.3.3 African Association of Political Science

Founded in 1973 in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, this NGO aims to establish a permanent network of local and national social science research centres and institutions engaged in debates, discussions and intellectual training regarding the establishment of pan-African unification. Its membership is based on scholars who are of African descent and who are committed to promoting the study and application of political science in and about Africa. It focuses on African universities, community-based local organisations, civil society programmes, technical support for increasing capacity-building and development, and the promotion of forward thinking about Africa. Headquartered in Harare, Zimbabwe, the organisation's General Assembly meets every two years for policy decisions, holds a biennial international conference, and has a secretariat for daily operations. Additionally, it has a three-pronged approach for its programme – scholarly basic and applied research that is disseminated via conferences and its journal, the *African Journal of Political Science*; education activities for colleges, universities and the public promoted in its newsletter (in French, English and Arabic) and through the publication of textbooks and the hosting of public community forums; and its provision of conflict resolution and advisory analytical services to governments and organisations.³⁰

15.3.4 African Unification Front

Founded in 1996, the African Unification Front (AUF) is a large NGO consistently focused on achieving African political-economic unity and on assisting the AU in its evolution into the United States of Africa, also known as the Union of African States. According to its website, the AUF sees itself as 'the unification front of the pan-African mass movement'. According to the mission statement of the AUF on that website, 'African unification cannot happen automatically, it has to be fought for, we have to strive for it, we have to move things, and nudge people along. Behind the scenes, at conferences, dinners, community discussions in schools, inside churches, temples, mosques, and inside organizations of all kinds, the AUF has been working to change the attitudes of people towards (African) unity'. The AUF promotes the concept that the AU is the new government of Africa as a country – a federal republic and not an intergovernmental organisation – with the PAP as the official

representative organ of that government, and with the President of the PAP as the African Head of State. In the vision of the AUF, the structure of that AU continental government will be that the President of the PAP will maintain an equal status with what it calls the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights (aka the ACJ, and directly under this, the individual African state courts), the African Council of State (and directly under this, the AU Commission), the Assembly of Heads of State (and under this, the Executive Council), and the PAP itself. NEPAD and the Peace and Security Council represent the second tier of government, then the subsidiary AU organs, intergovernmental organisations and the regional African parliaments represent the last tier. Grounding all of these is the African electorate and the civil society organisations. The AUF puts out a regular Internet news service; submits frequent press releases urging AU reforms; runs candidates in PAP elections; recommends flags, anthems, all-African citizenship and other measures; initiates linkages and negotiations between local community action groups and pan-African policy-makers; operates local and global campaigns (e.g. its Fair Trade Coffee Campaign against Nestlé and other companies); and coordinates pan-African conferences.³¹

15.3.5 Media Institute of Southern Africa

Founded in 1992 and headquartered in Windhoek, Namibia, the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) is a media-oriented NGO that promotes the development of a free press, the free flow of information and civic accountability for leadership in Africa. According to MISA, it is through these freedoms and accountability that African unity, respect for human rights, and democracy will be fostered. To date, MISA has membership chapters and projects in 11 of the 12 SADC countries of the region. MISA publishes a 'State of Media Freedom' report annually in the 11 SADC countries, which summarises MISA's continuous monitoring of government attempts to block community access to information. MISA, in conjunction with another NGO, Gender Links, sponsored a massive study of African women in the southern Africa media and found that though over 51 per cent of the SADC region's population is female, women accounted for only 17 per cent of those responsible for delivering the news. Through its 'Open the Waves' advocacy, MISA was also instrumental in the passage and adoption of the African Charter on Broadcasting, which has since been incorporated into the African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights Declaration on Freedom of Expression in Africa, 2002.³²

15.3.6 The Pan-Afrikan Organizing Committee

Founded in April 2004 as a consequence of the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism in Durban (South Africa) and the 2002 Barbados Afrikan and

Afrikan Descendents Conference, the Pan Afrikan Organizing Committee (PAOC) is a believer in and an advocate of activist pan-Africanism, including the mantra that pan-Africanism is what one does, not merely what one says. Essentially, the PAOC is a collection of African-centred and pan-African nationalist individuals (who see land and repatriation opportunities as continuously vital issues) who are already working in other black-oriented organisations in their local areas. The PAOC began with members from Washington, DC, Baltimore (Maryland), Charleston (South Carolina), Atlanta (Georgia), Houston (Texas), Kansas City (Mississippi), Cleveland (Ohio), Chicago (Illinois), Indianapolis (Indiana), Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania), Los Angeles (California) and New York (New York), which covers the geographical areas of the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, South, Southwest, Midwest, and the Pacific Coast in the US. These original members are former Black Panther Party veterans, Black Student Union activists, political Black Theater and black prison-reform advocates and teachers, radical black ministers, UNIA-ACL (Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League) representatives, N'COBRA (National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America) activists, Rasta advocates, classroom instructors of thousands of black youth, directors of black political institutes, seasoned community organisers and former Global Afrikan Congress founding members.

The PAOC was born in the US, but is specifically *not* a US-only organisation. The international headquarters of the PAOC was established in Accra (Ghana) in October 2004. The PAOC and the CABO-ONECA (Central American Black Organization) group of Afrodescendant activists approved an agreement to form a partnership in Central and North America in December 2004. The establishment of a specific chapter of the PAOC has been negotiated in Bluefields, Nicaragua, in Panama City, Panama, and talks are currently under way to establish chapters in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and one in South Africa. The PAOC aims to attract and recruit pan-Africanists from the Caribbean, from South America, from the UK, from Canada, from Europe, and especially from the African continent.

The PAOC has based its operations on a set of principled beliefs, including:

- Africa must be free of neocolonial and capitalist exploitation.
- Africa must be united politically, economically and spiritually in order to re-establish its rightful place of respect and authority in the world.
- The African way of life can be redeemed, restored and used to help Africa reclaim its rightful place in world history, world politics and world development.
- African land must be reunited with African people.
- Repatriation to the African continent and/or dual citizenship opportunities must be consistently and seriously explored.

- A consistent and reliable network of African-centred and pan-African nationalist organisations must be established and maintained.
- One's pan-African commitment must be measured by one's pan-African work.

With that foundation, the PAOC has established its Ghana chapter as its international headquarters; established an annotated, up-to-date communications network of global pan-African organisations, established a Pan-African Youth Leadership Training project that can accommodate youth from all areas of the pan-African world using age-grade cadres for future ethical and responsible leadership in their respective countries; and is continuing an intensive and extensive research investigation into the legal requirements and political strategies necessary to move forward the issue of dual citizenship for diasporan Africans in African countries, among other things.³³ Recently, the PAOC has evolved into the Sixth Region Diaspora Caucus (SRDC).

15.3.7 Twenty-First Century African Youth Movement

Founded in 2001–2002 in Wisconsin as a global diasporan project, this NGO is aimed at integrating and connecting diasporan and continental African youth through artistic and cultural creativity that will help lead to an eventual African unification. This NGO advocates youth training for future leadership and decision-making, and the use of any and all available avenues to promote greater communication between Africans. Essentially, it uses travelling art exhibitions (e.g. 'Representations of Violence: Art About the Sierra Leone Civil War' 2003–2004), an annual awards banquet, social forums, and any meeting or gathering its members are invited to, or happen upon, to promote the idea of the responsibility and obligation of youth to redeem Africa. Currently, it has chapters in Kenya, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia and the US.³⁴

15.3.8 Women in Law and Development in Africa

Founded in 1990 from a base of 14 country representatives and 40 African-oriented organisations, Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF) is a pan-African network of organisations and individuals committed to improving women's rights and creating opportunities to help capacity-building all over the continent and in the diaspora. Through a current membership of over 3 500 individuals in 31 countries and 600 organisations, it links research and activism connected to legal strategies and development approaches to the empowerment of African women. Currently, it has established a communications network in over 26 African countries, including Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and

Zimbabwe. Headquartered in Harare (Zimbabwe) and Lomé (Togo), WILDAF regularly holds conferences, distributes newsletters and flyers, runs candidates for political offices, challenges instances of discrimination and does whatever it deems necessary to promote the rights of African women.³⁵

Clearly, based on these microcosmic examples as models for many, many more, twenty-first century pan-Africanism is alive, well and growing in the African community and in the world at large. Vestiges of the old Scramble may remain, but they are being steadily rooted out and displaced from the African garden as permanent change is occurring and will continue to do so.

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16

Chapter

Language in the Recovery of Ourselves: The *Medew Netjer* (Hieroglyphics) in the Construction of Pan-Afrikan Unity

Kimani S Nehusi

Inspiration

Not, in the saying of you, are you
said. Baffled and like a root
stopped by a stone you turn back questioning
the tree you feed. But what the leaves hear
is not what the roots ask.

– Martin Carter¹

... the West has not been calm enough and objective enough to teach us our history correctly, without crude falsifications ... Ancient Egypt was a Negro civilization. The history of Black Africa will remain suspended in air and cannot be written correctly until African historians dare to connect it with the history of Egypt.

– Cheikh Anta Diop²

16.1 The Scramble and its Effects: The General Situation as We Meet

The Afrikan world continues to suffer the effects of a twin catastrophe which began to unfold among its people about a millennium and a half ago: the Arab invasion and destruction, and the European invasion and destruction. The combined effects of this Afrikan Holocaust are termed the *Maafa*, a Kiswahili term which translates as ‘great destruction’. It is the greatest crime in history. The greatest destruction and horror caused by this terror was not the physical bondage that Western scholarship tends to focus upon. It is the deep spiritual, psychological and cultural devastation consequent upon the destruction of our spiritual system, our separation from our narratives of ourselves, the interrupted intergenerational conversation among us involving those who were here, those who are here, and those who are yet to come here, the deleted memories, the altered and distorted identities which condemn so many of us to mental enslavement, underachievement and impoverishment.

Some Afrikans have studied the effects of this crime from various perspectives and there are an increasing number of programmes within Afrikan communities to combat the effects of this massive catastrophe. But there has never been any comprehensive intervention to treat the resultant acute stress disorder syndrome

which has consumed many of Afrika's children in the past and continues to do so to this day.

One aspect of this invisible bomb that exploded in the consciousness of the Afrikan world and keeps reproducing itself, like a self-sustaining nuclear fission in the mind of every generation since the initial blast, is the disconnection from our history and therefore the disconnection from ourselves, from our sense of wholeness. Today we continue to be Balkanised, divided, weak, oppressed and exploited because we have accepted and come to live a vision of ourselves as fundamentally different from each other, instead of different branches of the same tree; never understanding that we are but different flowers borne by different stems from a single tree fed by roots anchored deep in the rich soil of our common Afrikan past.

Amidst the continuing scramble for our resources in old and new forms, from old and new agencies, the basic task facing Afrikans has always been, and remains, the challenge to regain possession of ourselves in our own image, on our own Afrikan terms. Our history shows that we cannot compromise on this fundamental, for everything else depends upon getting this right. For if we do not know who we are, we cannot know for certain what our real interests are. And if we do not know what our real interests are, how can we defend and advance them? While others scramble for our resources, we must scramble for the repossession of that most important resource of them all: our minds. For if we do not repossess our minds we will never repossess our continent and the vilest contradictions will continue to blight our lives each day. We will continue to have the richest continent but be the poorest people; live on the second largest land mass on earth but exist in the weakest and most dismembered states, designed and implemented by our oppressors; have the distinction of organising the first civilisations but benefiting the least from our ancestors' creations and therefore our common inheritance; possess the longest and richest history but the shortest memory, and learn little or nothing from the great lessons it offers.

16.2 Some Parameters

It has been said that the answers to the challenges confronting the Afrikan people lie in our past. That is true: our afflictions are clearly rooted in our past. But it is true for another reason. The way we interact with that past also holds the solutions to our afflictions. In the Afrikan tradition of deep thought or philosophy, the ancient Egyptian idea of *Weheme Mesut*, somewhat restated as Sankofa among the Twi-speaking Afrikans in Ghana and Ivory Coast, indicates that it is rewarding to interrogate the past in order to learn vital lessons which may be deployed to solve current difficulties. Doubtless other branches of our people have similar terms³ we could employ to describe our own methodology to understand our past as part of our effort to achieve our vision of a better future.

This chapter examines some of the ways in which the *Medew Netjer* illuminates problems we face today. Answers are found at two levels, first, to specific problems and, second, as another method for approaching pan-Afrikanism. Similarities and continuities between ancient Egypt and living Afrika are identified. The contrasts between Afrikan-centred and Eurocentric interpretations of the same information are on occasion pointed out. But this is not by any means a comprehensive exposition of what the *Medew Netjer* offers in our attempt to recover ourselves in full. Considerations of space demand that we restrict our attention to a few areas. We shall therefore concentrate here on the origins of the Ancient Egyptians and the way they organised the family.

16.3 The Significance of the Mdw NTr: *Medew Netjer*

The *Medew Netjer* belongs to a large corpus of scripts invented by Afrikan people to represent their speech in a graphic way. It was the first writing system in the world and promoted vastly increased communication and national unity in Kemet, ancient Egypt, in various ways, including the harmonisation and standardisation of at least three dialects. The debate about the identity of the *Medew Netjer* and its creators has moved on. Scholars at the leading edge of the study of Kemet, the first civilisation in the world, are no longer debating whether it was an Afrikan civilisation, but are working to find out the details of how this was so.⁴

The rmT n kmt (Coptic *remenkemi*), the ‘people of Kemet’ or ancient Egyptians, the founders of Kemet, were Afrikans and the population of the country remained predominantly Afrikan throughout the life of that civilisation. The current Arab demographic predominance in Egypt and the rest of North Afrika is a historically recent development which dates from the seventh century CE, long after the foundation and development of Kemet.⁵

Many of the social ideas, ideals and practices of the people of Kemet are preserved and reflected in the Mdw NTr *Medew Netjer*, literally, ‘Words of the God’ or ‘Divine Language’, which is the name they called their language. It is commonly known by the Greek term ‘hieroglyphics’ (Greek: *hiero* = god; *glyph* = sacred writing) in the West today.

16.4 Recovering Ourselves: Some Specific Examples and Patterns from Our Social History

The only way we can be certain of making any sense of this fast-moving and often chaotic and bewildering world is to step back and consider the most fundamental question that may face any group of human beings. Who are we? How do we define ourselves, and why? We come into this world with but ourselves, our bodies,

our minds and our spirit. If we are blessed, we may inherit the story of our ancestors, which will provide us with a reference point that orients us correctly, tells us who we are, how we fit into the world and, therefore, what our real interests are and what our duty must be in every situation that confronts us down the corridors of history.

It does not matter what we learn or what we teach. If we Afrikans do not begin with ourselves, we commit a series of the gravest violations. If we do not begin our story at our very beginnings, or as close to them as is possible, then we dishonour our sacred ancestors, desecrate their work and risk disorienting ourselves and compounding our errors in the most profound way.

16.4.1 Navel string, placenta, ancestral spirits and origins: The South or Inner Afrika

The people of Kemet consciously pointed towards the south as their place of origin. This is the reason why that direction held great significance for them. To the ancient Egyptian, the south, the headwaters of the Nile in the Great Lakes region of Afrika, where humanity was born, is a sacred place. In Kemet, water drawn from the River Nile, especially from the region of the First Cataract, was highly prized for the pouring of libation, a pan-Afrikan ritual,⁶ since tradition had it that the water drawn from this area was guaranteed to be pure because it was nearer than anywhere else in Kemet to the symbolic source of the river. Such a conclusion appears to be verified in the name the people of Kemet gave to this region of their country. It is qbHw: *Kebhu*,⁷ which must mean, literally, ‘pure land’ or ‘pure region’. This term is also consistent with the name the people of Kemet gave to the extreme south of their country (of which this region was a part), Wpt-tA = ‘Earth’s beginning’.⁸ This term means, literally, ‘the beginning of all land’, ‘the place where the water comes out of the land’. It was obviously a sacred place to the citizens of Kemet, who knew that that was the direction of their origin, for in fact they referred to Afrika south of their country by names such as *Ta-Kenset*, literally ‘placenta-land’, *Khenti* = ‘land of beginnings’ and *Ta-iaakhu* = ‘the land of the spirits’, that is, ‘where the souls of ancestors dwell’⁹ or ‘god’s land’, ‘the land of the ancestors’.¹⁰

It is helpful here to refer to a fact established below. To the ancient Egyptians, ancestors were revered persons. It is partly for this reason that the dwelling place of their ancestors was a sacred place. It was sacred also on account of the related fact of it being the place of their origin.

Great significance was attached to the navel string, or umbilical cord, and to the placenta or afterbirth, which the ancient Egyptian called the *kh*. This regard for the cord and afterbirth is reflected in the spiritual principles and teachings of Kemet: the god Horus felt compelled to retrieve the umbilical cord of his murdered

father Ausur from Seth and accord it the proper burial. Utterance 17 of the *Book of Going Forth into Enlightenment*, generally termed in the West *The Egyptian Book of the Dead*,¹¹ suggests that the cutting of the cord was associated with ritual cleansing. A reading of the medical texts of Kemet shows that the umbilical cord was not cut until the baby had been cleaned and bathed and the afterbirth had appeared. Both the umbilical cord and the afterbirth held deep spiritual significance for the people of Kemet, as they still do for the great majority of Afrikans today. The people of Kemet believed that the cord and afterbirth held the ‘spiritual *alter ego* or double of the child’: what happened to them was directly linked to the fate of the baby. Hence, cord and afterbirth were often preserved by drying, and kept to be buried with the owner, or buried safely at the entrance of the owner’s house, or thrown into the Nile.¹²

These exact cultural attitudes towards the umbilical cord, the placenta, ancestors and the place of their burial are alive all over the Afrikan world today. Afrikans on the continent and in the communities abroad today regard the placenta and umbilical cord or navel string in exactly the same way.¹³ In some parts of the diaspora, ‘*Me navel string bury deh!*’ (‘My navel string is buried there!’) is the standard affirmation of this inseparable link with the land in which one’s navel string is buried. In some parts of the Caribbean, the placenta is buried and sometimes a young tree planted on the spot, which is thereafter considered sacred. The idea is that the new arrival will tend the plant as they both grow to maturity. Most often it is a grandmother (sometimes the grandfather) who buries the navel string. In other instances it is simply buried under a tree, which always becomes a psychological marker of belonging. The interconnection of all these ideas may further be demonstrated in the fact that Aina (Yoruba) is a name usually given to a child born with the umbilical cord entwined around his or her neck. It is also the name of a town in Kemet and one in Yorubaland.¹⁴ There appears to be a syndrome of related ideas concerning some names, the concept of ancestors and the navel string, placenta and place of burial waiting to be recovered from the unremembered records of ourselves.

The ancient Egyptian belief that the southern region of their country was a sacred and perhaps even a pristine place also finds expression in the term ‘*Herr des Kataraktengebiets*’¹⁵ literally ‘Master of the Cataracts’, but more precisely, ‘Owner of the Cataracts’, one of the titles they gave to Khnum, who we must note was a creator divinity.

To the people of Kemet, this sacred land in Upper or southern Egypt, near to the First Cataract and contiguous with inner Afrika, is the place of origin of Osiris (Wosir), the culture hero and bringer of civilisation to Egypt and eventually everywhere else. He would later become Judge of the Underworld. Wosir and Auset

(Isis), his sister-wife, would become two of the most significant figures in the long history of the land and eventually of other lands, including Greece, the Roman Empire and Europe in later ages.¹⁶ The knowledge of inner Afrika ‘as the chief source of the spiritual – “The Land of the Gods” or “The Land of the Spirits”’ has persisted, even after the Arab invasion and domination of Kemet.¹⁷

Within Egypt the south was commonly recognised as the residence of the ancestral divinities, shrines and mystical power. ‘All Egyptians shared the tradition that the holiest spots in Egypt were in the very Negroid south ... The rulers there had high mystical status, and southerners were people who were believed to have close contact with “the ancestors” and were custodians of the earliest sources of mystical power, such as the shrine of Hathor ... and above all, the shrine of Hapi, god of the Nile, at the first cataract. During low Niles and floods, pharaohs travelled to the latter site to seek a change in the behaviour of the river’.¹⁸ Specific expression of this reverence of the south as the origin of ancestors is illustrated in the oft-recounted story of Pharaoh Pepi II and the Baka (Pigmy) man who is referred to in the literature of Egyptology as a ‘dwarf’. This man was from the ‘Land of Punt’ or ‘Land of the Spirits’. He was highly regarded because of this origin, as well as his related knowledge of ‘the dances of the ancestors’.¹⁹ Such reverence of the south seems to have exerted a powerful influence upon the Asiatic usurpers called the Hyksos, who persistently ‘sought the prestige of an alliance with the South’ in order to try to legitimise themselves as proper rulers in this Afrikan country.²⁰ The recognition of the south as the initiator and spiritual and cultural heartland of Kemet is almost universal to this day, for the Old Kingdom, which was unmistakably rooted in the Afrikan south, is widely understood to be the formative and classical era of Kemet.

16.4.2 *Abt M Kmt: Abet – The family in Kemet*

The family has been the primary institution for most of the social history of humanity. The nature of the family in Kemet is the site of a curious debate among scholars. Generally, Afrikan-centred scholarship concludes, on the demonstrated bases of cultural similarities and continuities between Kemet and contemporary Afrika, that the family in Kemet is an Afrikan ‘extended’ family marked by strong matrilineal lines of descent and inheritance, among other characteristics.²¹ Since terminology articulates ideology, part of this debate is about terminology and therefore about ideology. As Asante points out, the use of the term ‘extended’ is common in the West where the notion of the nuclear family is considered as the standard form. The inference here is that the concept of the extended family, rooted as it is in the notion of the European nuclear family, is discordant and misleading, as the referent is to an entirely different cultural form of the family in

Afrika. Asante posits the term ‘consanguineal’ instead.²² Some Egyptologists have recognised the ‘extended’ nature of this family, but the dominant tendency within Egyptology is silence on this question of racial and cultural identity, leaving it to be inferred that the past and current Egyptians are the same people, or asserting this to be true.²³ Further, the literature of Egyptology on the two critical factors of kinship terms and social organisation of the family in Kemet, is characterised by contradiction, incompleteness and the imposition of European terminology and cultural concepts that argue, at best, an incomplete and misleading understanding of the family in this society.²⁴ This is part of a wider debate over the identity of the people of Kemet.²⁵ Reconstruction and analysis of the family and family roles in Kemet provide much understanding of the culture of the people of that land.

In Kemet a family was established when a *si*, a man and a *st*, a woman, began living together as husband and wife, usually with the woman moving into the home of the man. There is no known spiritual, legal or civil ceremony marking this cultural event, but the union received legal sanction. Such unions were usually endogamous, between parties from within the same profession or occupation.²⁶

The home was much more than a mere ‘center of production of all the food and clothing required by a family’.²⁷ It was, and still is in Afrika, the spiritual, physical, social and psychological anchor of the family, which was in turn the major site of the transmission of values, attitudes, behavioural patterns and information from one generation to the other. It seems that initially this intergenerational transmission was dominated by apprenticeships and mentoring of most boys and girls, as there was a strong tendency for a girl to follow the occupation or profession of her mother, and a boy that of his father. As the development of society unfolded and new institutions such as the education system arose to meet new needs, as well as old needs on a vastly increased scale, mentoring and apprenticeships were retained as important modes of knowledge transmission.

16.4.3 Kinship concepts

The origins of the relevant ancient Egyptian kinship terms which translate into English as ‘mother’, ‘father’, ‘elder’, ‘ancestor’, ‘brother’, ‘sister’, ‘son’ and ‘daughter’ are so old that they are lost in the mists of the time before the inception of the Old Kingdom of Kemet, that is, before 3000 BCE by the minimalist estimate. However, it is possible to indicate that these origins are rooted in the very ancient understandings and practices of the people of Kemet, or ancient Egyptians.

16.4.3.1 Ancestors as part of the family: Respect for elders

Here is a saying of Ptahhotep, a wise ancestor and one of the most outstanding sages of Kemet. His *sbAyt*, *sebayt* or written teaching, instructions, or even maxims,

have been widely quoted and much studied. He speaks to us from over four and a half thousand years ago:

ix Dd=i n=f mdw

Then I will tell him (the) words

sDmyw sxrw²⁸ imyw-HAt

(of) those who obeyed (the) counsels (of the) ancestors

pAw sDm²⁹ n nTrw

who obeyed the divinities (gods).

The relationship among elders, ancestors and divinity was clearly established and expressed in the classical tradition of the Afrikan people many millennia ago. A clear hierarchy of wisdom, power and authority is articulated in this teaching. These attributes, indispensable for any successful society, originate from divinity and are passed down to ancestors, to elders, and thence to the younger generations. The younger people are instructed by Ptahhotep, who is a wise elder – more – a sage. But Ptahhotep says that his words come from the sDmyw, literally ‘the listeners’ or ‘those who obeyed’, but also ‘judges’³⁰ and therefore persons who are wise because they listened to and obeyed the ancestors. And the ancestors obeyed the divinities. This is a detailing of the hierarchy of wisdom, power and authority, as well as the connections among various beings in the cosmos. It is the same wherever Afrikans have retained their culture. Once again we must note that a fundamental principle in Kemet is continued, alive and well, in contemporary Afrika.

There is no fear of old age here. This is a natural condition, a consequence of birth and life, that is willingly and fully, even joyfully, embraced and valued highly in Afrikan society. Old age is simultaneously a privilege and a great practical advantage in that it provides the benefits of accumulated knowledge and wisdom while linking the generations on this side of reality and providing pointers towards our ancestors. The aged are cherished and are given much importance and attention in Afrikan communities. That is why elders and ancestors remain incorporated within the family, the clan and the community. They are great repositories of experience, often of knowledge, insight and wisdom. They therefore serve as valuable sources of advice and guidance to the younger generations, who are the less experienced and often less knowledgeable members of the family, the clan and the community. In Afrikan communities that remain Afrikan, it is not normal to shunt off elders to some ‘old people’s home’ where their great value is unutilised and their dignity diminished. The scourge of ageism, of a negative view of elders as useless, which is so rampant in Western society, is not possible in a real Afrikan society. In fact, all over Afrika before the *Maafa*, from the smallest

and most humble to the most complex societies, elders were tutors and advisors to rulers, or rulers themselves. It was their experience and wisdom that made society accord them these important roles, among others. Elders were valued, encouraged, stimulated and even challenged by their roles, so that they ‘had to be informed and alert because of their responsibilities’.³¹

In the *Medew Netjer* one of the earliest ways of writing the term ‘fathers’ was *itw*.³² This way of representing the concept graphically was extant during the Old Kingdom, when the conventions of the writing system were being established. Of special interest here is the fact that, in the first example, the word is written with the ideographic determinative of the ‘seated man’, number A50 in Gardiner’s Sign List. Its meaning is ‘revered person’.³³ The same meaning is true for mothers. This meaning of progenitor as revered person is considerably substantiated in some additional facts about this language. The word for family, Abt: *abet*, was current up to the early part of the second millennium,³⁴ after which it was replaced by other ways of writing it. These terms also contain the seated-man sense sign and so therefore the notion of reverence. Even further, most of the words for ancestors, including bAHi,³⁵ imyw-HAt, *imyuhat*,³⁶ tpyw-a,³⁷ and Drtyw³⁸ also carry the seated-man determinative or sense sign. This is consistent with the foregoing, in showing that all ancestors were revered. Again, the term ‘qr Ht’ means both an ancestral spirit and a local divinity,³⁹ which indicates that ancestors were treated as divine. It may also be said that fathers and mothers were revered because of their roles as progenitors, since the words for fathers, mothers, or fathers and mothers collectively, all carry the meaning of progenitors or ancestors and may therefore also mean grandfathers and grandmothers, however far removed. The fact that this usage is found in the *Book of Vindication*, commonly known in the West as the *Pyramid Texts*,⁴⁰ one of the oldest texts in the world, indicates just how ancient it is – and just how long and deeply held is this understanding of parent as venerated progenitor or ancestor among Afrikans. This antiquity of the early writing of *abet* or family and it: father, with the seated-man determinative or sense sign that indicates reverence, shows that the idea of father, and indeed every progenitor, as a revered person, was already fixed in the very early stages in the development of writing in Kemet. This in turn may indicate that it is entirely likely that this convention existed well before the invention of writing and so passed into that medium as a commonly held perception, indeed a sociological fact that reflected itself in the language of the people. It is also quite possible to conclude that this principle was so widespread and so deeply held that the people of Kemet at some stage no longer felt it necessary to represent it in the writing of all their words for ancestors or progenitors. It may be of some significance to the continuing breadth and depth of this idea that it is still held in common in the Afrikan world today.

The status of ‘revered person’ doubtlessly enhanced the positioning and roles of the father-figure, mother-figure and indeed all elders and ancestors. These were all very pivotal figures in the evolution of human society in Kemet.

16.4.3.2 Defining fatherhood

In Medew Netjer the word for husband is *hi*, *hy*, *hay*; that for male is *tjay*. Further, one of the terms which means ‘to copulate’ is rx: *rekh*, literally ‘to know a woman’.⁴¹ Each of these two terms is written with the male determinative or sense sign of a penis,⁴² signifying the organ itself and all that is represented by it, issues from it or is performed by it.⁴³ On the other hand, the word for father does not have this determinative or sense sign. Hence the first fact that may be noted of the ancient Egyptian construction of fatherhood is that it was not limited to a mere biological progenitor. Troy Allen makes a pertinent observation on this matter:

It is interesting to note that the ancient Kemites do not use the male organ in the word father. Obviously [they] recognized that the ability to use one’s male organ for the purpose of biological reproduction did not equate with fatherhood in the social sense.⁴⁴

Being a father was something much grander than being a mere agent, one of two parties, in biological reproduction. That latter was only the corporeal or physical basis, the material platform upon which non-material aspects of the person, roles and functions were erected. Fatherhood also meant social, cultural and spiritual reproduction and was part of a guarantee of the future. We shall see that the same pattern is evident in the terms used for other aspects of the family; these concepts transcended the blood ties which they initially described. The facts about how the people of Kemet actually practised this concept in their everyday life – the operational definition of fatherhood – speak in eloquent and abundant testimony in support of Allen’s conclusion.

Understanding this concept of fatherhood as developed and practised by Afrikans in ancient Kemet may be partly helpful in approaching the problem of absent fathers which currently bedevils some of our communities.

16.4.3.3 Defining womanhood

It is instructive that in the language of Kemet there is a term nbt pr, *nebet per*, which translates as ‘owner of the house’, the title of the wife or lady of the domain. This term does not have a masculine equivalent; there was no ‘master of the house’ in Kemet.⁴⁵ It is the same in much of the Afrikan world today, where the ‘woman is the mistress of the home in the economic sense of the word’.⁴⁶ Though there is some debate among Egyptologists as to its exact meaning,⁴⁷ the term *nebet*

per points towards some female managerial functions – the latter terminology is common in modern Western society and tends to privilege males and obscure females in such roles. The *per*, or house, was the woman's domain. Scholars have concluded that the mother–child relationship was the first in the sociology of the family and that it remained the primary bond upon which the family is constructed in Kemet and the rest of Afrika.⁴⁸ It is therefore entirely likely that motherhood was the first institution in human history, extant before fatherhood or the family, though not before childhood; these two called each other into being simultaneously. The enormous respect of the Afrikan man for his mother, a characteristic present throughout the Afrikan world today, may be rooted in this ancient fact of our social history, for it was certainly present in Kemet.⁴⁹

16.4.3.4 'Brother' means husband; 'sister' means wife

In the *Medew Netjer* the term zA (Old Kingdom) > sA, *sa* means 'son'. The feminisation of this term yields zAt (Old Kingdom) > sAt, *sat*: daughter. Etymologically, these two terms are closely related to *si* and *st*, which are the terms for man and woman, respectively. In fact, it may be said that they are descended from those two terms in much the same way as sons and daughters are descended from men and women. It is the same with the terms for brother and sister, as Obenga notes.⁵⁰ In this language the basic familial terms are etymologically all closely related, they share the same root.

The terms *sen* and *senet* are normally translated as 'brother' and 'sister'. This usage indicates *only* a biological or blood relationship. These meanings have been applied to many Egyptology texts but are not fully consistent with a greater reality that is to be understood from analysis of the language of the people, and often indicated by historically recent research from both Afrikan centred and Egyptological perspectives.

Scholarly understanding of these two terms has advanced significantly from that of Wilkinson, who in 1854, on the basis of brother–sister marriages among the Ptolemies, erroneously generalised this royal – as well as divine – custom to the entire population of Kemet, among whom he projected it backwards from the early history of the country.⁵¹ We must note, *en passant*, that brother–sister marriages also existed in the divine domain of Kemet, where it may be argued that this expedient was enforced by the absence of alternative marriage partners at the very beginning of the social world. The sacred literature of Kemet reveals brother–sister partners among the earliest beings created: Isis and Osiris, Setekh and Nephthys, Geb and Nuit, and Shu and Tefnut.

Wilkinson was followed by others in his error; substantially, for example, in 1886 by Erman⁵² and notably also by Breasted in 1909, whose very restricted

interpretation of these terms led him to the false conclusion that ‘... it was customary in *all* ranks of society for a youth to marry his sister’.⁵³ The bias of some Egyptologists has prevented them from observing the ancient Egyptians through the latter’s own cultural lens, and delayed our full and proper understanding of this society. The impatience of one scholar with cultural difference, or perhaps a failure to recognise that difference, is evident even while acknowledging the confusion over the meanings of these terms that reigned in early Egyptology: ‘The paucity of Egyptian kinship terminology (father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter being the only terms used), and the tendency to apply these terms rather loosely so that “sister” could be used to describe a sibling, a wife or a lover, confused many early Egyptologists’.⁵⁴

There is more than enough evidence to show that the ancient Egyptians did not always indicate only biological ties when they deployed these terms. Here the conclusions of other recent scholarship, though in instances slightly inaccurate, are more helpful in describing the living reality of the land as experienced and perceived by its people. It is these, their own perceptions of what they did, and why, that are the most genuine sources of understanding and explanation of the actions of the ancient Egyptians and of their world. Capel and Markoe⁵⁵ give us ‘*senet*, a term denoting both sister and wife’. Bryan says that the same term meant ‘a broad range of sisters, aunts and nieces’⁵⁶ and ‘female collateral relation, including both wife and true sister, as well as sister-in-law and cousin’.⁵⁷ Further evidence of this usage, for both brother and sister, is to be found in certain love poems of Kemet, in which

‘... lovers refer to each other as “brother” and “sister”, these words being the normal terms of endearment in ancient Egyptian usage’.⁵⁸ Extant examples are legion. One will suffice. On his statue (Cairo 1107), Simut, an Eighteenth Dynasty priest, describes Baky, his wife, as ‘His sister, his beloved in his affection, Lady of the House ...’.⁵⁹

This evidence suggests that as society developed there was an expansion in the semantic field; the meanings of these terms were extended to embrace any loving, caring and supportive relationship between and among males and/or females, especially of similar age. Further linguistic evidence appears to support this view, and may even argue an earlier expansion in meaning, since the terms for brother, sister, smell, kiss and companion or equal all appear to share a common morphological root: *sn*, to which phonetic complements were added to differentiate and specify meaning within a common semantic domain, in which these terms seem to represent related proximal or neighbouring notions of emotional and social closeness, bonding, equality and companionship. It is the Afrikan-centred scholar,

Théophile Obenga, who points us towards the cultural context that makes all this fully intelligible: '*L'Égyptien nomme parfois son épouse* (Hmt) *par le mot sœur* (snt). *C'est bien africain.*' ('The Egyptian sometimes calls his wife by the word sister. It is very African.')

⁶⁰ Here it is inescapable that the application of *sen* = 'brother', as well as the other familial terms in their expanded meanings, is also very Afrikan.

There is no doubt that the terms *sa* son, *sat* daughter, *sen* brother and *senet* sister, perhaps originally, but certainly in their most restrictive sense, indicated only blood relations. But, as can be observed for the other familial terms, 'father' and 'mother', 'brother' and 'sister', such minimal meanings and usage are almost always likely to be based upon readings that, in their imposition of the European model of the family into the information on the family of Kemet, are too restrictive and are likely to be misleading. Full and accurate understandings of the meanings of these terms and the related matter of the nature of the family in Kemet hold very important implications for our understanding of ourselves.

Egyptians did not possess terms for cousin, uncle, aunt or niece. Cousins were children of the same (consanguineal or extended) family, therefore they were sisters and brothers. Each of these other relationships was designated by way of a combination of terms for other primary relationships, such as 'brother of my father' (paternal uncle in European conception), 'sister of my mother' (maternal aunt), 'my spouse, daughter of her mother' followed by the name of her mother (wife). These terms are more accurate, apart from being more affectionate than the European. Further, they also unerringly locate these relations within the family. These very linguistic structures, as well as the texture of the sociological and psychological context they communicate, are evident in contemporary Afrikan society, but are alien to the European tradition of the family.⁶¹ The terms employed to designate such relationships are the very ones which describe blood relationships, for although blood relations are very important to Afrikan people, the quality of these relations is more important than mere blood ties alone, which are neither unacknowledged nor diminished in this context. On the other hand, European family relations are predominantly characterised by a number of terms which indicate a social distance that is not normal in the Afrikan family. Once again we behold language as a record of, and a witness to, the social history of a people.

16.5 Conclusion: (Re)Connections and pan-Afrikanism

What does this information, carried in the *Medew Netjer*, tell us about ourselves? These patterns of similarities represent continuities that are links between our direct ancestors and/or inheritors from a common ancestry.⁶² They tell us that we need to know more about these distant details of earlier selves, for we cannot know and understand who we are if we omit significant aspects of our story.

This information raises old questions in new ways, as well as new questions – but all in urgent ways. Why is it that Afrikans appear to share a significant number of values, attitudes and behaviours? Where do our social possessions come from? What does this tell us about ourselves? The task of Afrikan scholarship is surely to pursue these similarities, connections and continuities among ourselves as we have traditionally constructed our world – without walls between those past, those present and those who are coming into being. It is equally important not to avoid variations and real differences. After all, the Afrikan experience occupies the grandest dimensions of space and time and it is therefore logical that variation and differentiation would occur among the children of this experience. This makes the myriad connections among us even more astonishing – and even more important.

The examples offered here are far from exhaustive. They are merely indicative. We must also note that a few connections do not prove a case for intensive and extensive relations. Indeed, this is exactly what this chapter indicates. There is a majesty and a magnitude in the knowledge waiting to be unlocked within the *Medew Netjer*, and it is Afrika's task to accomplish, for it is only Afrika, not anyone else, that can truly (re)discover itself for itself, ancient and modern, its complete self.

This brief examination of the *Medew Netjer*, the language of ancient Egypt, shows us that a language is not just linguistic phenomena divorced from the processes unfolding in society. It is a record of and a witness to a people's experiences, values, attitudes, perceptions and patterned behaviours; it carries social, cultural and spiritual concepts, an entire worldview. The relations exposed by the specific linguistic data discussed here are not mere blood relationships in the narrowest understanding of that term, but the social, political, economic and spiritual realities lived by a people. In one word, the language reflects the culture of its creators and users. The culture reflected in this language is without doubt a specific and early example of Afrikan culture. This is therefore another argument for the conclusion that ancient Egypt was an Afrikan civilisation.

An encounter with the *Medew Netjer* is therefore an encounter with an outstanding creation of some of our early ancestors and with one of the earliest surviving detailed expressions of ourselves. It indicates that we do not possess a differentiated self, though there were variations and differences among us, for we are all connected by the similarities contained in this early record of ourselves.

If the Afrikan people are to successfully meet the challenges of development, we must throw off the continuing effects of cultural genocide, physical and mental enslavement, trauma, economic subjugation and other living consequences of Arab and European adventures in Afrika. If we Afrikans are to change our reality we must first of all be willing to change ourselves, for the new Afrika is not possible

without the new Afrikans. It is therefore imperative that we reject the distorted, diminished and demeaning image of Afrika and Afrikans so assiduously propagated by our oppressors. Conversely, we must inculcate a truthful image of the self, one based upon the real history of Afrika, and so of this world. It is a history that shows the full possibilities of the Afrikan self, for it shows the full extent of Afrikan accomplishments in every field of human endeavour. This objective renders necessary a full and coherent account of the Afrikan story, one that will begin at our beginnings, erase the omissions, correct the distortions and fill the gaps created by colonial historiography, which are victors' narratives designed to diminish and demean Afrikans and so seek to justify Arab and European conquest and oppression. The real history of Afrika connects all Afrikans to their own story. Some of the key objectives of such a historiography are the reincorporation of Kemet and the Nile Valley into the history of Afrika, and the connection of the people of each region of the continent and the communities abroad, resulting from each diaspora, to their deepest origins. The *Medew Netjer* should be studied and interrogated for all it may yield about our earliest recorded selves – and there is undoubtedly much to be learnt in this way. Here it is essential that the principle enunciated by Vincent B. Thompson be followed, for 'no region of Afrika, nor section of its population in any of its diasporas, can be properly understood, or understood at all, without the entire continent as a major frame of reference'.⁶³

For too long has Afrikan human sciences struggled to overcome the racist Eurocentric organisation of knowledge, which often defines difference from European norms as deviance or deformation, even something terminally ill. The incorporation of the *Medew Netjer* in the arts and sciences of Afrika will be a decisive step in the reinvigoration of an Afrikan indigenous knowledge system, aid the construction of an Afrikan library on Afrika's own terms and render Afrikans infinitely more capable of understanding ourselves. It will show our connections to one another through common fundamentals of culture, including worldview. It will also help us to understand another aspect of our common history. It is a cornerstone in telling us that in spite of some variations, we are one people, from the same source, with one history, one struggle and one destiny. It is a real basis for pan-Afrikanism.

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- 3 Afrikan people belong to a single tradition that has been balkanised by others who emphasise difference and do not see the basic similarities and the continuities they represent in Afrikan

culture. This vision does not deny genuine difference and variation; it puts them in an objective perspective.

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- 28 sxrw = ‘counsels’, in the sense of advice. This term may also be translated as ‘custom’ or even ‘tradition’, terms which indicate greater authority and power than mere advice. This translation is not strange to the Afrikan understanding and practice. In fact, it is completely in harmony with it.
- 29 sDm = literally, ‘to hear’, but also ‘to listen’, ‘to understand’ and ‘to obey’. The verb ‘to hear’ still has these very same meanings in many Afrikan languages, including Ebonics. ‘Obeyed’ is preferred here because of the greater force of tradition, in the form of ancestors and divinity, which are very significant aspects of this context.
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Conclusion

Renascent and United Africans: Never Again to Any Form of Scramble for Africa

Mammo Muchie, Sanya Osha and Matlotleng P Matlou

Introduction: Is History Repeating Itself?

It is far easier for the proverbial camel to pass through the needle's eye, hump and all, than for an erstwhile colonial administration to give sound and honest counsel of a political nature to its liberated territory.

– Kwame Nkrumah

Today is unlike yesterday; so too will tomorrow and today differ. However, today provides a bridge between the known of yesterday and the unknown of tomorrow. Thus, knowing and understanding yesterday enables us, guides us and teaches us about what actions we must undertake today and plan for tomorrow. Those who do not learn from history are bound to repeat its mistakes and cannot reap the benefits of either hindsight or foresight. Our commitment during the 2011 Scramble for Africa conference was to ensure that the work of the participants would be captured for posterity in this book as a contribution to the understanding of the conditions and processes leading to the fragmentation, enslavement, colonisation and underdevelopment of Africa through the actions of external parties, often with local cooperation or collusion. It also covers the post-independence era and an analysis of why Africa had made relatively little progress compared to other developing regions globally. Africa has not learnt sufficiently from her yesterday: her today is a cause for concern and tomorrow is therefore unlikely to differ if she continues on a similar trajectory.

As outlined in the introduction, the chapters presented in this volume bring together distinctive discursive strands that cut across the work, with the Berlin Conference of 1884 providing a significant backdrop as the authors ponder Africa's past and modern colourations. The scholars recognised that the past influences, the present and the ongoing new scramble for Africa's natural and human resources is predicated on the weaknesses and fragmentation of the continent. This also compels us to examine the consequences of the colonial encounter and its multifarious legacies. In addition, Africa's problems of development are given adequate scrutiny and, finally, Africa's political and economic future is cast in shades of optimism on the understanding that vision backed with adequate leadership can be the catalysts that propel Africa to a glorious future. In this regard, the global ideology of pan-Africanism is usually a motivating factor to explore and connect with the past, and to project into the future various possibilities for Africa.¹

Is Pan-Africanism the Answer to Africa's Sustainable Development?

The very fact that the conversation continues on whether Africa is still threatened with new scrambles over its resources, economy and politics demonstrates the prevailing vulnerable position that African states find themselves in to this day, irrespective of how each on its own may be stronger relative to other African states. The key is that the inter-African network is not yet strong; it suffers from the legacy of a past that has not fully opened the space in which inter-African solidarity, networking, synergies and union can flourish. The past colonial project of fragmentation largely hinders; it does not facilitate inter-African union and the manifestation of a united African agency. Africans must take the courageous step to revalidate and recognise the rich culture, tradition and values that they have that others have undermined, making them look to alien cultures, values and traditions. It is the hunted Africans that should have written their history, but it is the hunting colonial and imperial forces that continue to have the upper hand in telling the African story. It is Africans in large numbers who were stolen and taken to the Americas, struggling for survival from the time they arrived until the present day. That humiliation has been fiercely contested by Africans, but we cannot say for certain that it has ended for good. The African world, both inside the continent and outside, continues to face challenges that try the patience of present generations. The road is still rough. The direction is open to many ways. The true path of unity is still elusive. Currently there are many declarations for unity, but actual practice in forging unity seems to be inversely related to the talk of unity. This has to change.

The present also has divergent paths. Since the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was born in 1963, there has been a state-driven process with a pan-African orientation, where African heads of state meet and discuss issues, pass resolutions and make efforts to undertake various programmes together. After the OAU changed into the African Union (AU), there was hope of an 'African Renaissance', but understandings of this concept are as varied as the heads of state that espouse it. The originator of this concept in recent times is Thabo Mbeki, the former South African president. How far the renaissance process will be driven by the entire African universe remains to be seen.

African people have manifested many different pan-Africanist principles as guidelines for their renaissance, unity and development. In the past there were different political and socio-economic formations across the continent from empires to city states. Unfortunately, this internal process of convergence and dissolution of state formation was interrupted by external interventions including the Arab and Atlantic slave trades, unequal mercantile trading relations mainly with Europe and, eventually, the colonisation of virtually the whole continent. Africans fought

gallantly against these incursions, but were eventually defeated by more powerful scientific knowledge and military might. Other forms of resistance were then developed and some of these were of a pan-Africanist nature. Many of them began in the diaspora and include the various pan-Africanist congresses commencing from 1900, held in Europe until the 1940s and then in independent Africa since the 1950s. Some of the leaders of these campaigns include Marcus Garvey, Sylvester Williams, W.E.B. Du Bois, George Padmore, Kwame Nkrumah, Peter Abrahams and Dudley Thompson among others. This pan-African project has continued in different forms over the past century.

Is Pan-Africanism Global or Limited to the African Continent?

One variant of this pan-Africanism is that which sees Africans across the globe as one family, combining geography and the origins of a people. This explains why the AU Summit on 3 February 2003 introduced a Protocol on Amendments to its Constitutive Act, to include Article 3(q) wherein it states as one of its objectives that it 'invites and encourages the full participation of the African Diaspora as an important part of our continent, in the building of the African Union'. The African diaspora is recognised as anyone of African origin not resident on the continent committed to the sustainable development of Africa. The AU website has a table on the status of signature, ratification or accession and date of deposit of the relevant instrument for its various charters, protocols and other agreements. The status report on the Protocol on Amendments to its Constitutive Act is dated 3 February 2010 and indicates that out of 53 countries then: 47 had signed and there were 25 ratifications and deposits. This falls far short of the two-thirds (35 or 36) required for the protocol to come into force. It is imperative that the global African family lobby strenuously for the required number of ratifications for this protocol to enter into force, since it will soon be a decade since it was developed. This will provide credibility and indicate serious commitment by African countries about the declaration that will ensue from the African Diaspora Summit in South Africa in May 2012. Beyond the summit declaration there must be people to people, business to business and other engagements between Africa and the diaspora. There are valuable lessons to be learnt from the Chinese, Indian, Israeli and other diaspora.

There is continental-level unity, such as that espoused by the OAU which a decade ago transformed into the AU, which is geographically based. Forty-nine years later, the unity project that should have been signified by the weakening of internal or national borders does not seem to have progressed far or deep enough. Africa is more even fragmented with irredentism rearing its head every so often, with the last successful example being the creation of South Sudan in 2011 and

Mali, which is on the brink of fracturing, as the Tuaregs and the other groups fighting the central government have made significant progress in 2012.

Some critics have questioned whether the centralised vision of unity espoused by the AU is practical on a continent of over 1 billion people, with more ethnicities and languages (over two thousand) than any other region globally and very weak states. Add to this the languages of the colonisers and many people on the continent who originate from other countries, even if they have acquired citizenship, in order to understand the complexity of nation building and development in regional integration and continental unity. Others counter this argument, noting that if humankind originated from Africa then all human beings are African. Interestingly, all the North African states belong to the Arab League which covers countries in the Middle East as well and is based on origins of a people. Significant populations of Chinese, Europeans, Indians and other people who have been in Africa for generations often do not consider themselves as Africans. This leads to the further challenge of determining Africanness, as posed by the AU definition of the diaspora, as any people who have an interest in working for the sustainable development of Africa. How is this to be evaluated? How often? By whom, etc? Some other people would suggest the addition of a cultural definition linked to the practice and embracing of African culture. But with culture not being static and Africa having such a mixture of people from across the globe, how do we define people in and out?

One may ask what the point is of integrating African states when, in fact, each on its own can benefit by trading and cooperating with stronger and more developed economies, as indicated by the very low levels of inter-African trade. What could each state get from the other if horizontal integration were to replace vertical integration? The trouble with this position is that it does not recognise or appreciate that the overall African position, together or as distinct states, has not fundamentally changed the international division of labour in favour of African development. The global division of labour that has restrained African efforts towards structural transformation is still in place. That weakness has not been overcome by the particular ways in which decolonisation took place in Africa. The colonial period failed to develop Africa. Any deeper insertion of African states into the existing international division of labour hampers the likelihood of their breaking out from its grip to interlink with one another in economic policy, trade, education, research, knowledge, science, technology and innovation, and is likely to damage and hurt Africa. The coming together of Africans can create the necessary condition to begin the process of unravelling the pernicious international division of labour that locates Africa at the bottom of the ladder and ensures her continued underdevelopment.

The debate on whether African states should work together to reorder the international division of labour in favour of African structural transformation, or work with the existing international division of labour as separate entities, should remain alive and active. We think a series of annual international symposiums that include an educational component geared towards grassroots communities would contribute to the production of knowledge that will advance the African renaissance and sharpen its message and appeal not only to the public, but also to policy-makers and other stakeholders. The creation of a pan-African liberation education month in May every year could be useful in bringing together a variety of stakeholders to interact with one another. A variety of ways of spreading knowledge and consciousness of pan-Africanism could be tried, and opportunities to forge networks and links, to break barriers and expand the possibilities for economic, social, intellectual and cultural exchanges could be promoted.

The future depends on how pan-Africanism can be sustained and revitalised by using the African renaissance concept and making the pan-African institutions effective by ensuring that the various regional entities are effective. This should be buttressed by bringing about a much-needed decolonisation of the African imagination by promoting unification and aspirations for an African national identity. There is a need, conceptually and systematically, to transcend the current separate nation-state interests by building, with hope, passion and optimism, African national values and interests, and the national purpose, the national dream, as the basis for the continental project, in order to end all humiliation and realise full African dignity among all African people the world over. This shared project remains critical in order to valorise African agency and reject African dependence.

There should be a sharing of principles that no African will be tempted to disrupt relations with other Africans by giving in to the allure of ‘donorpreneurship’, ‘rent seeking-preneurship’ and ‘tenderpreneur’-driven corruption. What the latter has done is hurt Africa as a whole to this day, through a huge outflow of its resources with little or no benefit for most African people. It is estimated that illegal siphoning of US\$3 trillion has occurred since 1970, robbing Africa of vast resources that could have assisted her to overcome various developmental challenges.

Building a Multifaceted Pan-African Identity

There is a need to build trust-capital among Africans, in order to build the African unity first project identity. All have to learn to perceive themselves as Africans first, all have to have this project of African union as their primary goal. There is no need to disintegrate according to ethnicity, vernacularism, religion, tribe or other self-enclosures. There is no need to confuse uniting as the Africa nation with a loss of rights to language, ethnicity and region. On the contrary, being African first can

unleash the best forms of expression for these rights, in as many ways as possible. African unity is a facilitator, not a suppressor, of the fullest possible expression of freedoms and rights.

‘Putting Africa First’ challenges the world not to see Africa as a victim, but to recognise that what was done to Africa should not be done again to any human community, although the imbroglio and conflict in Ivory Coast and UN NATO-led regime change in Libya in 2011 and the role of external parties call for extra vigilance and commitment to peace and development by Africa. Putting Africa first can only mean putting humanity first. Imagining a future with values that put pan-Africanism first is crucial for moving in the direction of creating a worthy cosmopolitan community, free from the varied historical inequities bequeathed from the past that continue threatening to shape tomorrow with injustice and moral failure. Africans should recognise that Africans are heterogeneous, but also celebrate their similarity rather than their diversity and differences. The best way of realising Africa’s free and united future is through the resolve, intelligence, knowledge, capability, courage, realisation, innovation, learning and decolonised imagination of all Africans to create it.

Finally, there is one, and only one, human race. It is human as distinct from plants, insects and other non-human creatures. The degradation of this one human race by descriptions of colour has been employed to enforce control that justifies slavery, colonialism, apartheid and imperialism. Africa has suffered the most from this injustice. African unity yields the historic opportunity to make the human race realise its full humanity by uniting as an African nation which can overcome (at the same time as it celebrates) its variety of diverse and different races, colours, languages, ethnic groups, religions and regions. It is by uniting as Africans first that Africans’ own humanity can be reclaimed, which also makes it possible for others who have wronged them for so long to be finally redeemed. However, Africans should never forget the wrongs done against them, so that they can protect themselves against future colonial and other exploitative advances by external powers and they themselves do not repeat these wrongs against each other.

There is now positive conversation by those who used to condemn Africa as hopeless; they are now saying Africa is hopeful. Like the Asian Tigers, Africa is seen to possess roaring lions. Such optimism can be accelerated if Africans push harder to create a strong base, through African unity, in the quest for full and total liberation which will realise the wellbeing of all African people. The work to engage all Africans to bring unity is on the agenda. All Africans across the globe can play a leading role in pushing this agenda. The continuation of the Africa liberation education month is part of this contribution. Let it continue to make a real difference. Africans can only predict a free, dignified and non-humiliating

future by their commitment to create and make it, thus changing themselves and their destination.

Conclusion

This book is a record of the reflections of the chapter writers, who were enriched by the platform presented by the first annual Scramble for Africa conference held in South Africa in 2011, which enabled them to interact with and gain from the knowledge of other delegates from across the world. The diversity of the work presented is a foundation for the ongoing knowledge generation on African affairs to enable present and future scholars to understand our past and how it has influenced the present and why we could not could not pursue a different trajectory into the future. It is a small contribution to the project which has dared to declare the twenty-first century as one for Africa. However, we are mindful that this dream will remain just that if Africa remains fragmented, outward focused, bedevilled by weak and poor leadership and does not adequately deal with its under-development challenges. We are not blind to the fact that those who colonised and exploited Africa in the past and continue benefiting from this today will marshal all their resources, including their local collaborators and lackeys, to frustrate the African renaissance project. Let Africa learn that nations are born 'stoic' when driven by adversity, the need for cohesion, innovation, self-reliance, self-control and hard work; whilst nations die 'epicurean' through indulgence, vice, greed, abuse of power, taking society for granted, corruption, social and moral decay. Africa and its diaspora must recognise that for them to achieve their goal of pan-Africanism they will need to have a common vision, be united and also mobilise all their resources, in partnership with allies in the global South and North, to ensure the defeat of the neocolonial plan. This will require dedication, sacrifice, focus and endurance. In support of this journey and process, the Scramble for Africa conference declaration is published as an annexure in the book to reflection our vision and commitment.

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Appendix

Appendix: Tshwane Declaration

*Draft Statement from the African Liberation Day and the Africa in the Twenty-first Century and the Quasquicentennial of the Scramble of Africa Conference:
25–27 May 2011*

Preamble

We, the 100 plus delegates from various countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas, having met in Tshwane, South Africa over three days to commemorate Africa Liberation Day and deliberate on Africa affairs and global issues hereby resolved the following Tshwane Declaration

I. Introduction

1. 25 May 2011 marks the 48th anniversary of Africa Liberation Day since the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was founded in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1963.
2. The OAU had the mandate to achieve two main goals: to end colonialism and apartheid and to create a strong, free, independent, dignified and united Africa.
3. Colonialism and apartheid formally ended in 1994, some 34 years after formal decolonisation took place and many of the current existing states came into being in the 1960s.
4. The unity of Africa has remained a big challenge despite the fact that nearly all the states in Africa if asked will concede unity of Africa is important and it should take place.
5. But to date the unity of Africa remains elusive and the aspiration by Africans for full dignity and the end of humiliation has not been realised.
6. After half a century of African de-colonisation, the former colonial powers such as France and Britain have managed to persuade the USA and even African states to pass a UN resolution to intervene militarily in Africa on several occasions. This demonstrates the increasing weakness of African states.
7. Whatever the merits or demerits for their intervention, the fact that Africa is in a state of disunity, to be so ignored as to let once more the former colonial powers intervene militarily, compellingly brings home how much the lack of African unity is costing Africa by continuing its historic humiliation. It is important to recognise that the weakness of the African states lies in their artificial borders which ignore the cultural and linguistic characteristics of the people of Africa.

8. African unity may not make Africa rich quickly, but it will certainly bring the benefits that others will find it difficult to violate African dignity as they have continued to do to this day, based on their authentic reconstitution. A call for Africa unity, therefore, calls for the removal of these artificial boundaries. Cross-border integration that violates the borders others drew for divide and rule thrives in every region of Africa. Though the existing artificial boundaries are violated in the process, in many ways it is more real than the elite driven regional integration schemes that overlap and make the emergence of a genuine African national learning and innovative economy difficult.
9. Currently Africa and the Africa Union are being ignored and former colonial powers do not feel any reason to restrain them to take military action to pursue whatever interests they prefer by using any means necessary.
10. It is clear Africa's problems cannot be solved within the current colonial, neocolonial and post-colonial frameworks in which they are being re-created, enacted and re-played. Colonialism left structures that did not bring an end to the colonial structures which continue to make African economic and social development to remain complicated since the 1960s. The colonial structures left behind have given rise to rent-seeking behaviour by elites who seem unable to develop social economic strategy that can eradicate poverty and increase the wellbeing of the people. There is a real need to go beyond the post-colonial state framework and bring unity now and not later in the future by firmly putting African unity first through the termination of colonial boundaries.

II. Actions to be taken

1. There is a need not only to dwell on problems, but also strive to find solutions in order to accelerate African unity. When solving Africa's problems, we must excavate the roots and not dwell superficially at the surface.
2. The goal of a united Africa dwells where Africans engage first and foremost with each other before they deal with and respond to major challenges coming from elsewhere. This is yet to be achieved.
3. Africa must unite now, if not now, when can Africa unite over 125 years after the European Scramble for Africa, over 50 years of decolonisation and nearly 20 years of the end of apartheid.
4. Unity can start by making sure that all that the 53 states learn to communicate with each other and share decisions that affect Africa, such as the current NATO invasion of Libya. Africa should not be in a position where the AU decides to go for dialogue and a few states that are members of the AU sign up to the UN resolution 1973 that sanctions: 'to use any means necessary

to protect civilians.’ Unity means to stand either for dialogue together or for the UN Resolution, but not to prevaricate picking one or the other as time goes by.

5. The AU must practise and not merely pronounce pan-African values, including ensuring full participation of the Diaspora defined as Africa’s sixth region. Above all, African leaders who come to power must learn how important it is to do what the first democratic president Mandela did in South Africa to leave power while ‘there are one or two people that still think well of me.’
6. This means that term limits for power transition that the AU proposed should be enforced and those that wish to continue beyond ten years should not be allowed to enjoy support as if they are building institutions by staying longer when they are in fact undermining the opportunities to create sustainable institutions. Examples of success from South Africa and others must be promoted. Ten years is more than enough for a person to stay in power and have the right to do both wrong or right. If the person cannot do all that is to be done, adding more years is not going to make a difference. In fact it can bring diminishing returns.
7. As researchers and activists gathered from all over the world we wish to be part of the solution rather than part of the problem.
8. In our research, education and training, we need to bring back at the centre the ideal of pan-Africanism that inspired the liberation of Africans. This is necessary in order to ensure that the ‘Africaness’ or the African identity of the billion Africans living in Africa and those that have been forced out the continent from the times of slavery and the current difficulties of despotic rules achieve paramount significance in shaping the future of Africans.
9. The education systems after decolonisation have not fully developed pan-African education. It is incumbent upon all those involved in science to develop learning materials at various levels to wean the younger generation with strong pan-African (from Africa and its Diaspora) values, norms and ideals to overcome the pettiness of political tribalism and vernacular divisive blocks to the realisation of the fullest expression of the African identity.
10. The education system must recognise indigenous knowledge systems and include them in the curriculum from primary to higher education in Africa. Building knowledge and learning economy in Africa requires harvesting the existing grassroots knowledge processes within the indigenous communities in Africa by identifying, using and applying the existing knowledge that exists within the communities. This requires a willingness to be open by combining indigenous and scientific knowledge, creating a two-way dialogue and communication between them.

11. We need to re-define pan-Africanism for the twenty-first century and implement practical building on and improving on the AU sixth region concept as we prepare for the Africa and its Diaspora summit in 2012 in South Africa.

III. Recommendation

1. We strongly recommend that the Africa Liberation Day should be celebrated with both intellectual and popular education and other exhibitions so that Africans can engage with one another, network and build trust and spread the pan-African logo and message to all sectors of societies by going deep into the places where younger generations live.
2. The start of this Africa Liberation Day and the conference should become an annual event and the current partnerships (e.g. AISA, NRF, TUT and other universities, DST etc) should be entrusted to plan ahead by starting now preparing for the second and subsequent annual Africa Liberation Days and conferences to disseminate widely into the communities and townships pan-African knowledge and unity.
3. May 25 every year has been recognised as Africa liberation day. Like the Black History Month, the whole of May must be dedicated by all the African states as Africa Liberation Month, turning the whole month for spreading pan-African education to find various ways of making Africans engage with other Africans a number one priority.
4. South Africa should play a leadership role in promoting the African Renaissance. Its African policy need to be clear and should be the leading advocate of pan-African unity.
5. The African Institute of South Africa and partners should bring together a group of pan-African thinkers to start work to revisit pan-Africanism for our time by demonstrating how it can be implemented by all Africans in the twenty-first century.
6. TUT and AISA, with the support of the DST and the NRF should establish a suite of Research Chairs to be named for leading pan-Africanists. These chairs will encourage intra-African higher education teaching, training and research cooperative arrangements to foster pan-Africanism in the twenty-first century.
7. Post graduate short courses and even master's degrees, doctoral and post doctoral research to create a pan-African research area must be formed.
8. Funding for this initiative should be provided by the leading African Governments such as South Africa, Nigeria and others, including the African Diaspora.
9. A strong pan-African Academy should be created with AISA forming a working group to plan and work out how it can be realised
10. There is a need to produce, after a few years work, by engaging all sectors of African society to design and craft the African Unity First Manifesto (AUFM)

that all Africans must be exposed to. The leadership to provide this must come from South Africa. The AUFM must involve all sectors of society, women, the youth, workers, farmers, communities and other stakeholders from civil society, the private sector, education and Governments across Africa and the Diaspora.

This Tshwane Declaration from South Africa should be communicated widely to reach all Africans and friends of Africa across the world.

Drafted: By Mammo Muchie, edited by AISA, NRF, Dan Nabudere and Kimani Nehusi and approved unanimously by all the scientists and participants from all over the world at the International Symposium on 27 May 2011.¹

Note

- 1 See *Putting African Unity First to Overcome the Scramble for Africa: Africa in the Twenty-first Century After the Quasiquicentennial of the Scramble for Africa*. Available at: <http://www.nesglobal.org/symp125/> (accessed 9 May 2012).

The Africana World

From Fragmentation to Unity and Renaissance

It is 127 years since the Scramble for Africa divided up the continent, imposing borders that have led to conflict rather than peace and stability. It is 100 years since the African National Congress (ANC) was founded as the first African liberation movement with pan-African roots. It is nearly 50 years since the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded in May 1963 and ten years since the African Union (AU) was born with a vision that seeks 'the actualisation of human dignity, development and prosperity for the entire African people ... anchored on a vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa ... driven and managed by its own citizens ... and representing a dynamic force in the international arena'.

The achievement of the AU vision is predicated on colonialism being dead. However, it has actually been replaced by neocolonialism, which requires extra vigilance from Africa and its diaspora in order for the unity and renaissance dreamed of to become a reality. The chapters in *Africana World: From Fragmentation to Unity and Renaissance* address colonial and post-colonial African realities with a view to present a holistic and transcontinental appraisal of questions, issues and challenges that confront the continent. Contributors are drawn from different parts of the world – Africa, Europe and the Americas – and it is this eclectic range of scholarly views that lends a rich historicity to the meaning of Africanity. The book contains multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary engagements with Africa's rich cultural heritage, its lingering contemporary challenges, its multifaceted systems of knowledge and its future in the exciting context of the twenty-first century.

Africana World: From Fragmentation to Unity and Renaissance is put together in order to help develop the study and knowledge of African liberation across the continent and the diaspora. This first volume launches a new book series, following the Scramble for Africa conferences held every May to commemorate the founding of the OAU, which will be published annually to support the scholarly study of African unity and renaissance in order to replace the lingering imagery of colonialism in Africa with a fully liberated African consciousness.



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